OpenSSL Security Advisory [30 July 2002]
Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory,
Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number
F30602-01-2-0537.
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 270afb8..782b57f 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
@@ -964,6 +965,7 @@
s->session->session_id_length=0;
sl=s->session->session_id_length;
+ die(sl <= sizeof s->session->session_id);
*(p++)=sl;
memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
p+=sl;
@@ -1559,8 +1561,8 @@
EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
- + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + 1];
- int padl, outl = sizeof(pms);
+ + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+ int padl, outl;
krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
@@ -1583,6 +1585,16 @@
enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
p+=enc_pms.length;
+ /* Note that the length is checked again below,
+ ** after decryption
+ */
+ if(enc.pms_length > sizeof pms)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (n != enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
enc_pms.length + 6)
{
