memset, memcpy, sizeof consistency fixes Just as with the OPENSSL_malloc calls, consistently use sizeof(*ptr) for memset and memcpy. Remove needless casts for those functions. For memset, replace alternative forms of zero with 0. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
diff --git a/crypto/LPdir_unix.c b/crypto/LPdir_unix.c index 3a14da1..1428cd1 100644 --- a/crypto/LPdir_unix.c +++ b/crypto/LPdir_unix.c
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ errno = ENOMEM; return 0; } - memset(*ctx, '\0', sizeof(**ctx)); + memset(*ctx, 0, sizeof(**ctx)); (*ctx)->dir = opendir(directory); if ((*ctx)->dir == NULL) {
diff --git a/crypto/LPdir_vms.c b/crypto/LPdir_vms.c index 1e8f9e7..362918d 100644 --- a/crypto/LPdir_vms.c +++ b/crypto/LPdir_vms.c
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ errno = ENOMEM; return 0; } - memset(*ctx, '\0', sizeof(**ctx)); + memset(*ctx, 0, sizeof(**ctx)); strcpy((*ctx)->filespec, directory); strcat((*ctx)->filespec, "*.*;");
diff --git a/crypto/LPdir_win.c b/crypto/LPdir_win.c index 78a796d..4ff514f 100644 --- a/crypto/LPdir_win.c +++ b/crypto/LPdir_win.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ errno = ENOMEM; return 0; } - memset(*ctx, '\0', sizeof(**ctx)); + memset(*ctx, 0, sizeof(**ctx)); if (directory[dirlen - 1] != '*') { extdirbuf = (char *)malloc(dirlen + 3);
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c b/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c index 4abd80c..aed3de5 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ if (a->length < (int)(sizeof(long) + 1)) { OPENSSL_free(a->data); if ((a->data = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(long) + 1)) != NULL) - memset((char *)a->data, 0, sizeof(long) + 1); + memset(a->data, 0, sizeof(long) + 1); } if (a->data == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ENUMERATED_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_int.c b/crypto/asn1/a_int.c index 68a312b..2282978 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/a_int.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ if (a->length < (int)(sizeof(long) + 1)) { OPENSSL_free(a->data); if ((a->data = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(long) + 1)) != NULL) - memset((char *)a->data, 0, sizeof(long) + 1); + memset(a->data, 0, sizeof(long) + 1); } if (a->data == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_INTEGER_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c index b452999..5b908f1 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
@@ -121,11 +121,6 @@ ret = 0; goto err; } - /* - * we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked public - * information - */ - /* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */ ret = 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); @@ -221,11 +216,6 @@ ret = 0; goto err; } - /* - * we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked public - * information - */ - /* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */ ret = 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c b/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c index c7acb46..de70f9b 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c
@@ -288,8 +288,7 @@ if (!ameth) return NULL; - memset(ameth, 0, sizeof(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD)); - + memset(ameth, 0, sizeof(*ameth)); ameth->pkey_id = id; ameth->pkey_base_id = id; ameth->pkey_flags = flags | ASN1_PKEY_DYNAMIC;
diff --git a/crypto/bio/b_sock.c b/crypto/bio/b_sock.c index 39499de..e3a1ee9 100644 --- a/crypto/bio/b_sock.c +++ b/crypto/bio/b_sock.c
@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ if (!BIO_get_port(p, &port)) goto err; - memset((char *)&server, 0, sizeof(server)); + memset(&server, 0, sizeof(server)); server.sa_in.sin_family = AF_INET; server.sa_in.sin_port = htons(port); addrlen = sizeof(server.sa_in);
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c b/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c index cde8da3..48435b0 100644 --- a/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c +++ b/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) return (NULL); - memset(ret, 0, sizeof(BIO_ACCEPT)); + memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret)); ret->accept_sock = INVALID_SOCKET; ret->bind_mode = BIO_BIND_NORMAL; return (ret);
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_conn.c b/crypto/bio/bss_conn.c index b8fa828..60f58e2 100644 --- a/crypto/bio/bss_conn.c +++ b/crypto/bio/bss_conn.c
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ case BIO_CONN_S_CREATE_SOCKET: /* now setup address */ - memset((char *)&c->them, 0, sizeof(c->them)); + memset(&c->them, 0, sizeof(c->them)); c->them.sin_family = AF_INET; c->them.sin_port = htons((unsigned short)c->port); l = (unsigned long) @@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ ret->ip[2] = 0; ret->ip[3] = 0; ret->port = 0; - memset((char *)&ret->them, 0, sizeof(ret->them)); + memset(&ret->them, 0, sizeof(ret->them)); return (ret); }
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c b/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c index fb1564c..53d8136 100644 --- a/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c +++ b/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ data = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*data)); if (data == NULL) return 0; - memset(data, 0x00, sizeof(bio_dgram_data)); + memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data)); bi->ptr = data; bi->flags = 0; @@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ if (out != NULL) { clear_socket_error(); - memset(&sa.peer, 0x00, sizeof(sa.peer)); + memset(&sa.peer, 0, sizeof(sa.peer)); dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(b); ret = recvfrom(b->num, out, outl, 0, &sa.peer.sa, (void *)&sa.len); if (sizeof(sa.len.i) != sizeof(sa.len.s) && sa.len.i == 0) { @@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER: # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) && defined(IP_PMTUDISC_DO) addr_len = (socklen_t) sizeof(addr); - memset((void *)&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); if (getsockname(b->num, &addr.sa, &addr_len) < 0) { ret = 0; break; @@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU: # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTU) addr_len = (socklen_t) sizeof(addr); - memset((void *)&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); if (getsockname(b->num, &addr.sa, &addr_len) < 0) { ret = 0; break; @@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ } } else { data->connected = 0; - memset(&(data->peer), 0x00, sizeof(data->peer)); + memset(&data->peer, 0, sizeof(data->peer)); } break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_PEER: @@ -1028,7 +1028,7 @@ # ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT # ifdef SCTP_EVENT - memset(&event, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_event)); + memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event)); event.se_assoc_id = 0; event.se_type = SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT; event.se_on = 1; @@ -1088,7 +1088,7 @@ data = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*data)); if (data == NULL) return 0; - memset(data, 0x00, sizeof(bio_dgram_sctp_data)); + memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data)); # ifdef SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE data->prinfo.pr_policy = SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE; # endif @@ -1149,8 +1149,7 @@ clear_socket_error(); do { - memset(&data->rcvinfo, 0x00, - sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo)); + memset(&data->rcvinfo, 0, sizeof(data->rcvinfo)); iov.iov_base = out; iov.iov_len = outl; msg.msg_name = NULL; @@ -1229,7 +1228,7 @@ /* disable sender dry event */ # ifdef SCTP_EVENT - memset(&event, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_event)); + memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event)); event.se_assoc_id = 0; event.se_type = SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT; event.se_on = 0; @@ -1393,7 +1392,7 @@ * parameters and flags. */ if (in[0] != 23) { - memset(&handshake_sinfo, 0x00, sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo)); + memset(&handshake_sinfo, 0, sizeof(handshake_sinfo)); # ifdef SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY handshake_sinfo.snd_flags = SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY; # endif @@ -1433,7 +1432,7 @@ cmsg->cmsg_type = SCTP_SNDINFO; cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct sctp_sndinfo)); sndinfo = (struct sctp_sndinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg); - memset(sndinfo, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_sndinfo)); + memset(sndinfo, 0, sizeof(*sndinfo)); sndinfo->snd_sid = sinfo->snd_sid; sndinfo->snd_flags = sinfo->snd_flags; sndinfo->snd_ppid = sinfo->snd_ppid; @@ -1446,7 +1445,7 @@ cmsg->cmsg_type = SCTP_PRINFO; cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct sctp_prinfo)); prinfo = (struct sctp_prinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg); - memset(prinfo, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_prinfo)); + memset(prinfo, 0, sizeof(*prinfo)); prinfo->pr_policy = pinfo->pr_policy; prinfo->pr_value = pinfo->pr_value; msg.msg_controllen += CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_prinfo)); @@ -1456,7 +1455,7 @@ cmsg->cmsg_type = SCTP_SNDRCV; cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct sctp_sndrcvinfo)); sndrcvinfo = (struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg); - memset(sndrcvinfo, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_sndrcvinfo)); + memset(sndrcvinfo, 0, sizeof(*sndrcvinfo)); sndrcvinfo->sinfo_stream = sinfo->snd_sid; sndrcvinfo->sinfo_flags = sinfo->snd_flags; # ifdef __FreeBSD__ @@ -1553,7 +1552,7 @@ ret = -1; break; } - memset(authkey, 0x00, sockopt_len); + memset(authkey, 0, sockopt_len); authkey->sca_keynumber = authkeyid.scact_keynumber + 1; # ifndef __FreeBSD__ /* @@ -1750,7 +1749,7 @@ /* set sender dry event */ # ifdef SCTP_EVENT - memset(&event, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_event)); + memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event)); event.se_assoc_id = 0; event.se_type = SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT; event.se_on = 1; @@ -1773,7 +1772,7 @@ return -1; /* peek for notification */ - memset(&snp, 0x00, sizeof(union sctp_notification)); + memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp)); iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp; iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification); msg.msg_name = NULL; @@ -1795,7 +1794,7 @@ /* if we find a notification, process it and try again if necessary */ while (msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION) { - memset(&snp, 0x00, sizeof(union sctp_notification)); + memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp)); iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp; iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification); msg.msg_name = NULL; @@ -1820,7 +1819,7 @@ /* disable sender dry event */ # ifdef SCTP_EVENT - memset(&event, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_event)); + memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event)); event.se_assoc_id = 0; event.se_type = SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT; event.se_on = 0; @@ -1854,7 +1853,7 @@ (void *)&snp); /* found notification, peek again */ - memset(&snp, 0x00, sizeof(union sctp_notification)); + memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp)); iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp; iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification); msg.msg_name = NULL; @@ -1900,7 +1899,7 @@ /* Check if there are any messages waiting to be read */ do { - memset(&snp, 0x00, sizeof(union sctp_notification)); + memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp)); iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp; iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification); msg.msg_name = NULL; @@ -1923,7 +1922,7 @@ dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(b, &snp); # endif - memset(&snp, 0x00, sizeof(union sctp_notification)); + memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp)); iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp; iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification); msg.msg_name = NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c index 9338cdd..52f74d1 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } - memset(ret, 0, sizeof(BN_BLINDING)); + memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret)); if (A != NULL) { if ((ret->A = BN_dup(A)) == NULL) goto err;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_intern.c b/crypto/bn/bn_intern.c index 139d11b..c3ea561 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_intern.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_intern.c
@@ -211,8 +211,8 @@ if (in->top > size) return 0; - memset(out, 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * size); - memcpy(out, in->d, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * in->top); + memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out) * size); + memcpy(out, in->d, sizeof(*out) * in->top); return 1; }
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h b/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h index a24ae7f..196df7e 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
@@ -167,10 +167,10 @@ * *genuinely* constant variables that aren't mutable \ * wouldn't be constructed with top!=dmax. */ \ BN_ULONG *_not_const; \ - memcpy(&_not_const, &_bnum1->d, sizeof(BN_ULONG*)); \ + memcpy(&_not_const, &_bnum1->d, sizeof(_not_const)); \ RAND_bytes(&_tmp_char, 1); /* Debug only - safe to ignore error return */\ - memset((unsigned char *)(_not_const + _bnum1->top), _tmp_char, \ - (_bnum1->dmax - _bnum1->top) * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); \ + memset(_not_const + _bnum1->top, _tmp_char, \ + sizeof(*_not_const) * (_bnum1->dmax - _bnum1->top)); \ } \ } while(0) # ifdef BN_DEBUG_TRIX
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c index 6fc0e39..fec70a5 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ void BN_init(BIGNUM *a) { - memset(a, 0, sizeof(BIGNUM)); + memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a)); bn_check_top(a); } @@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ * function - what's important is constant time operation (we're not * actually going to use the data) */ - memset(a, 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * words); + memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a) * words); #endif #if 1 @@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ } } #else - memset(A, 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * words); + memset(A, 0, sizeof(*A) * words); memcpy(A, b->d, sizeof(b->d[0]) * b->top); #endif @@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ { bn_check_top(a); if (a->d != NULL) - memset(a->d, 0, a->dmax * sizeof(a->d[0])); + memset(a->d, 0, sizeof(*a->d) * a->dmax); a->top = 0; a->neg = 0; }
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c index d07afcc..613a384 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ rp = r->d; /* clear the top words of T */ - memset(&(rp[r->top]), 0, (max - r->top) * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + memset(&rp[r->top], 0, sizeof(*rp) * (max - r->top)); r->top = max; n0 = mont->n0[0];
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c b/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c index 9b66e66..f3b4859 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ if (!zero) bn_mul_comba4(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n])); else - memset(&(t[n2]), 0, 8 * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + memset(&t[n2], 0, sizeof(*t) * 8); bn_mul_comba4(r, a, b); bn_mul_comba4(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n])); @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ if (!zero) bn_mul_comba8(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n])); else - memset(&(t[n2]), 0, 16 * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + memset(&t[n2], 0, sizeof(*t) * 16); bn_mul_comba8(r, a, b); bn_mul_comba8(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n])); @@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ if (!zero) bn_mul_recursive(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]), n, 0, 0, p); else - memset(&(t[n2]), 0, n2 * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + memset(&t[n2], 0, sizeof(*t) * n2); bn_mul_recursive(r, a, b, n, 0, 0, p); bn_mul_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), n, dna, dnb, p); } @@ -584,14 +584,14 @@ bn_mul_comba4(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n])); bn_mul_comba4(r, a, b); bn_mul_normal(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), tn, &(b[n]), tn); - memset(&(r[n2 + tn * 2]), 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * (n2 - tn * 2)); + memset(&r[n2 + tn * 2], 0, sizeof(*r) * (n2 - tn * 2)); } else # endif if (n == 8) { bn_mul_comba8(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n])); bn_mul_comba8(r, a, b); bn_mul_normal(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), tna, &(b[n]), tnb); - memset(&(r[n2 + tna + tnb]), 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * (n2 - tna - tnb)); + memset(&r[n2 + tna + tnb], 0, sizeof(*r) * (n2 - tna - tnb)); } else { p = &(t[n2 * 2]); bn_mul_recursive(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]), n, 0, 0, p); @@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ if (j == 0) { bn_mul_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), i, tna - i, tnb - i, p); - memset(&(r[n2 + i * 2]), 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * (n2 - i * 2)); + memset(&r[n2 + i * 2], 0, sizeof(*r) * (n2 - i * 2)); } else if (j > 0) { /* eg, n == 16, i == 8 and tn == 11 */ bn_mul_part_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), i, tna - i, tnb - i, p); @@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ sizeof(BN_ULONG) * (n2 - tna - tnb)); } else { /* (j < 0) eg, n == 16, i == 8 and tn == 5 */ - memset(&(r[n2]), 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * n2); + memset(&r[n2], 0, sizeof(*r) * n2); if (tna < BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL && tnb < BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) { bn_mul_normal(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), tna, &(b[n]), tnb);
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c b/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c index b6cd0d9..9895646 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_shift.c
@@ -154,10 +154,7 @@ t[nw + i + 1] |= (l >> rb) & BN_MASK2; t[nw + i] = (l << lb) & BN_MASK2; } - memset(t, 0, nw * sizeof(t[0])); - /* - * for (i=0; i<nw; i++) t[i]=0; - */ + memset(t, 0, sizeof(*t) * nw); r->top = a->top + nw + 1; bn_correct_top(r); bn_check_top(r);
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c b/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c index f794c10..aa31f6e 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ if (!zero) bn_sqr_recursive(&(t[n2]), t, n, p); else - memset(&(t[n2]), 0, n2 * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + memset(&t[n2], 0, sizeof(*t) * n2); bn_sqr_recursive(r, a, n, p); bn_sqr_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), n, p);
diff --git a/crypto/comp/comp_lib.c b/crypto/comp/comp_lib.c index 9feb0af..42d9936 100644 --- a/crypto/comp/comp_lib.c +++ b/crypto/comp/comp_lib.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ /* ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ */ return (NULL); } - memset(ret, 0, sizeof(COMP_CTX)); + memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret)); ret->meth = meth; if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) { OPENSSL_free(ret);
diff --git a/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c b/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c index a0e711c..c555398 100644 --- a/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c +++ b/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ DSOerr(DSO_F_DSO_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (NULL); } - memset(ret, 0, sizeof(DSO)); + memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret)); ret->meth_data = sk_void_new_null(); if (ret->meth_data == NULL) { /* sk_new doesn't generate any errors so we do */
diff --git a/crypto/dso/dso_win32.c b/crypto/dso/dso_win32.c index bd96c5d..81c983c 100644 --- a/crypto/dso/dso_win32.c +++ b/crypto/dso/dso_win32.c
@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ return (NULL); } - memset(result, 0, sizeof(struct file_st)); + memset(result, 0, sizeof(*result)); position = IN_DEVICE; if ((filename[0] == '\\' && filename[1] == '\\')
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c index c79e6da..0e40db4 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ unsigned num_bytes; /* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */ - memset(b_out, 0, sizeof b_out); + memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out)); num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn); if (num_bytes > sizeof b_out) { ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE); @@ -1069,8 +1069,8 @@ { unsigned i, j; limb *outlimbs = &out[0][0]; - memset(outlimbs, 0, 3 * sizeof(felem)); + memset(out 0, sizeof(out)); for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { const limb *inlimbs = &pre_comp[i][0][0]; u64 mask = i ^ idx; @@ -1113,7 +1113,7 @@ u8 sign, digit; /* set nq to the point at infinity */ - memset(nq, 0, 3 * sizeof(felem)); + memset(nq, 0, sizeof(nq)); /* * Loop over all scalars msb-to-lsb, interleaving additions of multiples @@ -1390,7 +1390,7 @@ BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *tmp_scalar; felem_bytearray g_secret; felem_bytearray *secrets = NULL; - felem(*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL; + felem (*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL; felem *tmp_felems = NULL; felem_bytearray tmp; unsigned num_bytes; @@ -1457,11 +1457,11 @@ */ mixed = 1; } - secrets = OPENSSL_malloc(num_points * sizeof(felem_bytearray)); - pre_comp = OPENSSL_malloc(num_points * 17 * 3 * sizeof(felem)); + secrets = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*secrets) * num_points); + pre_comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*pre_comp) * num_points); if (mixed) tmp_felems = - OPENSSL_malloc((num_points * 17 + 1) * sizeof(felem)); + OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(felem) * (num_points * 17 + 1)); if ((secrets == NULL) || (pre_comp == NULL) || (mixed && (tmp_felems == NULL))) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP224_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); @@ -1472,8 +1472,8 @@ * we treat NULL scalars as 0, and NULL points as points at infinity, * i.e., they contribute nothing to the linear combination */ - memset(secrets, 0, num_points * sizeof(felem_bytearray)); - memset(pre_comp, 0, num_points * 17 * 3 * sizeof(felem)); + memset(secrets, 0, sizeof(*secrets) * num_points); + memset(pre_comp, 0, sizeof(*pre_comp) * num_points); for (i = 0; i < num_points; ++i) { if (i == num) /* the generator */ @@ -1533,7 +1533,7 @@ /* the scalar for the generator */ if ((scalar != NULL) && (have_pre_comp)) { - memset(g_secret, 0, sizeof g_secret); + memset(g_secret, 0, sizeof(g_secret)); /* reduce scalar to 0 <= scalar < 2^224 */ if ((BN_num_bits(scalar) > 224) || (BN_is_negative(scalar))) { /*
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c index 6ec5692..b4cd24d 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ unsigned num_bytes; /* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */ - memset(b_out, 0, sizeof b_out); + memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out)); num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn); if (num_bytes > sizeof b_out) { ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE); @@ -1624,7 +1624,8 @@ { unsigned i, j; u64 *outlimbs = &out[0][0]; - memset(outlimbs, 0, 3 * sizeof(smallfelem)); + + memset(out, 0, sizeof(out)); for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { const u64 *inlimbs = (u64 *)&pre_comp[i][0][0]; @@ -1668,7 +1669,7 @@ u8 sign, digit; /* set nq to the point at infinity */ - memset(nq, 0, 3 * sizeof(felem)); + memset(nq, 0, sizeof(nq)); /* * Loop over all scalars msb-to-lsb, interleaving additions of multiples @@ -2005,7 +2006,7 @@ BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *tmp_scalar; felem_bytearray g_secret; felem_bytearray *secrets = NULL; - smallfelem(*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL; + smallfelem (*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL; smallfelem *tmp_smallfelems = NULL; felem_bytearray tmp; unsigned i, num_bytes; @@ -2072,11 +2073,11 @@ */ mixed = 1; } - secrets = OPENSSL_malloc(num_points * sizeof(felem_bytearray)); - pre_comp = OPENSSL_malloc(num_points * 17 * 3 * sizeof(smallfelem)); + secrets = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*secrets) * num_points); + pre_comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*pre_comp) * num_points); if (mixed) tmp_smallfelems = - OPENSSL_malloc((num_points * 17 + 1) * sizeof(smallfelem)); + OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*tmp_smallfelems) * (num_points * 17 + 1)); if ((secrets == NULL) || (pre_comp == NULL) || (mixed && (tmp_smallfelems == NULL))) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); @@ -2087,8 +2088,8 @@ * we treat NULL scalars as 0, and NULL points as points at infinity, * i.e., they contribute nothing to the linear combination */ - memset(secrets, 0, num_points * sizeof(felem_bytearray)); - memset(pre_comp, 0, num_points * 17 * 3 * sizeof(smallfelem)); + memset(secrets, 0, sizeof(*secrets) * num_points); + memset(pre_comp, 0, sizeof(*pre_comp) * num_points); for (i = 0; i < num_points; ++i) { if (i == num) /*
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c index e208a83..6e572f1 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ unsigned num_bytes; /* BN_bn2bin eats leading zeroes */ - memset(b_out, 0, sizeof b_out); + memset(b_out, 0, sizeof(b_out)); num_bytes = BN_num_bytes(bn); if (num_bytes > sizeof b_out) { ECerr(EC_F_BN_TO_FELEM, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE); @@ -1470,7 +1470,8 @@ { unsigned i, j; limb *outlimbs = &out[0][0]; - memset(outlimbs, 0, 3 * sizeof(felem)); + + memset(out, 0, sizeof(out)); for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { const limb *inlimbs = &pre_comp[i][0][0]; @@ -1513,7 +1514,7 @@ u8 sign, digit; /* set nq to the point at infinity */ - memset(nq, 0, 3 * sizeof(felem)); + memset(nq, 0, sizeof(nq)); /* * Loop over all scalars msb-to-lsb, interleaving additions of multiples @@ -1834,7 +1835,7 @@ BIGNUM *x, *y, *z, *tmp_scalar; felem_bytearray g_secret; felem_bytearray *secrets = NULL; - felem(*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL; + felem (*pre_comp)[17][3] = NULL; felem *tmp_felems = NULL; felem_bytearray tmp; unsigned i, num_bytes; @@ -1901,11 +1902,11 @@ */ mixed = 1; } - secrets = OPENSSL_malloc(num_points * sizeof(felem_bytearray)); - pre_comp = OPENSSL_malloc(num_points * 17 * 3 * sizeof(felem)); + secrets = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*secrets) * num_points); + pre_comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*pre_comp) * num_points); if (mixed) tmp_felems = - OPENSSL_malloc((num_points * 17 + 1) * sizeof(felem)); + OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*tmp_felemts) * (num_points * 17 + 1)); if ((secrets == NULL) || (pre_comp == NULL) || (mixed && (tmp_felems == NULL))) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NISTP521_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); @@ -1916,8 +1917,8 @@ * we treat NULL scalars as 0, and NULL points as points at infinity, * i.e., they contribute nothing to the linear combination */ - memset(secrets, 0, num_points * sizeof(felem_bytearray)); - memset(pre_comp, 0, num_points * 17 * 3 * sizeof(felem)); + memset(secrets, 0, sizeof(*secrets) * num_points); + memset(pre_comp, 0, sizseof(*pre_comp) * num_points); for (i = 0; i < num_points; ++i) { if (i == num) /*
diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c b/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c index d801ae8..49a3989 100644 --- a/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c +++ b/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ return (0); } - memset(sess, 0, sizeof(struct session_op)); + memset(sess, 0, sizeof(*sess)); if ((state->d_fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0) return (0); @@ -770,7 +770,7 @@ return (0); } - memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state)); + memset(state, 0, sizeof(*state)); if ((state->d_fd = get_dev_crypto()) < 0) { printf("cryptodev_digest_init: Can't get Dev \n"); @@ -1115,7 +1115,7 @@ return (ret); } - memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop); + memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop)); kop.crk_op = CRK_MOD_EXP; /* inputs: a^p % m */ @@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@ return (0); } - memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop); + memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop)); kop.crk_op = CRK_MOD_EXP_CRT; /* inputs: rsa->p rsa->q I rsa->dmp1 rsa->dmq1 rsa->iqmp */ if (bn2crparam(rsa->p, &kop.crk_param[0])) @@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@ goto err; } - memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop); + memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop)); kop.crk_op = CRK_DSA_SIGN; /* inputs: dgst dsa->p dsa->q dsa->g dsa->priv_key */ @@ -1309,7 +1309,7 @@ struct crypt_kop kop; int dsaret = 1; - memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop); + memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop)); kop.crk_op = CRK_DSA_VERIFY; /* inputs: dgst dsa->p dsa->q dsa->g dsa->pub_key sig->r sig->s */ @@ -1382,7 +1382,7 @@ keylen = BN_num_bits(dh->p); - memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop); + memset(&kop, 0, sizeof(kop)); kop.crk_op = CRK_DH_COMPUTE_KEY; /* inputs: dh->priv_key pub_key dh->p key */
diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c b/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c index ed1c220..06a7018 100644 --- a/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c +++ b/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_SET_DATA_CTX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } - memset(c, 0, sizeof(dynamic_data_ctx)); + memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); c->dynamic_dso = NULL; c->v_check = NULL; c->bind_engine = NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c b/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c index 3bf06bb..c477c7e 100644 --- a/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c +++ b/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } - memset(ret, 0, sizeof(ENGINE)); + memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret)); ret->struct_ref = 1; engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1) CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_ENGINE, ret, &ret->ex_data);
diff --git a/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c b/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c index 9a65a9d..7a38cd9 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c +++ b/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
@@ -337,8 +337,7 @@ n = (inl + ctx->buf_len > OK_BLOCK_SIZE + OK_BLOCK_BLOCK) ? (int)(OK_BLOCK_SIZE + OK_BLOCK_BLOCK - ctx->buf_len) : inl; - memcpy((unsigned char *)(&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len])), - (unsigned char *)in, n); + memcpy(&ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len], in, n); ctx->buf_len += n; inl -= n; in += n;
diff --git a/crypto/evp/digest.c b/crypto/evp/digest.c index 04ab3a0..c7856c6 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/digest.c +++ b/crypto/evp/digest.c
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ void EVP_MD_CTX_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { - memset(ctx, '\0', sizeof(*ctx)); + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); } EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_create(void) @@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ */ ENGINE_finish(ctx->engine); #endif - memset(ctx, '\0', sizeof(*ctx)); + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); return 1; }
diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_null.c b/crypto/evp/e_null.c index 488add4..a585128 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/e_null.c +++ b/crypto/evp/e_null.c
@@ -86,7 +86,6 @@ static int null_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { - /* memset(&(ctx->c),0,sizeof(ctx->c)); */ return 1; } @@ -94,6 +93,6 @@ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { if (in != out) - memcpy((char *)out, (const char *)in, inl); + memcpy(out, in, inl); return 1; }
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c index 4dfc159..242874c 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c +++ b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
@@ -70,8 +70,7 @@ void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX)); - /* ctx->cipher=NULL; */ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); } EVP_CIPHER_CTX *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(void) @@ -546,7 +545,7 @@ */ ENGINE_finish(c->engine); #endif - memset(c, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX)); + memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); return 1; }
diff --git a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c index 397d342..eeee53a 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c +++ b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ if (!pmeth) return NULL; - memset(pmeth, 0, sizeof(EVP_PKEY_METHOD)); + memset(pmeth, 0, sizeof(*pmeth)); pmeth->pkey_id = id; pmeth->flags = flags | EVP_PKEY_FLAG_DYNAMIC;
diff --git a/crypto/jpake/jpake.c b/crypto/jpake/jpake.c index b494ac0..a8aa87d 100644 --- a/crypto/jpake/jpake.c +++ b/crypto/jpake/jpake.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ OPENSSL_free(ctx->p.peer_name); OPENSSL_free(ctx->p.name); - memset(ctx, '\0', sizeof(*ctx)); + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); } JPAKE_CTX *JPAKE_CTX_new(const char *name, const char *peer_name,
diff --git a/crypto/md2/md2_dgst.c b/crypto/md2/md2_dgst.c index e206b3f..70c19fb 100644 --- a/crypto/md2/md2_dgst.c +++ b/crypto/md2/md2_dgst.c
@@ -122,9 +122,9 @@ int MD2_Init(MD2_CTX *c) { c->num = 0; - memset(c->state, 0, sizeof c->state); - memset(c->cksm, 0, sizeof c->cksm); - memset(c->data, 0, sizeof c->data); + memset(c->state, 0, sizeof(c->state)); + memset(c->cksm, 0, sizeof(c->cksm)); + memset(c->data, 0, sizeof(c->data)); return 1; } @@ -219,6 +219,6 @@ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) md[i] = (UCHAR) (p1[i] & 0xff); - memset((char *)&c, 0, sizeof(c)); + memset(&c, 0, sizeof(c)); return 1; }
diff --git a/crypto/modes/ocb128.c b/crypto/modes/ocb128.c index 79b7862..ed48460 100644 --- a/crypto/modes/ocb128.c +++ b/crypto/modes/ocb128.c
@@ -226,9 +226,7 @@ int CRYPTO_ocb128_init(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, void *keyenc, void *keydec, block128_f encrypt, block128_f decrypt) { - /* Clear everything to NULLs */ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); - ctx->l_index = 0; ctx->max_l_index = 1; ctx->l = OPENSSL_malloc(ctx->max_l_index * 16); @@ -374,8 +372,8 @@ ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset_aad, &ctx->l_star, &ctx->offset_aad); /* CipherInput = (A_* || 1 || zeros(127-bitlen(A_*))) xor Offset_* */ - memset((void *)&tmp1, 0, 16); - memcpy((void *)&tmp1, aad + (num_blocks * 16), last_len); + memset(&tmp1, 0, 16); + memcpy(&tmp1, aad + (num_blocks * 16), last_len); ((unsigned char *)&tmp1)[last_len] = 0x80; ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->offset_aad, &tmp1, &tmp2); @@ -453,8 +451,8 @@ out + (num_blocks * 16)); /* Checksum_* = Checksum_m xor (P_* || 1 || zeros(127-bitlen(P_*))) */ - memset((void *)&tmp1, 0, 16); - memcpy((void *)&tmp1, in + (len / 16) * 16, last_len); + memset(&tmp1, 0, 16); + memcpy(&tmp1, in + (len / 16) * 16, last_len); ((unsigned char *)(&tmp1))[last_len] = 0x80; ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->checksum, &tmp1, &ctx->checksum); } @@ -526,8 +524,8 @@ out + (num_blocks * 16)); /* Checksum_* = Checksum_m xor (P_* || 1 || zeros(127-bitlen(P_*))) */ - memset((void *)&tmp1, 0, 16); - memcpy((void *)&tmp1, out + (len / 16) * 16, last_len); + memset(&tmp1, 0, 16); + memcpy(&tmp1, out + (len / 16) * 16, last_len); ((unsigned char *)(&tmp1))[last_len] = 0x80; ocb_block16_xor(&ctx->checksum, &tmp1, &ctx->checksum); }
diff --git a/crypto/pqueue/pqueue.c b/crypto/pqueue/pqueue.c index d66efe1..1378abc 100644 --- a/crypto/pqueue/pqueue.c +++ b/crypto/pqueue/pqueue.c
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ if (pq == NULL) return NULL; - memset(pq, 0x00, sizeof(pqueue_s)); + memset(pq, 0, sizeof(*pq)); return pq; }
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c index 7d8fd39..f4aaa29 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
@@ -293,14 +293,14 @@ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_MEMORY_LOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return (0); } - memset(p, 0, (off + j) * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p) * (off + j)); bn = (BIGNUM *)p; ul = (BN_ULONG *)&(p[off]); for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { b = *(t[i]); *(t[i]) = bn_array_el(bn, i); - memcpy((char *)bn_array_el(bn, i), (char *)b, bn_sizeof_BIGNUM()); - memcpy((char *)ul, bn_get_words(b), sizeof(BN_ULONG) * bn_get_top(b)); + memcpy(bn_array_el(bn, i), b, bn_sizeof_BIGNUM()); + memcpy(ul, bn_get_words(b), sizeof(*ul) * bn_get_top(b)); bn_set_static_words(bn_array_el(bn, i), ul, bn_get_top(b)); ul += bn_get_top(b); BN_clear_free(b);
diff --git a/crypto/sha/sha512.c b/crypto/sha/sha512.c index f934c74..c58cc1b 100644 --- a/crypto/sha/sha512.c +++ b/crypto/sha/sha512.c
@@ -107,9 +107,11 @@ p[n] = 0x80; /* There always is a room for one */ n++; - if (n > (sizeof(c->u) - 16)) - memset(p + n, 0, sizeof(c->u) - n), n = 0, - sha512_block_data_order(c, p, 1); + if (n > (sizeof(c->u) - 16)) { + memset(p + n, 0, sizeof(c->u) - n); + n = 0; + sha512_block_data_order(c, p, 1); + } memset(p + n, 0, sizeof(c->u) - 16 - n); #ifdef B_ENDIAN
diff --git a/crypto/stack/stack.c b/crypto/stack/stack.c index efabe16..c395d58 100644 --- a/crypto/stack/stack.c +++ b/crypto/stack/stack.c
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ return; if (st->num <= 0) return; - memset((char *)st->data, 0, sizeof(*st->data) * st->num); + memset(st->data, 0, sizeof(*st->data) * st->num); st->num = 0; }
diff --git a/crypto/store/str_mem.c b/crypto/store/str_mem.c index 632ada8..b14e289 100644 --- a/crypto/store/str_mem.c +++ b/crypto/store/str_mem.c
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ STOREerr(STORE_F_MEM_LIST_START, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } - memset(context, 0, sizeof(struct mem_ctx_st)); + memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context)); attribute_context = STORE_parse_attrs_start(attributes); if (!attribute_context) {
diff --git a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_sign.c b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_sign.c index 2d1e438..077d03d 100644 --- a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_sign.c +++ b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_sign.c
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(TS_RESP_CTX)); + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); /* Setting default callbacks. */ ctx->serial_cb = def_serial_cb;
diff --git a/crypto/ts/ts_verify_ctx.c b/crypto/ts/ts_verify_ctx.c index 651b1d1..75bf2df 100644 --- a/crypto/ts/ts_verify_ctx.c +++ b/crypto/ts/ts_verify_ctx.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ctx)); if (ctx) - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(TS_VERIFY_CTX)); + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); else TSerr(TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return ctx; @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ void TS_VERIFY_CTX_init(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx) { OPENSSL_assert(ctx != NULL); - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(TS_VERIFY_CTX)); + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); } void TS_VERIFY_CTX_free(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx)
diff --git a/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c b/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c index 2ee9658..0696341 100644 --- a/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c +++ b/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
@@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ # ifdef SIGACTION struct sigaction sa; - memset(&sa, 0, sizeof sa); + memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); sa.sa_handler = recsig; # endif
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c index 8c0680b..40a1e61 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -2217,7 +2217,7 @@ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); return ctx; } @@ -2337,11 +2337,9 @@ ctx->check_policy = check_policy; /* - * This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As - * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a - * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. + * Since X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we + * put a corresponding "new" here. */ - /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */ if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data))) { OPENSSL_free(ctx); @@ -2376,7 +2374,7 @@ sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); ctx->chain = NULL; CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); - memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); + memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c index 8870ec2..6b0167b 100644 --- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c +++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
@@ -235,14 +235,11 @@ return 0; } - memset(tree->levels, 0, n * sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL)); - + memset(tree->levels, 0, sizeof(*tree->levels) * n); tree->nlevel = n; - level = tree->levels; /* Root data: initialize to anyPolicy */ - data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0); if (!data || !level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree))