various spelling fixes
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/952)
diff --git a/ssl/d1_lib.c b/ssl/d1_lib.c
index 6d75225..193f603 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_lib.c
@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@
}
/*
- * This is unneccessary if rbio and wbio are one and the same - but
+ * This is unnecessary if rbio and wbio are one and the same - but
* maybe they're not. We ignore errors here - some BIOs do not
* support this.
*/
diff --git a/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c b/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c
index 00af44e..6f9ac96 100644
--- a/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c
+++ b/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c
@@ -666,7 +666,7 @@
if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
/*
- * XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello may be
+ * XDTLS: In a pathological case, the Client Hello may be
* fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes
*/
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < dest_maxlen) {
diff --git a/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c b/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c
index 773a6d6..4a5907b 100644
--- a/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c
+++ b/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@
/*
* Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
* better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
- * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
+ * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
* compromise is considered worthy.
*/
if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
@@ -631,7 +631,7 @@
split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
/*
* If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
- * 1 pipeline. Similaraly if the cipher does not support pipelined
+ * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
* processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
* explicit IVs
*/
@@ -810,7 +810,7 @@
/*
* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
* multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
- * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
+ * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
*/
align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
align = (0-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
@@ -862,7 +862,7 @@
*(outbuf[j]++) = (s->version >> 8);
/*
- * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
+ * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
* and record version number > TLS 1.0
*/
if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
@@ -1445,7 +1445,7 @@
/*
* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
* renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
- * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
+ * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
* presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
* future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
* the peer refused it where we carry on.
diff --git a/ssl/s3_enc.c b/ssl/s3_enc.c
index 35ef948..ec5ff9b 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@
goto err;
else
/*
- * make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error
+ * make sure it's initialised in case we exit later with an error
*/
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);
dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@
goto err;
else
/*
- * make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error
+ * make sure it's initialised in case we exit later with an error
*/
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_write_ctx);
dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c
index ef65050..fc2aac8 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -3839,7 +3839,7 @@
if (ret == -1) {
/*
* we only get to return -1 here the 2nd/Nth invocation, we must
- * have already signalled return 0 upon a previous invoation,
+ * have already signalled return 0 upon a previous invocation,
* return WANT_WRITE
*/
return (ret);
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
index a4bf76e..dc7debb 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_cert.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -853,7 +853,7 @@
return 1;
}
-/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM strcuture */
+/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM structure */
int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l)
{
BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf;
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_err.c b/ssl/ssl_err.c
index 1b59533..fe68590 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_err.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH), "renegotiation mismatch"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING), "required cipher missing"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING),
- "required compresssion algorithm missing"},
+ "required compression algorithm missing"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING),
"scsv received when renegotiating"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SCT_VERIFICATION_FAILED), "sct verification failed"},
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index 99d88b3..81c4b67 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -3722,7 +3722,7 @@
/*
* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
- * vairable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any.
+ * variable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any.
* If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md Returns newly
* allocated ctx;
*/
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_txt.c b/ssl/ssl_txt.c
index b2c6bf7..e0f82ec 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_txt.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_txt.c
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@
/*
* the RSA prefix is required by the format's definition although there's
- * nothing RSA-specifc in the output, therefore, we don't have to check if
+ * nothing RSA-specific in the output, therefore, we don't have to check if
* the cipher suite is based on RSA
*/
if (BIO_puts(bp, "RSA ") <= 0)
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem.h b/ssl/statem/statem.h
index 263a395..f8f79cf 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem.h
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem.h
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
/*****************************************************************************
* *
- * These emums should be considered PRIVATE to the state machine. No *
+ * These enums should be considered PRIVATE to the state machine. No *
* non-state machine code should need to use these *
* *
*****************************************************************************/
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
index 768cf83..a63d4d0 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
@@ -870,7 +870,7 @@
* 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
* 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
* 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
- * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
+ * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
* 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
* 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
* know that is maximum server supports.
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 06ed3d3..0a66c09 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -769,7 +769,7 @@
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/*
- * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity
+ * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
* @s: SSL connection
* @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
*
@@ -1181,7 +1181,7 @@
/*-
* check for enough space.
- * 4 for the servername type and entension length
+ * 4 for the servername type and extension length
* 2 for servernamelist length
* 1 for the hostname type
* 2 for hostname length
@@ -1219,7 +1219,7 @@
/*-
* check for enough space.
- * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
+ * 4 for the srp type type and extension length
* 1 for the srp user identity
* + srp user identity length
*/
@@ -1416,7 +1416,7 @@
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
/*
- * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
+ * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
* for Next Protocol Negotiation
*/
if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
@@ -2006,7 +2006,7 @@
/*
* Although the server_name extension was intended to be
* extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
- * syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
+ * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
* such.
* RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
* is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
@@ -2237,7 +2237,7 @@
*
* s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
* probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
- * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
+ * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
* there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
* earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
* anything like that, but this might change).
@@ -2739,7 +2739,8 @@
{
int al;
size_t i;
- /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
+
+ /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
@@ -3077,7 +3078,7 @@
* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
*
* etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
- * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
+ * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
* sess_id: points at the session ID.
* sesslen: the length of the session ID.
* psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
