PR: 1835 Submitted by: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> Approved by: steve@openssl.org Fix various typos.
diff --git a/MacOS/GetHTTPS.src/ErrorHandling.hpp b/MacOS/GetHTTPS.src/ErrorHandling.hpp index 3036df7..fbfbe78 100644 --- a/MacOS/GetHTTPS.src/ErrorHandling.hpp +++ b/MacOS/GetHTTPS.src/ErrorHandling.hpp
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ -// A bunch of evil macros that would be uneccessary if I were always using C++ ! +// A bunch of evil macros that would be unnecessary if I were always using C++ ! #define SetErrorMessageAndBailIfNil(theArg,theMessage) \ { \
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_bytes.c b/crypto/asn1/a_bytes.c index 8d13f9c..92d630c 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/a_bytes.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/a_bytes.c
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ if (tag >= 32) { - i=ASN1_R_TAG_VALUE_TOO_HIGH;; + i=ASN1_R_TAG_VALUE_TOO_HIGH; goto err; } if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(tag) & type))
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bntest.c b/crypto/bn/bntest.c index 565590a..14990bc 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bntest.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bntest.c
@@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ BN_bntest_rand(b,2+i,0,0); /**/ if (!BN_mod_exp(d,a,b,c,ctx)) - return(00); + return(0); if (bp != NULL) { @@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ BN_bntest_rand(b,2+i,0,0); /**/ if (!BN_exp(d,a,b,ctx)) - return(00); + return(0); if (bp != NULL) {
diff --git a/crypto/des/times/usparc.cc b/crypto/des/times/usparc.cc index f6ec8e8..0864285 100644 --- a/crypto/des/times/usparc.cc +++ b/crypto/des/times/usparc.cc
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ For the ultra sparc, SunC 4.0 cc -fast -Xa -xO5, running 'des_opts' gives a speed of 475,000 des/s while 'speed' gives 417,000 des/s. -I belive the difference is tied up in optimisation that the compiler +I believe the difference is tied up in optimisation that the compiler is able to perform when the code is 'inlined'. For 'speed', the DES routines are being linked from a library. I'll record the higher speed since if performance is everything, you can always inline
diff --git a/crypto/ripemd/README b/crypto/ripemd/README index 7097707..f1ffc8b 100644 --- a/crypto/ripemd/README +++ b/crypto/ripemd/README
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ This is my implementation of RIPEMD-160. The pentium assember is a little off the pace since I only get 1050 cycles, while the best is 1013. I have a few ideas for how to get another 20 or so cycles, but at -this point I will not bother right now. I belive the trick will be +this point I will not bother right now. I believe the trick will be to remove my 'copy X array onto stack' until inside the RIP1() finctions the first time round. To do this I need another register and will only have one temporary one. A bit tricky.... I can also cleanup the saving of the 5 words
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c index 706a2b4..4a87517 100644 --- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c +++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ CONF_VALUE *vtmp = NULL; char *tname = NULL, *tvalue = NULL; if(name && !(tname = BUF_strdup(name))) goto err; - if(value && !(tvalue = BUF_strdup(value))) goto err;; + if(value && !(tvalue = BUF_strdup(value))) goto err; if(!(vtmp = (CONF_VALUE *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CONF_VALUE)))) goto err; if(!*extlist && !(*extlist = sk_CONF_VALUE_new_null())) goto err; vtmp->section = NULL;
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CIPHER_get_name.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CIPHER_get_name.pod index f81f692..f62a869 100644 --- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CIPHER_get_name.pod +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CIPHER_get_name.pod
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER_description() returns a textual description of the cipher used into the buffer B<buf> of length B<len> provided. B<len> must be at least -128 bytes, otherwise a pointer to the the string "Buffer too small" is +128 bytes, otherwise a pointer to the string "Buffer too small" is returned. If B<buf> is NULL, a buffer of 128 bytes is allocated using OPENSSL_malloc(). If the allocation fails, a pointer to the string "OPENSSL_malloc Error" is returned.
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod index ca8d81b..8156683 100644 --- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ shall be specified, the NULL pointer can be used for B<verify_callback>. In this case last B<verify_callback> set specifically for this B<ssl> remains. If no special B<callback> was set before, the default callback for the underlying -B<ctx> is used, that was valid at the the time B<ssl> was created with +B<ctx> is used, that was valid at the time B<ssl> was created with L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>. SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() sets the maximum B<depth> for the certificate chain
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_free.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_free.pod index 558de01..110ec73 100644 --- a/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_free.pod +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_free.pod
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ SSL_SESSION_free() decrements the reference count of B<session> and removes the B<SSL_SESSION> structure pointed to by B<session> and frees up the allocated -memory, if the the reference count has reached 0. +memory, if the reference count has reached 0. =head1 NOTES
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_free.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_free.pod index 2d4f8b6..13c1abd 100644 --- a/doc/ssl/SSL_free.pod +++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_free.pod
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ SSL_free() decrements the reference count of B<ssl>, and removes the SSL structure pointed to by B<ssl> and frees up the allocated memory if the -the reference count has reached 0. +reference count has reached 0. =head1 NOTES
diff --git a/doc/ssleay.txt b/doc/ssleay.txt index c753129..a8b04d7 100644 --- a/doc/ssleay.txt +++ b/doc/ssleay.txt
@@ -3800,9 +3800,9 @@ copies of the origional postings if people are interested. RSA I believe claim that they were 'trade-secrets' and that some-one broke an NDA in revealing them. Other claim they reverse engineered the algorithms from -compiled binaries. If the algorithms were reverse engineered, I belive +compiled binaries. If the algorithms were reverse engineered, I believe RSA had no legal leg to stand on. If an NDA was broken, I don't know. -Regardless, RSA, I belive, is willing to go to court over the issue so +Regardless, RSA, I believe, is willing to go to court over the issue so licencing is probably the best idea, or at least talk to them. If there are people who actually know more about this, pease let me know, I don't want to vilify or spread miss-information if I can help it.
diff --git a/ssl/kssl.c b/ssl/kssl.c index 56e5eee..864eb83 100644 --- a/ssl/kssl.c +++ b/ssl/kssl.c
@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ if (kssl_err == NULL) return; kssl_err->reason = reason; - BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX, text); + BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX, "%s", text); return; }
diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c index 5d89086..f83389b 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ long num1; void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; int ret= -1; - int new_state,state,skip=0;; + int new_state,state,skip=0; RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); ERR_clear_error();
diff --git a/test/times b/test/times index 49aeebf..738d569 100644 --- a/test/times +++ b/test/times
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ --- Appendix --- - The time measured is user time but these number a very rough. - Remember this is the cost of both client and server sides of the protocol. -- The TCP/kernal overhead of connection establishment is normally the +- The TCP/kernel overhead of connection establishment is normally the killer in SSL. Often delays in the TCP protocol will make session-id reuse look slower that new sessions, but this would not be the case on a loaded server.