| /* |
| * Copyright 2007-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| * Copyright Nokia 2007-2020 |
| * Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2020 |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| */ |
| |
| /* CMP functions for PKIMessage checking */ |
| |
| #include "cmp_local.h" |
| #include <openssl/cmp_util.h> |
| |
| /* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */ |
| #include <openssl/asn1t.h> |
| #include <openssl/cmp.h> |
| #include <openssl/crmf.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| |
| /* Verify a message protected by signature according to RFC section 5.1.3.3 */ |
| static int verify_signature(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *cmp_ctx, |
| const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, X509 *cert) |
| { |
| OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part; |
| EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL; |
| BIO *bio; |
| int res = 0; |
| |
| if (!ossl_assert(cmp_ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && cert != NULL)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); /* may be NULL */ |
| if (bio == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| /* verify that keyUsage, if present, contains digitalSignature */ |
| if (!cmp_ctx->ignore_keyusage |
| && (X509_get_key_usage(cert) & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) == 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_USAGE_DIGITALSIGNATURE); |
| goto sig_err; |
| } |
| |
| pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert); |
| if (pubkey == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_FAILED_EXTRACTING_PUBKEY); |
| goto sig_err; |
| } |
| |
| prot_part.header = msg->header; |
| prot_part.body = msg->body; |
| |
| if (ASN1_item_verify_ex(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART), |
| msg->header->protectionAlg, msg->protection, |
| &prot_part, NULL, pubkey, cmp_ctx->libctx, |
| cmp_ctx->propq) > 0) { |
| res = 1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| sig_err: |
| res = ossl_x509_print_ex_brief(bio, cert, X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS); |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_SIGNATURE); |
| if (res) |
| ERR_add_error_mem_bio("\n", bio); |
| res = 0; |
| |
| end: |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); |
| BIO_free(bio); |
| |
| return res; |
| } |
| |
| /* Verify a message protected with PBMAC */ |
| static int verify_PBMAC(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) |
| { |
| ASN1_BIT_STRING *protection = NULL; |
| int valid = 0; |
| |
| /* generate expected protection for the message */ |
| if ((protection = ossl_cmp_calc_protection(ctx, msg)) == NULL) |
| return 0; /* failed to generate protection string! */ |
| |
| valid = msg->protection != NULL && msg->protection->length >= 0 |
| && msg->protection->type == protection->type |
| && msg->protection->length == protection->length |
| && CRYPTO_memcmp(msg->protection->data, protection->data, |
| protection->length) == 0; |
| ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(protection); |
| if (!valid) |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_WRONG_PBM_VALUE); |
| |
| return valid; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Attempt to validate certificate and path using any given store with trusted |
| * certs (possibly including CRLs and a cert verification callback function) |
| * and non-trusted intermediate certs from the given ctx. |
| * |
| * Returns 1 on successful validation and 0 otherwise. |
| */ |
| int OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, |
| X509_STORE *trusted_store, X509 *cert) |
| { |
| int valid = 0; |
| X509_STORE_CTX *csc = NULL; |
| int err; |
| |
| if (ctx == NULL || cert == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (trusted_store == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_STORE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if ((csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq)) == NULL |
| || !X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, trusted_store, |
| cert, ctx->untrusted)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| valid = X509_verify_cert(csc) > 0; |
| |
| /* make sure suitable error is queued even if callback did not do */ |
| err = ERR_peek_last_error(); |
| if (!valid && ERR_GET_REASON(err) != CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE) |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE); |
| |
| err: |
| /* directly output any fresh errors, needed for check_msg_find_cert() */ |
| OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx); |
| X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc); |
| return valid; |
| } |
| |
| /* Return 0 if expect_name != NULL and there is no matching actual_name */ |
| static int check_name(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int log_success, |
| const char *actual_desc, const X509_NAME *actual_name, |
| const char *expect_desc, const X509_NAME *expect_name) |
| { |
| char *str; |
| |
| if (expect_name == NULL) |
| return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */ |
| |
| /* make sure that a matching name is there */ |
| if (actual_name == NULL) { |
| ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "missing %s", actual_desc); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| str = X509_NAME_oneline(actual_name, NULL, 0); |
| if (X509_NAME_cmp(actual_name, expect_name) == 0) { |
| if (log_success && str != NULL) |
| ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " subject matches %s: %s", expect_desc, |
| str); |
| OPENSSL_free(str); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (str != NULL) |
| ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " actual name in %s = %s", actual_desc, str); |
| OPENSSL_free(str); |
| if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(expect_name, NULL, 0)) != NULL) |
| ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " does not match %s = %s", expect_desc, str); |
| OPENSSL_free(str); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Return 0 if skid != NULL and there is no matching subject key ID in cert */ |
| static int check_kid(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, |
| const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ckid, |
| const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid) |
| { |
| char *str; |
| |
| if (skid == NULL) |
| return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */ |
| |
| /* make sure that the expected subject key identifier is there */ |
| if (ckid == NULL) { |
| ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "missing Subject Key Identifier in certificate"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| str = i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, ckid); |
| if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ckid, skid) == 0) { |
| if (str != NULL) |
| ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subjectKID matches senderKID: %s", str); |
| OPENSSL_free(str); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (str != NULL) |
| ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " cert Subject Key Identifier = %s", str); |
| OPENSSL_free(str); |
| if ((str = i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, skid)) != NULL) |
| ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " does not match senderKID = %s", str); |
| OPENSSL_free(str); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int already_checked(const X509 *cert, |
| const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = sk_X509_num(already_checked /* may be NULL */); i > 0; i--) |
| if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(already_checked, i - 1), cert) == 0) |
| return 1; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Check if the given cert is acceptable as sender cert of the given message. |
| * The subject DN must match, the subject key ID as well if present in the msg, |
| * and the cert must be current (checked if ctx->trusted is not NULL). |
| * Note that cert revocation etc. is checked by OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(). |
| * |
| * Returns 0 on error or not acceptable, else 1. |
| */ |
| static int cert_acceptable(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, |
| const char *desc1, const char *desc2, X509 *cert, |
| const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1, |
| const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2, |
| const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) |
| { |
| X509_STORE *ts = ctx->trusted; |
| int self_issued = X509_check_issued(cert, cert) == X509_V_OK; |
| char *str; |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ts != NULL ? X509_STORE_get0_param(ts) : NULL; |
| int time_cmp; |
| |
| ossl_cmp_log3(INFO, ctx, " considering %s%s %s with..", |
| self_issued ? "self-issued ": "", desc1, desc2); |
| if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0)) != NULL) |
| ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subject = %s", str); |
| OPENSSL_free(str); |
| if (!self_issued) { |
| str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), NULL, 0); |
| if (str != NULL) |
| ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " issuer = %s", str); |
| OPENSSL_free(str); |
| } |
| |
| if (already_checked(cert, already_checked1) |
| || already_checked(cert, already_checked2)) { |
| ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert has already been checked"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| time_cmp = X509_cmp_timeframe(vpm, X509_get0_notBefore(cert), |
| X509_get0_notAfter(cert)); |
| if (time_cmp != 0) { |
| ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, time_cmp > 0 ? "cert has expired" |
| : "cert is not yet valid"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!check_name(ctx, 1, |
| "cert subject", X509_get_subject_name(cert), |
| "sender field", msg->header->sender->d.directoryName)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!check_kid(ctx, X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert), msg->header->senderKID)) |
| return 0; |
| /* prevent misleading error later in case x509v3_cache_extensions() fails */ |
| if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(cert)) { |
| ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "cert appears to be invalid"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (!verify_signature(ctx, msg, cert)) { |
| ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* acceptable also if there is no senderKID in msg header */ |
| ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert seems acceptable"); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_cert_path(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, |
| X509 *scrt) |
| { |
| if (OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt)) |
| return 1; |
| |
| ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, |
| "msg signature validates but cert path validation failed"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Exceptional handling for 3GPP TS 33.310 [3G/LTE Network Domain Security |
| * (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)], only to use for IP messages |
| * and if the ctx option is explicitly set: use self-issued certificates |
| * from extraCerts as trust anchor to validate sender cert - |
| * provided it also can validate the newly enrolled certificate |
| */ |
| static int check_cert_path_3gpp(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, |
| const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, X509 *scrt) |
| { |
| int valid = 0; |
| X509_STORE *store; |
| |
| if (!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if ((store = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL |
| || !ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(store, msg->extraCerts, |
| 1 /* self-issued only */)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| /* store does not include CRLs */ |
| valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt); |
| if (!valid) { |
| ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, |
| "also exceptional 3GPP mode cert path validation failed"); |
| } else { |
| /* |
| * verify that the newly enrolled certificate (which assumed rid == |
| * OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID) can also be validated with the same trusted store |
| */ |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(ctx, 1); |
| OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep = |
| ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(msg->body->value.ip, |
| OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID); |
| X509 *newcrt = ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_cert(crep, ctx, pkey); |
| /* |
| * maybe better use get_cert_status() from cmp_client.c, which catches |
| * errors |
| */ |
| valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, newcrt); |
| X509_free(newcrt); |
| } |
| |
| err: |
| X509_STORE_free(store); |
| return valid; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_msg_given_cert(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, |
| const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) |
| { |
| return cert_acceptable(ctx, "previously validated", "sender cert", |
| cert, NULL, NULL, msg) |
| && (check_cert_path(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert) |
| || check_cert_path_3gpp(ctx, msg, cert)); |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Try all certs in given list for verifying msg, normally or in 3GPP mode. |
| * If already_checked1 == NULL then certs are assumed to be the msg->extraCerts. |
| * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(). |
| */ |
| static int check_msg_with_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const STACK_OF(X509) *certs, |
| const char *desc, |
| const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1, |
| const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2, |
| const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int mode_3gpp) |
| { |
| int in_extraCerts = already_checked1 == NULL; |
| int n_acceptable_certs = 0; |
| int i; |
| |
| if (sk_X509_num(certs) <= 0) { |
| ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "no %s", desc); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { /* certs may be NULL */ |
| X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i); |
| |
| if (!ossl_assert(cert != NULL)) |
| return 0; |
| if (!cert_acceptable(ctx, "cert from", desc, cert, |
| already_checked1, already_checked2, msg)) |
| continue; |
| n_acceptable_certs++; |
| if (mode_3gpp ? check_cert_path_3gpp(ctx, msg, cert) |
| : check_cert_path(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert)) { |
| /* store successful sender cert for further msgs in transaction */ |
| if (!X509_up_ref(cert)) |
| return 0; |
| if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, cert)) { |
| X509_free(cert); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| if (in_extraCerts && n_acceptable_certs == 0) |
| ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "no acceptable cert in extraCerts"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Verify msg trying first ctx->untrusted, which should include extraCerts |
| * at its front, then trying the trusted certs in truststore (if any) of ctx. |
| * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(). |
| */ |
| static int check_msg_all_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, |
| int mode_3gpp) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| if (mode_3gpp |
| && ((!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR |
| || OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg) != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP))) |
| return 0; |
| |
| ossl_cmp_info(ctx, |
| mode_3gpp ? "normal mode failed; trying now 3GPP mode trusting extraCerts" |
| : "trying first normal mode using trust store"); |
| if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, msg->extraCerts, "extraCerts", |
| NULL, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp)) |
| return 1; |
| if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, ctx->untrusted, "untrusted certs", |
| msg->extraCerts, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp)) |
| return 1; |
| |
| if (ctx->trusted == NULL) { |
| ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, mode_3gpp ? "no self-issued extraCerts" |
| : "no trusted store"); |
| } else { |
| STACK_OF(X509) *trusted = X509_STORE_get1_all_certs(ctx->trusted); |
| ret = check_msg_with_certs(ctx, trusted, |
| mode_3gpp ? "self-issued extraCerts" |
| : "certs in trusted store", |
| msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted, |
| msg, mode_3gpp); |
| OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(trusted); |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static int no_log_cb(const char *func, const char *file, int line, |
| OSSL_CMP_severity level, const char *msg) |
| { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Verify message signature with any acceptable and valid candidate cert. |
| * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(). |
| */ |
| static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) |
| { |
| X509 *scrt = ctx->validatedSrvCert; /* previous successful sender cert */ |
| GENERAL_NAME *sender = msg->header->sender; |
| char *sname = NULL; |
| char *skid_str = NULL; |
| const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid = msg->header->senderKID; |
| OSSL_CMP_log_cb_t backup_log_cb = ctx->log_cb; |
| int res = 0; |
| |
| if (sender == NULL || msg->body == NULL) |
| return 0; /* other NULL cases already have been checked */ |
| if (sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* dump any hitherto errors to avoid confusion when printing further ones */ |
| OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx); |
| |
| /* enable clearing irrelevant errors in attempts to validate sender certs */ |
| (void)ERR_set_mark(); |
| ctx->log_cb = no_log_cb; /* temporarily disable logging */ |
| |
| /* |
| * try first cached scrt, used successfully earlier in same transaction, |
| * for validating this and any further msgs where extraCerts may be left out |
| */ |
| if (scrt != NULL) { |
| if (check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg)) { |
| ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb; |
| (void)ERR_pop_to_mark(); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| /* cached sender cert has shown to be no more successfully usable */ |
| (void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, NULL); |
| /* re-do the above check (just) for adding diagnostic information */ |
| ossl_cmp_info(ctx, |
| "trying to verify msg signature with previously validated cert"); |
| (void)check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg); |
| } |
| |
| res = check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */) |
| || check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */); |
| ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb; |
| if (res) { |
| /* discard any diagnostic information on trying to use certs */ |
| (void)ERR_pop_to_mark(); |
| goto end; |
| } |
| /* failed finding a sender cert that verifies the message signature */ |
| (void)ERR_clear_last_mark(); |
| |
| sname = X509_NAME_oneline(sender->d.directoryName, NULL, 0); |
| skid_str = skid == NULL ? NULL : i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, skid); |
| if (ctx->log_cb != NULL) { |
| ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "trying to verify msg signature with a valid cert that.."); |
| if (sname != NULL) |
| ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg sender = %s", sname); |
| if (skid_str != NULL) |
| ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg senderKID = %s", skid_str); |
| else |
| ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "while msg header does not contain senderKID"); |
| /* re-do the above checks (just) for adding diagnostic information */ |
| (void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */); |
| (void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */); |
| } |
| |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_NO_SUITABLE_SENDER_CERT); |
| if (sname != NULL) { |
| ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, "for msg sender name = "); |
| ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, sname); |
| } |
| if (skid_str != NULL) { |
| ERR_add_error_txt(" and ", "for msg senderKID = "); |
| ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, skid_str); |
| } |
| |
| end: |
| OPENSSL_free(sname); |
| OPENSSL_free(skid_str); |
| return res; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Validate the protection of the given PKIMessage using either password- |
| * based mac (PBM) or a signature algorithm. In the case of signature algorithm, |
| * the sender certificate can have been pinned by providing it in ctx->srvCert, |
| * else it is searched in msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted, in ctx->trusted |
| * (in this order) and is path is validated against ctx->trusted. |
| * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(). |
| * |
| * If ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR is true and when validating a CMP IP msg, |
| * the trust anchor for validating the IP msg may be taken from msg->extraCerts |
| * if a self-issued certificate is found there that can be used to |
| * validate the enrolled certificate returned in the IP. |
| * This is according to the need given in 3GPP TS 33.310. |
| * |
| * Returns 1 on success, 0 on error or validation failed. |
| */ |
| int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) |
| { |
| X509 *scrt; |
| |
| ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, "validating CMP message"); |
| if (ctx == NULL || msg == NULL |
| || msg->header == NULL || msg->body == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL /* unprotected message */ |
| || msg->protection == NULL || msg->protection->data == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| switch (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(msg->header)) { |
| /* 5.1.3.1. Shared Secret Information */ |
| case NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC: |
| if (ctx->secretValue == NULL) { |
| ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "no secret available for verifying PBM-based CMP message protection"); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| if (verify_PBMAC(ctx, msg)) { |
| /* |
| * RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is |
| * "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in |
| * the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA |
| * certificate by the initiator.' |
| */ |
| switch (OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg)) { |
| case -1: |
| return 0; |
| case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP: |
| case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP: |
| case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP: |
| case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP: |
| if (ctx->trusted != NULL) { |
| STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs; |
| /* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */ |
| |
| if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0)) |
| /* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| break; |
| default: |
| break; |
| } |
| ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, |
| "successfully validated PBM-based CMP message protection"); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "verifying PBM-based CMP message protection failed"); |
| break; |
| |
| /* |
| * 5.1.3.2 DH Key Pairs |
| * Not yet supported |
| */ |
| case NID_id_DHBasedMac: |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTECTION_ALG_DHBASEDMAC); |
| break; |
| |
| /* |
| * 5.1.3.3. Signature |
| */ |
| default: |
| scrt = ctx->srvCert; |
| if (scrt == NULL) { |
| if (ctx->trusted == NULL) { |
| ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "no trust store nor pinned server cert available for verifying signature-based CMP message protection"); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| if (check_msg_find_cert(ctx, msg)) |
| return 1; |
| } else { /* use pinned sender cert */ |
| /* use ctx->srvCert for signature check even if not acceptable */ |
| if (verify_signature(ctx, msg, scrt)) { |
| ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, |
| "successfully validated signature-based CMP message protection"); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "CMP message signature verification failed"); |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_SRVCERT_DOES_NOT_VALIDATE_MSG); |
| } |
| break; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_transactionID_or_nonce(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *expected, |
| ASN1_OCTET_STRING *actual, int reason) |
| { |
| if (expected != NULL |
| && (actual == NULL || ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(expected, actual) != 0)) { |
| #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
| char *expected_str, *actual_str; |
| |
| expected_str = i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, expected); |
| actual_str = actual == NULL ? "(none)" |
| : i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, actual); |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_TRANSACTIONID_UNMATCHED, |
| "expected = %s, actual = %s", |
| expected_str == NULL ? "?" : expected_str, |
| actual_str == NULL ? "?" : actual_str); |
| OPENSSL_free(expected_str); |
| OPENSSL_free(actual_str); |
| return 0; |
| #endif |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Check received message (i.e., response by server or request from client) |
| * Any msg->extraCerts are prepended to ctx->untrusted. |
| * |
| * Ensures that: |
| * its sender is of appropriate type (currently only X509_NAME) and |
| * matches any expected sender or srvCert subject given in the ctx |
| * it has a valid body type |
| * its protection is valid (or invalid/absent, but only if a callback function |
| * is present and yields a positive result using also the supplied argument) |
| * its transaction ID matches the previous transaction ID stored in ctx (if any) |
| * its recipNonce matches the previous senderNonce stored in the ctx (if any) |
| * |
| * If everything is fine: |
| * learns the senderNonce from the received message, |
| * learns the transaction ID if it is not yet in ctx, |
| * and makes any certs in caPubs directly trusted. |
| * |
| * Returns 1 on success, 0 on error. |
| */ |
| int ossl_cmp_msg_check_update(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, |
| ossl_cmp_allow_unprotected_cb_t cb, int cb_arg) |
| { |
| OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr; |
| const X509_NAME *expected_sender; |
| |
| if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && msg->header != NULL)) |
| return 0; |
| hdr = OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(msg); |
| |
| /* validate sender name of received msg */ |
| if (hdr->sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* |
| * Compare actual sender name of response with expected sender name. |
| * Mitigates risk to accept misused PBM secret |
| * or misused certificate of an unauthorized entity of a trusted hierarchy. |
| */ |
| expected_sender = ctx->expected_sender; |
| if (expected_sender == NULL && ctx->srvCert != NULL) |
| expected_sender = X509_get_subject_name(ctx->srvCert); |
| if (!check_name(ctx, 0, "sender DN field", hdr->sender->d.directoryName, |
| "expected sender", expected_sender)) |
| return 0; |
| /* Note: if recipient was NULL-DN it could be learned here if needed */ |
| |
| if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) > 10) |
| ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, |
| "received CMP message contains more than 10 extraCerts"); |
| /* |
| * Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for use in OSSL_CMP_validate_msg() |
| * and for future use, such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and |
| * the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction. |
| * Note that it does not help validating the message before storing the |
| * extraCerts because they do not belong to the protected msg part anyway. |
| * For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first. |
| */ |
| if (!X509_add_certs(ctx->untrusted, msg->extraCerts, |
| /* this allows self-signed certs */ |
| X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP |
| | X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* validate message protection */ |
| if (hdr->protectionAlg != NULL) { |
| /* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for invalid protection */ |
| if (!OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(ctx, msg) |
| && (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 1, cb_arg) <= 0)) { |
| #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION); |
| return 0; |
| #endif |
| } |
| } else { |
| /* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for missing protection */ |
| if (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 0, cb_arg) <= 0) { |
| #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION); |
| return 0; |
| #endif |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* check CMP version number in header */ |
| if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(hdr) != OSSL_CMP_PVNO) { |
| #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PVNO); |
| return 0; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| if (OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg) < 0) { |
| #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| /* compare received transactionID with the expected one in previous msg */ |
| if (!check_transactionID_or_nonce(ctx->transactionID, hdr->transactionID, |
| CMP_R_TRANSACTIONID_UNMATCHED)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* compare received nonce with the one we sent */ |
| if (!check_transactionID_or_nonce(ctx->senderNonce, hdr->recipNonce, |
| CMP_R_RECIPNONCE_UNMATCHED)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * RFC 4210 section 5.1.1 states: the recipNonce is copied from |
| * the senderNonce of the previous message in the transaction. |
| * --> Store for setting in next message |
| */ |
| if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(ctx, hdr->senderNonce)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* if not yet present, learn transactionID */ |
| if (ctx->transactionID == NULL |
| && !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(ctx, hdr->transactionID)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| /* |
| * Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for future use, |
| * such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and |
| * the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction. |
| * For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first. |
| */ |
| if (!X509_add_certs(ctx->untrusted, msg->extraCerts, |
| /* this allows self-signed certs */ |
| X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP |
| | X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(hdr) == NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC) { |
| /* |
| * RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is |
| * "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in |
| * the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA |
| * certificate by the initiator.' |
| */ |
| switch (OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg)) { |
| case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP: |
| case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP: |
| case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP: |
| case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP: |
| if (ctx->trusted != NULL) { |
| STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs; |
| /* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */ |
| |
| if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0)) |
| /* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| break; |
| default: |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ossl_cmp_verify_popo(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, |
| const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int acceptRAVerified) |
| { |
| if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL && msg->body != NULL)) |
| return 0; |
| switch (msg->body->type) { |
| case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR: |
| { |
| X509_REQ *req = msg->body->value.p10cr; |
| |
| if (X509_REQ_verify_ex(req, X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req), ctx->libctx, |
| ctx->propq) <= 0) { |
| #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_REQUEST_NOT_ACCEPTED); |
| return 0; |
| #endif |
| } |
| } |
| break; |
| case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IR: |
| case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CR: |
| case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR: |
| if (!OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_verify_popo(msg->body->value.ir, OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID, |
| acceptRAVerified, |
| ctx->libctx, ctx->propq)) { |
| #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
| return 0; |
| #endif |
| } |
| break; |
| default: |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
