Various style updates following extensions refactor
Perl changes reviewed by Richard Levitte. Non-perl changes reviewed by Rich
Salz
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
index 370d0b9..9763c47 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
/*
* Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
*/
-int tls_parse_client_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
unsigned int ilen;
const unsigned char *data;
@@ -49,35 +49,34 @@
return 1;
}
-int tls_parse_client_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+/*-
+ * The servername extension is treated as follows:
+ *
+ * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
+ * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
+ * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
+ * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
+ * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
+ * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
+ * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
+ * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
+ * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
+ * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
+ * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
+ * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
+ * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
+ * the value of the Host: field.
+ * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
+ * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
+ * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
+ * extension.
+ * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
+ */
+int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
unsigned int servname_type;
PACKET sni, hostname;
- /*-
- * The servername extension is treated as follows:
- *
- * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
- * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
- * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
- * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
- * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
- * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
- * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
- * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
- * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
- * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
- * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
- * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
- * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
- * the value of the Host: field.
- * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
- * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
- * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
- * extension.
- * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
- *
- */
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni)
/* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
|| PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
@@ -88,7 +87,7 @@
/*
* Although the server_name extension was intended to be
* extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
- * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
+ * syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
* such.
* RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
* is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
@@ -135,7 +134,7 @@
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-int tls_parse_client_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
PACKET srp_I;
@@ -159,7 +158,7 @@
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-int tls_parse_client_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
PACKET ec_point_format_list;
@@ -182,7 +181,7 @@
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-int tls_parse_client_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
!s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
@@ -195,7 +194,7 @@
return 1;
}
-int tls_parse_client_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
PACKET supported_sig_algs;
@@ -216,93 +215,93 @@
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
-int tls_parse_client_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
+ PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
+
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
- const unsigned char *ext_data;
- PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
- * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
- */
- sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
- if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
- s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- } else {
- s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
- }
-
- while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
- OCSP_RESPID *id;
- PACKET responder_id;
- const unsigned char *id_data;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
- &responder_id)
- || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
- /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
- id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
- (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
- if (id == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
- OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
- OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /* Read in request_extensions */
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
- ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
- sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
- X509_EXTENSION_free);
- s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
- d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
- (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- } else {
+ if (s->tlsext_status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
/*
* We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
*/
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
+ * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
+ */
+ sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
+ }
+
+ while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
+ OCSP_RESPID *id;
+ PACKET responder_id;
+ const unsigned char *id_data;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
+ id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
+ (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
+ if (id == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
+ OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
+ OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Read in request_extensions */
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
+ const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
+
+ sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
+ X509_EXTENSION_free);
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
+ d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
}
return 1;
@@ -310,40 +309,38 @@
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-int tls_parse_client_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
- if (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
- /*-
- * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
- * renegotiation.
- *
- * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
- * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
- * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
- * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
- * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
- * anything like that, but this might change).
- *
- * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
- * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
- * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
- * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
- * Finished message could have been computed.)
- */
+ /*
+ * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
+ * renegotiation.
+ *
+ * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
+ * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
+ * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
+ * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
+ * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
+ * anything like that, but this might change).
+ *
+ * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
+ * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
+ * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
+ * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
+ * Finished message could have been computed.)
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- }
return 1;
}
#endif
/*
- * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
- * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
- * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
- * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN
+ * extension, not including type and length. |al| is a pointer to the alert
+ * value to send in the event of a failure. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
*/
-int tls_parse_client_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
@@ -376,9 +373,8 @@
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-int tls_parse_client_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof;
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
unsigned int ct, mki_len, id;
int i, srtp_pref;
@@ -389,8 +385,8 @@
return 1;
/* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct)
- || (ct & 1) != 0 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0
+ || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_USE_SRTP,
SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
@@ -417,7 +413,9 @@
* does nothing.
*/
for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) {
- sprof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
+ const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof =
+ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
+
if (sprof->id == id) {
s->srtp_profile = sprof;
srtp_pref = i;
@@ -426,9 +424,7 @@
}
}
- /*
- * Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now
- */
+ /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CLIENT_USE_SRTP,
SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
@@ -447,7 +443,7 @@
}
#endif
-int tls_parse_client_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
@@ -474,8 +470,8 @@
unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]);
if (group_id == share_id
- && (!checkallow || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups,
- SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
+ && (!checkallow
+ || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
break;
}
}
@@ -489,7 +485,7 @@
* the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
* If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
*/
-int tls_parse_client_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
unsigned int group_id;
PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
@@ -585,6 +581,7 @@
} else {
/* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
+
if (pctx == NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
@@ -615,7 +612,7 @@
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-int tls_parse_client_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
PACKET supported_groups_list;
@@ -639,7 +636,7 @@
}
#endif
-int tls_parse_client_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
/* The extension must always be empty */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
@@ -652,8 +649,10 @@
return 1;
}
-/* Add the server's renegotiation binding */
-int tls_construct_server_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+/*
+ * Add the server's renegotiation binding
+ */
+int tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding)
return 1;
@@ -674,7 +673,7 @@
return 1;
}
-int tls_construct_server_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1
|| s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
@@ -690,7 +689,7 @@
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-int tls_construct_server_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
@@ -703,7 +702,6 @@
return 1;
tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
-
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
@@ -716,7 +714,7 @@
}
#endif
-int tls_construct_server_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
if (!s->tlsext_ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
@@ -733,7 +731,7 @@
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
-int tls_construct_server_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
if (!s->tlsext_status_expected)
return 1;
@@ -750,7 +748,7 @@
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-int tls_construct_server_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
const unsigned char *npa;
unsigned int npalen;
@@ -777,7 +775,7 @@
}
#endif
-int tls_construct_server_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
return 1;
@@ -798,7 +796,7 @@
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
-int tls_construct_server_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
if (s->srtp_profile == NULL)
return 1;
@@ -817,7 +815,7 @@
}
#endif
-int tls_construct_server_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) == 0)
return 1;
@@ -843,7 +841,7 @@
return 1;
}
-int tls_construct_server_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
return 1;
@@ -857,7 +855,7 @@
return 1;
}
-int tls_construct_server_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
unsigned char *encodedPoint;
size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
@@ -911,7 +909,7 @@
return 1;
}
-int tls_construct_server_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
+int tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
