Implementation of pkey_rsa_verify. Some constification.
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa.h b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
index e9f8769..02fdcd7 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
@@ -117,7 +117,8 @@
unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
int (*rsa_verify)(int dtype,
const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length,
- unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa);
+ const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
+ const RSA *rsa);
/* If this callback is NULL, the builtin software RSA key-gen will be used. This
* is for behavioural compatibility whilst the code gets rewired, but one day
* it would be nice to assume there are no such things as "builtin software"
@@ -281,7 +282,7 @@
int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length,
unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa);
int RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_length,
- unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa);
+ const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa);
/* The following 2 function sign and verify a ASN1_OCTET_STRING
* object inside PKCS#1 padded RSA encryption */
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
index 001dbd0..5501965 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@
BIGNUM *pub_exp;
/* RSA padding mode */
int pad_mode;
- /* nid for message digest */
+ /* message digest */
const EVP_MD *md;
/* Temp buffer */
unsigned char *tbuf;
@@ -154,6 +154,9 @@
ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md),
tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
+ ret = sltmp;
}
else
return -1;
@@ -169,8 +172,8 @@
static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
- unsigned char *sig, int *siglen,
- const unsigned char *tbs, int tbslen)
+ unsigned char *rout, int *routlen,
+ const unsigned char *sig, int siglen)
{
int ret;
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
@@ -181,7 +184,7 @@
{
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
return -1;
- ret = RSA_public_decrypt(tbslen, tbs,
+ ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig,
rctx->tbuf, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
RSA_X931_PADDING);
if (ret < 1)
@@ -200,27 +203,66 @@
RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
- memcpy(sig, rctx->tbuf, ret);
+ if (rout)
+ memcpy(rout, rctx->tbuf, ret);
}
else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
{
unsigned int sltmp;
ret = int_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md),
- NULL, 0, sig, &sltmp,
- tbs, tbslen, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
+ NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
+ sig, siglen, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
}
else
return -1;
}
else
- ret = RSA_public_decrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+ ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
rctx->pad_mode);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- *siglen = ret;
+ *routlen = ret;
return 1;
}
+static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *sig, int siglen,
+ const unsigned char *tbs, int tbslen)
+ {
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ int rslen;
+ if (rctx->md)
+ {
+ if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+ return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen,
+ sig, siglen, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
+ if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING)
+ {
+ if (pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &rslen,
+ sig, siglen) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+ return -1;
+ rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
+ ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
+ if (rslen <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+
+ }
+
+
static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outlen,
const unsigned char *in, int inlen)
{
@@ -341,7 +383,8 @@
0,
pkey_rsa_sign,
- 0,0,
+ 0,
+ pkey_rsa_verify,
0,
pkey_rsa_verifyrecover,
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
index 4d48164..52c8c98 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@
int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
unsigned char *rm, unsigned int *prm_len,
- unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
+ const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
RSA *rsa)
{
int i,ret=0,sigtype;
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@
}
int RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
- unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
+ const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
RSA *rsa)
{
diff --git a/engines/e_4758cca.c b/engines/e_4758cca.c
index a908949..9f6572e 100644
--- a/engines/e_4758cca.c
+++ b/engines/e_4758cca.c
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@
static int cca_rsa_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
static int cca_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
- unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa);
+ const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa);
/* utility functions */
/*-----------------------*/
@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@
#define SSL_SIG_LEN 36
static int cca_rsa_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
- unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa)
+ const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, const RSA *rsa)
{
long returnCode;
long reasonCode;
@@ -727,7 +727,8 @@
digitalSignatureVerify(&returnCode, &reasonCode, &exitDataLength,
exitData, &ruleArrayLength, ruleArray, &keyTokenLength,
- keyToken, &length, hashBuffer, &lsiglen, sigbuf);
+ keyToken, &length, hashBuffer, &lsiglen,
+ (unsigned char *)sigbuf);
if (type == NID_sha1 || type == NID_md5)
{
