| /* |
| * Copyright 2001-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * This file uses the low level AES functions (which are deprecated for |
| * non-internal use) in order to implement the EVP AES ciphers. |
| */ |
| #include "internal/deprecated.h" |
| |
| #include <string.h> |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <openssl/opensslconf.h> |
| #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/aes.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| #include <openssl/cmac.h> |
| #include "crypto/evp.h" |
| #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
| #include "crypto/modes.h" |
| #include "crypto/siv.h" |
| #include "crypto/aes_platform.h" |
| #include "evp_local.h" |
| |
| typedef struct { |
| union { |
| OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
| AES_KEY ks; |
| } ks; |
| block128_f block; |
| union { |
| cbc128_f cbc; |
| ctr128_f ctr; |
| } stream; |
| } EVP_AES_KEY; |
| |
| typedef struct { |
| union { |
| OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
| AES_KEY ks; |
| } ks; /* AES key schedule to use */ |
| int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */ |
| int iv_set; /* Set if an iv is set */ |
| GCM128_CONTEXT gcm; |
| unsigned char *iv; /* Temporary IV store */ |
| int ivlen; /* IV length */ |
| int taglen; |
| int iv_gen; /* It is OK to generate IVs */ |
| int iv_gen_rand; /* No IV was specified, so generate a rand IV */ |
| int tls_aad_len; /* TLS AAD length */ |
| uint64_t tls_enc_records; /* Number of TLS records encrypted */ |
| ctr128_f ctr; |
| } EVP_AES_GCM_CTX; |
| |
| typedef struct { |
| union { |
| OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
| AES_KEY ks; |
| } ks1, ks2; /* AES key schedules to use */ |
| XTS128_CONTEXT xts; |
| void (*stream) (const unsigned char *in, |
| unsigned char *out, size_t length, |
| const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2, |
| const unsigned char iv[16]); |
| } EVP_AES_XTS_CTX; |
| |
| #ifdef FIPS_MODULE |
| static const int allow_insecure_decrypt = 0; |
| #else |
| static const int allow_insecure_decrypt = 1; |
| #endif |
| |
| typedef struct { |
| union { |
| OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
| AES_KEY ks; |
| } ks; /* AES key schedule to use */ |
| int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */ |
| int iv_set; /* Set if an iv is set */ |
| int tag_set; /* Set if tag is valid */ |
| int len_set; /* Set if message length set */ |
| int L, M; /* L and M parameters from RFC3610 */ |
| int tls_aad_len; /* TLS AAD length */ |
| CCM128_CONTEXT ccm; |
| ccm128_f str; |
| } EVP_AES_CCM_CTX; |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB |
| typedef struct { |
| union { |
| OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
| AES_KEY ks; |
| } ksenc; /* AES key schedule to use for encryption */ |
| union { |
| OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
| AES_KEY ks; |
| } ksdec; /* AES key schedule to use for decryption */ |
| int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */ |
| int iv_set; /* Set if an iv is set */ |
| OCB128_CONTEXT ocb; |
| unsigned char *iv; /* Temporary IV store */ |
| unsigned char tag[16]; |
| unsigned char data_buf[16]; /* Store partial data blocks */ |
| unsigned char aad_buf[16]; /* Store partial AAD blocks */ |
| int data_buf_len; |
| int aad_buf_len; |
| int ivlen; /* IV length */ |
| int taglen; |
| } EVP_AES_OCB_CTX; |
| #endif |
| |
| #define MAXBITCHUNK ((size_t)1<<(sizeof(size_t)*8-4)) |
| |
| /* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */ |
| static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter) |
| { |
| int n = 8; |
| unsigned char c; |
| |
| do { |
| --n; |
| c = counter[n]; |
| ++c; |
| counter[n] = c; |
| if (c) |
| return; |
| } while (n); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(AESNI_CAPABLE) |
| # if defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) |
| # define AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx) (gctx->gcm.block==(block128_f)aesni_encrypt && \ |
| gctx->gcm.ghash==gcm_ghash_avx) |
| # undef AES_GCM_ASM2 /* minor size optimization */ |
| # endif |
| |
| static int aesni_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
| { |
| int ret, mode; |
| EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx); |
| const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; |
| |
| if (keylen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ctx); |
| if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
| && !enc) { |
| ret = aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks); |
| dat->block = (block128_f) aesni_decrypt; |
| dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? |
| (cbc128_f) aesni_cbc_encrypt : NULL; |
| } else { |
| ret = aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks); |
| dat->block = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt; |
| if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
| dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) aesni_cbc_encrypt; |
| else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) |
| dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; |
| else |
| dat->stream.cbc = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (ret < 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int aesni_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, &EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx)->ks.ks, |
| ctx->iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int aesni_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| size_t bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_block_size(ctx); |
| |
| if (len < bl) |
| return 1; |
| |
| aesni_ecb_encrypt(in, out, len, &EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx)->ks.ks, |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| # define aesni_ofb_cipher aes_ofb_cipher |
| static int aesni_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| |
| # define aesni_cfb_cipher aes_cfb_cipher |
| static int aesni_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| |
| # define aesni_cfb8_cipher aes_cfb8_cipher |
| static int aesni_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| |
| # define aesni_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher |
| static int aesni_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| |
| # define aesni_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher |
| static int aesni_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| |
| static int aesni_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx); |
| |
| if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) |
| return 1; |
| |
| if (key) { |
| const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; |
| |
| if (keylen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &gctx->ks.ks); |
| CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, (block128_f) aesni_encrypt); |
| gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; |
| /* |
| * If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. |
| */ |
| if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set) |
| iv = gctx->iv; |
| if (iv) { |
| CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); |
| gctx->iv_set = 1; |
| } |
| gctx->key_set = 1; |
| } else { |
| /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ |
| if (gctx->key_set) |
| CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); |
| else |
| memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen); |
| gctx->iv_set = 1; |
| gctx->iv_gen = 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| # define aesni_gcm_cipher aes_gcm_cipher |
| static int aesni_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| |
| static int aesni_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx); |
| |
| if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) |
| return 1; |
| |
| if (key) { |
| /* The key is two half length keys in reality */ |
| const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); |
| const int bytes = keylen / 2; |
| const int bits = bytes * 8; |
| |
| if (keylen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* |
| * Verify that the two keys are different. |
| * |
| * This addresses Rogaway's vulnerability. |
| * See comment in aes_xts_init_key() below. |
| */ |
| if ((!allow_insecure_decrypt || enc) |
| && CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* key_len is two AES keys */ |
| if (enc) { |
| aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); |
| xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt; |
| xctx->stream = aesni_xts_encrypt; |
| } else { |
| aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); |
| xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aesni_decrypt; |
| xctx->stream = aesni_xts_decrypt; |
| } |
| |
| aesni_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks); |
| xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt; |
| |
| xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1; |
| } |
| |
| if (iv) { |
| xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2; |
| memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 16); |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| # define aesni_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher |
| static int aesni_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| |
| static int aesni_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx); |
| |
| if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) |
| return 1; |
| |
| if (key != NULL) { |
| const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; |
| |
| if (keylen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &cctx->ks.ks); |
| CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L, |
| &cctx->ks, (block128_f) aesni_encrypt); |
| cctx->str = enc ? (ccm128_f) aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks : |
| (ccm128_f) aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks; |
| cctx->key_set = 1; |
| } |
| if (iv) { |
| memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->L); |
| cctx->iv_set = 1; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| # define aesni_ccm_cipher aes_ccm_cipher |
| static int aesni_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB |
| static int aesni_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,ctx); |
| |
| if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) |
| return 1; |
| |
| if (key != NULL) { |
| const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; |
| |
| if (keylen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| do { |
| /* |
| * We set both the encrypt and decrypt key here because decrypt |
| * needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the |
| * decrypt for an encryption operation. |
| */ |
| aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksenc.ks); |
| aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksdec.ks); |
| if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb, |
| &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks, |
| (block128_f) aesni_encrypt, |
| (block128_f) aesni_decrypt, |
| enc ? aesni_ocb_encrypt |
| : aesni_ocb_decrypt)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| while (0); |
| |
| /* |
| * If we have an iv we can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. |
| */ |
| if (iv == NULL && octx->iv_set) |
| iv = octx->iv; |
| if (iv) { |
| if (CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen) |
| != 1) |
| return 0; |
| octx->iv_set = 1; |
| } |
| octx->key_set = 1; |
| } else { |
| /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ |
| if (octx->key_set) |
| CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen); |
| else |
| memcpy(octx->iv, iv, octx->ivlen); |
| octx->iv_set = 1; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| # define aesni_ocb_cipher aes_ocb_cipher |
| static int aesni_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */ |
| |
| # define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \ |
| static const EVP_CIPHER aesni_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
| nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \ |
| flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
| EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
| aesni_init_key, \ |
| aesni_##mode##_cipher, \ |
| NULL, \ |
| sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ |
| NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \ |
| static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
| nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize, \ |
| keylen/8,ivlen, \ |
| flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
| EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
| aes_init_key, \ |
| aes_##mode##_cipher, \ |
| NULL, \ |
| sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ |
| NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \ |
| const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ |
| { return AESNI_CAPABLE?&aesni_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; } |
| |
| # define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \ |
| static const EVP_CIPHER aesni_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
| nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \ |
| (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \ |
| ivlen, \ |
| flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
| EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
| aesni_##mode##_init_key, \ |
| aesni_##mode##_cipher, \ |
| aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ |
| sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ |
| NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \ |
| static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
| nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \ |
| (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \ |
| ivlen, \ |
| flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
| EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
| aes_##mode##_init_key, \ |
| aes_##mode##_cipher, \ |
| aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ |
| sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ |
| NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \ |
| const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ |
| { return AESNI_CAPABLE?&aesni_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; } |
| |
| #elif defined(SPARC_AES_CAPABLE) |
| |
| static int aes_t4_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
| { |
| int ret, mode, bits; |
| EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx); |
| |
| mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ctx); |
| bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; |
| if (bits <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
| && !enc) { |
| ret = 0; |
| aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &dat->ks.ks); |
| dat->block = (block128_f) aes_t4_decrypt; |
| switch (bits) { |
| case 128: |
| dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? |
| (cbc128_f) aes128_t4_cbc_decrypt : NULL; |
| break; |
| case 192: |
| dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? |
| (cbc128_f) aes192_t4_cbc_decrypt : NULL; |
| break; |
| case 256: |
| dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? |
| (cbc128_f) aes256_t4_cbc_decrypt : NULL; |
| break; |
| default: |
| ret = -1; |
| } |
| } else { |
| ret = 0; |
| aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &dat->ks.ks); |
| dat->block = (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt; |
| switch (bits) { |
| case 128: |
| if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
| dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) aes128_t4_cbc_encrypt; |
| else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) |
| dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) aes128_t4_ctr32_encrypt; |
| else |
| dat->stream.cbc = NULL; |
| break; |
| case 192: |
| if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
| dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) aes192_t4_cbc_encrypt; |
| else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) |
| dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) aes192_t4_ctr32_encrypt; |
| else |
| dat->stream.cbc = NULL; |
| break; |
| case 256: |
| if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
| dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) aes256_t4_cbc_encrypt; |
| else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) |
| dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) aes256_t4_ctr32_encrypt; |
| else |
| dat->stream.cbc = NULL; |
| break; |
| default: |
| ret = -1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (ret < 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| # define aes_t4_cbc_cipher aes_cbc_cipher |
| static int aes_t4_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| |
| # define aes_t4_ecb_cipher aes_ecb_cipher |
| static int aes_t4_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| |
| # define aes_t4_ofb_cipher aes_ofb_cipher |
| static int aes_t4_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| |
| # define aes_t4_cfb_cipher aes_cfb_cipher |
| static int aes_t4_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| |
| # define aes_t4_cfb8_cipher aes_cfb8_cipher |
| static int aes_t4_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| |
| # define aes_t4_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher |
| static int aes_t4_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| |
| # define aes_t4_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher |
| static int aes_t4_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| |
| static int aes_t4_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx); |
| |
| if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) |
| return 1; |
| if (key) { |
| const int bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; |
| |
| if (bits <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &gctx->ks.ks); |
| CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, |
| (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt); |
| switch (bits) { |
| case 128: |
| gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) aes128_t4_ctr32_encrypt; |
| break; |
| case 192: |
| gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) aes192_t4_ctr32_encrypt; |
| break; |
| case 256: |
| gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) aes256_t4_ctr32_encrypt; |
| break; |
| default: |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* |
| * If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. |
| */ |
| if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set) |
| iv = gctx->iv; |
| if (iv) { |
| CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); |
| gctx->iv_set = 1; |
| } |
| gctx->key_set = 1; |
| } else { |
| /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ |
| if (gctx->key_set) |
| CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); |
| else |
| memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen); |
| gctx->iv_set = 1; |
| gctx->iv_gen = 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| # define aes_t4_gcm_cipher aes_gcm_cipher |
| static int aes_t4_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| |
| static int aes_t4_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx); |
| |
| if (!iv && !key) |
| return 1; |
| |
| if (key) { |
| /* The key is two half length keys in reality */ |
| const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); |
| const int bytes = keylen / 2; |
| const int bits = bytes * 8; |
| |
| if (keylen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* |
| * Verify that the two keys are different. |
| * |
| * This addresses Rogaway's vulnerability. |
| * See comment in aes_xts_init_key() below. |
| */ |
| if ((!allow_insecure_decrypt || enc) |
| && CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| xctx->stream = NULL; |
| /* key_len is two AES keys */ |
| if (enc) { |
| aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); |
| xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt; |
| switch (bits) { |
| case 128: |
| xctx->stream = aes128_t4_xts_encrypt; |
| break; |
| case 256: |
| xctx->stream = aes256_t4_xts_encrypt; |
| break; |
| default: |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } else { |
| aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); |
| xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aes_t4_decrypt; |
| switch (bits) { |
| case 128: |
| xctx->stream = aes128_t4_xts_decrypt; |
| break; |
| case 256: |
| xctx->stream = aes256_t4_xts_decrypt; |
| break; |
| default: |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks); |
| xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt; |
| |
| xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1; |
| } |
| |
| if (iv) { |
| xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2; |
| memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 16); |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| # define aes_t4_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher |
| static int aes_t4_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| |
| static int aes_t4_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx); |
| |
| if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) |
| return 1; |
| |
| if (key != NULL) { |
| const int bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; |
| |
| if (bits <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &cctx->ks.ks); |
| CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L, |
| &cctx->ks, (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt); |
| cctx->str = NULL; |
| cctx->key_set = 1; |
| } |
| if (iv) { |
| memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->L); |
| cctx->iv_set = 1; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| # define aes_t4_ccm_cipher aes_ccm_cipher |
| static int aes_t4_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB |
| static int aes_t4_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,ctx); |
| |
| if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) |
| return 1; |
| |
| if (key != NULL) { |
| const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; |
| |
| if (keylen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| do { |
| /* |
| * We set both the encrypt and decrypt key here because decrypt |
| * needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the |
| * decrypt for an encryption operation. |
| */ |
| aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksenc.ks); |
| aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksdec.ks); |
| if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb, |
| &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks, |
| (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt, |
| (block128_f) aes_t4_decrypt, |
| NULL)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| while (0); |
| |
| /* |
| * If we have an iv we can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. |
| */ |
| if (iv == NULL && octx->iv_set) |
| iv = octx->iv; |
| if (iv) { |
| if (CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen) |
| != 1) |
| return 0; |
| octx->iv_set = 1; |
| } |
| octx->key_set = 1; |
| } else { |
| /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ |
| if (octx->key_set) |
| CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen); |
| else |
| memcpy(octx->iv, iv, octx->ivlen); |
| octx->iv_set = 1; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| # define aes_t4_ocb_cipher aes_ocb_cipher |
| static int aes_t4_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */ |
| |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SIV |
| # define aes_t4_siv_init_key aes_siv_init_key |
| # define aes_t4_siv_cipher aes_siv_cipher |
| # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SIV */ |
| |
| # define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \ |
| static const EVP_CIPHER aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
| nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \ |
| flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
| EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
| aes_t4_init_key, \ |
| aes_t4_##mode##_cipher, \ |
| NULL, \ |
| sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ |
| NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \ |
| static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
| nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize, \ |
| keylen/8,ivlen, \ |
| flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
| EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
| aes_init_key, \ |
| aes_##mode##_cipher, \ |
| NULL, \ |
| sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ |
| NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \ |
| const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ |
| { return SPARC_AES_CAPABLE?&aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; } |
| |
| # define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \ |
| static const EVP_CIPHER aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
| nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \ |
| (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \ |
| ivlen, \ |
| flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
| EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
| aes_t4_##mode##_init_key, \ |
| aes_t4_##mode##_cipher, \ |
| aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ |
| sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ |
| NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \ |
| static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
| nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \ |
| (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \ |
| ivlen, \ |
| flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
| EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
| aes_##mode##_init_key, \ |
| aes_##mode##_cipher, \ |
| aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ |
| sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ |
| NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \ |
| const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ |
| { return SPARC_AES_CAPABLE?&aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; } |
| |
| #elif defined(S390X_aes_128_CAPABLE) |
| /* IBM S390X support */ |
| typedef struct { |
| union { |
| OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
| /*- |
| * KM-AES parameter block - begin |
| * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-06) |
| */ |
| struct { |
| unsigned char k[32]; |
| } param; |
| /* KM-AES parameter block - end */ |
| } km; |
| unsigned int fc; |
| } S390X_AES_ECB_CTX; |
| |
| typedef struct { |
| union { |
| OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
| /*- |
| * KMO-AES parameter block - begin |
| * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-08) |
| */ |
| struct { |
| unsigned char cv[16]; |
| unsigned char k[32]; |
| } param; |
| /* KMO-AES parameter block - end */ |
| } kmo; |
| unsigned int fc; |
| |
| int res; |
| } S390X_AES_OFB_CTX; |
| |
| typedef struct { |
| union { |
| OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
| /*- |
| * KMF-AES parameter block - begin |
| * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-08) |
| */ |
| struct { |
| unsigned char cv[16]; |
| unsigned char k[32]; |
| } param; |
| /* KMF-AES parameter block - end */ |
| } kmf; |
| unsigned int fc; |
| |
| int res; |
| } S390X_AES_CFB_CTX; |
| |
| typedef struct { |
| union { |
| OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
| /*- |
| * KMA-GCM-AES parameter block - begin |
| * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-11) |
| */ |
| struct { |
| unsigned char reserved[12]; |
| union { |
| unsigned int w; |
| unsigned char b[4]; |
| } cv; |
| union { |
| unsigned long long g[2]; |
| unsigned char b[16]; |
| } t; |
| unsigned char h[16]; |
| unsigned long long taadl; |
| unsigned long long tpcl; |
| union { |
| unsigned long long g[2]; |
| unsigned int w[4]; |
| } j0; |
| unsigned char k[32]; |
| } param; |
| /* KMA-GCM-AES parameter block - end */ |
| } kma; |
| unsigned int fc; |
| int key_set; |
| |
| unsigned char *iv; |
| int ivlen; |
| int iv_set; |
| int iv_gen; |
| |
| int taglen; |
| |
| unsigned char ares[16]; |
| unsigned char mres[16]; |
| unsigned char kres[16]; |
| int areslen; |
| int mreslen; |
| int kreslen; |
| |
| int tls_aad_len; |
| uint64_t tls_enc_records; /* Number of TLS records encrypted */ |
| } S390X_AES_GCM_CTX; |
| |
| typedef struct { |
| union { |
| OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
| /*- |
| * Padding is chosen so that ccm.kmac_param.k overlaps with key.k and |
| * ccm.fc with key.k.rounds. Remember that on s390x, an AES_KEY's |
| * rounds field is used to store the function code and that the key |
| * schedule is not stored (if aes hardware support is detected). |
| */ |
| struct { |
| unsigned char pad[16]; |
| AES_KEY k; |
| } key; |
| |
| struct { |
| /*- |
| * KMAC-AES parameter block - begin |
| * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-08) |
| */ |
| struct { |
| union { |
| unsigned long long g[2]; |
| unsigned char b[16]; |
| } icv; |
| unsigned char k[32]; |
| } kmac_param; |
| /* KMAC-AES parameter block - end */ |
| |
| union { |
| unsigned long long g[2]; |
| unsigned char b[16]; |
| } nonce; |
| union { |
| unsigned long long g[2]; |
| unsigned char b[16]; |
| } buf; |
| |
| unsigned long long blocks; |
| int l; |
| int m; |
| int tls_aad_len; |
| int iv_set; |
| int tag_set; |
| int len_set; |
| int key_set; |
| |
| unsigned char pad[140]; |
| unsigned int fc; |
| } ccm; |
| } aes; |
| } S390X_AES_CCM_CTX; |
| |
| # define s390x_aes_init_key aes_init_key |
| static int s390x_aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv, int enc); |
| |
| # define S390X_AES_CBC_CTX EVP_AES_KEY |
| |
| # define s390x_aes_cbc_init_key aes_init_key |
| |
| # define s390x_aes_cbc_cipher aes_cbc_cipher |
| static int s390x_aes_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| |
| static int s390x_aes_ecb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, |
| const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
| { |
| S390X_AES_ECB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_ECB_CTX, ctx); |
| const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); |
| |
| if (keylen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen); |
| if (!enc) |
| cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT; |
| |
| memcpy(cctx->km.param.k, key, keylen); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int s390x_aes_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| S390X_AES_ECB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_ECB_CTX, ctx); |
| |
| s390x_km(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->km.param); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int s390x_aes_ofb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, |
| const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *ivec, int enc) |
| { |
| S390X_AES_OFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_OFB_CTX, ctx); |
| const unsigned char *iv = ctx->oiv; |
| const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); |
| const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx); |
| |
| if (keylen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (ivlen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| memcpy(cctx->kmo.param.cv, iv, ivlen); |
| memcpy(cctx->kmo.param.k, key, keylen); |
| cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen); |
| cctx->res = 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int s390x_aes_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| S390X_AES_OFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_OFB_CTX, ctx); |
| const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx); |
| unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx); |
| int n = cctx->res; |
| int rem; |
| |
| memcpy(cctx->kmo.param.cv, iv, ivlen); |
| while (n && len) { |
| *out = *in ^ cctx->kmo.param.cv[n]; |
| n = (n + 1) & 0xf; |
| --len; |
| ++in; |
| ++out; |
| } |
| |
| rem = len & 0xf; |
| |
| len &= ~(size_t)0xf; |
| if (len) { |
| s390x_kmo(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->kmo.param); |
| |
| out += len; |
| in += len; |
| } |
| |
| if (rem) { |
| s390x_km(cctx->kmo.param.cv, 16, cctx->kmo.param.cv, cctx->fc, |
| cctx->kmo.param.k); |
| |
| while (rem--) { |
| out[n] = in[n] ^ cctx->kmo.param.cv[n]; |
| ++n; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| memcpy(iv, cctx->kmo.param.cv, ivlen); |
| cctx->res = n; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int s390x_aes_cfb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, |
| const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *ivec, int enc) |
| { |
| S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx); |
| const unsigned char *iv = ctx->oiv; |
| const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); |
| const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx); |
| |
| if (keylen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (ivlen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen); |
| cctx->fc |= 16 << 24; /* 16 bytes cipher feedback */ |
| if (!enc) |
| cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT; |
| |
| cctx->res = 0; |
| memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen); |
| memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.k, key, keylen); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int s390x_aes_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx); |
| const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); |
| const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx); |
| const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx); |
| unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx); |
| int n = cctx->res; |
| int rem; |
| unsigned char tmp; |
| |
| if (keylen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (ivlen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen); |
| while (n && len) { |
| tmp = *in; |
| *out = cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] ^ tmp; |
| cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] = enc ? *out : tmp; |
| n = (n + 1) & 0xf; |
| --len; |
| ++in; |
| ++out; |
| } |
| |
| rem = len & 0xf; |
| |
| len &= ~(size_t)0xf; |
| if (len) { |
| s390x_kmf(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->kmf.param); |
| |
| out += len; |
| in += len; |
| } |
| |
| if (rem) { |
| s390x_km(cctx->kmf.param.cv, 16, cctx->kmf.param.cv, |
| S390X_AES_FC(keylen), cctx->kmf.param.k); |
| |
| while (rem--) { |
| tmp = in[n]; |
| out[n] = cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] ^ tmp; |
| cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] = enc ? out[n] : tmp; |
| ++n; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| memcpy(iv, cctx->kmf.param.cv, ivlen); |
| cctx->res = n; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int s390x_aes_cfb8_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, |
| const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *ivec, int enc) |
| { |
| S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx); |
| const unsigned char *iv = ctx->oiv; |
| const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); |
| const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx); |
| |
| if (keylen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (ivlen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen); |
| cctx->fc |= 1 << 24; /* 1 byte cipher feedback */ |
| if (!enc) |
| cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT; |
| |
| memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen); |
| memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.k, key, keylen); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int s390x_aes_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx); |
| const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx); |
| unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx); |
| |
| memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen); |
| s390x_kmf(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->kmf.param); |
| memcpy(iv, cctx->kmf.param.cv, ivlen); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| # define s390x_aes_cfb1_init_key aes_init_key |
| |
| # define s390x_aes_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher |
| static int s390x_aes_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| |
| # define S390X_AES_CTR_CTX EVP_AES_KEY |
| |
| # define s390x_aes_ctr_init_key aes_init_key |
| |
| # define s390x_aes_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher |
| static int s390x_aes_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| |
| /* iv + padding length for iv lengths != 12 */ |
| # define S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(i) ((((i) + 15) >> 4 << 4) + 16) |
| |
| /*- |
| * Process additional authenticated data. Returns 0 on success. Code is |
| * big-endian. |
| */ |
| static int s390x_aes_gcm_aad(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *aad, |
| size_t len) |
| { |
| unsigned long long alen; |
| int n, rem; |
| |
| if (ctx->kma.param.tpcl) |
| return -2; |
| |
| alen = ctx->kma.param.taadl + len; |
| if (alen > (U64(1) << 61) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && alen < len)) |
| return -1; |
| ctx->kma.param.taadl = alen; |
| |
| n = ctx->areslen; |
| if (n) { |
| while (n && len) { |
| ctx->ares[n] = *aad; |
| n = (n + 1) & 0xf; |
| ++aad; |
| --len; |
| } |
| /* ctx->ares contains a complete block if offset has wrapped around */ |
| if (!n) { |
| s390x_kma(ctx->ares, 16, NULL, 0, NULL, ctx->fc, &ctx->kma.param); |
| ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS; |
| } |
| ctx->areslen = n; |
| } |
| |
| rem = len & 0xf; |
| |
| len &= ~(size_t)0xf; |
| if (len) { |
| s390x_kma(aad, len, NULL, 0, NULL, ctx->fc, &ctx->kma.param); |
| aad += len; |
| ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS; |
| } |
| |
| if (rem) { |
| ctx->areslen = rem; |
| |
| do { |
| --rem; |
| ctx->ares[rem] = aad[rem]; |
| } while (rem); |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * En/de-crypt plain/cipher-text and authenticate ciphertext. Returns 0 for |
| * success. Code is big-endian. |
| */ |
| static int s390x_aes_gcm(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in, |
| unsigned char *out, size_t len) |
| { |
| const unsigned char *inptr; |
| unsigned long long mlen; |
| union { |
| unsigned int w[4]; |
| unsigned char b[16]; |
| } buf; |
| size_t inlen; |
| int n, rem, i; |
| |
| mlen = ctx->kma.param.tpcl + len; |
| if (mlen > ((U64(1) << 36) - 32) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && mlen < len)) |
| return -1; |
| ctx->kma.param.tpcl = mlen; |
| |
| n = ctx->mreslen; |
| if (n) { |
| inptr = in; |
| inlen = len; |
| while (n && inlen) { |
| ctx->mres[n] = *inptr; |
| n = (n + 1) & 0xf; |
| ++inptr; |
| --inlen; |
| } |
| /* ctx->mres contains a complete block if offset has wrapped around */ |
| if (!n) { |
| s390x_kma(ctx->ares, ctx->areslen, ctx->mres, 16, buf.b, |
| ctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD, &ctx->kma.param); |
| ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS; |
| ctx->areslen = 0; |
| |
| /* previous call already encrypted/decrypted its remainder, |
| * see comment below */ |
| n = ctx->mreslen; |
| while (n) { |
| *out = buf.b[n]; |
| n = (n + 1) & 0xf; |
| ++out; |
| ++in; |
| --len; |
| } |
| ctx->mreslen = 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| rem = len & 0xf; |
| |
| len &= ~(size_t)0xf; |
| if (len) { |
| s390x_kma(ctx->ares, ctx->areslen, in, len, out, |
| ctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD, &ctx->kma.param); |
| in += len; |
| out += len; |
| ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS; |
| ctx->areslen = 0; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * If there is a remainder, it has to be saved such that it can be |
| * processed by kma later. However, we also have to do the for-now |
| * unauthenticated encryption/decryption part here and now... |
| */ |
| if (rem) { |
| if (!ctx->mreslen) { |
| buf.w[0] = ctx->kma.param.j0.w[0]; |
| buf.w[1] = ctx->kma.param.j0.w[1]; |
| buf.w[2] = ctx->kma.param.j0.w[2]; |
| buf.w[3] = ctx->kma.param.cv.w + 1; |
| s390x_km(buf.b, 16, ctx->kres, ctx->fc & 0x1f, &ctx->kma.param.k); |
| } |
| |
| n = ctx->mreslen; |
| for (i = 0; i < rem; i++) { |
| ctx->mres[n + i] = in[i]; |
| out[i] = in[i] ^ ctx->kres[n + i]; |
| } |
| |
| ctx->mreslen += rem; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Initialize context structure. Code is big-endian. |
| */ |
| static void s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx, |
| const unsigned char *iv) |
| { |
| ctx->kma.param.t.g[0] = 0; |
| ctx->kma.param.t.g[1] = 0; |
| ctx->kma.param.tpcl = 0; |
| ctx->kma.param.taadl = 0; |
| ctx->mreslen = 0; |
| ctx->areslen = 0; |
| ctx->kreslen = 0; |
| |
| if (ctx->ivlen == 12) { |
| memcpy(&ctx->kma.param.j0, iv, ctx->ivlen); |
| ctx->kma.param.j0.w[3] = 1; |
| ctx->kma.param.cv.w = 1; |
| } else { |
| /* ctx->iv has the right size and is already padded. */ |
| memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, ctx->ivlen); |
| s390x_kma(ctx->iv, S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(ctx->ivlen), NULL, 0, NULL, |
| ctx->fc, &ctx->kma.param); |
| ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS; |
| |
| ctx->kma.param.j0.g[0] = ctx->kma.param.t.g[0]; |
| ctx->kma.param.j0.g[1] = ctx->kma.param.t.g[1]; |
| ctx->kma.param.cv.w = ctx->kma.param.j0.w[3]; |
| ctx->kma.param.t.g[0] = 0; |
| ctx->kma.param.t.g[1] = 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Performs various operations on the context structure depending on control |
| * type. Returns 1 for success, 0 for failure and -1 for unknown control type. |
| * Code is big-endian. |
| */ |
| static int s390x_aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) |
| { |
| S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, c); |
| S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx_out; |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out; |
| unsigned char *buf; |
| int ivlen, enc, len; |
| |
| switch (type) { |
| case EVP_CTRL_INIT: |
| ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(c->cipher); |
| gctx->key_set = 0; |
| gctx->iv_set = 0; |
| gctx->ivlen = ivlen; |
| gctx->iv = c->iv; |
| gctx->taglen = -1; |
| gctx->iv_gen = 0; |
| gctx->tls_aad_len = -1; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN: |
| *(int *)ptr = gctx->ivlen; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: |
| if (arg <= 0) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (arg != 12) { |
| len = S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(arg); |
| |
| /* Allocate memory for iv if needed. */ |
| if (gctx->ivlen == 12 || len > S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(gctx->ivlen)) { |
| if (gctx->iv != c->iv) |
| OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv); |
| |
| if ((gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| /* Add padding. */ |
| memset(gctx->iv + arg, 0, len - arg - 8); |
| *((unsigned long long *)(gctx->iv + len - 8)) = arg << 3; |
| } |
| gctx->ivlen = arg; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG: |
| buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c); |
| enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); |
| if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || enc) |
| return 0; |
| |
| memcpy(buf, ptr, arg); |
| gctx->taglen = arg; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG: |
| enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); |
| if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !enc || gctx->taglen < 0) |
| return 0; |
| |
| memcpy(ptr, gctx->kma.param.t.b, arg); |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED: |
| /* Special case: -1 length restores whole iv */ |
| if (arg == -1) { |
| memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, gctx->ivlen); |
| gctx->iv_gen = 1; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| /* |
| * Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field at least |
| * 8. |
| */ |
| if ((arg < 4) || (gctx->ivlen - arg) < 8) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (arg) |
| memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg); |
| |
| enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); |
| if (enc && RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0) |
| return 0; |
| |
| gctx->iv_gen = 1; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN: |
| if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0) |
| return 0; |
| |
| s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, gctx->iv); |
| |
| if (arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen) |
| arg = gctx->ivlen; |
| |
| memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, arg); |
| /* |
| * Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need |
| * to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes. |
| */ |
| ctr64_inc(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8); |
| gctx->iv_set = 1; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV: |
| enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); |
| if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0 || enc) |
| return 0; |
| |
| memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg); |
| s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, gctx->iv); |
| gctx->iv_set = 1; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: |
| /* Save the aad for later use. */ |
| if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) |
| return 0; |
| |
| buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c); |
| memcpy(buf, ptr, arg); |
| gctx->tls_aad_len = arg; |
| gctx->tls_enc_records = 0; |
| |
| len = buf[arg - 2] << 8 | buf[arg - 1]; |
| /* Correct length for explicit iv. */ |
| if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) |
| return 0; |
| len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| |
| /* If decrypting correct for tag too. */ |
| enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); |
| if (!enc) { |
| if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN) |
| return 0; |
| len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; |
| } |
| buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8; |
| buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff; |
| /* Extra padding: tag appended to record. */ |
| return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_COPY: |
| out = ptr; |
| gctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, out); |
| |
| if (gctx->iv == c->iv) { |
| gctx_out->iv = out->iv; |
| } else { |
| len = S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(gctx->ivlen); |
| |
| if ((gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, len); |
| } |
| return 1; |
| |
| default: |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Set key and/or iv. Returns 1 on success. Otherwise 0 is returned. |
| */ |
| static int s390x_aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, |
| const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
| { |
| S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx); |
| int keylen; |
| |
| if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) |
| return 1; |
| |
| if (key != NULL) { |
| keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); |
| if (keylen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| memcpy(&gctx->kma.param.k, key, keylen); |
| |
| gctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen); |
| if (!enc) |
| gctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT; |
| |
| if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set) |
| iv = gctx->iv; |
| |
| if (iv != NULL) { |
| s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, iv); |
| gctx->iv_set = 1; |
| } |
| gctx->key_set = 1; |
| } else { |
| if (gctx->key_set) |
| s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, iv); |
| else |
| memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen); |
| |
| gctx->iv_set = 1; |
| gctx->iv_gen = 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * En/de-crypt and authenticate TLS packet. Returns the number of bytes written |
| * if successful. Otherwise -1 is returned. Code is big-endian. |
| */ |
| static int s390x_aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx); |
| const unsigned char *buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx); |
| const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx); |
| int rv = -1; |
| |
| if (out != in || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| /* |
| * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness |
| * Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the |
| * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting |
| * side only. |
| */ |
| if (ctx->encrypt && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, enc ? EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN |
| : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV, |
| EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) <= 0) |
| goto err; |
| |
| in += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| out += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; |
| |
| gctx->kma.param.taadl = gctx->tls_aad_len << 3; |
| gctx->kma.param.tpcl = len << 3; |
| s390x_kma(buf, gctx->tls_aad_len, in, len, out, |
| gctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD | S390X_KMA_LPC, &gctx->kma.param); |
| |
| if (enc) { |
| memcpy(out + len, gctx->kma.param.t.b, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN); |
| rv = len + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; |
| } else { |
| if (CRYPTO_memcmp(gctx->kma.param.t.b, in + len, |
| EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) { |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| rv = len; |
| } |
| err: |
| gctx->iv_set = 0; |
| gctx->tls_aad_len = -1; |
| return rv; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Called from EVP layer to initialize context, process additional |
| * authenticated data, en/de-crypt plain/cipher-text and authenticate |
| * ciphertext or process a TLS packet, depending on context. Returns bytes |
| * written on success. Otherwise -1 is returned. Code is big-endian. |
| */ |
| static int s390x_aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx); |
| unsigned char *buf, tmp[16]; |
| int enc; |
| |
| if (!gctx->key_set) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if (gctx->tls_aad_len >= 0) |
| return s390x_aes_gcm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len); |
| |
| if (!gctx->iv_set) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if (in != NULL) { |
| if (out == NULL) { |
| if (s390x_aes_gcm_aad(gctx, in, len)) |
| return -1; |
| } else { |
| if (s390x_aes_gcm(gctx, in, out, len)) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| return len; |
| } else { |
| gctx->kma.param.taadl <<= 3; |
| gctx->kma.param.tpcl <<= 3; |
| s390x_kma(gctx->ares, gctx->areslen, gctx->mres, gctx->mreslen, tmp, |
| gctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD | S390X_KMA_LPC, &gctx->kma.param); |
| /* recall that we already did en-/decrypt gctx->mres |
| * and returned it to caller... */ |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, gctx->mreslen); |
| gctx->iv_set = 0; |
| |
| enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx); |
| if (enc) { |
| gctx->taglen = 16; |
| } else { |
| if (gctx->taglen < 0) |
| return -1; |
| |
| buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx); |
| if (CRYPTO_memcmp(buf, gctx->kma.param.t.b, gctx->taglen)) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int s390x_aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c) |
| { |
| S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, c); |
| |
| if (gctx == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (gctx->iv != c->iv) |
| OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv); |
| |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(gctx, sizeof(*gctx)); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| # define S390X_AES_XTS_CTX EVP_AES_XTS_CTX |
| |
| # define s390x_aes_xts_init_key aes_xts_init_key |
| static int s390x_aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, |
| const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv, int enc); |
| # define s390x_aes_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher |
| static int s390x_aes_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| # define s390x_aes_xts_ctrl aes_xts_ctrl |
| static int s390x_aes_xts_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr); |
| # define s390x_aes_xts_cleanup aes_xts_cleanup |
| |
| /*- |
| * Set nonce and length fields. Code is big-endian. |
| */ |
| static inline void s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *ctx, |
| const unsigned char *nonce, |
| size_t mlen) |
| { |
| ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] &= ~S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG; |
| ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.g[1] = mlen; |
| memcpy(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b + 1, nonce, 15 - ctx->aes.ccm.l); |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Process additional authenticated data. Code is big-endian. |
| */ |
| static void s390x_aes_ccm_aad(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *aad, |
| size_t alen) |
| { |
| unsigned char *ptr; |
| int i, rem; |
| |
| if (!alen) |
| return; |
| |
| ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] |= S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG; |
| |
| /* Suppress 'type-punned pointer dereference' warning. */ |
| ptr = ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b; |
| |
| if (alen < ((1 << 16) - (1 << 8))) { |
| *(uint16_t *)ptr = alen; |
| i = 2; |
| } else if (sizeof(alen) == 8 |
| && alen >= (size_t)1 << (32 % (sizeof(alen) * 8))) { |
| *(uint16_t *)ptr = 0xffff; |
| *(uint64_t *)(ptr + 2) = alen; |
| i = 10; |
| } else { |
| *(uint16_t *)ptr = 0xfffe; |
| *(uint32_t *)(ptr + 2) = alen; |
| i = 6; |
| } |
| |
| while (i < 16 && alen) { |
| ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b[i] = *aad; |
| ++aad; |
| --alen; |
| ++i; |
| } |
| while (i < 16) { |
| ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b[i] = 0; |
| ++i; |
| } |
| |
| ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[0] = 0; |
| ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[1] = 0; |
| s390x_kmac(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, 32, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, |
| &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param); |
| ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += 2; |
| |
| rem = alen & 0xf; |
| alen &= ~(size_t)0xf; |
| if (alen) { |
| s390x_kmac(aad, alen, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param); |
| ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += alen >> 4; |
| aad += alen; |
| } |
| if (rem) { |
| for (i = 0; i < rem; i++) |
| ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b[i] ^= aad[i]; |
| |
| s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, 16, |
| ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, |
| ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k); |
| ctx->aes.ccm.blocks++; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * En/de-crypt plain/cipher-text. Compute tag from plaintext. Returns 0 for |
| * success. |
| */ |
| static int s390x_aes_ccm(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in, |
| unsigned char *out, size_t len, int enc) |
| { |
| size_t n, rem; |
| unsigned int i, l, num; |
| unsigned char flags; |
| |
| flags = ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0]; |
| if (!(flags & S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG)) { |
| s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, 16, ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, |
| ctx->aes.ccm.fc, ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k); |
| ctx->aes.ccm.blocks++; |
| } |
| l = flags & 0x7; |
| ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = l; |
| |
| /*- |
| * Reconstruct length from encoded length field |
| * and initialize it with counter value. |
| */ |
| n = 0; |
| for (i = 15 - l; i < 15; i++) { |
| n |= ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[i]; |
| ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[i] = 0; |
| n <<= 8; |
| } |
| n |= ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[15]; |
| ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[15] = 1; |
| |
| if (n != len) |
| return -1; /* length mismatch */ |
| |
| if (enc) { |
| /* Two operations per block plus one for tag encryption */ |
| ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += (((len + 15) >> 4) << 1) + 1; |
| if (ctx->aes.ccm.blocks > (1ULL << 61)) |
| return -2; /* too much data */ |
| } |
| |
| num = 0; |
| rem = len & 0xf; |
| len &= ~(size_t)0xf; |
| |
| if (enc) { |
| /* mac-then-encrypt */ |
| if (len) |
| s390x_kmac(in, len, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param); |
| if (rem) { |
| for (i = 0; i < rem; i++) |
| ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b[i] ^= in[len + i]; |
| |
| s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, 16, |
| ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, |
| ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k); |
| } |
| |
| CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len + rem, &ctx->aes.key.k, |
| ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b, |
| &num, (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt); |
| } else { |
| /* decrypt-then-mac */ |
| CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len + rem, &ctx->aes.key.k, |
| ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b, |
| &num, (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt); |
| |
| if (len) |
| s390x_kmac(out, len, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param); |
| if (rem) { |
| for (i = 0; i < rem; i++) |
| ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b[i] ^= out[len + i]; |
| |
| s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, 16, |
| ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, |
| ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k); |
| } |
| } |
| /* encrypt tag */ |
| for (i = 15 - l; i < 16; i++) |
| ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[i] = 0; |
| |
| s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, 16, ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, |
| ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k); |
| ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[0] ^= ctx->aes.ccm.buf.g[0]; |
| ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[1] ^= ctx->aes.ccm.buf.g[1]; |
| |
| ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = flags; /* restore flags field */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * En/de-crypt and authenticate TLS packet. Returns the number of bytes written |
| * if successful. Otherwise -1 is returned. |
| */ |
| static int s390x_aes_ccm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx); |
| unsigned char *ivec = ctx->iv; |
| unsigned char *buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx); |
| const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx); |
| |
| if (out != in |
| || len < (EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + (size_t)cctx->aes.ccm.m)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if (enc) { |
| /* Set explicit iv (sequence number). */ |
| memcpy(out, buf, EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN); |
| } |
| |
| len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->aes.ccm.m; |
| /*- |
| * Get explicit iv (sequence number). We already have fixed iv |
| * (server/client_write_iv) here. |
| */ |
| memcpy(ivec + EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN, in, EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN); |
| s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ivec, len); |
| |
| /* Process aad (sequence number|type|version|length) */ |
| s390x_aes_ccm_aad(cctx, buf, cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len); |
| |
| in += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| out += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| |
| if (enc) { |
| if (s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| memcpy(out + len, cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, cctx->aes.ccm.m); |
| return len + EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->aes.ccm.m; |
| } else { |
| if (!s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc)) { |
| if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, in + len, |
| cctx->aes.ccm.m)) |
| return len; |
| } |
| |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Set key and flag field and/or iv. Returns 1 if successful. Otherwise 0 is |
| * returned. |
| */ |
| static int s390x_aes_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, |
| const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
| { |
| S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx); |
| int keylen; |
| |
| if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) |
| return 1; |
| |
| if (key != NULL) { |
| keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); |
| if (keylen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| cctx->aes.ccm.fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen); |
| memcpy(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k, key, keylen); |
| |
| /* Store encoded m and l. */ |
| cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = ((cctx->aes.ccm.l - 1) & 0x7) |
| | (((cctx->aes.ccm.m - 2) >> 1) & 0x7) << 3; |
| memset(cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b + 1, 0, |
| sizeof(cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b)); |
| cctx->aes.ccm.blocks = 0; |
| |
| cctx->aes.ccm.key_set = 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (iv != NULL) { |
| memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->aes.ccm.l); |
| |
| cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 1; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Called from EVP layer to initialize context, process additional |
| * authenticated data, en/de-crypt plain/cipher-text and authenticate |
| * plaintext or process a TLS packet, depending on context. Returns bytes |
| * written on success. Otherwise -1 is returned. |
| */ |
| static int s390x_aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx); |
| const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx); |
| int rv; |
| unsigned char *buf; |
| |
| if (!cctx->aes.ccm.key_set) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if (cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len >= 0) |
| return s390x_aes_ccm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len); |
| |
| /*- |
| * Final(): Does not return any data. Recall that ccm is mac-then-encrypt |
| * so integrity must be checked already at Update() i.e., before |
| * potentially corrupted data is output. |
| */ |
| if (in == NULL && out != NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if (out == NULL) { |
| /* Update(): Pass message length. */ |
| if (in == NULL) { |
| s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ctx->iv, len); |
| |
| cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 1; |
| return len; |
| } |
| |
| /* Update(): Process aad. */ |
| if (!cctx->aes.ccm.len_set && len) |
| return -1; |
| |
| s390x_aes_ccm_aad(cctx, in, len); |
| return len; |
| } |
| |
| /* The tag must be set before actually decrypting data */ |
| if (!enc && !cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set) |
| return -1; |
| |
| /* Update(): Process message. */ |
| |
| if (!cctx->aes.ccm.len_set) { |
| /*- |
| * In case message length was not previously set explicitly via |
| * Update(), set it now. |
| */ |
| s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ctx->iv, len); |
| |
| cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (enc) { |
| if (s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 1; |
| return len; |
| } else { |
| rv = -1; |
| |
| if (!s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc)) { |
| buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx); |
| if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, buf, |
| cctx->aes.ccm.m)) |
| rv = len; |
| } |
| |
| if (rv == -1) |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); |
| |
| cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0; |
| cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0; |
| cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0; |
| return rv; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Performs various operations on the context structure depending on control |
| * type. Returns 1 for success, 0 for failure and -1 for unknown control type. |
| * Code is big-endian. |
| */ |
| static int s390x_aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) |
| { |
| S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, c); |
| unsigned char *buf; |
| int enc, len; |
| |
| switch (type) { |
| case EVP_CTRL_INIT: |
| cctx->aes.ccm.key_set = 0; |
| cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0; |
| cctx->aes.ccm.l = 8; |
| cctx->aes.ccm.m = 12; |
| cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0; |
| cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0; |
| cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len = -1; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN: |
| *(int *)ptr = 15 - cctx->aes.ccm.l; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: |
| if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Save the aad for later use. */ |
| buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c); |
| memcpy(buf, ptr, arg); |
| cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len = arg; |
| |
| len = buf[arg - 2] << 8 | buf[arg - 1]; |
| if (len < EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Correct length for explicit iv. */ |
| len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| |
| enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); |
| if (!enc) { |
| if (len < cctx->aes.ccm.m) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Correct length for tag. */ |
| len -= cctx->aes.ccm.m; |
| } |
| |
| buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8; |
| buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff; |
| |
| /* Extra padding: tag appended to record. */ |
| return cctx->aes.ccm.m; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED: |
| if (arg != EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Copy to first part of the iv. */ |
| memcpy(c->iv, ptr, arg); |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: |
| arg = 15 - arg; |
| /* fall-through */ |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L: |
| if (arg < 2 || arg > 8) |
| return 0; |
| |
| cctx->aes.ccm.l = arg; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG: |
| if ((arg & 1) || arg < 4 || arg > 16) |
| return 0; |
| |
| enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); |
| if (enc && ptr) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (ptr) { |
| cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 1; |
| buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c); |
| memcpy(buf, ptr, arg); |
| } |
| |
| cctx->aes.ccm.m = arg; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG: |
| enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c); |
| if (!enc || !cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (arg < cctx->aes.ccm.m) |
| return 0; |
| |
| memcpy(ptr, cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, cctx->aes.ccm.m); |
| cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0; |
| cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0; |
| cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_COPY: |
| return 1; |
| |
| default: |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| # define s390x_aes_ccm_cleanup aes_ccm_cleanup |
| |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB |
| # define S390X_AES_OCB_CTX EVP_AES_OCB_CTX |
| |
| # define s390x_aes_ocb_init_key aes_ocb_init_key |
| static int s390x_aes_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv, int enc); |
| # define s390x_aes_ocb_cipher aes_ocb_cipher |
| static int s390x_aes_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len); |
| # define s390x_aes_ocb_cleanup aes_ocb_cleanup |
| static int s390x_aes_ocb_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *); |
| # define s390x_aes_ocb_ctrl aes_ocb_ctrl |
| static int s390x_aes_ocb_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr); |
| # endif |
| |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SIV |
| # define S390X_AES_SIV_CTX EVP_AES_SIV_CTX |
| |
| # define s390x_aes_siv_init_key aes_siv_init_key |
| # define s390x_aes_siv_cipher aes_siv_cipher |
| # define s390x_aes_siv_cleanup aes_siv_cleanup |
| # define s390x_aes_siv_ctrl aes_siv_ctrl |
| # endif |
| |
| # define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode, \ |
| MODE,flags) \ |
| static const EVP_CIPHER s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
| nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize, \ |
| keylen / 8, \ |
| ivlen, \ |
| flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
| EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
| s390x_aes_##mode##_init_key, \ |
| s390x_aes_##mode##_cipher, \ |
| NULL, \ |
| sizeof(S390X_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ |
| NULL, \ |
| NULL, \ |
| NULL, \ |
| NULL \ |
| }; \ |
| static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
| nid##_##keylen##_##nmode, \ |
| blocksize, \ |
| keylen / 8, \ |
| ivlen, \ |
| flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
| EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
| aes_init_key, \ |
| aes_##mode##_cipher, \ |
| NULL, \ |
| sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ |
| NULL, \ |
| NULL, \ |
| NULL, \ |
| NULL \ |
| }; \ |
| const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ |
| { \ |
| return S390X_aes_##keylen##_##mode##_CAPABLE ? \ |
| &s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ |
| } |
| |
| # define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags)\ |
| static const EVP_CIPHER s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
| nid##_##keylen##_##mode, \ |
| blocksize, \ |
| (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \ |
| ivlen, \ |
| flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
| EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
| s390x_aes_##mode##_init_key, \ |
| s390x_aes_##mode##_cipher, \ |
| s390x_aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ |
| sizeof(S390X_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ |
| NULL, \ |
| NULL, \ |
| s390x_aes_##mode##_ctrl, \ |
| NULL \ |
| }; \ |
| static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
| nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \ |
| (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \ |
| ivlen, \ |
| flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
| EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
| aes_##mode##_init_key, \ |
| aes_##mode##_cipher, \ |
| aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ |
| sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ |
| NULL, \ |
| NULL, \ |
| aes_##mode##_ctrl, \ |
| NULL \ |
| }; \ |
| const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ |
| { \ |
| return S390X_aes_##keylen##_##mode##_CAPABLE ? \ |
| &s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \ |
| } |
| |
| #else |
| |
| # define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \ |
| static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
| nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \ |
| flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
| EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
| aes_init_key, \ |
| aes_##mode##_cipher, \ |
| NULL, \ |
| sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \ |
| NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \ |
| const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ |
| { return &aes_##keylen##_##mode; } |
| |
| # define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \ |
| static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \ |
| nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \ |
| (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \ |
| ivlen, \ |
| flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \ |
| EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \ |
| aes_##mode##_init_key, \ |
| aes_##mode##_cipher, \ |
| aes_##mode##_cleanup, \ |
| sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \ |
| NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \ |
| const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \ |
| { return &aes_##keylen##_##mode; } |
| |
| #endif |
| |
| #define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(nid,keylen,flags) \ |
| BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,16,16,cbc,cbc,CBC,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ |
| BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,16,0,ecb,ecb,ECB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ |
| BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,ofb128,ofb,OFB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ |
| BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb128,cfb,CFB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \ |
| BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb1,cfb1,CFB,flags) \ |
| BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb8,cfb8,CFB,flags) \ |
| BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,ctr,ctr,CTR,flags) |
| |
| static int aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
| { |
| int ret, mode; |
| EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx); |
| const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; |
| |
| if (keylen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ctx); |
| if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
| && !enc) { |
| #ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE |
| if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { |
| ret = HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks); |
| dat->block = (block128_f) HWAES_decrypt; |
| dat->stream.cbc = NULL; |
| # ifdef HWAES_cbc_encrypt |
| if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
| dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) HWAES_cbc_encrypt; |
| # endif |
| } else |
| #endif |
| #ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE |
| if (BSAES_CAPABLE && mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { |
| ret = AES_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks); |
| dat->block = (block128_f) AES_decrypt; |
| dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) ossl_bsaes_cbc_encrypt; |
| } else |
| #endif |
| #ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE |
| if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { |
| ret = vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks); |
| dat->block = (block128_f) vpaes_decrypt; |
| dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? |
| (cbc128_f) vpaes_cbc_encrypt : NULL; |
| } else |
| #endif |
| { |
| ret = AES_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks); |
| dat->block = (block128_f) AES_decrypt; |
| dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? |
| (cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt : NULL; |
| } |
| } else |
| #ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE |
| if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { |
| ret = HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks); |
| dat->block = (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt; |
| dat->stream.cbc = NULL; |
| # ifdef HWAES_cbc_encrypt |
| if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
| dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) HWAES_cbc_encrypt; |
| else |
| # endif |
| # ifdef HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks |
| if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) |
| dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; |
| else |
| # endif |
| (void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */ |
| } else |
| #endif |
| #ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE |
| if (BSAES_CAPABLE && mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) { |
| ret = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks); |
| dat->block = (block128_f) AES_encrypt; |
| dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) ossl_bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; |
| } else |
| #endif |
| #ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE |
| if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { |
| ret = vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks); |
| dat->block = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt; |
| dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? |
| (cbc128_f) vpaes_cbc_encrypt : NULL; |
| } else |
| #endif |
| { |
| ret = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks); |
| dat->block = (block128_f) AES_encrypt; |
| dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? |
| (cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt : NULL; |
| #ifdef AES_CTR_ASM |
| if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) |
| dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) AES_ctr32_encrypt; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| if (ret < 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int aes_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx); |
| |
| if (dat->stream.cbc) |
| (*dat->stream.cbc) (in, out, len, &dat->ks, ctx->iv, |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)); |
| else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) |
| CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, ctx->iv, |
| dat->block); |
| else |
| CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, |
| ctx->iv, dat->block); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int aes_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| size_t bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_block_size(ctx); |
| size_t i; |
| EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx); |
| |
| if (len < bl) |
| return 1; |
| |
| for (i = 0, len -= bl; i <= len; i += bl) |
| (*dat->block) (in + i, out + i, &dat->ks); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int aes_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx); |
| |
| int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx); |
| CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, |
| ctx->iv, &num, dat->block); |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int aes_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx); |
| |
| int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx); |
| CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, |
| ctx->iv, &num, |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int aes_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx); |
| |
| int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx); |
| CRYPTO_cfb128_8_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, |
| ctx->iv, &num, |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int aes_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx); |
| |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS)) { |
| int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx); |
| CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, |
| ctx->iv, &num, |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| while (len >= MAXBITCHUNK) { |
| int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx); |
| CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, MAXBITCHUNK * 8, &dat->ks, |
| ctx->iv, &num, |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); |
| len -= MAXBITCHUNK; |
| out += MAXBITCHUNK; |
| in += MAXBITCHUNK; |
| } |
| if (len) { |
| int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx); |
| CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len * 8, &dat->ks, |
| ctx->iv, &num, |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx), dat->block); |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int aes_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| int n = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx); |
| unsigned int num; |
| EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx); |
| |
| if (n < 0) |
| return 0; |
| num = (unsigned int)n; |
| |
| if (dat->stream.ctr) |
| CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len, &dat->ks, |
| ctx->iv, |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), |
| &num, dat->stream.ctr); |
| else |
| CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, |
| ctx->iv, |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), &num, |
| dat->block); |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 128, 0) |
| BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 192, 0) |
| BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 256, 0) |
| |
| static int aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,c); |
| if (gctx == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(&gctx->gcm, sizeof(gctx->gcm)); |
| if (gctx->iv != c->iv) |
| OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,c); |
| switch (type) { |
| case EVP_CTRL_INIT: |
| gctx->key_set = 0; |
| gctx->iv_set = 0; |
| gctx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(c->cipher); |
| gctx->iv = c->iv; |
| gctx->taglen = -1; |
| gctx->iv_gen = 0; |
| gctx->tls_aad_len = -1; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN: |
| *(int *)ptr = gctx->ivlen; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: |
| if (arg <= 0) |
| return 0; |
| /* Allocate memory for IV if needed */ |
| if ((arg > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) && (arg > gctx->ivlen)) { |
| if (gctx->iv != c->iv) |
| OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv); |
| if ((gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg)) == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| gctx->ivlen = arg; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG: |
| if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || c->encrypt) |
| return 0; |
| memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg); |
| gctx->taglen = arg; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG: |
| if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !c->encrypt |
| || gctx->taglen < 0) |
| return 0; |
| memcpy(ptr, c->buf, arg); |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED: |
| /* Special case: -1 length restores whole IV */ |
| if (arg == -1) { |
| memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, gctx->ivlen); |
| gctx->iv_gen = 1; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| /* |
| * Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field at least |
| * 8. |
| */ |
| if ((arg < 4) || (gctx->ivlen - arg) < 8) |
| return 0; |
| if (arg) |
| memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg); |
| if (c->encrypt && RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0) |
| return 0; |
| gctx->iv_gen = 1; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN: |
| if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0) |
| return 0; |
| CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen); |
| if (arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen) |
| arg = gctx->ivlen; |
| memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, arg); |
| /* |
| * Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need |
| * to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes. |
| */ |
| ctr64_inc(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8); |
| gctx->iv_set = 1; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV: |
| if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0 || c->encrypt) |
| return 0; |
| memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg); |
| CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen); |
| gctx->iv_set = 1; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: |
| /* Save the AAD for later use */ |
| if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) |
| return 0; |
| memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg); |
| gctx->tls_aad_len = arg; |
| gctx->tls_enc_records = 0; |
| { |
| unsigned int len = c->buf[arg - 2] << 8 | c->buf[arg - 1]; |
| /* Correct length for explicit IV */ |
| if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) |
| return 0; |
| len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| /* If decrypting correct for tag too */ |
| if (!c->encrypt) { |
| if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN) |
| return 0; |
| len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; |
| } |
| c->buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8; |
| c->buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff; |
| } |
| /* Extra padding: tag appended to record */ |
| return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_COPY: |
| { |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr; |
| EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,out); |
| if (gctx->gcm.key) { |
| if (gctx->gcm.key != &gctx->ks) |
| return 0; |
| gctx_out->gcm.key = &gctx_out->ks; |
| } |
| if (gctx->iv == c->iv) |
| gctx_out->iv = out->iv; |
| else { |
| if ((gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(gctx->ivlen)) == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen); |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| default: |
| return -1; |
| |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx); |
| |
| if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) |
| return 1; |
| |
| if (key != NULL) { |
| const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; |
| |
| if (keylen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| do { |
| #ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE |
| if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { |
| HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &gctx->ks.ks); |
| CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, |
| (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt); |
| # ifdef HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks |
| gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; |
| # else |
| gctx->ctr = NULL; |
| # endif |
| break; |
| } else |
| #endif |
| #ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE |
| if (BSAES_CAPABLE) { |
| AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &gctx->ks.ks); |
| CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, |
| (block128_f) AES_encrypt); |
| gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) ossl_bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; |
| break; |
| } else |
| #endif |
| #ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE |
| if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { |
| vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &gctx->ks.ks); |
| CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, |
| (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt); |
| gctx->ctr = NULL; |
| break; |
| } else |
| #endif |
| (void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */ |
| |
| AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &gctx->ks.ks); |
| CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, |
| (block128_f) AES_encrypt); |
| #ifdef AES_CTR_ASM |
| gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) AES_ctr32_encrypt; |
| #else |
| gctx->ctr = NULL; |
| #endif |
| } while (0); |
| |
| /* |
| * If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. |
| */ |
| if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set) |
| iv = gctx->iv; |
| if (iv) { |
| CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); |
| gctx->iv_set = 1; |
| } |
| gctx->key_set = 1; |
| } else { |
| /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ |
| if (gctx->key_set) |
| CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen); |
| else |
| memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen); |
| gctx->iv_set = 1; |
| gctx->iv_gen = 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Handle TLS GCM packet format. This consists of the last portion of the IV |
| * followed by the payload and finally the tag. On encrypt generate IV, |
| * encrypt payload and write the tag. On verify retrieve IV, decrypt payload |
| * and verify tag. |
| */ |
| |
| static int aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx); |
| int rv = -1; |
| /* Encrypt/decrypt must be performed in place */ |
| if (out != in |
| || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| /* |
| * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness |
| * Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the |
| * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting |
| * side only. |
| */ |
| if (ctx->encrypt && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Set IV from start of buffer or generate IV and write to start of |
| * buffer. |
| */ |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, ctx->encrypt ? EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN |
| : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV, |
| EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) <= 0) |
| goto err; |
| /* Use saved AAD */ |
| if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, gctx->tls_aad_len)) |
| goto err; |
| /* Fix buffer and length to point to payload */ |
| in += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| out += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; |
| if (ctx->encrypt) { |
| /* Encrypt payload */ |
| if (gctx->ctr) { |
| size_t bulk = 0; |
| #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM) |
| if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) { |
| if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in, out, len, |
| gctx->gcm.key, |
| gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); |
| gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; |
| } |
| #endif |
| if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, |
| in + bulk, |
| out + bulk, |
| len - bulk, gctx->ctr)) |
| goto err; |
| } else { |
| size_t bulk = 0; |
| #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2) |
| if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) { |
| if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in, out, len, |
| gctx->gcm.key, |
| gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); |
| gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; |
| } |
| #endif |
| if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, |
| in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk)) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| out += len; |
| /* Finally write tag */ |
| CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, out, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN); |
| rv = len + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; |
| } else { |
| /* Decrypt */ |
| if (gctx->ctr) { |
| size_t bulk = 0; |
| #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM) |
| if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) { |
| if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in, out, len, |
| gctx->gcm.key, |
| gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); |
| gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; |
| } |
| #endif |
| if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, |
| in + bulk, |
| out + bulk, |
| len - bulk, gctx->ctr)) |
| goto err; |
| } else { |
| size_t bulk = 0; |
| #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2) |
| if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) { |
| if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in, out, len, |
| gctx->gcm.key, |
| gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); |
| gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; |
| } |
| #endif |
| if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, |
| in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk)) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| /* Retrieve tag */ |
| CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN); |
| /* If tag mismatch wipe buffer */ |
| if (CRYPTO_memcmp(ctx->buf, in + len, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) { |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| rv = len; |
| } |
| |
| err: |
| gctx->iv_set = 0; |
| gctx->tls_aad_len = -1; |
| return rv; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef FIPS_MODULE |
| /* |
| * See SP800-38D (GCM) Section 8 "Uniqueness requirement on IVS and keys" |
| * |
| * See also 8.2.2 RBG-based construction. |
| * Random construction consists of a free field (which can be NULL) and a |
| * random field which will use a DRBG that can return at least 96 bits of |
| * entropy strength. (The DRBG must be seeded by the FIPS module). |
| */ |
| static int aes_gcm_iv_generate(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx, int offset) |
| { |
| int sz = gctx->ivlen - offset; |
| |
| /* Must be at least 96 bits */ |
| if (sz <= 0 || gctx->ivlen < 12) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Use DRBG to generate random iv */ |
| if (RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + offset, sz) <= 0) |
| return 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| #endif /* FIPS_MODULE */ |
| |
| static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx); |
| |
| /* If not set up, return error */ |
| if (!gctx->key_set) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if (gctx->tls_aad_len >= 0) |
| return aes_gcm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len); |
| |
| #ifdef FIPS_MODULE |
| /* |
| * FIPS requires generation of AES-GCM IV's inside the FIPS module. |
| * The IV can still be set externally (the security policy will state that |
| * this is not FIPS compliant). There are some applications |
| * where setting the IV externally is the only option available. |
| */ |
| if (!gctx->iv_set) { |
| if (!ctx->encrypt || !aes_gcm_iv_generate(gctx, 0)) |
| return -1; |
| CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen); |
| gctx->iv_set = 1; |
| gctx->iv_gen_rand = 1; |
| } |
| #else |
| if (!gctx->iv_set) |
| return -1; |
| #endif /* FIPS_MODULE */ |
| |
| if (in) { |
| if (out == NULL) { |
| if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, in, len)) |
| return -1; |
| } else if (ctx->encrypt) { |
| if (gctx->ctr) { |
| size_t bulk = 0; |
| #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM) |
| if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) { |
| size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16; |
| |
| if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in + res, |
| out + res, len - res, |
| gctx->gcm.key, gctx->gcm.Yi.c, |
| gctx->gcm.Xi.u); |
| gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; |
| bulk += res; |
| } |
| #endif |
| if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, |
| in + bulk, |
| out + bulk, |
| len - bulk, gctx->ctr)) |
| return -1; |
| } else { |
| size_t bulk = 0; |
| #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2) |
| if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) { |
| size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16; |
| |
| if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in + res, |
| out + res, len - res, |
| gctx->gcm.key, gctx->gcm.Yi.c, |
| gctx->gcm.Xi.u); |
| gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; |
| bulk += res; |
| } |
| #endif |
| if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, |
| in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk)) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (gctx->ctr) { |
| size_t bulk = 0; |
| #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM) |
| if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) { |
| size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16; |
| |
| if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in + res, |
| out + res, len - res, |
| gctx->gcm.key, |
| gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); |
| gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; |
| bulk += res; |
| } |
| #endif |
| if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, |
| in + bulk, |
| out + bulk, |
| len - bulk, gctx->ctr)) |
| return -1; |
| } else { |
| size_t bulk = 0; |
| #if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2) |
| if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) { |
| size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16; |
| |
| if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in + res, |
| out + res, len - res, |
| gctx->gcm.key, |
| gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u); |
| gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk; |
| bulk += res; |
| } |
| #endif |
| if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, |
| in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk)) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| return len; |
| } else { |
| if (!ctx->encrypt) { |
| if (gctx->taglen < 0) |
| return -1; |
| if (CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, gctx->taglen) != 0) |
| return -1; |
| gctx->iv_set = 0; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, 16); |
| gctx->taglen = 16; |
| /* Don't reuse the IV */ |
| gctx->iv_set = 0; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| } |
| |
| #define CUSTOM_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 \ |
| | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \ |
| | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \ |
| | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV_LENGTH) |
| |
| BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 12, gcm, GCM, |
| EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) |
| BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 1, 12, gcm, GCM, |
| EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) |
| BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 12, gcm, GCM, |
| EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) |
| |
| static int aes_xts_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX, c); |
| |
| if (type == EVP_CTRL_COPY) { |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr; |
| EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,out); |
| |
| if (xctx->xts.key1) { |
| if (xctx->xts.key1 != &xctx->ks1) |
| return 0; |
| xctx_out->xts.key1 = &xctx_out->ks1; |
| } |
| if (xctx->xts.key2) { |
| if (xctx->xts.key2 != &xctx->ks2) |
| return 0; |
| xctx_out->xts.key2 = &xctx_out->ks2; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } else if (type != EVP_CTRL_INIT) |
| return -1; |
| /* key1 and key2 are used as an indicator both key and IV are set */ |
| xctx->xts.key1 = NULL; |
| xctx->xts.key2 = NULL; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx); |
| |
| if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) |
| return 1; |
| |
| if (key != NULL) { |
| do { |
| /* The key is two half length keys in reality */ |
| const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx); |
| const int bytes = keylen / 2; |
| const int bits = bytes * 8; |
| |
| if (keylen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* |
| * Verify that the two keys are different. |
| * |
| * This addresses the vulnerability described in Rogaway's |
| * September 2004 paper: |
| * |
| * "Efficient Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and |
| * Refinements to Modes OCB and PMAC". |
| * (http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/offsets.pdf) |
| * |
| * FIPS 140-2 IG A.9 XTS-AES Key Generation Requirements states |
| * that: |
| * "The check for Key_1 != Key_2 shall be done at any place |
| * BEFORE using the keys in the XTS-AES algorithm to process |
| * data with them." |
| */ |
| if ((!allow_insecure_decrypt || enc) |
| && CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef AES_XTS_ASM |
| xctx->stream = enc ? AES_xts_encrypt : AES_xts_decrypt; |
| #else |
| xctx->stream = NULL; |
| #endif |
| /* key_len is two AES keys */ |
| #ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE |
| if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { |
| if (enc) { |
| HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); |
| xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt; |
| # ifdef HWAES_xts_encrypt |
| xctx->stream = HWAES_xts_encrypt; |
| # endif |
| } else { |
| HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); |
| xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) HWAES_decrypt; |
| # ifdef HWAES_xts_decrypt |
| xctx->stream = HWAES_xts_decrypt; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks); |
| xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt; |
| |
| xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1; |
| break; |
| } else |
| #endif |
| #ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE |
| if (BSAES_CAPABLE) |
| xctx->stream = enc ? ossl_bsaes_xts_encrypt : ossl_bsaes_xts_decrypt; |
| else |
| #endif |
| #ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE |
| if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { |
| if (enc) { |
| vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); |
| xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt; |
| } else { |
| vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); |
| xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) vpaes_decrypt; |
| } |
| |
| vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks); |
| xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt; |
| |
| xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1; |
| break; |
| } else |
| #endif |
| (void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */ |
| |
| if (enc) { |
| AES_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); |
| xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) AES_encrypt; |
| } else { |
| AES_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks); |
| xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) AES_decrypt; |
| } |
| |
| AES_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks); |
| xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) AES_encrypt; |
| |
| xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1; |
| } while (0); |
| } |
| |
| if (iv) { |
| xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2; |
| memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 16); |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int aes_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx); |
| |
| if (xctx->xts.key1 == NULL |
| || xctx->xts.key2 == NULL |
| || out == NULL |
| || in == NULL |
| || len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * Impose a limit of 2^20 blocks per data unit as specified by |
| * IEEE Std 1619-2018. The earlier and obsolete IEEE Std 1619-2007 |
| * indicated that this was a SHOULD NOT rather than a MUST NOT. |
| * NIST SP 800-38E mandates the same limit. |
| */ |
| if (len > XTS_MAX_BLOCKS_PER_DATA_UNIT * AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_XTS_DATA_UNIT_IS_TOO_LARGE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (xctx->stream) |
| (*xctx->stream) (in, out, len, |
| xctx->xts.key1, xctx->xts.key2, |
| ctx->iv); |
| else if (CRYPTO_xts128_encrypt(&xctx->xts, ctx->iv, in, out, len, |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx))) |
| return 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| #define aes_xts_cleanup NULL |
| |
| #define XTS_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV \ |
| | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \ |
| | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY) |
| |
| BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 16, xts, XTS, XTS_FLAGS) |
| BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 16, xts, XTS, XTS_FLAGS) |
| |
| static int aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,c); |
| switch (type) { |
| case EVP_CTRL_INIT: |
| cctx->key_set = 0; |
| cctx->iv_set = 0; |
| cctx->L = 8; |
| cctx->M = 12; |
| cctx->tag_set = 0; |
| cctx->len_set = 0; |
| cctx->tls_aad_len = -1; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN: |
| *(int *)ptr = 15 - cctx->L; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: |
| /* Save the AAD for later use */ |
| if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) |
| return 0; |
| memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg); |
| cctx->tls_aad_len = arg; |
| { |
| uint16_t len = |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] << 8 |
| | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1]; |
| /* Correct length for explicit IV */ |
| if (len < EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) |
| return 0; |
| len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| /* If decrypting correct for tag too */ |
| if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c)) { |
| if (len < cctx->M) |
| return 0; |
| len -= cctx->M; |
| } |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] = len >> 8; |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1] = len & 0xff; |
| } |
| /* Extra padding: tag appended to record */ |
| return cctx->M; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED: |
| /* Sanity check length */ |
| if (arg != EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN) |
| return 0; |
| /* Just copy to first part of IV */ |
| memcpy(c->iv, ptr, arg); |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: |
| arg = 15 - arg; |
| /* fall thru */ |
| case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L: |
| if (arg < 2 || arg > 8) |
| return 0; |
| cctx->L = arg; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG: |
| if ((arg & 1) || arg < 4 || arg > 16) |
| return 0; |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c) && ptr) |
| return 0; |
| if (ptr) { |
| cctx->tag_set = 1; |
| memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg); |
| } |
| cctx->M = arg; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG: |
| if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c) || !cctx->tag_set) |
| return 0; |
| if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(&cctx->ccm, ptr, (size_t)arg)) |
| return 0; |
| cctx->tag_set = 0; |
| cctx->iv_set = 0; |
| cctx->len_set = 0; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_COPY: |
| { |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr; |
| EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,out); |
| if (cctx->ccm.key) { |
| if (cctx->ccm.key != &cctx->ks) |
| return 0; |
| cctx_out->ccm.key = &cctx_out->ks; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| default: |
| return -1; |
| |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int aes_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx); |
| |
| if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) |
| return 1; |
| |
| if (key != NULL) { |
| const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; |
| |
| if (keylen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| do { |
| #ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE |
| if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { |
| HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &cctx->ks.ks); |
| |
| CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L, |
| &cctx->ks, (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt); |
| cctx->str = NULL; |
| cctx->key_set = 1; |
| break; |
| } else |
| #endif |
| #ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE |
| if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { |
| vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &cctx->ks.ks); |
| CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L, |
| &cctx->ks, (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt); |
| cctx->str = NULL; |
| cctx->key_set = 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| #endif |
| AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &cctx->ks.ks); |
| CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L, |
| &cctx->ks, (block128_f) AES_encrypt); |
| cctx->str = NULL; |
| cctx->key_set = 1; |
| } while (0); |
| } |
| if (iv != NULL) { |
| memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->L); |
| cctx->iv_set = 1; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int aes_ccm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx); |
| CCM128_CONTEXT *ccm = &cctx->ccm; |
| /* Encrypt/decrypt must be performed in place */ |
| if (out != in || len < (EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + (size_t)cctx->M)) |
| return -1; |
| /* If encrypting set explicit IV from sequence number (start of AAD) */ |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) |
| memcpy(out, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), |
| EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN); |
| /* Get rest of IV from explicit IV */ |
| memcpy(ctx->iv + EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN, in, |
| EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN); |
| /* Correct length value */ |
| len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->M; |
| if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, ctx->iv, 15 - cctx->L, |
| len)) |
| return -1; |
| /* Use saved AAD */ |
| CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), |
| cctx->tls_aad_len); |
| /* Fix buffer to point to payload */ |
| in += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| out += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { |
| if (cctx->str ? CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len, |
| cctx->str) : |
| CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) |
| return -1; |
| if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, out + len, cctx->M)) |
| return -1; |
| return len + EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->M; |
| } else { |
| if (cctx->str ? !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len, |
| cctx->str) : |
| !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) { |
| unsigned char tag[16]; |
| if (CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, tag, cctx->M)) { |
| if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in + len, cctx->M)) |
| return len; |
| } |
| } |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx); |
| CCM128_CONTEXT *ccm = &cctx->ccm; |
| /* If not set up, return error */ |
| if (!cctx->key_set) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if (cctx->tls_aad_len >= 0) |
| return aes_ccm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len); |
| |
| /* EVP_*Final() doesn't return any data */ |
| if (in == NULL && out != NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!cctx->iv_set) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if (!out) { |
| if (!in) { |
| if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, ctx->iv, |
| 15 - cctx->L, len)) |
| return -1; |
| cctx->len_set = 1; |
| return len; |
| } |
| /* If have AAD need message length */ |
| if (!cctx->len_set && len) |
| return -1; |
| CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(ccm, in, len); |
| return len; |
| } |
| |
| /* The tag must be set before actually decrypting data */ |
| if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx) && !cctx->tag_set) |
| return -1; |
| |
| /* If not set length yet do it */ |
| if (!cctx->len_set) { |
| if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, ctx->iv, 15 - cctx->L, len)) |
| return -1; |
| cctx->len_set = 1; |
| } |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { |
| if (cctx->str ? CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len, |
| cctx->str) : |
| CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) |
| return -1; |
| cctx->tag_set = 1; |
| return len; |
| } else { |
| int rv = -1; |
| if (cctx->str ? !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len, |
| cctx->str) : |
| !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) { |
| unsigned char tag[16]; |
| if (CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, tag, cctx->M)) { |
| if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), |
| cctx->M)) |
| rv = len; |
| } |
| } |
| if (rv == -1) |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); |
| cctx->iv_set = 0; |
| cctx->tag_set = 0; |
| cctx->len_set = 0; |
| return rv; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #define aes_ccm_cleanup NULL |
| |
| BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 12, ccm, CCM, |
| EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) |
| BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 1, 12, ccm, CCM, |
| EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) |
| BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 12, ccm, CCM, |
| EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) |
| |
| typedef struct { |
| union { |
| OSSL_UNION_ALIGN; |
| AES_KEY ks; |
| } ks; |
| /* Indicates if IV has been set */ |
| unsigned char *iv; |
| } EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX; |
| |
| static int aes_wrap_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
| { |
| int len; |
| EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX *wctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX,ctx); |
| |
| if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) |
| return 1; |
| if (key != NULL) { |
| const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; |
| |
| if (keylen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) |
| AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &wctx->ks.ks); |
| else |
| AES_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &wctx->ks.ks); |
| if (iv == NULL) |
| wctx->iv = NULL; |
| } |
| if (iv != NULL) { |
| if ((len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx)) < 0) |
| return 0; |
| memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, len); |
| wctx->iv = ctx->iv; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int aes_wrap_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX *wctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX,ctx); |
| size_t rv; |
| /* AES wrap with padding has IV length of 4, without padding 8 */ |
| int pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx) == 4; |
| /* No final operation so always return zero length */ |
| if (!in) |
| return 0; |
| /* Input length must always be non-zero */ |
| if (!inlen) |
| return -1; |
| /* If decrypting need at least 16 bytes and multiple of 8 */ |
| if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx) && (inlen < 16 || inlen & 0x7)) |
| return -1; |
| /* If not padding input must be multiple of 8 */ |
| if (!pad && inlen & 0x7) |
| return -1; |
| if (ossl_is_partially_overlapping(out, in, inlen)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (!out) { |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { |
| /* If padding round up to multiple of 8 */ |
| if (pad) |
| inlen = (inlen + 7) / 8 * 8; |
| /* 8 byte prefix */ |
| return inlen + 8; |
| } else { |
| /* |
| * If not padding output will be exactly 8 bytes smaller than |
| * input. If padding it will be at least 8 bytes smaller but we |
| * don't know how much. |
| */ |
| return inlen - 8; |
| } |
| } |
| if (pad) { |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) |
| rv = CRYPTO_128_wrap_pad(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv, |
| out, in, inlen, |
| (block128_f) AES_encrypt); |
| else |
| rv = CRYPTO_128_unwrap_pad(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv, |
| out, in, inlen, |
| (block128_f) AES_decrypt); |
| } else { |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) |
| rv = CRYPTO_128_wrap(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv, |
| out, in, inlen, (block128_f) AES_encrypt); |
| else |
| rv = CRYPTO_128_unwrap(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv, |
| out, in, inlen, (block128_f) AES_decrypt); |
| } |
| return rv ? (int)rv : -1; |
| } |
| |
| #define WRAP_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE \ |
| | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \ |
| | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) |
| |
| static const EVP_CIPHER aes_128_wrap = { |
| NID_id_aes128_wrap, |
| 8, 16, 8, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, |
| aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, |
| NULL, |
| sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), |
| NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL |
| }; |
| |
| const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_wrap(void) |
| { |
| return &aes_128_wrap; |
| } |
| |
| static const EVP_CIPHER aes_192_wrap = { |
| NID_id_aes192_wrap, |
| 8, 24, 8, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, |
| aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, |
| NULL, |
| sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), |
| NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL |
| }; |
| |
| const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_wrap(void) |
| { |
| return &aes_192_wrap; |
| } |
| |
| static const EVP_CIPHER aes_256_wrap = { |
| NID_id_aes256_wrap, |
| 8, 32, 8, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, |
| aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, |
| NULL, |
| sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), |
| NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL |
| }; |
| |
| const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_wrap(void) |
| { |
| return &aes_256_wrap; |
| } |
| |
| static const EVP_CIPHER aes_128_wrap_pad = { |
| NID_id_aes128_wrap_pad, |
| 8, 16, 4, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, |
| aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, |
| NULL, |
| sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), |
| NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL |
| }; |
| |
| const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_wrap_pad(void) |
| { |
| return &aes_128_wrap_pad; |
| } |
| |
| static const EVP_CIPHER aes_192_wrap_pad = { |
| NID_id_aes192_wrap_pad, |
| 8, 24, 4, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, |
| aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, |
| NULL, |
| sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), |
| NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL |
| }; |
| |
| const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_wrap_pad(void) |
| { |
| return &aes_192_wrap_pad; |
| } |
| |
| static const EVP_CIPHER aes_256_wrap_pad = { |
| NID_id_aes256_wrap_pad, |
| 8, 32, 4, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, |
| aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher, |
| NULL, |
| sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX), |
| NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL |
| }; |
| |
| const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_wrap_pad(void) |
| { |
| return &aes_256_wrap_pad; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB |
| static int aes_ocb_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,c); |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX *newc; |
| EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *new_octx; |
| |
| switch (type) { |
| case EVP_CTRL_INIT: |
| octx->key_set = 0; |
| octx->iv_set = 0; |
| octx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(c->cipher); |
| octx->iv = c->iv; |
| octx->taglen = 16; |
| octx->data_buf_len = 0; |
| octx->aad_buf_len = 0; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN: |
| *(int *)ptr = octx->ivlen; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: |
| /* IV len must be 1 to 15 */ |
| if (arg <= 0 || arg > 15) |
| return 0; |
| |
| octx->ivlen = arg; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG: |
| if (ptr == NULL) { |
| /* Tag len must be 0 to 16 */ |
| if (arg < 0 || arg > 16) |
| return 0; |
| |
| octx->taglen = arg; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| if (arg != octx->taglen || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c)) |
| return 0; |
| memcpy(octx->tag, ptr, arg); |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG: |
| if (arg != octx->taglen || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| memcpy(ptr, octx->tag, arg); |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_CTRL_COPY: |
| newc = (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)ptr; |
| new_octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,newc); |
| return CRYPTO_ocb128_copy_ctx(&new_octx->ocb, &octx->ocb, |
| &new_octx->ksenc.ks, |
| &new_octx->ksdec.ks); |
| |
| default: |
| return -1; |
| |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int aes_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, |
| const unsigned char *iv, int enc) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,ctx); |
| |
| if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) |
| return 1; |
| |
| if (key != NULL) { |
| const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8; |
| |
| if (keylen <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| do { |
| /* |
| * We set both the encrypt and decrypt key here because decrypt |
| * needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the |
| * decrypt for an encryption operation. |
| */ |
| # ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE |
| if (HWAES_CAPABLE) { |
| HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksenc.ks); |
| HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksdec.ks); |
| if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb, |
| &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks, |
| (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt, |
| (block128_f) HWAES_decrypt, |
| enc ? HWAES_ocb_encrypt |
| : HWAES_ocb_decrypt)) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| } |
| # endif |
| # ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE |
| if (VPAES_CAPABLE) { |
| vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksenc.ks); |
| vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksdec.ks); |
| if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb, |
| &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks, |
| (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt, |
| (block128_f) vpaes_decrypt, |
| NULL)) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| } |
| # endif |
| AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksenc.ks); |
| AES_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksdec.ks); |
| if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb, |
| &octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks, |
| (block128_f) AES_encrypt, |
| (block128_f) AES_decrypt, |
| NULL)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| while (0); |
| |
| /* |
| * If we have an iv we can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. |
| */ |
| if (iv == NULL && octx->iv_set) |
| iv = octx->iv; |
| if (iv) { |
| if (CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen) |
| != 1) |
| return 0; |
| octx->iv_set = 1; |
| } |
| octx->key_set = 1; |
| } else { |
| /* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */ |
| if (octx->key_set) |
| CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen); |
| else |
| memcpy(octx->iv, iv, octx->ivlen); |
| octx->iv_set = 1; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int aes_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| unsigned char *buf; |
| int *buf_len; |
| int written_len = 0; |
| size_t trailing_len; |
| EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,ctx); |
| |
| /* If IV or Key not set then return error */ |
| if (!octx->iv_set) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if (!octx->key_set) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if (in != NULL) { |
| /* |
| * Need to ensure we are only passing full blocks to low level OCB |
| * routines. We do it here rather than in EVP_EncryptUpdate/ |
| * EVP_DecryptUpdate because we need to pass full blocks of AAD too |
| * and those routines don't support that |
| */ |
| |
| /* Are we dealing with AAD or normal data here? */ |
| if (out == NULL) { |
| buf = octx->aad_buf; |
| buf_len = &(octx->aad_buf_len); |
| } else { |
| buf = octx->data_buf; |
| buf_len = &(octx->data_buf_len); |
| |
| if (ossl_is_partially_overlapping(out + *buf_len, in, len)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * If we've got a partially filled buffer from a previous call then |
| * use that data first |
| */ |
| if (*buf_len > 0) { |
| unsigned int remaining; |
| |
| remaining = AES_BLOCK_SIZE - (*buf_len); |
| if (remaining > len) { |
| memcpy(buf + (*buf_len), in, len); |
| *(buf_len) += len; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| memcpy(buf + (*buf_len), in, remaining); |
| |
| /* |
| * If we get here we've filled the buffer, so process it |
| */ |
| len -= remaining; |
| in += remaining; |
| if (out == NULL) { |
| if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(&octx->ocb, buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) |
| return -1; |
| } else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { |
| if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(&octx->ocb, buf, out, |
| AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) |
| return -1; |
| } else { |
| if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(&octx->ocb, buf, out, |
| AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| written_len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; |
| *buf_len = 0; |
| if (out != NULL) |
| out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; |
| } |
| |
| /* Do we have a partial block to handle at the end? */ |
| trailing_len = len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; |
| |
| /* |
| * If we've got some full blocks to handle, then process these first |
| */ |
| if (len != trailing_len) { |
| if (out == NULL) { |
| if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(&octx->ocb, in, len - trailing_len)) |
| return -1; |
| } else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { |
| if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt |
| (&octx->ocb, in, out, len - trailing_len)) |
| return -1; |
| } else { |
| if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt |
| (&octx->ocb, in, out, len - trailing_len)) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| written_len += len - trailing_len; |
| in += len - trailing_len; |
| } |
| |
| /* Handle any trailing partial block */ |
| if (trailing_len > 0) { |
| memcpy(buf, in, trailing_len); |
| *buf_len = trailing_len; |
| } |
| |
| return written_len; |
| } else { |
| /* |
| * First of all empty the buffer of any partial block that we might |
| * have been provided - both for data and AAD |
| */ |
| if (octx->data_buf_len > 0) { |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { |
| if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(&octx->ocb, octx->data_buf, out, |
| octx->data_buf_len)) |
| return -1; |
| } else { |
| if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(&octx->ocb, octx->data_buf, out, |
| octx->data_buf_len)) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| written_len = octx->data_buf_len; |
| octx->data_buf_len = 0; |
| } |
| if (octx->aad_buf_len > 0) { |
| if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_aad |
| (&octx->ocb, octx->aad_buf, octx->aad_buf_len)) |
| return -1; |
| octx->aad_buf_len = 0; |
| } |
| /* If decrypting then verify */ |
| if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) { |
| if (octx->taglen < 0) |
| return -1; |
| if (CRYPTO_ocb128_finish(&octx->ocb, |
| octx->tag, octx->taglen) != 0) |
| return -1; |
| octx->iv_set = 0; |
| return written_len; |
| } |
| /* If encrypting then just get the tag */ |
| if (CRYPTO_ocb128_tag(&octx->ocb, octx->tag, 16) != 1) |
| return -1; |
| /* Don't reuse the IV */ |
| octx->iv_set = 0; |
| return written_len; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int aes_ocb_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c) |
| { |
| EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,c); |
| CRYPTO_ocb128_cleanup(&octx->ocb); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 16, 12, ocb, OCB, |
| EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) |
| BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 16, 12, ocb, OCB, |
| EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) |
| BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 16, 12, ocb, OCB, |
| EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS) |
| #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */ |