| /* |
| * Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for |
| * internal use. |
| */ |
| #include "internal/deprecated.h" |
| |
| #include <string.h> |
| #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
| #include <openssl/core_dispatch.h> |
| #include <openssl/core_names.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/rsa.h> |
| #include <openssl/params.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
| #include "internal/nelem.h" |
| #include "internal/sizes.h" |
| #include "crypto/rsa.h" |
| #include "prov/providercommonerr.h" |
| #include "prov/implementations.h" |
| #include "prov/provider_ctx.h" |
| #include "prov/der_rsa.h" |
| |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx; |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init; |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init; |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init; |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign; |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify; |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover; |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_sign_init; |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update; |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final; |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init; |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update; |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final; |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx; |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx; |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params; |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params; |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params; |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params; |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params; |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params; |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params; |
| static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params; |
| |
| static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = { |
| { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PKCSV15 }, |
| { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_SSLV23 }, |
| { RSA_NO_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE }, |
| { RSA_X931_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_X931 }, |
| { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PSS }, |
| { 0, NULL } |
| }; |
| |
| /* |
| * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface. |
| * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes RSA structures, so |
| * we use that here too. |
| */ |
| |
| typedef struct { |
| OPENSSL_CTX *libctx; |
| char *propq; |
| RSA *rsa; |
| int operation; |
| |
| /* |
| * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0) |
| * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify |
| * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again |
| * by their Final function. |
| */ |
| unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1; |
| |
| /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature agorithm */ |
| unsigned char aid_buf[128]; |
| unsigned char *aid; |
| size_t aid_len; |
| |
| /* main digest */ |
| EVP_MD *md; |
| EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx; |
| int mdnid; |
| char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */ |
| |
| /* RSA padding mode */ |
| int pad_mode; |
| /* message digest for MGF1 */ |
| EVP_MD *mgf1_md; |
| char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */ |
| /* PSS salt length */ |
| int saltlen; |
| /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */ |
| int min_saltlen; |
| |
| /* Temp buffer */ |
| unsigned char *tbuf; |
| |
| } PROV_RSA_CTX; |
| |
| static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx) |
| { |
| if (prsactx->md != NULL) |
| return EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md) |
| { |
| /* |
| * Because the RSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate. |
| * We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID |
| * map. |
| */ |
| static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = { |
| { NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 }, |
| { NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 }, |
| { NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 }, |
| { NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 }, |
| { NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 }, |
| { NID_sha512_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_224 }, |
| { NID_sha512_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_256 }, |
| { NID_md5, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5 }, |
| { NID_md5_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5_SHA1 }, |
| { NID_md2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD2 }, |
| { NID_md4, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD4 }, |
| { NID_mdc2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2 }, |
| { NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 }, |
| { NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 }, |
| { NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 }, |
| { NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 }, |
| { NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 }, |
| }; |
| size_t i; |
| int mdnid = NID_undef; |
| |
| if (md == NULL) |
| goto end; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) { |
| if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) { |
| mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| end: |
| return mdnid; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding) |
| { |
| if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) { |
| if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_check_parameters(EVP_MD *md, PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx) |
| { |
| if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { |
| int max_saltlen; |
| |
| /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */ |
| max_saltlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) - EVP_MD_size(md); |
| if ((RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) & 0x7) == 1) |
| max_saltlen--; |
| if (prsactx->min_saltlen > max_saltlen) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = NULL; |
| char *propq_copy = NULL; |
| |
| if ((prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX))) == NULL |
| || (propq != NULL |
| && (propq_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(propq)) == NULL)) { |
| OPENSSL_free(prsactx); |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx); |
| prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1; |
| prsactx->propq = propq_copy; |
| return prsactx; |
| } |
| |
| /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */ |
| #define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1) |
| |
| static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname, |
| const char *mdprops) |
| { |
| if (mdprops == NULL) |
| mdprops = ctx->propq; |
| |
| if (mdname != NULL) { |
| EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops); |
| int md_nid = rsa_get_md_nid(md); |
| WPACKET pkt; |
| size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname); |
| |
| if (md == NULL |
| || md_nid == NID_undef |
| || !rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode) |
| || !rsa_check_parameters(md, ctx) |
| || mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname)) { |
| if (md == NULL) |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, |
| "%s could not be fetched", mdname); |
| if (md_nid == NID_undef) |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED, |
| "digest=%s", mdname); |
| if (mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname)) |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, |
| "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname); |
| EVP_MD_free(md); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx); |
| EVP_MD_free(ctx->md); |
| |
| /* |
| * TODO(3.0) Should we care about DER writing errors? |
| * All it really means is that for some reason, there's no |
| * AlgorithmIdentifier to be had (consider RSA with MD5-SHA1), |
| * but the operation itself is still valid, just as long as it's |
| * not used to construct anything that needs an AlgorithmIdentifier. |
| */ |
| ctx->aid_len = 0; |
| if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf)) |
| && DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_MDWithRSAEncryption(&pkt, -1, ctx->rsa, |
| md_nid) |
| && WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) { |
| WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len); |
| ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt); |
| } |
| WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); |
| |
| ctx->mdctx = NULL; |
| ctx->md = md; |
| ctx->mdnid = md_nid; |
| OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname)); |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname, |
| const char *mdprops) |
| { |
| size_t len; |
| |
| if (mdprops == NULL) |
| mdprops = ctx->propq; |
| |
| if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0') |
| EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md); |
| |
| if ((ctx->mgf1_md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops)) == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, |
| "%s could not be fetched", mdname); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname)); |
| if (len >= sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname)) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, |
| "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_signature_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, int operation) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| |
| if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| RSA_free(prsactx->rsa); |
| prsactx->rsa = vrsa; |
| prsactx->operation = operation; |
| |
| /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */ |
| prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO; |
| prsactx->min_saltlen = -1; |
| |
| switch (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK)) { |
| case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA: |
| prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; |
| break; |
| case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS: |
| prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING; |
| |
| { |
| const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss = |
| rsa_get0_pss_params_30(prsactx->rsa); |
| |
| if (!rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) { |
| int md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss); |
| int mgf1md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss); |
| int min_saltlen = rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss); |
| const char *mdname, *mgf1mdname; |
| size_t len; |
| |
| mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(md_nid); |
| mgf1mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(mgf1md_nid); |
| prsactx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen; |
| |
| if (mdname == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, |
| "PSS restrictions lack hash algorithm"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (mgf1mdname == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, |
| "PSS restrictions lack MGF1 hash algorithm"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mdname, mdname, |
| sizeof(prsactx->mdname)); |
| if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mdname)) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, |
| "hash algorithm name too long"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mgf1_mdname, mgf1mdname, |
| sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname)); |
| if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname)) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, |
| "MGF1 hash algorithm name too long"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| prsactx->saltlen = min_saltlen; |
| |
| return rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, prsactx->propq) |
| && rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mgf1mdname, prsactx->propq); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| break; |
| default: |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, PROV_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int setup_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| if (ctx->tbuf != NULL) |
| return 1; |
| if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(ctx->rsa))) == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static void clean_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| if (ctx->tbuf != NULL) |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa)); |
| } |
| |
| static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| clean_tbuf(ctx); |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->tbuf); |
| ctx->tbuf = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_sign_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa) |
| { |
| return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN); |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, |
| size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| int ret; |
| size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa); |
| size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx); |
| |
| if (sig == NULL) { |
| *siglen = rsasize; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (sigsize < rsasize) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_SIZE, |
| "is %zu, should be at least %zu", sigsize, rsasize); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (mdsize != 0) { |
| if (tbslen != mdsize) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| if (EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2)) { |
| unsigned int sltmp; |
| |
| if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE, |
| "only PKCS#1 padding supported with MDC2"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, |
| prsactx->rsa); |
| |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ret = sltmp; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| #endif |
| switch (prsactx->pad_mode) { |
| case RSA_X931_PADDING: |
| if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL, |
| "RSA key size = %d, expected minimum = %d", |
| RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), tbslen + 1); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| memcpy(prsactx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen); |
| prsactx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid); |
| ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, prsactx->tbuf, |
| sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING); |
| clean_tbuf(prsactx); |
| break; |
| |
| case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
| { |
| unsigned int sltmp; |
| |
| ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, |
| prsactx->rsa); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ret = sltmp; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING: |
| /* Check PSS restrictions */ |
| if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) { |
| switch (prsactx->saltlen) { |
| case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST: |
| if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, |
| PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL, |
| "minimum salt length set to %d, " |
| "but the digest only gives %d", |
| prsactx->min_saltlen, |
| EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* FALLTHRU */ |
| default: |
| if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0 |
| && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, |
| PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL, |
| "minimum salt length set to %d, but the" |
| "actual salt length is only set to %d", |
| prsactx->min_saltlen, |
| prsactx->saltlen); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) |
| return 0; |
| if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, |
| prsactx->tbuf, tbs, |
| prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md, |
| prsactx->saltlen)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf, |
| sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); |
| clean_tbuf(prsactx); |
| break; |
| |
| default: |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE, |
| "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } else { |
| ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, prsactx->rsa, |
| prsactx->pad_mode); |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| end: |
| #endif |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| *siglen = ret; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_verify_recover_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa) |
| { |
| return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER); |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx, |
| unsigned char *rout, |
| size_t *routlen, |
| size_t routsize, |
| const unsigned char *sig, |
| size_t siglen) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| int ret; |
| |
| if (rout == NULL) { |
| *routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (prsactx->md != NULL) { |
| switch (prsactx->pad_mode) { |
| case RSA_X931_PADDING: |
| if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) |
| return 0; |
| ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa, |
| RSA_X931_PADDING); |
| if (ret < 1) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ret--; |
| if (prsactx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (ret != EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH, |
| "Should be %d, but got %d", |
| EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md), ret); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| *routlen = ret; |
| if (rout != prsactx->tbuf) { |
| if (routsize < (size_t)ret) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, |
| "buffer size is %d, should be %d", |
| routsize, ret); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret); |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
| { |
| size_t sltmp; |
| |
| ret = int_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp, |
| sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ret = sltmp; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| default: |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE, |
| "Only X.931 or PKCS#1 v1.5 padding allowed"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } else { |
| ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa, |
| prsactx->pad_mode); |
| if (ret < 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| *routlen = ret; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_verify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa) |
| { |
| return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY); |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, |
| const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| size_t rslen; |
| |
| if (prsactx->md != NULL) { |
| switch (prsactx->pad_mode) { |
| case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
| if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, |
| prsactx->rsa)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| case RSA_X931_PADDING: |
| if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) |
| return 0; |
| if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, prsactx->tbuf, &rslen, 0, |
| sig, siglen) <= 0) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING: |
| { |
| int ret; |
| size_t mdsize; |
| |
| /* |
| * We need to check this for the RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1() |
| * call |
| */ |
| mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx); |
| if (tbslen != mdsize) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH, |
| "Should be %d, but got %d", |
| mdsize, tbslen); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) |
| return 0; |
| ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, |
| prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs, |
| prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md, |
| prsactx->tbuf, |
| prsactx->saltlen); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| default: |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE, |
| "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) |
| return 0; |
| rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa, |
| prsactx->pad_mode); |
| if (rslen == 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, prsactx->tbuf, rslen)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname, |
| void *vrsa, int operation) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| |
| prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0; |
| if (!rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, operation) |
| || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, NULL)) /* TODO RL */ |
| return 0; |
| |
| prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
| if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, NULL)) |
| goto error; |
| |
| return 1; |
| |
| error: |
| EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx); |
| EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md); |
| prsactx->mdctx = NULL; |
| prsactx->md = NULL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx, |
| const unsigned char *data, |
| size_t datalen) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| |
| if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return EVP_DigestUpdate(prsactx->mdctx, data, datalen); |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_digest_sign_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname, |
| void *vrsa) |
| { |
| return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa, |
| EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN); |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, |
| size_t *siglen, size_t sigsize) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| unsigned int dlen = 0; |
| |
| prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1; |
| if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields |
| * are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign. |
| */ |
| if (sig != NULL) { |
| /* |
| * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided |
| * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow - |
| * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA. |
| */ |
| if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return rsa_sign(vprsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen); |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_digest_verify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname, |
| void *vrsa) |
| { |
| return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa, |
| EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY); |
| } |
| |
| int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, |
| size_t siglen) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| unsigned int dlen = 0; |
| |
| prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1; |
| if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided |
| * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow - |
| * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA. |
| */ |
| if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen); |
| } |
| |
| static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| |
| if (prsactx == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| RSA_free(prsactx->rsa); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx); |
| EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md); |
| EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md); |
| OPENSSL_free(prsactx->propq); |
| free_tbuf(prsactx); |
| |
| OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(prsactx)); |
| } |
| |
| static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx; |
| |
| dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx)); |
| if (dstctx == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| *dstctx = *srcctx; |
| dstctx->rsa = NULL; |
| dstctx->md = NULL; |
| dstctx->mdctx = NULL; |
| dstctx->tbuf = NULL; |
| |
| if (srcctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(srcctx->rsa)) |
| goto err; |
| dstctx->rsa = srcctx->rsa; |
| |
| if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md)) |
| goto err; |
| dstctx->md = srcctx->md; |
| |
| if (srcctx->mgf1_md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->mgf1_md)) |
| goto err; |
| dstctx->mgf1_md = srcctx->mgf1_md; |
| |
| if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) { |
| dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
| if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL |
| || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx)) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| return dstctx; |
| err: |
| rsa_freectx(dstctx); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| OSSL_PARAM *p; |
| |
| if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID); |
| if (p != NULL |
| && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, prsactx->aid, prsactx->aid_len)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE); |
| if (p != NULL) |
| switch (p->data_type) { |
| case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: |
| if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->pad_mode)) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING: |
| { |
| int i; |
| const char *word = NULL; |
| |
| for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) { |
| if (prsactx->pad_mode == (int)padding_item[i].id) { |
| word = padding_item[i].ptr; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (word != NULL) { |
| if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, word)) |
| return 0; |
| } else { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| } |
| } |
| break; |
| default: |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST); |
| if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mdname)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST); |
| if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mgf1_mdname)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN); |
| if (p != NULL) { |
| if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER) { |
| if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen)) |
| return 0; |
| } else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) { |
| const char *value = NULL; |
| |
| switch (prsactx->saltlen) { |
| case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST: |
| value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST; |
| break; |
| case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX: |
| value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX; |
| break; |
| case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO: |
| value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO; |
| break; |
| default: |
| { |
| int len = BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d", |
| prsactx->saltlen); |
| |
| if (len <= 0) |
| return 0; |
| p->return_size = len; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (value != NULL |
| && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, value)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = { |
| OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_END |
| }; |
| |
| static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(void) |
| { |
| return known_gettable_ctx_params; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| const OSSL_PARAM *p; |
| |
| if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST); |
| /* Not allowed during certain operations */ |
| if (p != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md) |
| return 0; |
| if (p != NULL) { |
| char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname; |
| char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops; |
| const OSSL_PARAM *propsp = |
| OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, |
| OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES); |
| |
| if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname))) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (propsp == NULL) |
| pmdprops = NULL; |
| else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, |
| &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops))) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) { |
| /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */ |
| if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname)) |
| return 1; |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* non-PSS code follows */ |
| if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE); |
| if (p != NULL) { |
| int pad_mode = 0; |
| const char *err_extra_text = NULL; |
| |
| switch (p->data_type) { |
| case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */ |
| if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pad_mode)) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING: |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| if (p->data == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) { |
| if (strcmp(p->data, padding_item[i].ptr) == 0) { |
| pad_mode = padding_item[i].id; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| break; |
| default: |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| switch (pad_mode) { |
| case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: |
| /* |
| * OAEP padding is for asymmetric cipher only so is not compatible |
| * with signature use. |
| */ |
| err_extra_text = "OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying"; |
| goto bad_pad; |
| case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING: |
| if ((prsactx->operation |
| & (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)) == 0) { |
| err_extra_text = |
| "PSS padding only allowed for sign and verify operations"; |
| goto bad_pad; |
| } |
| if (prsactx->md == NULL |
| && !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1, NULL)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| break; |
| case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
| err_extra_text = "PKCS#1 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS"; |
| goto cont; |
| case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: |
| err_extra_text = "SSLv3 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS"; |
| goto cont; |
| case RSA_NO_PADDING: |
| err_extra_text = "No padding not allowed with RSA-PSS"; |
| goto cont; |
| case RSA_X931_PADDING: |
| err_extra_text = "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS"; |
| cont: |
| if (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, |
| RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA) |
| break; |
| /* FALLTHRU */ |
| default: |
| bad_pad: |
| if (err_extra_text == NULL) |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, |
| PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE); |
| else |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, |
| PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE, |
| err_extra_text); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode)) |
| return 0; |
| prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode; |
| } |
| |
| p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN); |
| if (p != NULL) { |
| int saltlen; |
| |
| if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED, |
| "PSS saltlen can only be specified if " |
| "PSS padding has been specified first"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| switch (p->data_type) { |
| case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */ |
| if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &saltlen)) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING: |
| if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST) == 0) |
| saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST; |
| else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX) == 0) |
| saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX; |
| else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO) == 0) |
| saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO; |
| else |
| saltlen = atoi(p->data); |
| break; |
| default: |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check. |
| * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently |
| * lowest saltlen number possible. |
| */ |
| if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) { |
| switch (prsactx->saltlen) { |
| case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO: |
| if (prsactx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| break; |
| case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST: |
| if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, |
| PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL, |
| "Should be more than %d, but would be " |
| "set to match digest size (%d)", |
| prsactx->min_saltlen, |
| EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* FALLTHRU */ |
| default: |
| if (saltlen >= 0 && saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, |
| PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL, |
| "Should be more than %d, " |
| "but would be set to %d", |
| prsactx->min_saltlen, saltlen); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| prsactx->saltlen = saltlen; |
| } |
| |
| p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST); |
| if (p != NULL) { |
| char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname; |
| char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops; |
| const OSSL_PARAM *propsp = |
| OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, |
| OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES); |
| |
| if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname))) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (propsp == NULL) |
| pmdprops = NULL; |
| else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, |
| &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops))) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) { |
| /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL */ |
| if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL |
| || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname)) |
| return 1; |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* non-PSS code follows */ |
| if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = { |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_END |
| }; |
| |
| static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(void) |
| { |
| /* |
| * TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx |
| * params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that |
| * case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the |
| * digest is explicitly set as part of the init. |
| */ |
| return known_settable_ctx_params; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| |
| if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(prsactx->mdctx, params); |
| } |
| |
| static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| |
| if (prsactx->md == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(prsactx->md); |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| |
| if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(prsactx->mdctx, params); |
| } |
| |
| static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| |
| if (prsactx->md == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md); |
| } |
| |
| const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[] = { |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign_init }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_init }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover_init }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_init }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_final }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_init }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_final }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_freectx }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_dupctx }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_params }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_params }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_params }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_params }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_md_params }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_md_params }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_md_params }, |
| { 0, NULL } |
| }; |
