Fix misc size_t issues causing Windows warnings in 64 bit
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
index 194243f..bde5373 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
@@ -1358,18 +1358,19 @@
return 0;
}
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
- PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
+ (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
|| (s->srp_ctx.g =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
- PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
+ (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
|| (s->srp_ctx.s =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
- PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
+ (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
|| (s->srp_ctx.B =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
- PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
+ (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
return 0;
@@ -1419,10 +1420,12 @@
goto err;
}
- p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
- g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL);
- bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key),
- NULL);
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
+ p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
+ g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
+ NULL);
+ bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
+ (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1710,8 +1713,10 @@
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
- PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) {
+ (unsigned int)PACKET_remaining(&signature),
+ pkey) <= 0) {
/* bad signature */
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
@@ -2193,7 +2198,8 @@
pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0) {
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
+ if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
goto err;
}
@@ -2283,7 +2289,7 @@
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
- int encoded_pt_len = 0;
+ size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
int ret = 0;
@@ -2375,8 +2381,10 @@
}
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
- /* Generate session key */
- || RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+ /* Generate session key
+ * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
+ */
+ || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
@@ -2617,7 +2625,7 @@
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
|| (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
&& !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
- s->session->master_key_length,
+ (int)s->session->master_key_length,
s->session->master_key))
|| !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, sig, &u, pkey)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);