crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c - third_party/openssl - Git at Google

 /*
  * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  *
  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
  * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
  * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
  */

 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <ctype.h>
 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 #include "internal/x509_int.h"

 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
 {
     int i;
     const X509_CINF *ai, *bi;

     ai = &a->cert_info;
     bi = &b->cert_info;
     i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber);
     if (i)
         return (i);
     return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
 }

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
 {
     unsigned long ret = 0;
     EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
     unsigned char md[16];
     char *f;

     if (ctx == NULL)
         goto err;
     f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0);
     if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
         goto err;
     if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
         goto err;
     OPENSSL_free(f);
     if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
         (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data,
          (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length))
         goto err;
     if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
         goto err;
     ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
            ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
         ) & 0xffffffffL;
  err:
     EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
     return (ret);
 }
 #endif

 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
 {
     return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer));
 }

 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
 {
     return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject));
 }

 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
 {
     return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer));
 }

 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
 {
     return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
 }

 X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a)
 {
     return (a->cert_info.issuer);
 }

 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
 {
     return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer));
 }

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
 {
     return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer));
 }
 #endif

 X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a)
 {
     return (a->cert_info.subject);
 }

 ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
 {
     return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
 }

 const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a)
 {
     return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
 }

 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
 {
     return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject));
 }

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
 {
     return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject));
 }
 #endif

 /*
  * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
  * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
  * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
  * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
  * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
  * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
  */
 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
 {
     int rv;
     /* ensure hash is valid */
     X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
     X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);

     rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
     if (rv)
         return rv;
     /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
     if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) {
         if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len)
             return -1;
         if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len)
             return 1;
         return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc,
                       a->cert_info.enc.len);
     }
     return rv;
 }

 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
 {
     int ret;

     /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */

     if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
         ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
         if (ret < 0)
             return -2;
     }

     if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
         ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
         if (ret < 0)
             return -2;
     }

     ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;

     if (ret)
         return ret;

     return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);

 }

 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
 {
     unsigned long ret = 0;
     unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];

     /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
     i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
     if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
                     NULL))
         return 0;

     ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
            ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
         ) & 0xffffffffL;
     return (ret);
 }

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
 /*
  * I now DER encode the name and hash it.  Since I cache the DER encoding,
  * this is reasonably efficient.
  */

 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
 {
     EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
     unsigned long ret = 0;
     unsigned char md[16];

     if (md_ctx == NULL)
         return ret;

     /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
     i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
     EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
     if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
         && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
         && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL))
         ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
                ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
             ) & 0xffffffffL;
     EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);

     return (ret);
 }
 #endif

 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
 X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
                                      ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
 {
     int i;
     X509 x, *x509 = NULL;

     if (!sk)
         return NULL;

     x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial;
     x.cert_info.issuer = name;

     for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
         x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
         if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
             return (x509);
     }
     return (NULL);
 }

 X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
 {
     X509 *x509;
     int i;

     for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
         x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
             return (x509);
     }
     return (NULL);
 }

 EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x)
 {
     if (x == NULL)
         return NULL;
     return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key);
 }

 EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
 {
     if (x == NULL)
         return NULL;
     return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key);
 }

 int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k)
 {
     const EVP_PKEY *xk;
     int ret;

     xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);

     if (xk)
         ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
     else
         ret = -2;

     switch (ret) {
     case 1:
         break;
     case 0:
         X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
         break;
     case -1:
         X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
         break;
     case -2:
         X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
     }
     if (ret > 0)
         return 1;
     return 0;
 }

 /*
  * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
  * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
  * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
  */

 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC

 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
 {
     const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
     int curve_nid;
     if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC)
         grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
     if (!grp)
         return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
     curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
     /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
     if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
         /*
          * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
          */
         if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
             return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
         if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
             return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
         /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
         *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
     } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
         if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
             return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
         if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
             return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
     } else
         return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;

     return X509_V_OK;
 }

 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
                             unsigned long flags)
 {
     int rv, i, sign_nid;
     EVP_PKEY *pk;
     unsigned long tflags = flags;

     if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
         return X509_V_OK;

     /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
     if (x == NULL) {
         x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
         i = 1;
     } else
         i = 0;

     pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);

     /*
      * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
      * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
      * Suite-B errors if applicable.  This is indicated via a NULL chain
      * pointer.  All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
      */
     if (chain == NULL)
         return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);

     if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
         rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
         /* Correct error depth */
         i = 0;
         goto end;
     }

     /* Check EE key only */
     rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
     if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
         /* Correct error depth */
         i = 0;
         goto end;
     }
     for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
         sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
         x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
         if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
             rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
             goto end;
         }
         pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
         rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
         if (rv != X509_V_OK)
             goto end;
     }

     /* Final check: root CA signature */
     rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
  end:
     if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
         /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
         if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
              || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
             i--;
         /*
          * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
          * with P-256. Use more meaningful error.
          */
         if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
             rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
         if (perror_depth)
             *perror_depth = i;
     }
     return rv;
 }

 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
 {
     int sign_nid;
     if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
         return X509_V_OK;
     sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm);
     return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
 }

 #else
 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
                             unsigned long flags)
 {
     return 0;
 }

 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
 {
     return 0;
 }

 #endif
 /*
  * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
  * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
  * each X509 structure.
  */
 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
 {
     STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
     int i;
     ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
     for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
         X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
         X509_up_ref(x);
     }
     return ret;
 }
	/*
	* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
	*
	* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
	* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
	* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
	* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
	*/

	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <ctype.h>
	#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
	#include <openssl/asn1.h>
	#include <openssl/objects.h>
	#include <openssl/x509.h>
	#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
	#include "internal/x509_int.h"

	int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 a, const X509 b)
	{
	int i;
	const X509_CINF ai, bi;

	ai = &a->cert_info;
	bi = &b->cert_info;
	i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber);
	if (i)
	return (i);
	return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
	}

	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
	unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
	{
	unsigned long ret = 0;
	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
	unsigned char md[16];
	char *f;

	if (ctx == NULL)
	goto err;
	f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0);
	if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
	goto err;
	if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
	goto err;
	OPENSSL_free(f);
	if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
	(ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data,
	(unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length))
	goto err;
	if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
	goto err;
	ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) \| ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) \|
	((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) \| ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
	) & 0xffffffffL;
	err:
	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
	return (ret);
	}
	#endif

	int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 a, const X509 b)
	{
	return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer));
	}

	int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 a, const X509 b)
	{
	return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject));
	}

	int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL a, const X509_CRL b)
	{
	return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer));
	}

	int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL a, const X509_CRL b)
	{
	return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
	}

	X509_NAME X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 a)
	{
	return (a->cert_info.issuer);
	}

	unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
	{
	return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer));
	}

	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
	unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
	{
	return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer));
	}
	#endif

	X509_NAME X509_get_subject_name(const X509 a)
	{
	return (a->cert_info.subject);
	}

	ASN1_INTEGER X509_get_serialNumber(X509 a)
	{
	return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
	}

	const ASN1_INTEGER X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 a)
	{
	return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
	}

	unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
	{
	return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject));
	}

	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
	unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
	{
	return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject));
	}
	#endif

	/*
	* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
	* Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
	* arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
	* operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
	* certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
	* "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
	*/
	int X509_cmp(const X509 a, const X509 b)
	{
	int rv;
	/* ensure hash is valid */
	X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
	X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);

	rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
	if (rv)
	return rv;
	/* Check for match against stored encoding too */
	if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) {
	if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len)
	return -1;
	if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len)
	return 1;
	return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc,
	a->cert_info.enc.len);
	}
	return rv;
	}

	int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME a, const X509_NAME b)
	{
	int ret;

	/* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */

	if (!a->canon_enc \|\| a->modified) {
	ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
	if (ret < 0)
	return -2;
	}

	if (!b->canon_enc \|\| b->modified) {
	ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
	if (ret < 0)
	return -2;
	}

	ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;

	if (ret)
	return ret;

	return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);

	}

	unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
	{
	unsigned long ret = 0;
	unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];

	/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
	i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
	if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
	NULL))
	return 0;

	ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) \| ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) \|
	((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) \| ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
	) & 0xffffffffL;
	return (ret);
	}

	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
	/*
	* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
	* this is reasonably efficient.
	*/

	unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
	{
	EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
	unsigned long ret = 0;
	unsigned char md[16];

	if (md_ctx == NULL)
	return ret;

	/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
	i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
	EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
	&& EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
	&& EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL))
	ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) \| ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) \|
	((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) \| ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
	) & 0xffffffffL;
	EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);

	return (ret);
	}
	#endif

	/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
	X509 X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) sk, X509_NAME *name,
	ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
	{
	int i;
	X509 x, *x509 = NULL;

	if (!sk)
	return NULL;

	x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial;
	x.cert_info.issuer = name;

	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
	x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
	if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
	return (x509);
	}
	return (NULL);
	}

	X509 X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) sk, X509_NAME *name)
	{
	X509 *x509;
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
	x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
	if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
	return (x509);
	}
	return (NULL);
	}

	EVP_PKEY X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 x)
	{
	if (x == NULL)
	return NULL;
	return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key);
	}

	EVP_PKEY X509_get_pubkey(X509 x)
	{
	if (x == NULL)
	return NULL;
	return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key);
	}

	int X509_check_private_key(const X509 x, const EVP_PKEY k)
	{
	const EVP_PKEY *xk;
	int ret;

	xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);

	if (xk)
	ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
	else
	ret = -2;

	switch (ret) {
	case 1:
	break;
	case 0:
	X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
	break;
	case -1:
	X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
	break;
	case -2:
	X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
	}
	if (ret > 0)
	return 1;
	return 0;
	}

	/*
	* Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
	* of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
	* flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
	*/

	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC

	static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long pflags)
	{
	const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
	int curve_nid;
	if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC)
	grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
	if (!grp)
	return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
	curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
	/* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
	if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
	/*
	* Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
	*/
	if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
	return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
	if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
	return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
	/* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
	*pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
	} else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
	if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
	return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
	if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
	return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
	} else
	return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;

	return X509_V_OK;
	}

	int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int perror_depth, X509 x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
	unsigned long flags)
	{
	int rv, i, sign_nid;
	EVP_PKEY *pk;
	unsigned long tflags = flags;

	if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
	return X509_V_OK;

	/* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
	if (x == NULL) {
	x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
	i = 1;
	} else
	i = 0;

	pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);

	/*
	* With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
	* a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
	* Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain
	* pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
	*/
	if (chain == NULL)
	return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);

	if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
	rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
	/* Correct error depth */
	i = 0;
	goto end;
	}

	/* Check EE key only */
	rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
	if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
	/* Correct error depth */
	i = 0;
	goto end;
	}
	for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
	sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
	x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
	if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
	rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
	goto end;
	}
	pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
	rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
	if (rv != X509_V_OK)
	goto end;
	}

	/* Final check: root CA signature */
	rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
	end:
	if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
	/* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
	if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
	\|\| rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
	i--;
	/*
	* If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
	* with P-256. Use more meaningful error.
	*/
	if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
	rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
	if (perror_depth)
	*perror_depth = i;
	}
	return rv;
	}

	int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL crl, EVP_PKEY pk, unsigned long flags)
	{
	int sign_nid;
	if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
	return X509_V_OK;
	sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm);
	return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
	}

	#else
	int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int perror_depth, X509 x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
	unsigned long flags)
	{
	return 0;
	}

	int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL crl, EVP_PKEY pk, unsigned long flags)
	{
	return 0;
	}

	#endif
	/*
	* Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
	* count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
	* each X509 structure.
	*/
	STACK_OF(X509) X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) chain)
	{
	STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
	int i;
	ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
	X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
	X509_up_ref(x);
	}
	return ret;
	}