A general spring-cleaning (in autumn) to fix up signed/unsigned warnings.
I have tried to convert 'len' type variable declarations to unsigned as a
means to address these warnings when appropriate, but when in doubt I have
used casts in the comparisons instead. The better solution (that would get
us all lynched by API users) would be to go through and convert all the
function prototypes and structure definitions to use unsigned variables
except when signed is necessary. The proliferation of (signed) "int" for
strictly non-negative uses is unfortunate.
diff --git a/apps/ca.c b/apps/ca.c
index 780868a..15211b8 100644
--- a/apps/ca.c
+++ b/apps/ca.c
@@ -3005,7 +3005,8 @@
char *tmp = NULL;
char *rtime_str, *reason_str = NULL, *arg_str = NULL, *p;
int reason_code = -1;
- int i, ret = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned int i;
ASN1_OBJECT *hold = NULL;
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *comp_time = NULL;
tmp = BUF_strdup(str);
diff --git a/apps/enc.c b/apps/enc.c
index 0a9f731..ae18452 100644
--- a/apps/enc.c
+++ b/apps/enc.c
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@
if (!nosalt)
{
printf("salt=");
- for (i=0; i<sizeof salt; i++)
+ for (i=0; i<(int)sizeof(salt); i++)
printf("%02X",salt[i]);
printf("\n");
}
diff --git a/apps/passwd.c b/apps/passwd.c
index 3ad91d8..b9d9d7a 100644
--- a/apps/passwd.c
+++ b/apps/passwd.c
@@ -312,7 +312,8 @@
static char out_buf[6 + 9 + 24 + 2]; /* "$apr1$..salt..$.......md5hash..........\0" */
unsigned char buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
char *salt_out;
- int n, i;
+ int n;
+ unsigned int i;
EVP_MD_CTX md,md2;
size_t passwd_len, salt_len;
diff --git a/apps/rand.c b/apps/rand.c
index 63724bc..a893896 100644
--- a/apps/rand.c
+++ b/apps/rand.c
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@
int chunk;
chunk = num;
- if (chunk > sizeof buf)
+ if (chunk > (int)sizeof(buf))
chunk = sizeof buf;
r = RAND_bytes(buf, chunk);
if (r <= 0)
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c b/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c
index 68a525f..d9db53f 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c
@@ -67,12 +67,13 @@
int ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a, long v)
{
- int i,j,k;
+ int j,k;
+ unsigned int i;
unsigned char buf[sizeof(long)+1];
long d;
a->type=V_ASN1_ENUMERATED;
- if (a->length < (sizeof(long)+1))
+ if (a->length < (int)(sizeof(long)+1))
{
if (a->data != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(a->data);
@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@
else if (i != V_ASN1_ENUMERATED)
return -1;
- if (a->length > sizeof(long))
+ if (a->length > (int)sizeof(long))
{
/* hmm... a bit ugly */
return(0xffffffffL);
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_int.c b/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
index 78402cd..4bb300c 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
@@ -313,12 +313,13 @@
int ASN1_INTEGER_set(ASN1_INTEGER *a, long v)
{
- int i,j,k;
+ int j,k;
+ unsigned int i;
unsigned char buf[sizeof(long)+1];
long d;
a->type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
- if (a->length < (sizeof(long)+1))
+ if (a->length < (int)(sizeof(long)+1))
{
if (a->data != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(a->data);
@@ -362,7 +363,7 @@
else if (i != V_ASN1_INTEGER)
return -1;
- if (a->length > sizeof(long))
+ if (a->length > (int)sizeof(long))
{
/* hmm... a bit ugly */
return(0xffffffffL);
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_object.c b/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
index 0a8e6c2..124451d 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@
if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
return(BIO_write(bp,"NULL",4));
i=i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(buf,sizeof buf,a);
- if (i > sizeof buf) i=sizeof buf;
+ if (i > (int)sizeof(buf)) i=sizeof buf;
BIO_write(bp,buf,i);
return(i);
}
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c b/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c
index c035cc0..277726c 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@
static int asn1_str2tag(const char *tagstr, int len)
{
- int i;
+ unsigned int i;
static struct tag_name_st *tntmp, tnst [] = {
ASN1_GEN_STR("BOOL", V_ASN1_BOOLEAN),
ASN1_GEN_STR("BOOLEAN", V_ASN1_BOOLEAN),
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c b/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
index e100e93..1905b09 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@
{
unsigned char *p= *pp;
unsigned long ret=0;
- int i;
+ unsigned int i;
if (max-- < 1) return(0);
if (*p == 0x80)
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_long.c b/crypto/asn1/x_long.c
index c04b192..954d183 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/x_long.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/x_long.c
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@
int neg, i;
long ltmp;
unsigned long utmp = 0;
- if(len > sizeof(long)) {
+ if(len > (int)sizeof(long)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
index bbcc62d..8207bce 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
@@ -91,28 +91,28 @@
{
if (mult >= 0)
{
- if (mult > (sizeof(int)*8)-1)
+ if (mult > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
mult=sizeof(int)*8-1;
bn_limit_bits=mult;
bn_limit_num=1<<mult;
}
if (high >= 0)
{
- if (high > (sizeof(int)*8)-1)
+ if (high > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
high=sizeof(int)*8-1;
bn_limit_bits_high=high;
bn_limit_num_high=1<<high;
}
if (low >= 0)
{
- if (low > (sizeof(int)*8)-1)
+ if (low > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
low=sizeof(int)*8-1;
bn_limit_bits_low=low;
bn_limit_num_low=1<<low;
}
if (mont >= 0)
{
- if (mont > (sizeof(int)*8)-1)
+ if (mont > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
mont=sizeof(int)*8-1;
bn_limit_bits_mont=mont;
bn_limit_num_mont=1<<mont;
@@ -610,7 +610,7 @@
BN_ULONG ret=0;
n=BN_num_bytes(a);
- if (n > sizeof(BN_ULONG))
+ if (n > (int)sizeof(BN_ULONG))
return(BN_MASK2);
for (i=a->top-1; i>=0; i--)
{
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@
int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
{
int i,n;
- if (bn_expand(a,sizeof(BN_ULONG)*8) == NULL) return(0);
+ if (bn_expand(a,(int)sizeof(BN_ULONG)*8) == NULL) return(0);
n=sizeof(BN_ULONG)/BN_BYTES;
a->neg=0;
diff --git a/crypto/des/destest.c b/crypto/des/destest.c
index 3983ac8..788f552 100644
--- a/crypto/des/destest.c
+++ b/crypto/des/destest.c
@@ -333,7 +333,8 @@
static int ede_cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher);
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
- int i,j,err=0;
+ int j,err=0;
+ unsigned int i;
des_cblock in,out,outin,iv3,iv2;
des_key_schedule ks,ks2,ks3;
unsigned char cbc_in[40];
@@ -391,7 +392,7 @@
DES_ede3_cbcm_encrypt(cbc_out,cbc_in,i,&ks,&ks2,&ks3,&iv3,&iv2,DES_DECRYPT);
if (memcmp(cbc_in,cbc_data,strlen((char *)cbc_data)+1) != 0)
{
- int n;
+ unsigned int n;
printf("des_ede3_cbcm_encrypt decrypt error\n");
for(n=0 ; n < i ; ++n)
@@ -540,7 +541,7 @@
if (memcmp(cbc_out,cbc3_ok,
(unsigned int)(strlen((char *)cbc_data)+1+7)/8*8) != 0)
{
- int n;
+ unsigned int n;
printf("des_ede3_cbc_encrypt encrypt error\n");
for(n=0 ; n < i ; ++n)
@@ -556,7 +557,7 @@
des_ede3_cbc_encrypt(cbc_out,cbc_in,i,ks,ks2,ks3,&iv3,DES_DECRYPT);
if (memcmp(cbc_in,cbc_data,strlen((char *)cbc_data)+1) != 0)
{
- int n;
+ unsigned int n;
printf("des_ede3_cbc_encrypt decrypt error\n");
for(n=0 ; n < i ; ++n)
diff --git a/crypto/des/set_key.c b/crypto/des/set_key.c
index 143008e..55efe03 100644
--- a/crypto/des/set_key.c
+++ b/crypto/des/set_key.c
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@
void DES_set_odd_parity(DES_cblock *key)
{
- int i;
+ unsigned int i;
for (i=0; i<DES_KEY_SZ; i++)
(*key)[i]=odd_parity[(*key)[i]];
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@
int DES_check_key_parity(const_DES_cblock *key)
{
- int i;
+ unsigned int i;
for (i=0; i<DES_KEY_SZ; i++)
{
diff --git a/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c b/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
index 33349c2..fa5cbc7 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@
{
i=ctx->buf_len-ctx->buf_off;
if (i > outl) i=outl;
- OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_off+i < sizeof ctx->buf);
+ OPENSSL_assert(ctx->buf_off+i < (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
memcpy(out,&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]),i);
ret=i;
out+=i;
diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_rc2.c b/crypto/evp/e_rc2.c
index 3932f60..d37726f 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_rc2.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_rc2.c
@@ -168,16 +168,17 @@
static int rc2_get_asn1_type_and_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
{
long num=0;
- int i=0,l;
+ int i=0;
int key_bits;
+ unsigned int l;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
if (type != NULL)
{
l=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
- OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof iv);
+ OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof(iv));
i=ASN1_TYPE_get_int_octetstring(type,&num,iv,l);
- if (i != l)
+ if (i != (int)l)
return(-1);
key_bits =rc2_magic_to_meth((int)num);
if (!key_bits)
diff --git a/crypto/evp/encode.c b/crypto/evp/encode.c
index 0820935..32744ca 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/encode.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/encode.c
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@
*outl=0;
if (inl == 0) return;
- OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= sizeof ctx->enc_data);
+ OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
if ((ctx->num+inl) < ctx->length)
{
memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]),in,inl);
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@
/* only save the good data :-) */
if (!B64_NOT_BASE64(v))
{
- OPENSSL_assert(n < sizeof ctx->enc_data);
+ OPENSSL_assert(n < (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
d[n++]=tmp;
ln++;
}
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
index be0758a..db621bf 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
@@ -187,7 +187,8 @@
case EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE:
- OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) <= sizeof ctx->iv);
+ OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) <=
+ (int)sizeof(ctx->iv));
if(iv) memcpy(ctx->oiv, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
memcpy(ctx->iv, ctx->oiv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
break;
@@ -274,7 +275,7 @@
}
i=ctx->buf_len;
bl=ctx->cipher->block_size;
- OPENSSL_assert(bl <= sizeof ctx->buf);
+ OPENSSL_assert(bl <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
if (i != 0)
{
if (i+inl < bl)
@@ -320,7 +321,8 @@
int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
{
- int i,n,b,bl,ret;
+ int n,ret;
+ unsigned int i, b, bl;
b=ctx->cipher->block_size;
OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->buf);
@@ -356,7 +358,8 @@
int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
const unsigned char *in, int inl)
{
- int b, fix_len;
+ int fix_len;
+ unsigned int b;
if (inl == 0)
{
@@ -409,8 +412,8 @@
int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
{
- int i,b;
- int n;
+ int i,n;
+ unsigned int b;
*outl=0;
b=ctx->cipher->block_size;
@@ -433,7 +436,7 @@
}
OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->final);
n=ctx->final[b-1];
- if (n > b)
+ if (n > (int)b)
{
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL,EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return(0);
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c b/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
index 52a3b28..c97cb9c 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
@@ -85,14 +85,15 @@
int EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
{
- int i=0,l;
+ int i=0;
+ unsigned int l;
if (type != NULL)
{
l=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
- OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof c->iv);
+ OPENSSL_assert(l <= sizeof(c->iv));
i=ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring(type,c->oiv,l);
- if (i != l)
+ if (i != (int)l)
return(-1);
else if (i > 0)
memcpy(c->iv,c->oiv,l);
@@ -102,12 +103,13 @@
int EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
{
- int i=0,j;
+ int i=0;
+ unsigned int j;
if (type != NULL)
{
j=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
- OPENSSL_assert(j <= sizeof c->iv);
+ OPENSSL_assert(j <= sizeof(c->iv));
i=ASN1_TYPE_set_octetstring(type,c->oiv,j);
}
return(i);
diff --git a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c
index a1874e8..39306f4 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@
EVP_DigestFinal_ex (&ctx, md_tmp, NULL);
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher) <= sizeof md_tmp);
+ OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher) <= (int)sizeof(md_tmp));
memcpy(key, md_tmp, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher));
OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) <= 16);
memcpy(iv, md_tmp + (16 - EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)),
diff --git a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
index b161d76..dca0514 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
@@ -149,7 +149,8 @@
int en_de)
{
unsigned char *pbuf, *salt, key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- int saltlen, keylen, iter, plen;
+ int saltlen, iter, plen;
+ unsigned int keylen;
PBE2PARAM *pbe2 = NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
PBKDF2PARAM *kdf = NULL;
@@ -208,7 +209,7 @@
/* Now check the parameters of the kdf */
- if(kdf->keylength && (ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->keylength) != keylen)){
+ if(kdf->keylength && (ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->keylength) != (int)keylen)){
EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN,
EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEYLENGTH);
goto err;
diff --git a/crypto/hmac/hmac.c b/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
index 4c91f91..f7392a0 100644
--- a/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
+++ b/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@
{
reset=1;
j=EVP_MD_block_size(md);
- OPENSSL_assert(j <= sizeof ctx->key);
+ OPENSSL_assert(j <= (int)sizeof(ctx->key));
if (j < len)
{
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx->md_ctx,md, impl);
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@
}
else
{
- OPENSSL_assert(len <= sizeof ctx->key);
+ OPENSSL_assert(len <= (int)sizeof(ctx->key));
memcpy(ctx->key,key,len);
ctx->key_length=len;
}
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
index 900af73..d536b52 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@
kstr=(unsigned char *)buf;
}
RAND_add(data,i,0);/* put in the RSA key. */
- OPENSSL_assert(enc->iv_len <= sizeof iv);
+ OPENSSL_assert(enc->iv_len <= (int)sizeof(iv));
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv,enc->iv_len) < 0) /* Generate a salt */
goto err;
/* The 'iv' is used as the iv and as a salt. It is
diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index eeffc0d..66b229c 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@
* other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for
* the incremented counter). By XORing it we keep at least as
* much entropy as fits into md. */
- for (k = 0; k < sizeof md; k++)
+ for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++)
{
md[k] ^= local_md[k];
}
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
index 3714b24..024e11b 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
@@ -85,7 +85,8 @@
static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, unsigned long e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
{
BIGNUM *r0=NULL,*r1=NULL,*r2=NULL,*r3=NULL,*tmp;
- int bitsp,bitsq,ok= -1,n=0,i;
+ int bitsp,bitsq,ok= -1,n=0;
+ unsigned int i;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL,*ctx2=NULL;
ctx=BN_CTX_new();
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c b/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
index 8812526..9c84a59 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@
X509_TRUST * X509_TRUST_get0(int idx)
{
if(idx < 0) return NULL;
- if(idx < X509_TRUST_COUNT) return trstandard + idx;
+ if(idx < (int)X509_TRUST_COUNT) return trstandard + idx;
return sk_X509_TRUST_value(trtable, idx - X509_TRUST_COUNT);
}
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@
void X509_TRUST_cleanup(void)
{
- int i;
+ unsigned int i;
for(i = 0; i < X509_TRUST_COUNT; i++) trtable_free(trstandard + i);
sk_X509_TRUST_pop_free(trtable, trtable_free);
trtable = NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
index 4d145f7..b1a6d26 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@
X509_PURPOSE * X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)
{
if(idx < 0) return NULL;
- if(idx < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) return xstandard + idx;
+ if(idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) return xstandard + idx;
return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
}
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@
void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
{
- int i;
+ unsigned int i;
sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) xptable_free(xstandard + i);
xptable = NULL;
diff --git a/engines/e_4758_cca.c b/engines/e_4758_cca.c
index ee52a3f..b006ed8 100644
--- a/engines/e_4758_cca.c
+++ b/engines/e_4758_cca.c
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@
unsigned char exitData[8];
unsigned char ruleArray[8];
unsigned char keyLabel[64];
- long keyLabelLength = strlen(key_id);
+ unsigned long keyLabelLength = strlen(key_id);
unsigned char modulus[256];
long modulusFieldLength = sizeof(modulus);
long modulusLength = 0;
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@
unsigned char exitData[8];
unsigned char ruleArray[8];
unsigned char keyLabel[64];
- long keyLabelLength = strlen(key_id);
+ unsigned long keyLabelLength = strlen(key_id);
unsigned char modulus[512];
long modulusFieldLength = sizeof(modulus);
long modulusLength = 0;
@@ -922,7 +922,7 @@
unsigned char form[] = "RANDOM ";
unsigned char rand_buf[8];
- while(num >= sizeof(rand_buf))
+ while(num >= (int)sizeof(rand_buf))
{
randomNumberGenerate(&ret_code, &reason_code, &exit_data_length,
exit_data, form, rand_buf);
diff --git a/ssl/s2_clnt.c b/ssl/s2_clnt.c
index 1d24ded..62e83af 100644
--- a/ssl/s2_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s2_clnt.c
@@ -668,7 +668,7 @@
sess->master_key_length=i;
if (i > 0)
{
- if (i > sizeof sess->master_key)
+ if (i > (int)sizeof(sess->master_key))
{
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -688,7 +688,7 @@
else
enc=i;
- if (i < enc)
+ if ((int)i < enc)
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR);
@@ -717,7 +717,7 @@
d+=enc;
karg=sess->key_arg_length;
s2n(karg,p); /* key arg size */
- if (karg > sizeof sess->key_arg)
+ if (karg > (int)sizeof(sess->key_arg))
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
diff --git a/ssl/s2_enc.c b/ssl/s2_enc.c
index d3b144f..12e17bf 100644
--- a/ssl/s2_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/s2_enc.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@
if (ssl2_generate_key_material(s) <= 0)
return 0;
- OPENSSL_assert(c->iv_len <= sizeof s->session->key_arg);
+ OPENSSL_assert(c->iv_len <= (int)sizeof(s->session->key_arg));
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ws,c,NULL,&(s->s2->key_material[(client)?num:0]),
s->session->key_arg);
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(rs,c,NULL,&(s->s2->key_material[(client)?0:num]),
diff --git a/ssl/s2_lib.c b/ssl/s2_lib.c
index 910b9fe..a0edfb8 100644
--- a/ssl/s2_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/s2_lib.c
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@
static SSL_CIPHER *sorted[SSL2_NUM_CIPHERS];
SSL_CIPHER c,*cp= &c,**cpp;
unsigned long id;
- int i;
+ unsigned int i;
if (init)
{
@@ -437,7 +437,8 @@
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
km=s->s2->key_material;
- if (s->session->master_key_length < 0 || s->session->master_key_length > sizeof s->session->master_key)
+ if (s->session->master_key_length < 0 ||
+ s->session->master_key_length > (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
@@ -445,7 +446,8 @@
for (i=0; i<s->s2->key_material_length; i += EVP_MD_size(md5))
{
- if (((km - s->s2->key_material) + EVP_MD_size(md5)) > sizeof s->s2->key_material)
+ if (((km - s->s2->key_material) + EVP_MD_size(md5)) >
+ (int)sizeof(s->s2->key_material))
{
/* EVP_DigestFinal_ex() below would write beyond buffer */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -456,7 +458,7 @@
OPENSSL_assert(s->session->master_key_length >= 0
&& s->session->master_key_length
- < sizeof s->session->master_key);
+ < (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,&c,1);
c++;
@@ -495,7 +497,7 @@
error=s->error; /* number of bytes left to write */
s->error=0;
- OPENSSL_assert(error >= 0 && error <= sizeof buf);
+ OPENSSL_assert(error >= 0 && error <= (int)sizeof(buf));
i=ssl2_write(s,&(buf[3-error]),error);
/* if (i == error) s->rwstate=state; */
diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index b27a1de..6b29f04 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@
*(p++)=i;
if (i != 0)
{
- if (i > sizeof s->session->session_id)
+ if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
diff --git a/ssl/s3_enc.c b/ssl/s3_enc.c
index 559924d..56e274f 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@
EVP_MD_CTX s1;
unsigned char buf[16],smd[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char c='A';
- int i,j,k;
+ unsigned int i,j,k;
#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
c = os_toascii[c]; /*'A' in ASCII */
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@
k=0;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m5);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&s1);
- for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+ for (i=0; (int)i<num; i+=MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)
{
k++;
if (k > sizeof buf)
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@
EVP_DigestUpdate(&m5,s->session->master_key,
s->session->master_key_length);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&m5,smd,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- if ((i+MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) > num)
+ if ((int)(i+MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) > num)
{
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&m5,smd,NULL);
memcpy(km,smd,(num-i));
diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c
index 2145385..6c208cc 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -1914,7 +1914,7 @@
static SSL_CIPHER *sorted[SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS];
SSL_CIPHER c,*cp= &c,**cpp;
unsigned long id;
- int i;
+ unsigned int i;
if (init)
{
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index bd0624b..abb03ca 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@
s->session->session_id_length=0;
sl=s->session->session_id_length;
- if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id)
+ if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_asn1.c b/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
index 16bc11b..f5d3c13 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
@@ -295,11 +295,11 @@
if (os.length > i)
os.length = i;
- if (os.length > sizeof ret->session_id) /* can't happen */
- os.length = sizeof ret->session_id;
+ if (os.length > (int)sizeof(ret->session_id)) /* can't happen */
+ os.length = sizeof(ret->session_id);
ret->session_id_length=os.length;
- OPENSSL_assert(os.length <= sizeof ret->session_id);
+ OPENSSL_assert(os.length <= (int)sizeof(ret->session_id));
memcpy(ret->session_id,os.data,os.length);
M_ASN1_D2I_get(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
index 144b90d..ad56b7b 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_cert.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -794,7 +794,7 @@
}
r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,dstruct->d_name);
- if (r <= 0 || r >= sizeof buf)
+ if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
goto err;
if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf))
goto err;
diff --git a/ssl/ssltest.c b/ssl/ssltest.c
index 82c3b8d..5aadfa5 100644
--- a/ssl/ssltest.c
+++ b/ssl/ssltest.c
@@ -1350,8 +1350,8 @@
{
if (c_write)
{
- j=(cw_num > (long)sizeof(cbuf))
- ?sizeof(cbuf):(int)cw_num;
+ j = (cw_num > (long)sizeof(cbuf)) ?
+ (int)sizeof(cbuf) : (int)cw_num;
i=BIO_write(c_bio,cbuf,j);
if (i < 0)
{
@@ -1481,8 +1481,8 @@
}
else
{
- j=(sw_num > (long)sizeof(sbuf))?
- sizeof(sbuf):(int)sw_num;
+ j = (sw_num > (long)sizeof(sbuf)) ?
+ (int)sizeof(sbuf) : (int)sw_num;
i=BIO_write(s_bio,sbuf,j);
if (i < 0)
{
