commit fbb82a60dcbe820714a246ab3e7617eaf3a7b656
author Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org> Fri Mar 18 22:09:41 2016 -0400
committer Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org> Sun Apr 03 11:35:35 2016 -0400
tree 261c976e4e3d6dbea776b0fb54c635bd2a10eebd
parent 70dd3c6593d87e4cbb56b485717cb2cfff730f3e

Move peer chain security checks into x509_vfy.c

A new X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level() function sets the
authentication security level.  For verification of SSL peers, this
is automatically set from the SSL security level.  Otherwise, for
now, the authentication security level remains at (effectively) 0
by default.

The new "-auth_level" verify(1) option is available in all the
command-line tools that support the standard verify(1) options.

New verify(1) tests added to check enforcement of chain signature
and public key security levels.  Also added new tests of enforcement
of the verify_depth limit.

Updated documentation.

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

ssl/ssl_cert.c

diff --git a/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
index 4081ebe..24ac352 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_cert.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -494,6 +494,12 @@
         return (0);
     }
     param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx);
+    /*
+     * XXX: Separate @AUTHSECLEVEL and @TLSSECLEVEL would be useful at some
+     * point, for now a single @SECLEVEL sets the same policy for TLS crypto
+     * and PKI authentication.
+     */
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(param, SSL_get_security_level(s));
 
     /* Set suite B flags if needed */
     X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
@@ -520,17 +526,8 @@
 
     if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
         i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
-    else {
+    else
         i = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
-# if 0
-        /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
-# endif
-        if (i > 0)
-            i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, ctx.chain, NULL, 1);
-    }
 
     s->verify_result = ctx.error;
     sk_X509_pop_free(s->verified_chain, X509_free);
@@ -894,12 +891,18 @@
          * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
          * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
          */
-        X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+        (void) X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
         /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
         ERR_clear_error();
         i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, xs_ctx.chain, NULL, 0);
         if (i != 1) {
             X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+#if 0
+            /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
+#endif
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
             return 0;
         }