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flutter / third_party / openssl / 33fbca83dcd05b77f807fab205c4523b8cfe85b5 / . / ssl / ssl_sess.c
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/* ssl/ssl_sess.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
# include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
#include "ssl_locl.h"
static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck);
SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl)
/* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */
{
return (ssl->session);
}
SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl)
/* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */
{
SSL_SESSION *sess;
/*
* Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
* somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's non-null
* and when we up the reference count.
*/
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
sess = ssl->session;
if (sess)
sess->references++;
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
return (sess);
}
int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp,
new_func, dup_func, free_func);
}
int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg)
{
return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg));
}
void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx)
{
return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx));
}
SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
{
SSL_SESSION *ss;
ss = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
if (ss == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (0);
}
memset(ss, 0, sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */
ss->references = 1;
ss->timeout = 60 * 5 + 4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */
ss->time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
ss->prev = NULL;
ss->next = NULL;
ss->compress_meth = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
ss->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
# endif
#endif
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
ss->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
ss->psk_identity = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
ss->srp_username = NULL;
#endif
return (ss);
}
const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s,
unsigned int *len)
{
if (len)
*len = s->session_id_length;
return s->session_id;
}
unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s)
{
return s->compress_meth;
}
/*
* SSLv3/TLSv1 has 32 bytes (256 bits) of session ID space. As such, filling
* the ID with random junk repeatedly until we have no conflict is going to
* complete in one iteration pretty much "most" of the time (btw:
* understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations and we still can't avoid
* a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call it quits. Either the
* RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly very close to
* 2^256 SSL sessions to our server. How you might store that many sessions
* is perhaps a more interesting question ...
*/
#define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
unsigned int *id_len)
{
unsigned int retry = 0;
do
if (RAND_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
return 0;
while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
(++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)) ;
if (retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)
return 1;
/* else - woops a session_id match */
/*
* XXX We should also check the external cache -- but the probability of
* a collision is negligible, and we could not prevent the concurrent
* creation of sessions with identical IDs since we currently don't have
* means to atomically check whether a session ID already exists and make
* a reservation for it if it does not (this problem applies to the
* internal cache as well).
*/
return 0;
}
int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
{
/* This gets used by clients and servers. */
unsigned int tmp;
SSL_SESSION *ss = NULL;
GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
if ((ss = SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL)
return (0);
/* If the context has a default timeout, use it */
if (s->session_ctx->session_timeout == 0)
ss->timeout = SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
else
ss->timeout = s->session_ctx->session_timeout;
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = NULL;
if (session) {
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
ss->ssl_version = SSL3_VERSION;
ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
} else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
ss->ssl_version = TLS1_VERSION;
ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
} else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION) {
ss->ssl_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
} else if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION) {
ss->ssl_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
} else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_BAD_VER;
ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
} else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) {
ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_VERSION;
ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
} else if (s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) {
ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return (0);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/*-
* If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server).
* Note that:
* (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the
* ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket.
* When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, s3_srvr.c calls
* ssl_get_new_session() in ssl3_get_client_hello().
* At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions,
* however, because of the lookahead, it already knows
* whether a ticket is expected or not.
*
* (b) s3_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing
* ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session
* ID received from the server, so this block is a noop.
*/
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
ss->session_id_length = 0;
goto sess_id_done;
}
#endif
/* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (s->generate_session_id)
cb = s->generate_session_id;
else if (s->session_ctx->generate_session_id)
cb = s->session_ctx->generate_session_id;
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
/* Choose a session ID */
tmp = ss->session_id_length;
if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) {
/* The callback failed */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED);
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return (0);
}
/*
* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. nor
* set it higher than it was.
*/
if (!tmp || (tmp > ss->session_id_length)) {
/* The callback set an illegal length */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH);
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return (0);
}
ss->session_id_length = tmp;
/* Finally, check for a conflict */
if (SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id,
ss->session_id_length)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT);
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return (0);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
sess_id_done:
if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
ss->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return 0;
}
}
#endif
} else {
ss->session_id_length = 0;
}
if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof ss->sid_ctx) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return 0;
}
memcpy(ss->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
ss->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
s->session = ss;
ss->ssl_version = s->version;
ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
return (1);
}
/*-
* ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this
* connection. It is only called by servers.
*
* session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
* read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
* extension, if any.
* len: the length of the session ID.
* limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
*
* Returns:
* -1: error
* 0: a session may have been found.
*
* Side effects:
* - If a session is found then s->session is pointed at it (after freeing an
* existing session if need be) and s->verify_result is set from the session.
* - Both for new and resumed sessions, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 1
* if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise).
*/
int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
const unsigned char *limit)
{
/* This is used only by servers. */
SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL;
int fatal = 0;
int try_session_cache = 1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
int r;
#endif
if (len < 0 || len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
goto err;
if (session_id + len > limit) {
fatal = 1;
goto err;
}
if (len == 0)
try_session_cache = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected */
r = tls1_process_ticket(s, session_id, len, limit, &ret);
switch (r) {
case -1: /* Error during processing */
fatal = 1;
goto err;
case 0: /* No ticket found */
case 1: /* Zero length ticket found */
break; /* Ok to carry on processing session id. */
case 2: /* Ticket found but not decrypted. */
case 3: /* Ticket decrypted, *ret has been set. */
try_session_cache = 0;
break;
default:
abort();
}
#endif
if (try_session_cache &&
ret == NULL &&
!(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
SSL_SESSION data;
data.ssl_version = s->version;
data.session_id_length = len;
if (len == 0)
return 0;
memcpy(data.session_id, session_id, len);
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
ret = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions, &data);
if (ret != NULL) {
/* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
}
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (ret == NULL)
s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
}
if (try_session_cache &&
ret == NULL && s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) {
int copy = 1;
if ((ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, session_id, len, &copy))) {
s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++;
/*
* Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us
* to do so (note that if the session structures returned by the
* callback are shared between threads, it must handle the
* reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0], or things won't be
* thread-safe).
*/
if (copy)
CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
/*
* Add the externally cached session to the internal cache as
* well if and only if we are supposed to.
*/
if (!
(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) {
/*
* The following should not return 1, otherwise, things are
* very strange
*/
if (SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, ret))
goto err;
}
}
}
if (ret == NULL)
goto err;
/* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */
if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length)) {
/*
* We have the session requested by the client, but we don't want to
* use it in this context.
*/
goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
}
if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) {
/*
* We can't be sure if this session is being used out of context,
* which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The application
* should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context. For this error
* case, we generate an error instead of treating the event like a
* cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for applications to
* effectively disable the session cache by accident without anyone
* noticing).
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,
SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
fatal = 1;
goto err;
}
if (ret->cipher == NULL) {
unsigned char buf[5], *p;
unsigned long l;
p = buf;
l = ret->cipher_id;
l2n(l, p);
if ((ret->ssl_version >> 8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[2]));
else
ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[1]));
if (ret->cipher == NULL)
goto err;
}
if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) { /* timeout */
s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout++;
if (try_session_cache) {
/* session was from the cache, so remove it */
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, ret);
}
goto err;
}
s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = ret;
s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
return 1;
err:
if (ret != NULL) {
SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (!try_session_cache) {
/*
* The session was from a ticket, so we should issue a ticket for
* the new session
*/
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
}
#endif
}
if (fatal)
return -1;
else
return 0;
}
int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
{
int ret = 0;
SSL_SESSION *s;
/*
* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache even though
* it has two ways of access: each session is in a doubly linked list and
* an lhash
*/
CRYPTO_add(&c->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
/*
* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later
*/
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
s = lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, c);
/*
* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. In this
* case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify
* ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble.
*/
if (s != NULL && s != c) {
/* We *are* in trouble ... */
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
SSL_SESSION_free(s);
/*
* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache (we cannot
* handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical session ID in the
* same cache, which could happen e.g. when two threads concurrently
* obtain the same session from an external cache)
*/
s = NULL;
}
/* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
if (s == NULL)
SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, c);
if (s != NULL) {
/*
* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference
* count because it already takes into account the cache
*/
SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */
ret = 0;
} else {
/*
* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large
*/
ret = 1;
if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) {
while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) >
SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) {
if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0))
break;
else
ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++;
}
}
}
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
return (ret);
}
int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
{
return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1);
}
static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck)
{
SSL_SESSION *r;
int ret = 0;
if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0)) {
if (lck)
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if ((r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c)) == c) {
ret = 1;
r = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, c);
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, c);
}
if (lck)
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (ret) {
r->not_resumable = 1;
if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, r);
SSL_SESSION_free(r);
}
} else
ret = 0;
return (ret);
}
void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss)
{
int i;
if (ss == NULL)
return;
i = CRYPTO_add(&ss->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
REF_PRINT("SSL_SESSION", ss);
#endif
if (i > 0)
return;
#ifdef REF_CHECK
if (i < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "SSL_SESSION_free, bad reference count\n");
abort(); /* ok */
}
#endif
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key, sizeof ss->master_key);
OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id, sizeof ss->session_id);
ssl_sess_cert_free(ss->sess_cert);
X509_free(ss->peer);
if (ss->ciphers != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (ss->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_hostname);
if (ss->tlsext_tick != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_tick);
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
if (ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
if (ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (ss->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity_hint);
if (ss->psk_identity != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (ss->srp_username != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(ss->srp_username);
#endif
OPENSSL_clear_free(ss, sizeof(*ss));
}
int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session)
{
int ret = 0;
const SSL_METHOD *meth;
if (session != NULL) {
meth = s->ctx->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
if (meth == NULL)
meth = s->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
if (meth == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD);
return (0);
}
if (meth != s->method) {
if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s, meth))
return (0);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
if (s->kssl_ctx && !s->kssl_ctx->client_princ &&
session->krb5_client_princ_len > 0) {
s->kssl_ctx->client_princ =
OPENSSL_malloc(session->krb5_client_princ_len + 1);
if (s->kssl_ctx->client_princ == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (0);
}
memcpy(s->kssl_ctx->client_princ, session->krb5_client_princ,
session->krb5_client_princ_len);
s->kssl_ctx->client_princ[session->krb5_client_princ_len] = '\0';
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
/* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); */
CRYPTO_add(&session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = session;
s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
/* CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); */
ret = 1;
} else {
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = NULL;
meth = s->ctx->method;
if (meth != s->method) {
if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s, meth))
return (0);
}
ret = 1;
}
return (ret);
}
long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
{
if (s == NULL)
return (0);
s->timeout = t;
return (1);
}
long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s)
{
if (s == NULL)
return (0);
return (s->timeout);
}
long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s)
{
if (s == NULL)
return (0);
return (s->time);
}
long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
{
if (s == NULL)
return (0);
s->time = t;
return (t);
}
int SSL_SESSION_has_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s)
{
return (s->tlsext_ticklen > 0) ? 1 : 0;
}
unsigned long SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(const SSL_SESSION *s)
{
return s->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint;
}
void SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned char **tick,
size_t *len)
{
*len = s->tlsext_ticklen;
if (tick != NULL)
*tick = s->tlsext_tick;
}
X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s)
{
return s->peer;
}
int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
{
if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT,
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
s->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
memcpy(s->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
return 1;
}
long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
{
long l;
if (s == NULL)
return (0);
l = s->session_timeout;
s->session_timeout = t;
return (l);
}
long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s)
{
if (s == NULL)
return (0);
return (s->session_timeout);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s,
int (*tls_session_secret_cb) (SSL *s,
void *secret,
int *secret_len,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
*peer_ciphers,
SSL_CIPHER
**cipher,
void *arg),
void *arg)
{
if (s == NULL)
return (0);
s->tls_session_secret_cb = tls_session_secret_cb;
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg = arg;
return (1);
}
int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb,
void *arg)
{
if (s == NULL)
return (0);
s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb = cb;
s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg = arg;
return (1);
}
int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len)
{
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
s->tlsext_session_ticket = NULL;
}
s->tlsext_session_ticket =
OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT) + ext_len);
if (!s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (ext_data) {
s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = ext_len;
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = s->tlsext_session_ticket + 1;
memcpy(s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ext_data, ext_len);
} else {
s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = 0;
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = NULL;
}
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
typedef struct timeout_param_st {
SSL_CTX *ctx;
long time;
LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache;
} TIMEOUT_PARAM;
static void timeout_doall_arg(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p)
{
if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time + s->timeout))) { /* timeout */
/*
* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to save on
* locking overhead
*/
(void)lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(p->cache, s);
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(p->ctx, s);
s->not_resumable = 1;
if (p->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
p->ctx->remove_session_cb(p->ctx, s);
SSL_SESSION_free(s);
}
}
static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout, SSL_SESSION, TIMEOUT_PARAM)
void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
{
unsigned long i;
TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
tp.ctx = s;
tp.cache = s->sessions;
if (tp.cache == NULL)
return;
tp.time = t;
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
i = CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load;
CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load = 0;
lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_arg(tp.cache, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout),
TIMEOUT_PARAM, &tp);
CHECKED_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION, tp.cache)->down_load = i;
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
}
int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s)
{
if ((s->session != NULL) &&
!(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
!(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))) {
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
return (1);
} else
return (0);
}
/* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */
static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
{
if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL))
return;
if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail)) {
/* last element in list */
if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) {
/* only one element in list */
ctx->session_cache_head = NULL;
ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL;
} else {
ctx->session_cache_tail = s->prev;
s->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
}
} else {
if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) {
/* first element in list */
ctx->session_cache_head = s->next;
s->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
} else {
/* middle of list */
s->next->prev = s->prev;
s->prev->next = s->next;
}
}
s->prev = s->next = NULL;
}
static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
{
if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL))
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) {
ctx->session_cache_head = s;
ctx->session_cache_tail = s;
s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
s->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
} else {
s->next = ctx->session_cache_head;
s->next->prev = s;
s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
ctx->session_cache_head = s;
}
}
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
SSL_SESSION *sess))
{
ctx->new_session_cb = cb;
}
int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) {
return ctx->new_session_cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
void (*cb) (SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess))
{
ctx->remove_session_cb = cb;
}
void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL_CTX *ctx,
SSL_SESSION *sess) {
return ctx->remove_session_cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
SSL_SESSION *(*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
unsigned char *data, int len,
int *copy))
{
ctx->get_session_cb = cb;
}
SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl,
unsigned char *data,
int len, int *copy) {
return ctx->get_session_cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val))
{
ctx->info_callback = cb;
}
void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *ssl, int type,
int val) {
return ctx->info_callback;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
EVP_PKEY **pkey))
{
ctx->client_cert_cb = cb;
}
int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
EVP_PKEY **pkey) {
return ctx->client_cert_cb;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e)
{
if (!ENGINE_init(e)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
return 0;
}
if (!ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_function(e)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE,
SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD);
ENGINE_finish(e);
return 0;
}
ctx->client_cert_engine = e;
return 1;
}
#endif
void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
unsigned char *cookie,
unsigned int *cookie_len))
{
ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
unsigned int cookie_len))
{
ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb = cb;
}
IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION,
SSL_SESSION)