Implement SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG for servers.
Call dh_tmp_cb with correct 'is_export' flag.
Avoid tabs in CHANGES.
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index e23ca20..64c1d80 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -982,7 +982,7 @@
dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
- !SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
if (dhp == NULL)
{
@@ -1326,11 +1326,22 @@
goto f_err;
}
- if ((p[0] != (s->client_version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->client_version & 0xff)))
+ if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
- goto f_err;
+ /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
+ * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
+ * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
+ * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
+ * version instead if the servers does not support the requested
+ * protocol version.
+ * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
+ if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
+ (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
}
s->session->master_key_length=
