Don't crash when processing a zero-length, TLS >= 1.1 record.

The previous CBC patch was bugged in that there was a path through enc()
in s3_pkt.c/d1_pkt.c which didn't set orig_len. orig_len would be left
at the previous value which could suggest that the packet was a
sufficient length when it wasn't.
(cherry picked from commit 6cb19b7681f600b2f165e4adc57547b097b475fd)

ssl/s3_pkt.c

diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index b2e5dc1..3e60f50 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -401,8 +401,13 @@
 
 	/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
 	rr->data=rr->input;
+	rr->orig_len=rr->length;
 
 	enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
+	/* enc_err is:
+	 *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+	 *    1: if the padding is valid
+	 *    -1: if the padding is invalid */
 	if (enc_err == 0)
 		{
 		/* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */