| /* |
| * Written by Rob Stradling (rob@comodo.com), Stephen Henson (steve@openssl.org) |
| * and Adam Eijdenberg (adam.eijdenberg@gmail.com) for the OpenSSL project 2016. |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 2014 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * licensing@OpenSSL.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| */ |
| |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CT |
| # error "CT disabled" |
| #endif |
| |
| #include <openssl/ct.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/tls1.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| |
| #include "ct_locl.h" |
| |
| SCT *SCT_new(void) |
| { |
| SCT *sct = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*sct)); |
| |
| if (sct == NULL) { |
| CTerr(CT_F_SCT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| sct->entry_type = CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET; |
| sct->version = SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET; |
| return sct; |
| } |
| |
| void SCT_free(SCT *sct) |
| { |
| if (sct == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id); |
| OPENSSL_free(sct->ext); |
| OPENSSL_free(sct->sig); |
| OPENSSL_free(sct->sct); |
| OPENSSL_free(sct); |
| } |
| |
| int SCT_set_version(SCT *sct, sct_version_t version) |
| { |
| if (version != SCT_VERSION_V1) { |
| CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_VERSION, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| sct->version = version; |
| sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SCT_set_log_entry_type(SCT *sct, ct_log_entry_type_t entry_type) |
| { |
| sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; |
| |
| switch (entry_type) { |
| case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509: |
| case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT: |
| sct->entry_type = entry_type; |
| return 1; |
| default: |
| CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENTRY_TYPE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int SCT_set0_log_id(SCT *sct, unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len) |
| { |
| if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1 && log_id_len != CT_V1_HASHLEN) { |
| CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET0_LOG_ID, CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id); |
| sct->log_id = log_id; |
| sct->log_id_len = log_id_len; |
| sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SCT_set1_log_id(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len) |
| { |
| if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1 && log_id_len != CT_V1_HASHLEN) { |
| CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_LOG_ID, CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id); |
| sct->log_id = NULL; |
| sct->log_id_len = 0; |
| sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; |
| |
| if (log_id != NULL && log_id_len > 0) { |
| sct->log_id = OPENSSL_memdup(log_id, log_id_len); |
| if (sct->log_id == NULL) { |
| CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_LOG_ID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| sct->log_id_len = log_id_len; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| |
| void SCT_set_timestamp(SCT *sct, uint64_t timestamp) |
| { |
| sct->timestamp = timestamp; |
| sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; |
| } |
| |
| int SCT_set_signature_nid(SCT *sct, int nid) |
| { |
| switch (nid) { |
| case NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption: |
| sct->hash_alg = TLSEXT_hash_sha256; |
| sct->sig_alg = TLSEXT_signature_rsa; |
| sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; |
| return 1; |
| case NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256: |
| sct->hash_alg = TLSEXT_hash_sha256; |
| sct->sig_alg = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa; |
| sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; |
| return 1; |
| default: |
| CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_SIGNATURE_NID, CT_R_UNRECOGNIZED_SIGNATURE_NID); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void SCT_set0_extensions(SCT *sct, unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_free(sct->ext); |
| sct->ext = ext; |
| sct->ext_len = ext_len; |
| sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; |
| } |
| |
| int SCT_set1_extensions(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_free(sct->ext); |
| sct->ext = NULL; |
| sct->ext_len = 0; |
| sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; |
| |
| if (ext != NULL && ext_len > 0) { |
| sct->ext = OPENSSL_memdup(ext, ext_len); |
| if (sct->ext == NULL) { |
| CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| sct->ext_len = ext_len; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| void SCT_set0_signature(SCT *sct, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_free(sct->sig); |
| sct->sig = sig; |
| sct->sig_len = sig_len; |
| sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; |
| } |
| |
| int SCT_set1_signature(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_free(sct->sig); |
| sct->sig = NULL; |
| sct->sig_len = 0; |
| sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET; |
| |
| if (sig != NULL && sig_len > 0) { |
| sct->sig = OPENSSL_memdup(sig, sig_len); |
| if (sct->sig == NULL) { |
| CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_SIGNATURE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| sct->sig_len = sig_len; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| sct_version_t SCT_get_version(const SCT *sct) |
| { |
| return sct->version; |
| } |
| |
| ct_log_entry_type_t SCT_get_log_entry_type(const SCT *sct) |
| { |
| return sct->entry_type; |
| } |
| |
| size_t SCT_get0_log_id(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **log_id) |
| { |
| *log_id = sct->log_id; |
| return sct->log_id_len; |
| } |
| |
| uint64_t SCT_get_timestamp(const SCT *sct) |
| { |
| return sct->timestamp; |
| } |
| |
| int SCT_get_signature_nid(const SCT *sct) |
| { |
| if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1) { |
| if (sct->hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_sha256) { |
| switch (sct->sig_alg) { |
| case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: |
| return NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256; |
| case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: |
| return NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption; |
| default: |
| return NID_undef; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| return NID_undef; |
| } |
| |
| size_t SCT_get0_extensions(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **ext) |
| { |
| *ext = sct->ext; |
| return sct->ext_len; |
| } |
| |
| size_t SCT_get0_signature(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **sig) |
| { |
| *sig = sct->sig; |
| return sct->sig_len; |
| } |
| |
| int SCT_is_complete(const SCT *sct) |
| { |
| switch (sct->version) { |
| case SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET: |
| return 0; |
| case SCT_VERSION_V1: |
| return sct->log_id != NULL && SCT_signature_is_complete(sct); |
| default: |
| return sct->sct != NULL; /* Just need cached encoding */ |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int SCT_signature_is_complete(const SCT *sct) |
| { |
| return SCT_get_signature_nid(sct) != NID_undef && |
| sct->sig != NULL && sct->sig_len > 0; |
| } |
| |
| sct_source_t SCT_get_source(const SCT *sct) |
| { |
| return sct->source; |
| } |
| |
| int SCT_set_source(SCT *sct, sct_source_t source) |
| { |
| sct->source = source; |
| switch (source) { |
| case SCT_SOURCE_TLS_EXTENSION: |
| case SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE: |
| return SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509); |
| case SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION: |
| return SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT); |
| default: /* if we aren't sure, leave the log entry type alone */ |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| sct_validation_status_t SCT_get_validation_status(const SCT *sct) |
| { |
| return sct->validation_status; |
| } |
| |
| int SCT_validate(SCT *sct, const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| int is_sct_valid = -1; |
| SCT_CTX *sctx = NULL; |
| X509_PUBKEY *pub = NULL, *log_pkey = NULL; |
| const CTLOG *log; |
| |
| /* |
| * With an unrecognized SCT version we don't know what such an SCT means, |
| * let alone validate one. So we return validation failure (0). |
| */ |
| if (sct->version != SCT_VERSION_V1) { |
| sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_VERSION; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| log = CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(ctx->log_store, |
| sct->log_id, sct->log_id_len); |
| |
| /* Similarly, an SCT from an unknown log also cannot be validated. */ |
| if (log == NULL) { |
| sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_LOG; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| sctx = SCT_CTX_new(); |
| if (sctx == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| |
| if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&log_pkey, CTLOG_get0_public_key(log)) != 1) |
| goto err; |
| if (SCT_CTX_set1_pubkey(sctx, log_pkey) != 1) |
| goto err; |
| |
| if (SCT_get_log_entry_type(sct) == CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT) { |
| EVP_PKEY *issuer_pkey; |
| |
| if (ctx->issuer == NULL) { |
| sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| issuer_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(ctx->issuer); |
| |
| if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&pub, issuer_pkey) != 1) |
| goto err; |
| if (SCT_CTX_set1_issuer_pubkey(sctx, pub) != 1) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * XXX: Potential for optimization. This repeats some idempotent heavy |
| * lifting on the certificate for each candidate SCT, and appears to not |
| * use any information in the SCT itself, only the certificate is |
| * processed. So it may make more sense to to do this just once, perhaps |
| * associated with the shared (by all SCTs) policy eval ctx. |
| * |
| * XXX: Failure here is global (SCT independent) and represents either an |
| * issue with the certificate (e.g. duplicate extensions) or an out of |
| * memory condition. When the certificate is incompatible with CT, we just |
| * mark the SCTs invalid, rather than report a failure to determine the |
| * validation status. That way, callbacks that want to do "soft" SCT |
| * processing will not abort handshakes with false positive internal |
| * errors. Since the function does not distinguish between certificate |
| * issues (peer's fault) and internal problems (out fault) the safe thing |
| * to do is to report a validation failure and let the callback or |
| * application decide what to do. |
| */ |
| if (SCT_CTX_set1_cert(sctx, ctx->cert, NULL) != 1) |
| sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED; |
| else |
| sct->validation_status = SCT_verify(sctx, sct) == 1 ? |
| SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID : SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID; |
| |
| end: |
| is_sct_valid = sct->validation_status == SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID; |
| err: |
| X509_PUBKEY_free(pub); |
| X509_PUBKEY_free(log_pkey); |
| SCT_CTX_free(sctx); |
| |
| return is_sct_valid; |
| } |
| |
| int SCT_LIST_validate(const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| int are_scts_valid = 1; |
| int sct_count = scts != NULL ? sk_SCT_num(scts) : 0; |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < sct_count; ++i) { |
| int is_sct_valid = -1; |
| SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(scts, i); |
| |
| if (sct == NULL) |
| continue; |
| |
| is_sct_valid = SCT_validate(sct, ctx); |
| if (is_sct_valid < 0) |
| return is_sct_valid; |
| are_scts_valid &= is_sct_valid; |
| } |
| |
| return are_scts_valid; |
| } |