| /* |
| * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| * |
| * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| */ |
| |
| #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| |
| #include "pcy_int.h" |
| |
| /* |
| * Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during |
| * evaluation. |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * #define OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG |
| */ |
| |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG |
| |
| static void expected_print(BIO *err, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev, |
| X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent) |
| { |
| if ((lev->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) |
| || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK)) |
| BIO_puts(err, " Not Mapped\n"); |
| else { |
| int i; |
| STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *pset = node->data->expected_policy_set; |
| ASN1_OBJECT *oid; |
| BIO_puts(err, " Expected: "); |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(pset); i++) { |
| oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(pset, i); |
| if (i) |
| BIO_puts(err, ", "); |
| i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(err, oid); |
| } |
| BIO_puts(err, "\n"); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void tree_print(char *str, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, |
| X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) |
| { |
| BIO *err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE); |
| X509_POLICY_LEVEL *plev; |
| |
| if (err == NULL) |
| return; |
| if (!curr) |
| curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel; |
| else |
| curr++; |
| |
| BIO_printf(err, "Level print after %s\n", str); |
| BIO_printf(err, "Printing Up to Level %ld\n", curr - tree->levels); |
| for (plev = tree->levels; plev != curr; plev++) { |
| int i; |
| |
| BIO_printf(err, "Level %ld, flags = %x\n", |
| (long)(plev - tree->levels), plev->flags); |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(plev->nodes); i++) { |
| X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(plev->nodes, i); |
| |
| X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, node, 2); |
| expected_print(err, plev, node, 2); |
| BIO_printf(err, " Flags: %x\n", node->data->flags); |
| } |
| if (plev->anyPolicy) |
| X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, plev->anyPolicy, 2); |
| } |
| BIO_free(err); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /*- |
| * Return value: <= 0 on error, or positive bit mask: |
| * |
| * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree |
| * X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree (including bare TA case) |
| * X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT: explicit policy required |
| */ |
| static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, |
| unsigned int flags) |
| { |
| X509_POLICY_TREE *tree; |
| X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level; |
| const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache; |
| X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL; |
| int ret = X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; |
| int n = sk_X509_num(certs) - 1; /* RFC5280 paths omit the TA */ |
| int explicit_policy = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY) ? 0 : n+1; |
| int any_skip = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) ? 0 : n+1; |
| int map_skip = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) ? 0 : n+1; |
| int i; |
| |
| *ptree = NULL; |
| |
| /* Can't do anything with just a trust anchor */ |
| if (n == 0) |
| return X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY; |
| |
| /* |
| * First setup the policy cache in all n non-TA certificates, this will be |
| * used in X509_verify_cert() which will invoke the verify callback for all |
| * certificates with invalid policy extensions. |
| */ |
| for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
| X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); |
| |
| /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ |
| X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); |
| |
| /* If cache is NULL, likely ENOMEM: return immediately */ |
| if (policy_cache_set(x) == NULL) |
| return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * At this point check for invalid policies and required explicit policy. |
| * Note that the explicit_policy counter is a count-down to zero, with the |
| * requirement kicking in if and once it does that. The counter is |
| * decremented for every non-self-issued certificate in the path, but may |
| * be further reduced by policy constraints in a non-leaf certificate. |
| * |
| * The ultimate policy set is the intersection of all the policies along |
| * the path, if we hit a certificate with an empty policy set, and explicit |
| * policy is required we're done. |
| */ |
| for (i = n - 1; |
| i >= 0 && (explicit_policy > 0 || (ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) == 0); |
| i--) { |
| X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); |
| uint32_t ex_flags = X509_get_extension_flags(x); |
| |
| /* All the policies are already cached, we can return early */ |
| if (ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) |
| return X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID; |
| |
| /* Access the cache which we now know exists */ |
| cache = policy_cache_set(x); |
| |
| if ((ret & X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) && cache->data == NULL) |
| ret = X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY; |
| if (explicit_policy > 0) { |
| if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) |
| explicit_policy--; |
| if ((cache->explicit_skip >= 0) |
| && (cache->explicit_skip < explicit_policy)) |
| explicit_policy = cache->explicit_skip; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (explicit_policy == 0) |
| ret |= X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT; |
| if ((ret & X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) == 0) |
| return ret; |
| |
| /* If we get this far initialize the tree */ |
| if ((tree = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*tree))) == NULL) |
| return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; |
| |
| /* |
| * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3. |
| * |
| * The top level is implicitly for the trust anchor with valid expected |
| * policies of anyPolicy. (RFC 5280 has the TA at depth 0 and the leaf at |
| * depth n, we have the leaf at depth 0 and the TA at depth n). |
| */ |
| if ((tree->levels = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*tree->levels)*(n+1))) == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_free(tree); |
| return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; |
| } |
| tree->nlevel = n+1; |
| level = tree->levels; |
| if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL) |
| goto bad_tree; |
| if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) { |
| policy_data_free(data); |
| goto bad_tree; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * In this pass initialize all the tree levels and whether anyPolicy and |
| * policy mapping are inhibited at each level. |
| */ |
| for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
| X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); |
| uint32_t ex_flags = X509_get_extension_flags(x); |
| |
| /* Access the cache which we now know exists */ |
| cache = policy_cache_set(x); |
| |
| X509_up_ref(x); |
| (++level)->cert = x; |
| |
| if (!cache->anyPolicy) |
| level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY; |
| |
| /* Determine inhibit any and inhibit map flags */ |
| if (any_skip == 0) { |
| /* |
| * Any matching allowed only if certificate is self issued and not |
| * the last in the chain. |
| */ |
| if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) || (i == 0)) |
| level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY; |
| } else { |
| if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) |
| any_skip--; |
| if ((cache->any_skip >= 0) && (cache->any_skip < any_skip)) |
| any_skip = cache->any_skip; |
| } |
| |
| if (map_skip == 0) |
| level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP; |
| else { |
| if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) |
| map_skip--; |
| if ((cache->map_skip >= 0) && (cache->map_skip < map_skip)) |
| map_skip = cache->map_skip; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| *ptree = tree; |
| return ret; |
| |
| bad_tree: |
| X509_policy_tree_free(tree); |
| return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise |
| */ |
| static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| X509_POLICY_DATA *data) |
| { |
| X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; |
| int i, matched = 0; |
| |
| /* Iterate through all in nodes linking matches */ |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) { |
| X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); |
| |
| if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) { |
| if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| matched = 1; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) { |
| if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(1): link any data from |
| * CertificatePolicies onto matching parent or anyPolicy if no match. |
| * |
| * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. |
| */ |
| static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_num(cache->data); i++) { |
| X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i); |
| |
| /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */ |
| if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(2): Create new data for any unmatched |
| * policies in the parent and link to anyPolicy. |
| * |
| * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. |
| */ |
| static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, |
| const ASN1_OBJECT *id, |
| X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| { |
| X509_POLICY_DATA *data; |
| |
| if (id == NULL) |
| id = node->data->valid_policy; |
| /* |
| * Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from unmatched |
| * node. |
| */ |
| if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, id, node_critical(node))) == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */ |
| data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set; |
| data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS; |
| if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) { |
| policy_data_free(data); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. |
| */ |
| static int tree_link_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, |
| X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| { |
| const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; |
| int i; |
| |
| if ((last->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) |
| || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED)) { |
| /* If no policy mapping: matched if one child present */ |
| if (node->nchild) |
| return 1; |
| if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, NULL, node, tree)) |
| return 0; |
| /* Add it */ |
| } else { |
| /* If mapping: matched if one child per expected policy set */ |
| STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *expset = node->data->expected_policy_set; |
| if (node->nchild == sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset)) |
| return 1; |
| /* Locate unmatched nodes */ |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset); i++) { |
| ASN1_OBJECT *oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(expset, i); |
| if (level_find_node(curr, node, oid)) |
| continue; |
| if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, oid, node, tree)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise |
| */ |
| static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, |
| X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| { |
| int i; |
| X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
| X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) { |
| node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); |
| |
| if (!tree_link_unmatched(curr, cache, node, tree)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */ |
| if (last->anyPolicy && |
| level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Prune the tree: delete any child mapped child data on the current level then |
| * proceed up the tree deleting any data with no children. If we ever have no |
| * data on a level we can halt because the tree will be empty. |
| * |
| * Return value: <= 0 error, otherwise one of: |
| * |
| * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree |
| * X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree |
| */ |
| static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) |
| { |
| STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes; |
| X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
| int i; |
| nodes = curr->nodes; |
| if (curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) { |
| for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
| node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); |
| /* Delete any mapped data: see RFC3280 XXXX */ |
| if (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK) { |
| node->parent->nchild--; |
| OPENSSL_free(node); |
| (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| --curr; |
| nodes = curr->nodes; |
| for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
| node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); |
| if (node->nchild == 0) { |
| node->parent->nchild--; |
| OPENSSL_free(node); |
| (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i); |
| } |
| } |
| if (curr->anyPolicy && !curr->anyPolicy->nchild) { |
| if (curr->anyPolicy->parent) |
| curr->anyPolicy->parent->nchild--; |
| OPENSSL_free(curr->anyPolicy); |
| curr->anyPolicy = NULL; |
| } |
| if (curr == tree->levels) { |
| /* If we zapped anyPolicy at top then tree is empty */ |
| if (!curr->anyPolicy) |
| return X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. |
| */ |
| static int tree_add_auth_node(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes, |
| X509_POLICY_NODE *pcy) |
| { |
| if (*pnodes == NULL && |
| (*pnodes = policy_node_cmp_new()) == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(*pnodes, pcy) != -1) |
| return 1; |
| return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(*pnodes, pcy) != 0; |
| } |
| |
| #define TREE_CALC_FAILURE 0 |
| #define TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE 1 |
| #define TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE 2 |
| |
| /*- |
| * Calculate the authority set based on policy tree. The 'pnodes' parameter is |
| * used as a store for the set of policy nodes used to calculate the user set. |
| * If the authority set is not anyPolicy then pnodes will just point to the |
| * authority set. If however the authority set is anyPolicy then the set of |
| * valid policies (other than anyPolicy) is store in pnodes. |
| * |
| * Return value: |
| * TREE_CALC_FAILURE on failure, |
| * TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE on success and pnodes need not be freed, |
| * TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE on success and pnodes needs to be freed |
| */ |
| static int tree_calculate_authority_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, |
| STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes) |
| { |
| X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr; |
| X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *anyptr; |
| STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **addnodes; |
| int i, j; |
| curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel - 1; |
| |
| /* If last level contains anyPolicy set is anyPolicy */ |
| if (curr->anyPolicy) { |
| if (!tree_add_auth_node(&tree->auth_policies, curr->anyPolicy)) |
| return TREE_CALC_FAILURE; |
| addnodes = pnodes; |
| } else |
| /* Add policies to authority set */ |
| addnodes = &tree->auth_policies; |
| |
| curr = tree->levels; |
| for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++) { |
| /* |
| * If no anyPolicy node on this this level it can't appear on lower |
| * levels so end search. |
| */ |
| if ((anyptr = curr->anyPolicy) == NULL) |
| break; |
| curr++; |
| for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes); j++) { |
| node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, j); |
| if ((node->parent == anyptr) |
| && !tree_add_auth_node(addnodes, node)) { |
| if (addnodes == pnodes) { |
| sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(*pnodes); |
| *pnodes = NULL; |
| } |
| return TREE_CALC_FAILURE; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| if (addnodes == pnodes) |
| return TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE; |
| |
| *pnodes = tree->auth_policies; |
| return TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. |
| */ |
| static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, |
| STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, |
| STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_nodes) |
| { |
| int i; |
| X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
| ASN1_OBJECT *oid; |
| X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy; |
| X509_POLICY_DATA *extra; |
| |
| /* |
| * Check if anyPolicy present in authority constrained policy set: this |
| * will happen if it is a leaf node. |
| */ |
| if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids) <= 0) |
| return 1; |
| |
| anyPolicy = tree->levels[tree->nlevel - 1].anyPolicy; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) { |
| oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i); |
| if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) == NID_any_policy) { |
| tree->flags |= POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) { |
| oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i); |
| node = tree_find_sk(auth_nodes, oid); |
| if (!node) { |
| if (!anyPolicy) |
| continue; |
| /* |
| * Create a new node with policy ID from user set and qualifiers |
| * from anyPolicy. |
| */ |
| extra = policy_data_new(NULL, oid, node_critical(anyPolicy)); |
| if (extra == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set; |
| extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS |
| | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE; |
| node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree); |
| } |
| if (!tree->user_policies) { |
| tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null(); |
| if (!tree->user_policies) |
| return 1; |
| } |
| if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(tree->user_policies, node)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Return value: <= 0 error, otherwise one of: |
| * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree |
| * X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree |
| * (see tree_prune()). |
| */ |
| static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| { |
| int ret, i; |
| X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr = tree->levels + 1; |
| const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache; |
| |
| for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) { |
| cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert); |
| if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache)) |
| return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; |
| |
| if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) |
| && !tree_link_any(curr, cache, tree)) |
| return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG |
| tree_print("before tree_prune()", tree, curr); |
| #endif |
| ret = tree_prune(tree, curr); |
| if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) |
| return ret; |
| } |
| return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; |
| } |
| |
| static void exnode_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node) |
| { |
| if (node->data && (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE)) |
| OPENSSL_free(node); |
| } |
| |
| void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| { |
| X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr; |
| int i; |
| |
| if (!tree) |
| return; |
| |
| sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(tree->auth_policies); |
| sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(tree->user_policies, exnode_free); |
| |
| for (i = 0, curr = tree->levels; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) { |
| X509_free(curr->cert); |
| sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(curr->nodes, policy_node_free); |
| policy_node_free(curr->anyPolicy); |
| } |
| |
| sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(tree->extra_data, policy_data_free); |
| OPENSSL_free(tree->levels); |
| OPENSSL_free(tree); |
| |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Application policy checking function. |
| * Return codes: |
| * X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE: Failure to satisfy explicit policy |
| * X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID: Inconsistent or invalid extensions |
| * X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL: Internal error, most likely malloc |
| * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: Success (null tree if empty or bare TA) |
| */ |
| int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy, |
| STACK_OF(X509) *certs, |
| STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, unsigned int flags) |
| { |
| int init_ret; |
| int ret; |
| X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL; |
| STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL; |
| |
| *ptree = NULL; |
| *pexplicit_policy = 0; |
| init_ret = tree_init(&tree, certs, flags); |
| |
| if (init_ret <= 0) |
| return init_ret; |
| |
| if ((init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT) == 0) { |
| if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) { |
| X509_policy_tree_free(tree); |
| return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; |
| } |
| } else { |
| *pexplicit_policy = 1; |
| /* Tree empty and requireExplicit True: Error */ |
| if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) |
| return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE; |
| } |
| |
| ret = tree_evaluate(tree); |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG |
| tree_print("tree_evaluate()", tree, NULL); |
| #endif |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) { |
| X509_policy_tree_free(tree); |
| if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT) |
| return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE; |
| return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; |
| } |
| |
| /* Tree is not empty: continue */ |
| if ((ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes)) == 0 || |
| !tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes)) |
| goto error; |
| if (ret == TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE) |
| sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes); |
| |
| *ptree = tree; |
| |
| if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT) { |
| nodes = X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree); |
| if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) <= 0) |
| return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE; |
| } |
| return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID; |
| |
| error: |
| X509_policy_tree_free(tree); |
| return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; |
| } |
