| /* |
| * Copyright 2005-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| */ |
| |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <errno.h> |
| #include "../ssl_local.h" |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
| #include "record_local.h" |
| #include "internal/packet.h" |
| #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
| |
| int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl) |
| { |
| DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d; |
| |
| if ((d = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d))) == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| rl->d = d; |
| |
| d->unprocessed_rcds.q = pqueue_new(); |
| d->processed_rcds.q = pqueue_new(); |
| d->buffered_app_data.q = pqueue_new(); |
| |
| if (d->unprocessed_rcds.q == NULL || d->processed_rcds.q == NULL |
| || d->buffered_app_data.q == NULL) { |
| pqueue_free(d->unprocessed_rcds.q); |
| pqueue_free(d->processed_rcds.q); |
| pqueue_free(d->buffered_app_data.q); |
| OPENSSL_free(d); |
| rl->d = NULL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(RECORD_LAYER *rl) |
| { |
| if (rl->d == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl); |
| pqueue_free(rl->d->unprocessed_rcds.q); |
| pqueue_free(rl->d->processed_rcds.q); |
| pqueue_free(rl->d->buffered_app_data.q); |
| OPENSSL_free(rl->d); |
| rl->d = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl) |
| { |
| DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d; |
| pitem *item = NULL; |
| DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; |
| pqueue *unprocessed_rcds; |
| pqueue *processed_rcds; |
| pqueue *buffered_app_data; |
| |
| d = rl->d; |
| |
| while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL) { |
| rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; |
| OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); |
| OPENSSL_free(item->data); |
| pitem_free(item); |
| } |
| |
| while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->processed_rcds.q)) != NULL) { |
| rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; |
| if (rl->s->options & SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT) |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(rdata->rbuf.buf, rdata->rbuf.len); |
| OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); |
| OPENSSL_free(item->data); |
| pitem_free(item); |
| } |
| |
| while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) { |
| rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; |
| if (rl->s->options & SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT) |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(rdata->rbuf.buf, rdata->rbuf.len); |
| OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); |
| OPENSSL_free(item->data); |
| pitem_free(item); |
| } |
| |
| unprocessed_rcds = d->unprocessed_rcds.q; |
| processed_rcds = d->processed_rcds.q; |
| buffered_app_data = d->buffered_app_data.q; |
| memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d)); |
| d->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds; |
| d->processed_rcds.q = processed_rcds; |
| d->buffered_app_data.q = buffered_app_data; |
| } |
| |
| void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned short e) |
| { |
| if (e == rl->d->w_epoch - 1) { |
| memcpy(rl->d->curr_write_sequence, |
| rl->write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); |
| memcpy(rl->write_sequence, |
| rl->d->last_write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); |
| } else if (e == rl->d->w_epoch + 1) { |
| memcpy(rl->d->last_write_sequence, |
| rl->write_sequence, sizeof(unsigned char[8])); |
| memcpy(rl->write_sequence, |
| rl->d->curr_write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); |
| } |
| rl->d->w_epoch = e; |
| } |
| |
| void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned char *seq) |
| { |
| memcpy(rl->write_sequence, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); |
| } |
| |
| /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */ |
| static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item) |
| { |
| DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; |
| |
| rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; |
| |
| SSL3_BUFFER_release(&s->rlayer.rbuf); |
| |
| s->rlayer.packet = rdata->packet; |
| s->rlayer.packet_length = rdata->packet_length; |
| memcpy(&s->rlayer.rbuf, &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); |
| memcpy(&s->rlayer.rrec, &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); |
| |
| /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */ |
| memcpy(&(s->rlayer.read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority) |
| { |
| DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; |
| pitem *item; |
| |
| /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */ |
| if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100) |
| return 0; |
| |
| rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*rdata)); |
| item = pitem_new(priority, rdata); |
| if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_free(rdata); |
| pitem_free(item); |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| rdata->packet = s->rlayer.packet; |
| rdata->packet_length = s->rlayer.packet_length; |
| memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &s->rlayer.rbuf, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); |
| memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &s->rlayer.rrec, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); |
| |
| item->data = rdata; |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */ |
| if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && |
| (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED |
| || SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED)) { |
| BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO, |
| sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| s->rlayer.packet = NULL; |
| s->rlayer.packet_length = 0; |
| memset(&s->rlayer.rbuf, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rbuf)); |
| memset(&s->rlayer.rrec, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rrec)); |
| |
| if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { |
| /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
| OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); |
| OPENSSL_free(rdata); |
| pitem_free(item); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) { |
| /* Must be a duplicate so ignore it */ |
| OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); |
| OPENSSL_free(rdata); |
| pitem_free(item); |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue) |
| { |
| pitem *item; |
| |
| item = pqueue_pop(queue->q); |
| if (item) { |
| dtls1_copy_record(s, item); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(item->data); |
| pitem_free(item); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not |
| * processed yet |
| */ |
| #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \ |
| dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ |
| &((s)->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds)) |
| |
| int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s) |
| { |
| pitem *item; |
| SSL3_BUFFER *rb; |
| SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
| DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; |
| unsigned int is_next_epoch; |
| int replayok = 1; |
| |
| item = pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q); |
| if (item) { |
| /* Check if epoch is current. */ |
| if (s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch) |
| return 1; /* Nothing to do. */ |
| |
| rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); |
| |
| rb = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); |
| |
| if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rb) > 0) { |
| /* |
| * We've still got data from the current packet to read. There could |
| * be a record from the new epoch in it - so don't overwrite it |
| * with the unprocessed records yet (we'll do it when we've |
| * finished reading the current packet). |
| */ |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Process all the records. */ |
| while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) { |
| dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s); |
| bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); |
| if (bitmap == NULL) { |
| /* |
| * Should not happen. This will only ever be NULL when the |
| * current record is from a different epoch. But that cannot |
| * be the case because we already checked the epoch above |
| */ |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */ |
| if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) |
| #endif |
| { |
| /* |
| * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. We did this |
| * check once already when we first received the record - but |
| * we might have updated the window since then due to |
| * records we subsequently processed. |
| */ |
| replayok = dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap); |
| } |
| |
| if (!replayok || !dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) { |
| if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { |
| /* dtls1_process_record called SSLfatal() */ |
| return -1; |
| } |
| /* dump this record */ |
| rr->length = 0; |
| RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds), |
| SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)) < 0) { |
| /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been |
| * processed |
| */ |
| s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch; |
| s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. |
| * 'type' is one of the following: |
| * |
| * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) |
| * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) |
| * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) |
| * |
| * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first |
| * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). |
| * |
| * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as |
| * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec |
| * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type| |
| * argument is non NULL. |
| * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store |
| * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol |
| * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): |
| * Change cipher spec protocol |
| * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored |
| * Alert protocol |
| * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) |
| * Handshake protocol |
| * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have |
| * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages |
| * here, anything else is handled by higher layers |
| * Application data protocol |
| * none of our business |
| */ |
| int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes) |
| { |
| int i, j, iret; |
| size_t n; |
| SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
| void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; |
| |
| if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&s->rlayer.rbuf)) { |
| /* Not initialized yet */ |
| if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { |
| /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && |
| (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || |
| (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) { |
| /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ |
| i = s->handshake_func(s); |
| /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ |
| if (i < 0) |
| return i; |
| if (i == 0) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| start: |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| |
| /*- |
| * s->s3.rrec.type - is the type of record |
| * s->s3.rrec.data, - data |
| * s->s3.rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read |
| * s->s3.rrec.length, - number of bytes. |
| */ |
| rr = s->rlayer.rrec; |
| |
| /* |
| * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered |
| * during the last handshake in advance, if any. |
| */ |
| if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) { |
| pitem *item; |
| item = pqueue_pop(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q); |
| if (item) { |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */ |
| if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { |
| DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; |
| BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO, |
| sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| dtls1_copy_record(s, item); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(item->data); |
| pitem_free(item); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Check for timeout */ |
| if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0) { |
| goto start; |
| } else if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { |
| /* dtls1_handle_timeout() has failed with a fatal error */ |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* get new packet if necessary */ |
| if ((SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) |
| || (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { |
| RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0); |
| iret = dtls1_get_record(s); |
| if (iret <= 0) { |
| iret = dtls1_read_failed(s, iret); |
| /* |
| * Anything other than a timeout is an error. SSLfatal() already |
| * called if appropriate. |
| */ |
| if (iret <= 0) |
| return iret; |
| else |
| goto start; |
| } |
| RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty |
| * record that isn't an alert. |
| */ |
| if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT |
| && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0) |
| s->rlayer.alert_count = 0; |
| |
| /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ |
| |
| if (s->s3.change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, |
| * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ |
| && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { |
| /* |
| * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely |
| * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application |
| * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection. |
| */ |
| if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data), |
| SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(rr)) < 0) { |
| /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
| return -1; |
| } |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in |
| * 'peek' mode) |
| */ |
| if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) |
| || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC |
| && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) { |
| /* |
| * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or |
| * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or |
| * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC |
| */ |
| /* |
| * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are |
| * doing a handshake for the first time |
| */ |
| if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && |
| (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
| SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (recvd_type != NULL) |
| *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr); |
| |
| if (len == 0) { |
| /* |
| * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to |
| * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause |
| * SSL_pending() to report data as being available. |
| */ |
| if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (len > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) |
| n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); |
| else |
| n = len; |
| |
| memcpy(buf, &(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)]), n); |
| if (peek) { |
| if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); |
| } else { |
| if (s->options & SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT) |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(&(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)]), n); |
| SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n); |
| SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n); |
| if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) { |
| s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0); |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); |
| } |
| } |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| /* |
| * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered |
| * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read |
| * anymore, finally set shutdown. |
| */ |
| if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && |
| s->d1->shutdown_received |
| && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { |
| s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif |
| *readbytes = n; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, |
| * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). |
| */ |
| |
| if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { |
| unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr; |
| unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) |
| + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr); |
| PACKET alert; |
| |
| if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) |
| || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level) |
| || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr) |
| || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->msg_callback) |
| s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s, |
| s->msg_callback_arg); |
| |
| if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
| cb = s->info_callback; |
| else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) |
| cb = s->ctx->info_callback; |
| |
| if (cb != NULL) { |
| j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; |
| cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); |
| } |
| |
| if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { |
| s->s3.warn_alert = alert_descr; |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); |
| |
| s->rlayer.alert_count++; |
| if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
| SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| /* |
| * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data |
| * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so |
| * that nothing gets discarded. |
| */ |
| if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && |
| BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { |
| s->d1->shutdown_received = 1; |
| s->rwstate = SSL_READING; |
| BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); |
| BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| #endif |
| s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| s->s3.fatal_alert = alert_descr; |
| SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, |
| SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr, |
| "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr); |
| s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); |
| SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); |
| return 0; |
| } else { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a |
| * shutdown */ |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
| /* |
| * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages |
| * are still missing, so just drop it. |
| */ |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) |
| */ |
| if ((SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && |
| !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { |
| struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; |
| |
| /* |
| * This may just be a stale retransmit. Also sanity check that we have |
| * at least enough record bytes for a message header |
| */ |
| if (SSL3_RECORD_get_epoch(rr) != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch |
| || SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr); |
| |
| /* |
| * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client |
| * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED. |
| */ |
| if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
| if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0) { |
| /* SSLfatal) already called */ |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s) <= 0) { |
| /* Fail if we encountered a fatal error */ |
| if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); |
| if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { |
| if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) { |
| /* no read-ahead left? */ |
| BIO *bio; |
| |
| s->rwstate = SSL_READING; |
| bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); |
| BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); |
| BIO_set_retry_read(bio); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * To get here we must be trying to read app data but found handshake |
| * data. But if we're trying to read app data, and we're not in init |
| * (which is tested for at the top of this function) then init must be |
| * finished |
| */ |
| if (!ossl_assert(SSL_is_init_finished(s))) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */ |
| ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); |
| |
| i = s->handshake_func(s); |
| /* SSLfatal() called if appropriate */ |
| if (i < 0) |
| return i; |
| if (i == 0) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { |
| if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) { |
| /* no read-ahead left? */ |
| BIO *bio; |
| /* |
| * In the case where we try to read application data, but we |
| * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry |
| * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty |
| * problems in the blocking world |
| */ |
| s->rwstate = SSL_READING; |
| bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); |
| BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); |
| BIO_set_retry_read(bio); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) { |
| default: |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
| return -1; |
| case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: |
| case SSL3_RT_ALERT: |
| case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: |
| /* |
| * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of |
| * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but |
| * that should not happen when type != rr->type |
| */ |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: |
| /* |
| * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have |
| * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() |
| * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read |
| * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet |
| * started), we will indulge it. |
| */ |
| if (s->s3.in_read_app_data && |
| (s->s3.total_renegotiations != 0) && |
| ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) { |
| s->s3.in_read_app_data = 2; |
| return -1; |
| } else { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| /* not reached */ |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if |
| * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. |
| */ |
| int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, size_t len, |
| size_t *written) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| if (!ossl_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0, written); |
| return i; |
| } |
| |
| int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len, int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p, *pseq; |
| int i, mac_size, clear = 0; |
| size_t prefix_len = 0; |
| int eivlen; |
| SSL3_RECORD wr; |
| SSL3_BUFFER *wb; |
| SSL_SESSION *sess; |
| |
| wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; |
| |
| /* |
| * DTLS writes whole datagrams, so there can't be anything left in |
| * the buffer. |
| */ |
| if (!ossl_assert(SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb) == 0)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ |
| if (s->s3.alert_dispatch) { |
| i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); |
| if (i <= 0) |
| return i; |
| /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ |
| } |
| |
| if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (len > ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_EXCEEDS_MAX_FRAGMENT_SIZE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| sess = s->session; |
| |
| if ((sess == NULL) |
| || (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) |
| || (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) |
| clear = 1; |
| |
| if (clear) |
| mac_size = 0; |
| else { |
| mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(s->write_hash); |
| if (mac_size < 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
| SSL_R_EXCEEDS_MAX_FRAGMENT_SIZE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + prefix_len; |
| |
| /* write the header */ |
| |
| *(p++) = type & 0xff; |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr, type); |
| /* |
| * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we |
| * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0 |
| * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it. |
| */ |
| if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION && |
| s->max_proto_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { |
| *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8; |
| *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff; |
| } else { |
| *(p++) = s->version >> 8; |
| *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; |
| } |
| |
| /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */ |
| pseq = p; |
| p += 10; |
| |
| /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ |
| if (s->enc_write_ctx) { |
| int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); |
| if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { |
| eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); |
| if (eivlen <= 1) |
| eivlen = 0; |
| } |
| /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ |
| else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) |
| eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) |
| eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| else |
| eivlen = 0; |
| } else |
| eivlen = 0; |
| |
| /* lets setup the record stuff. */ |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr, p + eivlen); /* make room for IV in case of CBC */ |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr, len); |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr, (unsigned char *)buf); |
| |
| /* |
| * we now 'read' from wr.input, wr.length bytes into wr.data |
| */ |
| |
| /* first we compress */ |
| if (s->compress != NULL) { |
| if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } else { |
| memcpy(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(&wr), SSL3_RECORD_get_input(&wr), |
| SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr)); |
| SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * we should still have the output to wr.data and the input from |
| * wr.input. Length should be wr.length. wr.data still points in the |
| * wb->buf |
| */ |
| |
| if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { |
| if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr, |
| &(p[SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr) + eivlen]), |
| 1)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, mac_size); |
| } |
| |
| /* this is true regardless of mac size */ |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr, p); |
| SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr); |
| |
| if (eivlen) |
| SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, eivlen); |
| |
| if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, &wr, 1, 1, NULL, mac_size) < 1) { |
| if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| } |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { |
| if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr, |
| &(p[SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr)]), 1)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, mac_size); |
| } |
| |
| /* record length after mac and block padding */ |
| |
| /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */ |
| |
| s2n(s->rlayer.d->w_epoch, pseq); |
| |
| memcpy(pseq, &(s->rlayer.write_sequence[2]), 6); |
| pseq += 6; |
| s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr), pseq); |
| |
| if (s->msg_callback) |
| s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, |
| DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| |
| /* |
| * we should now have wr.data pointing to the encrypted data, which is |
| * wr->length long |
| */ |
| SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr, type); /* not needed but helps for debugging */ |
| SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); |
| |
| ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->rlayer.write_sequence[0])); |
| |
| if (create_empty_fragment) { |
| /* |
| * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write |
| * out anything here |
| */ |
| *written = wr.length; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* now let's set up wb */ |
| SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(wb, prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr)); |
| SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, 0); |
| |
| /* |
| * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write |
| * retries later |
| */ |
| s->rlayer.wpend_tot = len; |
| s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf; |
| s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; |
| s->rlayer.wpend_ret = len; |
| |
| /* we now just need to write the buffer. Calls SSLfatal() as required. */ |
| return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len, written); |
| } |
| |
| DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, |
| unsigned int *is_next_epoch) |
| { |
| |
| *is_next_epoch = 0; |
| |
| /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */ |
| if (rr->epoch == s->rlayer.d->r_epoch) |
| return &s->rlayer.d->bitmap; |
| |
| /* |
| * Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch and only if we |
| * have already processed all of the unprocessed records from the last |
| * epoch |
| */ |
| else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1) && |
| s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch && |
| (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { |
| *is_next_epoch = 1; |
| return &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap; |
| } |
| |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw) |
| { |
| unsigned char *seq; |
| unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->rlayer.read_sequence); |
| |
| if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) { |
| seq = s->rlayer.read_sequence; |
| s->rlayer.d->r_epoch++; |
| memcpy(&s->rlayer.d->bitmap, &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap, |
| sizeof(s->rlayer.d->bitmap)); |
| memset(&s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap)); |
| |
| /* |
| * We must not use any buffered messages received from the previous |
| * epoch |
| */ |
| dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
| } else { |
| seq = s->rlayer.write_sequence; |
| memcpy(s->rlayer.d->last_write_sequence, seq, |
| sizeof(s->rlayer.write_sequence)); |
| s->rlayer.d->w_epoch++; |
| } |
| |
| memset(seq, 0, seq_bytes); |
| } |
