Patches from Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> to get Kerberos 5 in
SSL according to RFC 2712. His comment is:
This is a patch to openssl-SNAP-20010702 to support Kerberized SSL
authentication. I'm expecting to have the full kssl-0.5 kit up on
sourceforge by the end of the week. The full kit includes patches
for mod-ssl, apache, and a few text clients. The sourceforge URL
is http://sourceforge.net/projects/kssl/ .
Thanks to a note from Simon Wilkinson I've replaced my KRB5 AP_REQ
message with a real KerberosWrapper struct. I think this is fully
RFC 2712 compliant now, including support for the optional
authenticator field. I also added openssl-style ASN.1 macros for
a few Kerberos structs; see crypto/krb5/ if you're interested.
diff --git a/ssl/kssl.c b/ssl/kssl.c
index a8b7cc4..a92c872 100644
--- a/ssl/kssl.c
+++ b/ssl/kssl.c
@@ -56,15 +56,26 @@
*/
-/* ssl/kssl.c -- Routines to support (& debug) Kerberos5 auth for openssl
+/* ssl/kssl.c -- Routines to support (& debug) Kerberos5 auth for openssl
**
-** 19990701 VRS Started.
+** 19990701 VRS Started.
+** 200011?? Jeffrey Altman, Richard Levitte
+** Generalized for Heimdal, Newer MIT, & Win32.
+** Integrated into main OpenSSL 0.9.7 snapshots.
+** 20010413 Simon Wilkinson, VRS
+** Real RFC2712 KerberosWrapper replaces AP_REQ.
*/
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
#include <string.h>
+#define _XOPEN_SOURCE /* glibc2 needs this to declare strptime() */
+#include <time.h>
+
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
/*
* When OpenSSL is built on Windows, we do not want to require that
@@ -104,6 +115,15 @@
#define krb5_kt_resolve kssl_krb5_kt_resolve
#define krb5_auth_con_init kssl_krb5_auth_con_init
+#define krb5_principal_compare kssl_krb5_principal_compare
+/* macro #define krb5_kt_get_entry kssl_krb5_kt_get_entry */
+#define krb5_decrypt_tkt_part kssl_krb5_decrypt_tkt_part
+#define krb5_timeofday kssl_krb5_timeofday
+#define krb5_rc_default kssl_krb5_rc_default
+#define krb5_krb5_rc_initialize kssl_krb5_rc_initialize
+#define krb5_krb5_rc_get_lifespan kssl_krb5_rc_get_lifespan
+#define krb5_krb5_rc_destroy kssl_krb5_rc_destroy
+
/* Prototypes for built in stubs */
void kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_context, krb5_data *);
void kssl_krb5_free_principal(krb5_context, krb5_principal );
@@ -117,6 +137,19 @@
krb5_const krb5_data *,
krb5_const_principal, krb5_keytab,
krb5_flags *,krb5_ticket **);
+
+krb5_boolean kssl_krb5_principal_compare(krb5_context, krb5_const_principal,
+ krb5_const_principal);
+krb5_error_code krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(krb5_context, krb5_const krb5_keyblock *,
+ krb5_ticket *);
+krb5_error_code krb5_timeofday(krb5_context context, krb5_int32 *timeret);
+krb5_error_code krb5_rc_default(krb5_context context, krb5_rcache *rc);
+krb5_error_code krb5_rc_initialize(krb5_context context, krb5_rcache rc,
+ krb5_deltat lifespan);
+krb5_error_code krb5_rc_get_lifespan(krb5_context context, krb5_rcache rc,
+ krb5_deltat *lifespan);
+krb5_error_code krb5_rc_destroy(krb5_context context, krb5_rcache rc);
+
krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_mk_req_extended(krb5_context,
krb5_auth_context *,
krb5_const krb5_flags,
@@ -144,10 +177,12 @@
krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_auth_con_free(krb5_context,krb5_auth_context);
/* Function pointers (almost all Kerberos functions are _stdcall) */
-static void (_stdcall *p_krb5_free_data_contents)(krb5_context, krb5_data *)=NULL;
-static void (_stdcall *p_krb5_free_principal)(krb5_context, krb5_principal )=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code(_stdcall *p_krb5_kt_resolve)(krb5_context, krb5_const char *,
- krb5_keytab *)=NULL;
+static void (_stdcall *p_krb5_free_data_contents)(krb5_context, krb5_data *)
+ =NULL;
+static void (_stdcall *p_krb5_free_principal)(krb5_context, krb5_principal )
+ =NULL;
+static krb5_error_code(_stdcall *p_krb5_kt_resolve)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_const char *, krb5_keytab *)=NULL;
static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_kt_default)(krb5_context,
krb5_keytab *)=NULL;
static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_free_ticket)(krb5_context,
@@ -158,33 +193,27 @@
krb5_const_principal,
krb5_keytab, krb5_flags *,
krb5_ticket **)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_mk_req_extended) (krb5_context,
- krb5_auth_context *,
- krb5_const krb5_flags,
- krb5_data *,
- krb5_creds *,
- krb5_data * )=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_mk_req_extended)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_auth_context *,
+ krb5_const krb5_flags, krb5_data *, krb5_creds *,
+ krb5_data * )=NULL;
static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_init_context)(krb5_context *)=NULL;
static void (_stdcall *p_krb5_free_context)(krb5_context)=NULL;
static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_cc_default)(krb5_context,
krb5_ccache *)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_sname_to_principal)(krb5_context,
- krb5_const char *,
- krb5_const char *,
- krb5_int32,
- krb5_principal *)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_get_credentials)(krb5_context,
- krb5_const krb5_flags,
- krb5_ccache,
- krb5_creds *,
- krb5_creds * *)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_auth_con_init)(krb5_context,
- krb5_auth_context *)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_cc_get_principal)(krb5_context context,
- krb5_ccache cache,
- krb5_principal *principal)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_auth_con_free)(krb5_context,
- krb5_auth_context)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_sname_to_principal)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_const char *, krb5_const char *,
+ krb5_int32, krb5_principal *)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_get_credentials)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_const krb5_flags, krb5_ccache,
+ krb5_creds *, krb5_creds **)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_auth_con_init)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_auth_context *)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_cc_get_principal)
+ (krb5_context context, krb5_ccache cache,
+ krb5_principal *principal)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_auth_con_free)
+ (krb5_context, krb5_auth_context)=NULL;
static int krb5_loaded = 0; /* only attempt to initialize func ptrs once */
/* Function to Load the Kerberos 5 DLL and initialize function pointers */
@@ -222,6 +251,20 @@
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_free_ticket" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_rd_req =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rd_req" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_principal_compare =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_principal_compare" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_decrypt_tkt_part =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_decrypt_tkt_part" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_timeofday =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_timeofday" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_rc_default =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rc_default" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_rc_initialize =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rc_initialize" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_rc_get_lifespan =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rc_get_lifespan" );
+ (FARPROC) p_krb5_rc_destroy =
+ GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rc_destroy" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_kt_default =
GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_kt_default" );
(FARPROC) p_krb5_kt_resolve =
@@ -412,6 +455,92 @@
return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
}
+krb5_boolean
+krb5_principal_compare(krb5_context con, krb5_const_principal princ1,
+ krb5_const_principal princ2)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_principal_compare )
+ return(p_krb5_principal_compare(con,princ1,princ2);
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(krb5_context con, krb5_const krb5_keyblock *keys,
+ krb5_ticket *ticket)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_decrypt_tkt_part )
+ return(p_krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(con,keys,ticket);
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+krb5_timeofday(krb5_context con, krb5_int32 *timeret)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_timeofday )
+ return(p_krb5_timeofday(con,timeret);
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+krb5_rc_default(krb5_context con, krb5_rcache *rc)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_rc_default )
+ return(p_krb5_rc_default(con,rc);
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+krb5_rc_initialize(krb5_context con, krb5_rcache rc, krb5_deltat lifespan)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_rc_initialize )
+ return(p_krb5_rc_initialize(con, rc, lifespan);
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+krb5_rc_get_lifespan(krb5_context con, krb5_rcache rc, krb5_deltat *lifespanp)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_rc_get_lifespan )
+ return(p_krb5_rc_get_lifespan(con, rc, lifespanp);
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+krb5_error_code
+krb5_rc_destroy(krb5_context con, krb5_rcache rc)
+ {
+ if (!krb5_loaded)
+ load_krb5_dll();
+
+ if ( p_krb5_rc_destroy )
+ return(p_krb5_rc_destroy(con, rc);
+ else
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
/* Structure definitions */
#ifndef NO_DEF_KRB5_CCACHE
#ifndef krb5_x
@@ -432,31 +561,37 @@
{
krb5_magic magic;
char *prefix;
- char * (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_name) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache));
- krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *resolve) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache *,
- const char *));
- krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *gen_new) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache *));
- krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *init) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
- krb5_principal));
- krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *destroy) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache));
- krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *close) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache));
- krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *store) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
- krb5_creds *));
- krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *retrieve) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
- krb5_flags, krb5_creds *,
- krb5_creds *));
- krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_princ) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
- krb5_principal *));
- krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_first) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
- krb5_cc_cursor *));
- krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_next) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
+ char * (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_name)
+ KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache));
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *resolve)
+ KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, const char *));
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *gen_new)
+ KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache *));
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *init)
+ KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_principal));
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *destroy)
+ KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache));
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *close)
+ KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache));
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *store)
+ KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_creds *));
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *retrieve)
+ KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
+ krb5_flags, krb5_creds *, krb5_creds *));
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_princ)
+ KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_principal *));
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_first)
+ KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_cc_cursor *));
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_next)
+ KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
krb5_cc_cursor *, krb5_creds *));
- krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *end_get) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
- krb5_cc_cursor *));
- krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *remove_cred) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *end_get)
+ KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_cc_cursor *));
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *remove_cred)
+ KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
krb5_flags, krb5_creds *));
- krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *set_flags) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
- krb5_flags));
+ krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *set_flags)
+ KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_flags));
} krb5_cc_ops;
#endif /* NO_DEF_KRB5_CCACHE */
@@ -468,8 +603,10 @@
if ( p_krb5_cc_get_principal )
return(p_krb5_cc_get_principal(context,cache,principal));
else
- return(krb5_x ((cache)->ops->get_princ,(context, cache, principal)));
+ return(krb5_x
+ ((cache)->ops->get_princ,(context, cache, principal)));
}
+#else
#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS || OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
char
@@ -498,6 +635,120 @@
}
+/* Given KRB5 enctype (basically DES or 3DES), return
+*/
+EVP_CIPHER *
+kssl_map_enc(krb5_enctype enctype)
+ {
+ switch (enctype)
+ {
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW:
+#if ! defined(KRB5_MIT_OLD11)
+ case ENCTYPE_DES_HMAC_SHA1:
+#endif
+ return (EVP_CIPHER *) EVP_des_cbc();
+ break;
+ case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA:
+ case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
+#if ! defined(KRB5_MIT_OLD11)
+ case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
+#endif
+ return (EVP_CIPHER *) EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
+ break;
+ default: return (EVP_CIPHER *) NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+/* Return true:1 if p "looks like" the start of the real authenticator
+** described in kssl_skip_confound() below. The ASN.1 pattern is
+** "62 xx 30 yy" (APPLICATION-2, SEQUENCE), where xx-yy =~ 2, and
+** xx and yy are possibly multi-byte length fields.
+*/
+int kssl_test_confound(unsigned char *p)
+ {
+ int len = 2;
+ int xx = 0, yy = 0;
+
+ if (*p++ != 0x62) return 0;
+ if (*p > 0x82) return 0;
+ switch(*p) {
+ case 0x82: p++; xx = (*p++ << 8); xx += *p++; break;
+ case 0x81: p++; xx = *p++; break;
+ case 0x80: return 0;
+ default: xx = *p++; break;
+ }
+ if (*p++ != 0x30) return 0;
+ if (*p > 0x82) return 0;
+ switch(*p) {
+ case 0x82: p++; len+=2; yy = (*p++ << 8); yy += *p++; break;
+ case 0x81: p++; len++; yy = *p++; break;
+ case 0x80: return 0;
+ default: yy = *p++; break;
+ }
+
+ return (xx - len == yy)? 1: 0;
+ }
+
+/* Allocate, fill, and return cksumlens array of checksum lengths.
+** This array holds just the unique elements from the krb5_cksumarray[].
+** array[n] == 0 signals end of data.
+*/
+int *populate_cksumlens(void)
+ {
+ int i, j, n = krb5_max_cksum+1;
+ static int *cklens = NULL;
+
+#ifdef KRB5CHECKAUTH
+ if (!cklens && !(cklens = (int *) calloc(sizeof(int), n))) return NULL;
+
+ for (i=0; i < krb5_max_cksum; i++) {
+ if (!krb5_cksumarray[i]) continue; /* array has holes */
+ for (j=0; j < krb5_max_cksum; j++) {
+ if (cklens[j] == 0) {
+ cklens[j] = krb5_cksumarray[i]->checksum_length;
+ break; /* krb5 elem was new: add */
+ }
+ if (cklens[j] == krb5_cksumarray[i]->checksum_length) {
+ break; /* ignore duplicate elements */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* KRB5CHECKAUTH */
+
+ return cklens;
+ }
+
+/* Return pointer to start of real authenticator within authenticator, or
+** return NULL on error.
+** Decrypted authenticator looks like this:
+** [0 or 8 byte confounder] [4-24 byte checksum] [real authent'r]
+** This hackery wouldn't be necessary if MIT KRB5 1.0.6 had the
+** krb5_auth_con_getcksumtype() function advertised in its krb5.h.
+*/
+unsigned char *kssl_skip_confound(krb5_enctype etype, unsigned char *a)
+ {
+ int i, cklen, conlen;
+ static int *cksumlens = NULL;
+ unsigned char *test_auth;
+
+ conlen = (etype)? 8: 0;
+
+ if (!cksumlens && !(cksumlens = populate_cksumlens())) return NULL;
+ for (i=0; (cklen = cksumlens[i]) != 0; i++)
+ {
+ test_auth = a + conlen + cklen;
+ if (kssl_test_confound(test_auth)) return test_auth;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+
/* Set kssl_err error info when reason text is a simple string
** kssl_err = struct { int reason; char text[KSSL_ERR_MAX+1]; }
*/
@@ -522,10 +773,10 @@
printf("%s[%d] ", label, kdata->length);
for (i=0; i < kdata->length; i++)
{
- if (isprint((int) kdata->data[i]))
+ if (0 && isprint((int) kdata->data[i]))
printf( "%c ", kdata->data[i]);
else
- printf( "%02x", kdata->data[i]);
+ printf( "%02x ", (unsigned char) kdata->data[i]);
}
printf("\n");
}
@@ -570,7 +821,8 @@
return;
}
#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
- printf("%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->keytype, keyblk->keyvalue->length);
+ printf("%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->keytype,
+ keyblk->keyvalue->length);
for (i=0; i < keyblk->keyvalue->length; i++)
{
printf("%02x",(unsigned char *)(keyblk->keyvalue->contents)[i]);
@@ -587,21 +839,52 @@
}
+/* Display contents of krb5_principal_data struct, for debugging
+** (krb5_principal is typedef'd == krb5_principal_data *)
+*/
+void
+print_krb5_princ(char *label, krb5_principal_data *princ)
+ {
+ int i, j;
+
+ printf("%s principal Realm: ", label);
+ if (princ == NULL) return;
+ for (i=0; i < princ->realm.length; i++) putchar(princ->realm.data[i]);
+ printf(" (nametype %d) has %d strings:\n", princ->type,princ->length);
+ for (i=0; i < princ->length; i++)
+ {
+ printf("\t%d [%d]: ", i, princ->data[i].length);
+ for (j=0; j < princ->data[i].length; j++) {
+ putchar(princ->data[i].data[j]);
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
+
/* Given krb5 service (typically "kssl") and hostname in kssl_ctx,
-** Create Kerberos AP_REQ message for SSL Client.
+** Return encrypted Kerberos ticket for service @ hostname.
+** If authenp is non-NULL, also return encrypted authenticator,
+** whose data should be freed by caller.
+** (Originally was: Create Kerberos AP_REQ message for SSL Client.)
**
-** 19990628 VRS Started.
+** 19990628 VRS Started; Returns Kerberos AP_REQ message.
+** 20010409 VRS Modified for RFC2712; Returns enc tkt.
+** 20010606 VRS May also return optional authenticator.
*/
krb5_error_code
kssl_cget_tkt( /* UPDATE */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
- /* OUT */ krb5_data *krb5_app_req, KSSL_ERR *kssl_err)
+ /* OUT */ krb5_data **enc_ticketp,
+ /* UPDATE */ krb5_data *authenp,
+ /* OUT */ KSSL_ERR *kssl_err)
{
krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
krb5_context krb5context = NULL;
krb5_auth_context krb5auth_context = NULL;
krb5_ccache krb5ccdef = NULL;
krb5_creds krb5creds, *krb5credsp = NULL;
- krb5_data krb5in_data;
+ krb5_data krb5_app_req;
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, 0, "");
memset((char *)&krb5creds, 0, sizeof(krb5creds));
@@ -635,7 +918,8 @@
BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text,KSSL_ERR_MAX,
"krb5_sname_to_principal() fails for %s/%s\n",
kssl_ctx->service_host,
- (kssl_ctx->service_name)? kssl_ctx->service_name: KRB5SVC);
+ (kssl_ctx->service_name)? kssl_ctx->service_name:
+ KRB5SVC);
kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT;
goto err;
}
@@ -663,26 +947,65 @@
goto err;
}
- krb5in_data.data = NULL;
- krb5in_data.length = 0;
+ *enc_ticketp = &krb5credsp->ticket;
+#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
+ kssl_ctx->enctype = krb5credsp->session.keytype;
+#else
+ kssl_ctx->enctype = krb5credsp->keyblock.enctype;
+#endif
krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
/* caller should free data of krb5_app_req */
- if ((krb5rc = krb5_mk_req_extended(krb5context, &krb5auth_context,
- 0, &krb5in_data, krb5credsp, krb5_app_req)) != 0)
+ /* 20010406 VRS deleted for real KerberosWrapper
+ ** 20010605 VRS reinstated to offer Authenticator to KerberosWrapper
+ */
+ krb5_app_req.length = 0;
+ if (authenp)
{
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ,
- "krb5_mk_req_extended() fails.\n");
- goto err;
+ krb5_data krb5in_data;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ long arlen;
+ KRB5_APREQBODY *ap_req;
+
+ authenp->length = 0;
+ krb5in_data.data = NULL;
+ krb5in_data.length = 0;
+ if ((krb5rc = krb5_mk_req_extended(krb5context,
+ &krb5auth_context, 0, &krb5in_data, krb5credsp,
+ &krb5_app_req)) != 0)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ,
+ "krb5_mk_req_extended() fails.\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ arlen = krb5_app_req.length;
+ p = krb5_app_req.data;
+ ap_req = (KRB5_APREQBODY *) d2i_KRB5_APREQ(NULL, &p, arlen);
+ if (ap_req)
+ {
+ authenp->length = i2d_KRB5_ENCDATA(
+ ap_req->authenticator, NULL);
+ if (authenp->length &&
+ (authenp->data = malloc(authenp->length)))
+ {
+ unsigned char *p = authenp->data;
+ authenp->length = i2d_KRB5_ENCDATA(
+ ap_req->authenticator, &p);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ap_req) KRB5_APREQ_free((KRB5_APREQ *) ap_req);
+ if (krb5_app_req.length) krb5_xfree(krb5_app_req.data);
}
#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
- else if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, &krb5credsp->session))
+ if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, &krb5credsp->session))
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT,
"kssl_ctx_setkey() fails.\n");
}
#else
- else if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, &krb5credsp->keyblock))
+ if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, &krb5credsp->keyblock))
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT,
"kssl_ctx_setkey() fails.\n");
@@ -695,14 +1018,102 @@
kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- if (krb5creds.client) krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5creds.client);
- if (krb5creds.server) krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5creds.server);
- if (krb5auth_context) krb5_auth_con_free(krb5context, krb5auth_context);
+ if (krb5creds.client) krb5_free_principal(krb5context,
+ krb5creds.client);
+ if (krb5creds.server) krb5_free_principal(krb5context,
+ krb5creds.server);
+ if (krb5auth_context) krb5_auth_con_free(krb5context,
+ krb5auth_context);
if (krb5context) krb5_free_context(krb5context);
return (krb5rc);
}
+/* Given d2i_-decoded asn1ticket, allocate and return a new krb5_ticket.
+** Return Kerberos error code and kssl_err struct on error.
+** Allocates krb5_ticket and krb5_principal; caller should free these.
+**
+** 20010410 VRS Implemented krb5_decode_ticket() as
+** old_krb5_decode_ticket(). Missing from MIT1.0.6.
+** 20010615 VRS Re-cast as openssl/asn1 d2i_*() functions.
+** Re-used some of the old krb5_decode_ticket()
+** code here. This tkt should alloc/free just
+** like the real thing.
+*/
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_TKT2tkt( /* IN */ krb5_context krb5context,
+ /* IN */ KRB5_TKTBODY *asn1ticket,
+ /* OUT */ krb5_ticket **krb5ticket,
+ /* OUT */ KSSL_ERR *kssl_err )
+ {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ krb5_ticket *new5ticket = NULL;
+ ASN1_GENERALSTRING *gstr_svc, *gstr_host;
+
+ *krb5ticket = NULL;
+
+ if (asn1ticket == NULL || asn1ticket->realm == NULL ||
+ asn1ticket->sname == NULL ||
+ asn1ticket->sname->namestring == NULL ||
+ asn1ticket->sname->namestring->num < 2)
+ {
+ BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+ "Null field in asn1ticket.\n");
+ kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+
+ if ((new5ticket = (krb5_ticket *) calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_ticket)))==NULL)
+ {
+ BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+ "Unable to allocate new krb5_ticket.\n");
+ kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+ return ENOMEM; /* or KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; */
+ }
+
+ gstr_svc = (ASN1_GENERALSTRING*)asn1ticket->sname->namestring->data[0];
+ gstr_host = (ASN1_GENERALSTRING*)asn1ticket->sname->namestring->data[1];
+
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_build_principal_2(krb5context,
+ &new5ticket->server,
+ asn1ticket->realm->length, asn1ticket->realm->data,
+ gstr_svc->length, gstr_svc->data,
+ gstr_host->length, gstr_host->data)) != 0)
+ {
+ free(new5ticket);
+ BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+ "Error building ticket server principal.\n");
+ kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+ return krb5rc; /* or KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; */
+ }
+
+ krb5_princ_type(krb5context, new5ticket->server) =
+ asn1ticket->sname->nametype->data[0];
+ new5ticket->enc_part.enctype = asn1ticket->encdata->etype->data[0];
+ new5ticket->enc_part.kvno = asn1ticket->encdata->kvno->data[0];
+ new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.length =
+ asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length;
+ if ((new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.data =
+ calloc(1, asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length)) == NULL)
+ {
+ free(new5ticket);
+ BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+ "Error allocating cipher in krb5ticket.\n");
+ kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+ return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ memcpy(new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.data,
+ asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->data,
+ asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length);
+ }
+
+ *krb5ticket = new5ticket;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+
/* Given krb5 service name in KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx (typically "kssl"),
** and krb5 AP_REQ message & message length,
** Return Kerberos session key and client principle
@@ -711,24 +1122,27 @@
** 19990702 VRS Started.
*/
krb5_error_code
-kssl_sget_tkt( /* UPDATE */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
- /* IN */ char *msg, int msglen,
- /* OUT */ KSSL_ERR *kssl_err )
+kssl_sget_tkt( /* UPDATE */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
+ /* IN */ krb5_data *indata,
+ /* OUT */ krb5_ticket_times *ttimes,
+ /* OUT */ KSSL_ERR *kssl_err )
{
krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
static krb5_context krb5context = NULL;
static krb5_auth_context krb5auth_context = NULL;
krb5_ticket *krb5ticket = NULL;
+ KRB5_TKTBODY *asn1ticket = NULL;
+ unsigned char *p;
krb5_keytab krb5keytab = NULL;
+ krb5_keytab_entry kt_entry;
krb5_principal krb5server;
- krb5_data krb5in_data;
- krb5_flags ap_option;
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, 0, "");
if (!kssl_ctx)
{
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT, "No kssl_ctx defined.\n");
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "No kssl_ctx defined.\n");
goto err;
}
@@ -792,21 +1206,89 @@
}
/* Actual Kerberos5 krb5_recvauth() has initial conversation here
- ** o check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS unless KRB5_RECVAUTH_SKIP_VERSION
+ ** o check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS
+ ** unless KRB5_RECVAUTH_SKIP_VERSION
** o check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS
** o send "0" msg if all OK
*/
- krb5in_data.data = msg;
- krb5in_data.length = msglen;
- if ((krb5rc = krb5_rd_req(krb5context, &krb5auth_context, &krb5in_data,
- krb5server, krb5keytab, &ap_option, &krb5ticket)) != 0)
- {
+ /* 20010411 was using AP_REQ instead of true KerberosWrapper
+ **
+ ** if ((krb5rc = krb5_rd_req(krb5context, &krb5auth_context,
+ ** &krb5in_data, krb5server, krb5keytab,
+ ** &ap_option, &krb5ticket)) != 0) { Error }
+ */
+
+ p = indata->data;
+ if ((asn1ticket = (KRB5_TKTBODY *) d2i_KRB5_TICKET(NULL, &p,
+ (long) indata->length)) == NULL)
+ {
BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
- "krb5_rd_req() fails with %x.\n", krb5rc);
+ "d2i_KRB5_TICKET() ASN.1 decode failure.\n");
kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
goto err;
}
+
+ /* Was: krb5rc = krb5_decode_ticket(krb5in_data,&krb5ticket)) != 0) */
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_TKT2tkt(krb5context, asn1ticket, &krb5ticket,
+ kssl_err)) != 0)
+ {
+ BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+ "Error converting ASN.1 ticket to krb5_ticket.\n");
+ kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (! krb5_principal_compare(krb5context, krb5server,
+ krb5ticket->server)) {
+ krb5rc = KRB5_PRINC_NOMATCH;
+ BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+ "server principal != ticket principal\n");
+ kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((krb5rc = krb5_kt_get_entry(krb5context, krb5keytab,
+ krb5ticket->server, krb5ticket->enc_part.kvno,
+ krb5ticket->enc_part.enctype, &kt_entry)) != 0) {
+ BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+ "krb5_kt_get_entry() fails with %x.\n", krb5rc);
+ kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((krb5rc = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(krb5context, &kt_entry.key,
+ krb5ticket)) != 0) {
+ BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+ "krb5_decrypt_tkt_part() failed.\n");
+ kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else {
+ krb5_kt_free_entry(krb5context, &kt_entry);
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ int i; krb5_address **paddr = krb5ticket->enc_part2->caddrs;
+ printf("Decrypted ticket fields:\n");
+ printf("\tflags: %X, transit-type: %X",
+ krb5ticket->enc_part2->flags,
+ krb5ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_type);
+ print_krb5_data("\ttransit-data: ",
+ &(krb5ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_contents));
+ printf("\tcaddrs: %p, authdata: %p\n",
+ krb5ticket->enc_part2->caddrs,
+ krb5ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data);
+ printf("\tcaddrs:\n");
+ for (i=0; paddr[i] != NULL; i++)
+ { krb5_data d;
+ d.length=paddr[i]->length; d.data=paddr[i]->contents;
+ print_krb5_data("\t\tIP: ", &d);
+ }
+ printf("\tstart/auth/end times: %d / %d / %d\n",
+ krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime,
+ krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime,
+ krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime);
+ }
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ }
krb5rc = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED;
if (!krb5ticket || !krb5ticket->enc_part2 ||
@@ -829,13 +1311,26 @@
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET,
"kssl_ctx_setkey() fails.\n");
}
+ else if (krb5ticket->enc_part2->flags & TKT_FLG_INVALID)
+ {
+ krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_INVALID;
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET,
+ "invalid ticket from krb5_rd_req.\n");
+ }
else krb5rc = 0;
+ kssl_ctx->enctype = krb5ticket->enc_part.enctype;
+ ttimes->authtime = krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
+ ttimes->starttime = krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime;
+ ttimes->endtime = krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime;
+ ttimes->renew_till = krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till;
+
err:
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ if (asn1ticket) KRB5_TICKET_free((KRB5_TICKET *) asn1ticket);
if (krb5keytab) krb5_kt_close(krb5context, krb5keytab);
if (krb5ticket) krb5_free_ticket(krb5context, krb5ticket);
if (krb5server) krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5server);
@@ -860,7 +1355,8 @@
{
if (kssl_ctx == NULL) return kssl_ctx;
- if (kssl_ctx->key) memset(kssl_ctx->key, 0, kssl_ctx->length);
+ if (kssl_ctx->key) memset(kssl_ctx->key, 0,
+ kssl_ctx->length);
if (kssl_ctx->key) free(kssl_ctx->key);
if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) free(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
if (kssl_ctx->service_host) free(kssl_ctx->service_host);
@@ -953,6 +1449,10 @@
krb5_error_code
kssl_ctx_setkey(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_keyblock *session)
{
+ int length;
+ krb5_enctype enctype;
+ krb5_octet FAR *contents = NULL;
+
if (!kssl_ctx) return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
if (kssl_ctx->key)
@@ -963,8 +1463,18 @@
if (session)
{
- kssl_ctx->enctype = session->enctype;
- kssl_ctx->length = session->length;
+
+#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
+ length = session->keyvalue->length;
+ enctype = session->keytype;
+ contents = session->keyvalue->contents;
+#else
+ length = session->length;
+ enctype = session->enctype;
+ contents = session->contents;
+#endif
+ kssl_ctx->enctype = enctype;
+ kssl_ctx->length = length;
}
else
{
@@ -980,7 +1490,7 @@
return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
}
else
- memcpy(kssl_ctx->key, session->contents, session->length);
+ memcpy(kssl_ctx->key, contents, length);
return KSSL_CTX_OK;
}
@@ -1026,11 +1536,269 @@
#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
data->length = 0;
free(data->if (data->data) data);
+#elif defined(KRB5_MIT_OLD11)
+ if (data->data) {
+ krb5_xfree(data->data);
+ data->data = 0;
+ }
#else
krb5_free_data_contents(NULL, data);
#endif
}
+
+/* Helper function for kssl_validate_times().
+** We need context->clockskew, but krb5_context is an opaque struct.
+** So we try to sneek the clockskew out through the replay cache.
+** If that fails just return a likely default (300 seconds).
+*/
+krb5_deltat get_rc_clockskew(krb5_context context)
+ {
+ krb5_rcache rc;
+ krb5_deltat clockskew;
+
+ if (krb5_rc_default(context, &rc)) return KSSL_CLOCKSKEW;
+ if (krb5_rc_initialize(context, rc, 0)) return KSSL_CLOCKSKEW;
+ if (krb5_rc_get_lifespan(context, rc, &clockskew)) {
+ clockskew = KSSL_CLOCKSKEW;
+ }
+ (void) krb5_rc_destroy(context, rc);
+ return clockskew;
+ }
+
+
+/* kssl_validate_times() combines (and more importantly exposes)
+** the MIT KRB5 internal function krb5_validate_times() and the
+** in_clock_skew() macro. The authenticator client time is checked
+** to be within clockskew secs of the current time and the current
+** time is checked to be within the ticket start and expire times.
+** Either check may be omitted by supplying a NULL value.
+** Returns 0 for valid times, SSL_R_KRB5* error codes otherwise.
+** See Also: (Kerberos source)/krb5/lib/krb5/krb/valid_times.c
+** 20010420 VRS
+*/
+krb5_error_code kssl_validate_times( krb5_timestamp atime,
+ krb5_ticket_times *ttimes)
+ {
+ krb5_deltat skew;
+ krb5_timestamp start, now;
+ krb5_error_code rc;
+ krb5_context context;
+
+ if ((rc = krb5_init_context(&context))) return SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET;
+ skew = get_rc_clockskew(context);
+ if ((rc = krb5_timeofday(context,&now))) return SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET;
+ krb5_free_context(context);
+
+ if (atime && labs(atime - now) >= skew) return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW;
+
+ if (! ttimes) return 0;
+
+ start = (ttimes->starttime != 0)? ttimes->starttime: ttimes->authtime;
+ if (start - now > skew) return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV;
+ if ((now - ttimes->endtime) > skew) return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("kssl_validate_times: %d |<- | %d - %d | < %d ->| %d\n",
+ start, atime, now, skew, ttimes->endtime);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+
+/* Decode and decrypt given DER-encoded authenticator, then pass
+** authenticator ctime back in *atimep (or 0 if time unavailable).
+** Returns krb5_error_code and kssl_err on error. A NULL
+** authenticator (authentp->length == 0) is not considered an error.
+** Note that kssl_check_authent() makes use of the KRB5 session key;
+** you must call kssl_sget_tkt() to get the key before calling this routine.
+*/
+krb5_error_code kssl_check_authent(
+ /* IN */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
+ /* IN */ krb5_data *authentp,
+ /* OUT */ krb5_timestamp *atimep,
+ /* OUT */ KSSL_ERR *kssl_err )
+ {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc = 0;
+ KRB5_ENCDATA *dec_authent = NULL;
+ KRB5_AUTHENTBODY *auth = NULL;
+ krb5_enctype enctype;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char *p, *unenc_authent, *tbuf = NULL;
+ int padl, outl, unencbufsize;
+ struct tm tm_time, *tm_l, *tm_g;
+ time_t now, tl, tg, tz_offset;
+
+ *atimep = 0;
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, 0, "");
+
+#ifndef KRB5CHECKAUTH
+ authentp = NULL;
+#else
+#if KRB5CHECKAUTH == 0
+ authentp = NULL;
+#endif
+#endif /* KRB5CHECKAUTH */
+
+ if (authentp == NULL || authentp->length == 0) return 0;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("kssl_check_authent: authenticator[%d]:\n",authentp->length);
+ p = authentp->data;
+ for (padl=0; padl < authentp->length; padl++) printf("%02x ",p[padl]);
+ printf("\n");
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ unencbufsize = 2 * authentp->length;
+ if ((unenc_authent = calloc(1, unencbufsize)) == NULL)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "Unable to allocate authenticator buffer.\n");
+ krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = authentp->data;
+ if ((dec_authent = d2i_KRB5_ENCDATA(NULL, &p,
+ (long) authentp->length)) == NULL)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "Error decoding authenticator.\n");
+ krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ enctype = dec_authent->etype->data[0]; /* should = kssl_ctx->enctype */
+ enc = kssl_map_enc(enctype);
+ memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH); /* per RFC 1510 */
+
+ EVP_DecryptInit(&ciph_ctx, enc, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, unenc_authent, &outl,
+ dec_authent->cipher->data, dec_authent->cipher->length);
+ if (outl > unencbufsize)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "Buffer overflow decrypting authenticator.\n");
+ krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_DecryptFinal(&ciph_ctx, &(unenc_authent[outl]), &padl);
+ outl += padl;
+ if (outl > unencbufsize)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "Buffer overflow decrypting authenticator.\n");
+ krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("kssl_check_authent: decrypted authenticator[%d] =\n", outl);
+ for (padl=0; padl < outl; padl++) printf("%02x ",unenc_authent[padl]);
+ printf("\n");
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if ((p = kssl_skip_confound(enctype, unenc_authent)) == NULL)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "confounded by authenticator.\n");
+ krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ outl -= p - unenc_authent;
+
+ if ((auth = (KRB5_AUTHENTBODY *) d2i_KRB5_AUTHENT(NULL, &p,
+ (long) outl))==NULL)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "Error decoding authenticator body.\n");
+ krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((tbuf = calloc(1, auth->ctime->length + 1)) == NULL)
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "Unable to allocate atime buffer.\n");
+ krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else strncpy(tbuf, auth->ctime->data, auth->ctime->length);
+
+ if (strptime(tbuf, "%Y%m%d%H%M%S", &tm_time) != NULL)
+ {
+ now = time(&now);
+ tm_l = localtime(&now); tl = mktime(tm_l);
+ tm_g = gmtime(&now); tg = mktime(tm_g);
+ tz_offset = tg - tl;
+
+ *atimep = mktime(&tm_time) - tz_offset;
+ }
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("kssl_check_authent: client time %s = %d\n", tbuf, *atimep);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ err:
+ if (tbuf) free(tbuf);
+ if (auth) KRB5_AUTHENT_free((KRB5_AUTHENT *) auth);
+ if (dec_authent) KRB5_ENCDATA_free(dec_authent);
+ if (unenc_authent) free(unenc_authent);
+ return krb5rc;
+ }
+
+
+/* Replaces krb5_build_principal_ext(), with varargs length == 2 (svc, host),
+** because I dont't know how to stub varargs.
+** Returns krb5_error_code == ENOMEM on alloc error, otherwise
+** passes back newly constructed principal, which should be freed by caller.
+*/
+krb5_error_code kssl_build_principal_2(
+ /* UPDATE */ krb5_context context,
+ /* OUT */ krb5_principal *princ,
+ /* IN */ int rlen, const char *realm,
+ /* IN */ int slen, const char *svc,
+ /* IN */ int hlen, const char *host)
+ {
+ krb5_data *p_data = NULL;
+ krb5_principal new_p = NULL;
+ char *new_r = NULL;
+
+ if ((p_data = (krb5_data *) calloc(2, sizeof(krb5_data))) == NULL ||
+ (new_p = (krb5_principal) calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_principal_data)))
+ == NULL) goto err;
+ new_p->length = 2;
+ new_p->data = p_data;
+
+ if ((new_r = calloc(1, rlen + 1)) == NULL) goto err;
+ memcpy(new_r, realm, rlen);
+ krb5_princ_set_realm_length(context, new_p, rlen);
+ krb5_princ_set_realm_data(context, new_p, new_r);
+
+ if ((new_p->data[0].data = calloc(1, slen + 1)) == NULL) goto err;
+ memcpy(new_p->data[0].data, svc, slen);
+ new_p->data[0].length = slen;
+
+ if ((new_p->data[1].data = calloc(1, hlen + 1)) == NULL) goto err;
+ memcpy(new_p->data[1].data, host, hlen);
+ new_p->data[1].length = hlen;
+
+ krb5_princ_type(context, new_p) = KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN;
+ *princ = new_p;
+ return 0;
+
+ err:
+ if (new_p && new_p[0].data) free(new_p[0].data);
+ if (new_p && new_p[1].data) free(new_p[1].data);
+ if (new_p) free(new_p);
+ if (new_r) free(new_r);
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+
#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#if defined(PEDANTIC) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
diff --git a/ssl/kssl.h b/ssl/kssl.h
index ef0fc84..7319b3d 100644
--- a/ssl/kssl.h
+++ b/ssl/kssl.h
@@ -96,6 +96,17 @@
#define KRB5KEYTAB "/etc/krb5.keytab"
#endif
+#ifndef KRB5SENDAUTH
+#define KRB5SENDAUTH 1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef KRB5CHECKAUTH
+#define KRB5CHECKAUTH 1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef KSSL_CLOCKSKEW
+#define KSSL_CLOCKSKEW 300;
+#endif
#define KSSL_ERR_MAX 255
typedef struct kssl_err_st {
@@ -139,6 +150,8 @@
char *kstring(char *string);
char *knumber(int len, krb5_octet *contents);
+EVP_CIPHER *kssl_map_enc(krb5_enctype enctype);
+
/* Public (for use by applications that use OpenSSL with Kerberos 5 support */
krb5_error_code kssl_ctx_setstring(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which, char *text);
@@ -147,13 +160,21 @@
void kssl_ctx_show(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx);
krb5_error_code kssl_ctx_setprinc(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which,
krb5_data *realm, krb5_data *entity);
-krb5_error_code kssl_cget_tkt(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_data *ap_req,
- KSSL_ERR *kssl_err);
-krb5_error_code kssl_sget_tkt(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, char *msg, int msglen,
- KSSL_ERR *kssl_err);
+krb5_error_code kssl_cget_tkt(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_data **enc_tktp,
+ krb5_data *authenp, KSSL_ERR *kssl_err);
+krb5_error_code kssl_sget_tkt(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_data *indata,
+ krb5_ticket_times *ttimes, KSSL_ERR *kssl_err);
krb5_error_code kssl_ctx_setkey(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_keyblock *session);
void kssl_err_set(KSSL_ERR *kssl_err, int reason, char *text);
void kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_context context, krb5_data *data);
+krb5_error_code kssl_build_principal_2(krb5_context context,
+ krb5_principal *princ, int rlen, const char *realm,
+ int slen, const char *svc, int hlen, const char *host);
+krb5_error_code kssl_validate_times(krb5_timestamp atime,
+ krb5_ticket_times *ttimes);
+krb5_error_code kssl_check_authent(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_data *authentp,
+ krb5_timestamp *atimep, KSSL_ERR *kssl_err);
+unsigned char *kssl_skip_confound(krb5_enctype enctype, unsigned char *authn);
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index a700c64..93a87c4 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -785,13 +785,13 @@
* certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */
x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
sk=NULL;
- /* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end */
+ /* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);
/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
- need_cert =
- ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
+ need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
+ & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
== (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))? 0: 1;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
@@ -801,11 +801,12 @@
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms, need_cert);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)))
+ if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)))
{
x=NULL;
al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
@@ -814,7 +815,8 @@
{
x=NULL;
al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
@@ -1427,65 +1429,121 @@
{
krb5_error_code krb5rc;
KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
- krb5_data krb5_ap_req;
+ /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
+ krb5_data *enc_ticket;
+ krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
l, SSL_kKRB5);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- /*
- ** Tried to send random tmp_buf[] as PMS in Kerberos ticket
- ** by passing krb5_mk_req_extended(ctx,authctx,opts, tmp_buf, ...)
- ** but: I can't retrieve the PMS on the other side! There is
- ** some indication in the krb5 source that this is only used
- ** to generate a checksum. OTOH, the Tung book shows data
- ** ("GET widget01.txt") being passed in krb5_mk_req_extended()
- ** by way of krb5_sendauth(). I don't get it.
- ** Until Kerberos goes 3DES, the big PMS secret would only be
- ** encrypted in 1-DES anyway. So losing the PMS shouldn't be
- ** a big deal.
- */
- krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &krb5_ap_req,
- &kssl_err);
+ authp = NULL;
+#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
+ if (KRB5SENDAUTH) authp = &authenticator;
+#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
+
+ krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
+ &kssl_err);
+ enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
- kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
- printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
+ printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (krb5rc)
{
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+ SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ kssl_err.reason);
goto err;
}
- /* Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
- */
- n = krb5_ap_req.length;
- memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
- if (krb5_ap_req.data)
- kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
+ /* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
+ ** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
+ **
+ ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
+ ** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
+ ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
+ ** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
+ ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
+ **
+ ** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
+ ** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
+ ** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
+ ** with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
+ ** Example:
+ ** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
+ ** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
+ ** optional authenticator omitted.
+ */
- /* 19991013 VRS - 3DES is kind of bogus here,
- ** at least until Kerberos supports 3DES. The only
- ** real secret is the 8-byte Kerberos session key;
- ** the other key material ((s->) client_random, server_random)
- ** could be sniffed. Mixing in these nonces should help
- ** protect against replay attacks, however.
- **
- ** Alternate code for Kerberos Purists:
- **
- ** memcpy(s->session->master_key, kssl_ctx->key, kssl_ctx->length);
- ** s->session->master_key_length = kssl_ctx->length;
- */
+ /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
+ s2n(enc_ticket->length,p);
+ memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
+ p+= enc_ticket->length;
+ n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
+ if (authp && authp->length)
+ {
+ s2n(authp->length,p);
+ memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
+ p+= authp->length;
+ n+= authp->length + 2;
+
+ free(authp->data);
+ authp->data = NULL;
+ authp->length = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s2n(0,p);/* null authenticator length */
+ n+=2;
+ }
+
+ if (RAND_bytes(tmp_buf,SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
+ ** EVP_EncryptInit(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
+ ** EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
+ ** kssl_ctx->length);
+ ** EVP_EncryptInit(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
+ */
+
+ memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH); /* per RFC 1510 */
+ EVP_EncryptInit(&ciph_ctx,enc, kssl_ctx->key,iv);
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf,
+ SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+ EVP_EncryptFinal(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl);
+ outl += padl;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
+ s2n(outl,p);
+ memcpy(p, epms, outl);
+ p+=outl;
+ n+=outl + 2;
+
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key, kssl_ctx->key,kssl_ctx->length);
+ s->session->master_key,
+ tmp_buf, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+
+ memset(tmp_buf, 0, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+ memset(epms, 0, outl);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 09fcc59..9fcf8c0 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
@@ -1452,13 +1453,46 @@
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
{
- krb5_error_code krb5rc;
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc;
+ krb5_data enc_ticket;
+ krb5_data authenticator;
+ krb5_data enc_pms;
+ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ int padl, outl = sizeof(pms);
+ krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
+ krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx,
- s->init_buf->data, s->init_buf->length,
- &kssl_err)) != 0)
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ enc_ticket.length = i;
+ enc_ticket.data = p;
+ p+=enc_ticket.length;
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ authenticator.length = i;
+ authenticator.data = p;
+ p+=authenticator.length;
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ enc_pms.length = i;
+ enc_pms.data = p;
+ p+=enc_pms.length;
+
+ if (n != enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
+ enc_pms.length + 6)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
+ &kssl_err)) != 0)
{
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
@@ -1471,34 +1505,71 @@
goto err;
}
+ /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
+ ** but will return authtime == 0.
+ */
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
+ &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
+ {
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
+ krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+ if (kssl_err.text)
+ printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- /* 19991013 VRS - 3DES is kind of bogus here,
- ** at least until Kerberos supports 3DES. The only
- ** real secret is the 8-byte Kerberos session key;
- ** the other key material (client_random, server_random)
- ** could be sniffed. Nonces may help against replays though.
- **
- ** Alternate code for Kerberos Purists:
- **
- ** memcpy(s->session->master_key, kssl_ctx->key, kssl_ctx->length);
- ** s->session->master_key_length = kssl_ctx->length;
- */
+ enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
+ memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH); /* per RFC 1510 */
+
+ EVP_DecryptInit(&ciph_ctx,enc,kssl_ctx->key,iv);
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
+ enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length);
+ if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_DecryptFinal(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl);
+ outl += padl;
+ if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key, kssl_ctx->key, kssl_ctx->length);
- /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, but it caused problems for apache.
- ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
- ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
+ s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
+
+ /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
+ ** but it caused problems for apache.
+ ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
+ ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
*/
}
else
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h
index e2e80dc..216afd9 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -1459,13 +1459,17 @@
#define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND 280
#define SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE 278
#define SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST 279
+#define SSL_R_KRB5 1104
#define SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC 1094
#define SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED 1095
#define SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT 1096
#define SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ 1097
#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET 1098
#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT 1099
-#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ 1100
+#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ 1108
+#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED 1105
+#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV 1106
+#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW 1107
#define SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH 159
#define SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT 160
#define SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG 274
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_err.c b/ssl/ssl_err.c
index 481481b..26410b9 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_err.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -273,13 +273,17 @@
{SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND ,"invalid command"},
{SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE ,"invalid purpose"},
{SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST ,"invalid trust"},
-{SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC ,"krb5 c cc princ"},
-{SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED ,"krb5 c get cred"},
-{SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT ,"krb5 c init"},
-{SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ ,"krb5 c mk req"},
-{SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET ,"krb5 s bad ticket"},
-{SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT ,"krb5 s init"},
-{SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ ,"krb5 s rd req"},
+{SSL_R_KRB5 ,"krb5"},
+{SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC ,"krb5 client cc principal (no tkt?)"},
+{SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED ,"krb5 client get cred"},
+{SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT ,"krb5 client init"},
+{SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ ,"krb5 client mk_req (expired tkt?)"},
+{SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET ,"krb5 server bad ticket"},
+{SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT ,"krb5 server init"},
+{SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ ,"krb5 server rd_req (keytab perms?)"},
+{SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED ,"krb5 server tkt expired"},
+{SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV ,"krb5 server tkt not yet valid"},
+{SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW ,"krb5 server tkt skew"},
{SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH ,"length mismatch"},
{SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT ,"length too short"},
{SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG ,"library bug"},
