| /* |
| * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| */ |
| |
| #if defined(__TANDEM) && defined(_SPT_MODEL_) |
| # include <spthread.h> |
| # include <spt_extensions.h> /* timeval */ |
| #endif |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| #include <openssl/engine.h> |
| #include "internal/refcount.h" |
| #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
| #include "ssl_local.h" |
| #include "statem/statem_local.h" |
| |
| static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s); |
| static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s); |
| static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck); |
| |
| DEFINE_STACK_OF(SSL_SESSION) |
| |
| __owur static int sess_timedout(time_t t, SSL_SESSION *ss) |
| { |
| /* if timeout overflowed, it can never timeout! */ |
| if (ss->timeout_ovf) |
| return 0; |
| return t > ss->calc_timeout; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Returns -1/0/+1 as other XXXcmp-type functions |
| * Takes overflow of calculated timeout into consideration |
| */ |
| __owur static int timeoutcmp(SSL_SESSION *a, SSL_SESSION *b) |
| { |
| /* if only one overflowed, then it is greater */ |
| if (a->timeout_ovf && !b->timeout_ovf) |
| return 1; |
| if (!a->timeout_ovf && b->timeout_ovf) |
| return -1; |
| /* No overflow, or both overflowed, so straight compare is safe */ |
| if (a->calc_timeout < b->calc_timeout) |
| return -1; |
| if (a->calc_timeout > b->calc_timeout) |
| return 1; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Calculates effective timeout, saving overflow state |
| * Locking must be done by the caller of this function |
| */ |
| void ssl_session_calculate_timeout(SSL_SESSION *ss) |
| { |
| /* Force positive timeout */ |
| if (ss->timeout < 0) |
| ss->timeout = 0; |
| ss->calc_timeout = ss->time + ss->timeout; |
| /* |
| * |timeout| is always zero or positive, so the check for |
| * overflow only needs to consider if |time| is positive |
| */ |
| ss->timeout_ovf = ss->time > 0 && ss->calc_timeout < ss->time; |
| /* |
| * N.B. Realistic overflow can only occur in our lifetimes on a |
| * 32-bit machine in January 2038. |
| * However, There are no controls to limit the |timeout| |
| * value, except to keep it positive. |
| */ |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * SSL_get_session() and SSL_get1_session() are problematic in TLS1.3 because, |
| * unlike in earlier protocol versions, the session ticket may not have been |
| * sent yet even though a handshake has finished. The session ticket data could |
| * come in sometime later...or even change if multiple session ticket messages |
| * are sent from the server. The preferred way for applications to obtain |
| * a resumable session is to use SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(). |
| */ |
| |
| SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl) |
| /* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */ |
| { |
| return ssl->session; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl) |
| /* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */ |
| { |
| SSL_SESSION *sess; |
| /* |
| * Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that |
| * somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's non-null |
| * and when we up the reference count. |
| */ |
| if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(ssl->lock)) |
| return NULL; |
| sess = ssl->session; |
| if (sess) |
| SSL_SESSION_up_ref(sess); |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ssl->lock); |
| return sess; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg) |
| { |
| return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg); |
| } |
| |
| void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx) |
| { |
| return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx); |
| } |
| |
| SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) |
| { |
| SSL_SESSION *ss; |
| |
| if (!OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS, NULL)) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| ss = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ss)); |
| if (ss == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */ |
| ss->references = 1; |
| ss->timeout = 60 * 5 + 4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */ |
| ss->time = time(NULL); |
| ssl_session_calculate_timeout(ss); |
| ss->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); |
| if (ss->lock == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| OPENSSL_free(ss); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data)) { |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ss->lock); |
| OPENSSL_free(ss); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| return ss; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src) |
| { |
| return ssl_session_dup(src, 1); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If |
| * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is. |
| */ |
| SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) |
| { |
| SSL_SESSION *dest; |
| |
| dest = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*dest)); |
| if (dest == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(*dest)); |
| |
| /* |
| * Set the various pointers to NULL so that we can call SSL_SESSION_free in |
| * the case of an error whilst halfway through constructing dest |
| */ |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
| dest->psk_identity_hint = NULL; |
| dest->psk_identity = NULL; |
| #endif |
| dest->ext.hostname = NULL; |
| dest->ext.tick = NULL; |
| dest->ext.alpn_selected = NULL; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
| dest->srp_username = NULL; |
| #endif |
| dest->peer_chain = NULL; |
| dest->peer = NULL; |
| dest->ticket_appdata = NULL; |
| memset(&dest->ex_data, 0, sizeof(dest->ex_data)); |
| |
| /* We deliberately don't copy the prev and next pointers */ |
| dest->prev = NULL; |
| dest->next = NULL; |
| |
| dest->references = 1; |
| |
| dest->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); |
| if (dest->lock == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| |
| if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, dest, &dest->ex_data)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| if (src->peer != NULL) { |
| if (!X509_up_ref(src->peer)) |
| goto err; |
| dest->peer = src->peer; |
| } |
| |
| if (src->peer_chain != NULL) { |
| dest->peer_chain = X509_chain_up_ref(src->peer_chain); |
| if (dest->peer_chain == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
| if (src->psk_identity_hint) { |
| dest->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(src->psk_identity_hint); |
| if (dest->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| if (src->psk_identity) { |
| dest->psk_identity = OPENSSL_strdup(src->psk_identity); |
| if (dest->psk_identity == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, |
| &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (src->ext.hostname) { |
| dest->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(src->ext.hostname); |
| if (dest->ext.hostname == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (ticket != 0 && src->ext.tick != NULL) { |
| dest->ext.tick = |
| OPENSSL_memdup(src->ext.tick, src->ext.ticklen); |
| if (dest->ext.tick == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| } else { |
| dest->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = 0; |
| dest->ext.ticklen = 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (src->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) { |
| dest->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(src->ext.alpn_selected, |
| src->ext.alpn_selected_len); |
| if (dest->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
| if (src->srp_username) { |
| dest->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(src->srp_username); |
| if (dest->srp_username == NULL) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| if (src->ticket_appdata != NULL) { |
| dest->ticket_appdata = |
| OPENSSL_memdup(src->ticket_appdata, src->ticket_appdata_len); |
| if (dest->ticket_appdata == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| return dest; |
| err: |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| SSL_SESSION_free(dest); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) |
| { |
| if (len) |
| *len = (unsigned int)s->session_id_length; |
| return s->session_id; |
| } |
| const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context(const SSL_SESSION *s, |
| unsigned int *len) |
| { |
| if (len != NULL) |
| *len = (unsigned int)s->sid_ctx_length; |
| return s->sid_ctx; |
| } |
| |
| unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s) |
| { |
| return s->compress_meth; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * SSLv3/TLSv1 has 32 bytes (256 bits) of session ID space. As such, filling |
| * the ID with random junk repeatedly until we have no conflict is going to |
| * complete in one iteration pretty much "most" of the time (btw: |
| * understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations and we still can't avoid |
| * a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call it quits. Either the |
| * RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly very close to |
| * 2^256 SSL sessions to our server. How you might store that many sessions |
| * is perhaps a more interesting question ... |
| */ |
| |
| #define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10 |
| static int def_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, |
| unsigned int *id_len) |
| { |
| unsigned int retry = 0; |
| do |
| if (RAND_bytes_ex(ssl->ctx->libctx, id, *id_len, 0) <= 0) |
| return 0; |
| while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) && |
| (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)) ; |
| if (retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS) |
| return 1; |
| /* else - woops a session_id match */ |
| /* |
| * XXX We should also check the external cache -- but the probability of |
| * a collision is negligible, and we could not prevent the concurrent |
| * creation of sessions with identical IDs since we currently don't have |
| * means to atomically check whether a session ID already exists and make |
| * a reservation for it if it does not (this problem applies to the |
| * internal cache as well). |
| */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_generate_session_id(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *ss) |
| { |
| unsigned int tmp; |
| GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id; |
| |
| switch (s->version) { |
| case SSL3_VERSION: |
| case TLS1_VERSION: |
| case TLS1_1_VERSION: |
| case TLS1_2_VERSION: |
| case TLS1_3_VERSION: |
| case DTLS1_BAD_VER: |
| case DTLS1_VERSION: |
| case DTLS1_2_VERSION: |
| ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; |
| break; |
| default: |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server). |
| * Note that: |
| * (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the |
| * ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket. |
| * When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, statem_srvr.c calls |
| * ssl_get_new_session() in tls_process_client_hello(). |
| * At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions, |
| * however, because of the lookahead, it already knows |
| * whether a ticket is expected or not. |
| * |
| * (b) statem_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing |
| * ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session |
| * ID received from the server, so this block is a noop. |
| */ |
| if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { |
| ss->session_id_length = 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */ |
| if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(s->lock)) |
| return 0; |
| if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(s->session_ctx->lock)) { |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->lock); |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
| SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (s->generate_session_id) |
| cb = s->generate_session_id; |
| else if (s->session_ctx->generate_session_id) |
| cb = s->session_ctx->generate_session_id; |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->session_ctx->lock); |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->lock); |
| /* Choose a session ID */ |
| memset(ss->session_id, 0, ss->session_id_length); |
| tmp = (int)ss->session_id_length; |
| if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) { |
| /* The callback failed */ |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
| SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* |
| * Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. nor |
| * set it higher than it was. |
| */ |
| if (tmp == 0 || tmp > ss->session_id_length) { |
| /* The callback set an illegal length */ |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
| SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ss->session_id_length = tmp; |
| /* Finally, check for a conflict */ |
| if (SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id, |
| (unsigned int)ss->session_id_length)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) |
| { |
| /* This gets used by clients and servers. */ |
| |
| SSL_SESSION *ss = NULL; |
| |
| if ((ss = SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* If the context has a default timeout, use it */ |
| if (s->session_ctx->session_timeout == 0) |
| ss->timeout = SSL_get_default_timeout(s); |
| else |
| ss->timeout = s->session_ctx->session_timeout; |
| ssl_session_calculate_timeout(ss); |
| |
| SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); |
| s->session = NULL; |
| |
| if (session) { |
| if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
| /* |
| * We generate the session id while constructing the |
| * NewSessionTicket in TLSv1.3. |
| */ |
| ss->session_id_length = 0; |
| } else if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, ss)) { |
| /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
| SSL_SESSION_free(ss); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| } else { |
| ss->session_id_length = 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof(ss->sid_ctx)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| SSL_SESSION_free(ss); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| memcpy(ss->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length); |
| ss->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length; |
| s->session = ss; |
| ss->ssl_version = s->version; |
| ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK; |
| |
| /* If client supports extended master secret set it in session */ |
| if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) |
| ss->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_SESSION *lookup_sess_in_cache(SSL *s, const unsigned char *sess_id, |
| size_t sess_id_len) |
| { |
| SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL; |
| |
| if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode |
| & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP) == 0) { |
| SSL_SESSION data; |
| |
| data.ssl_version = s->version; |
| if (!ossl_assert(sess_id_len <= SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| memcpy(data.session_id, sess_id, sess_id_len); |
| data.session_id_length = sess_id_len; |
| |
| if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(s->session_ctx->lock)) |
| return NULL; |
| ret = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions, &data); |
| if (ret != NULL) { |
| /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */ |
| SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret); |
| } |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->session_ctx->lock); |
| if (ret == NULL) |
| ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss); |
| } |
| |
| if (ret == NULL && s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) { |
| int copy = 1; |
| |
| ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, sess_id, sess_id_len, ©); |
| |
| if (ret != NULL) { |
| ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, |
| &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit); |
| |
| /* |
| * Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us |
| * to do so (note that if the session structures returned by the |
| * callback are shared between threads, it must handle the |
| * reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0], or things won't be |
| * thread-safe). |
| */ |
| if (copy) |
| SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret); |
| |
| /* |
| * Add the externally cached session to the internal cache as |
| * well if and only if we are supposed to. |
| */ |
| if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & |
| SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) == 0) { |
| /* |
| * Either return value of SSL_CTX_add_session should not |
| * interrupt the session resumption process. The return |
| * value is intentionally ignored. |
| */ |
| (void)SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, ret); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this |
| * connection. It is only called by servers. |
| * |
| * hello: The parsed ClientHello data |
| * |
| * Returns: |
| * -1: fatal error |
| * 0: no session found |
| * 1: a session may have been found. |
| * |
| * Side effects: |
| * - If a session is found then s->session is pointed at it (after freeing an |
| * existing session if need be) and s->verify_result is set from the session. |
| * - Both for new and resumed sessions, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 1 |
| * if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise). |
| */ |
| int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) |
| { |
| /* This is used only by servers. */ |
| |
| SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL; |
| int fatal = 0; |
| int try_session_cache = 0; |
| SSL_TICKET_STATUS r; |
| |
| if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
| /* |
| * By default we will send a new ticket. This can be overridden in the |
| * ticket processing. |
| */ |
| s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; |
| if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk_kex_modes, |
| SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, hello->pre_proc_exts, |
| NULL, 0) |
| || !tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
| hello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| ret = s->session; |
| } else { |
| /* sets s->ext.ticket_expected */ |
| r = tls_get_ticket_from_client(s, hello, &ret); |
| switch (r) { |
| case SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC: |
| case SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER: |
| fatal = 1; |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| case SSL_TICKET_NONE: |
| case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY: |
| if (hello->session_id_len > 0) { |
| try_session_cache = 1; |
| ret = lookup_sess_in_cache(s, hello->session_id, |
| hello->session_id_len); |
| } |
| break; |
| case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT: |
| case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS: |
| case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW: |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (ret == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| |
| /* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */ |
| |
| /* Check TLS version consistency */ |
| if (ret->ssl_version != s->version) |
| goto err; |
| |
| if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length |
| || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length)) { |
| /* |
| * We have the session requested by the client, but we don't want to |
| * use it in this context. |
| */ |
| goto err; /* treat like cache miss */ |
| } |
| |
| if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) { |
| /* |
| * We can't be sure if this session is being used out of context, |
| * which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The application |
| * should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context. For this error |
| * case, we generate an error instead of treating the event like a |
| * cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for applications to |
| * effectively disable the session cache by accident without anyone |
| * noticing). |
| */ |
| |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
| SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED); |
| fatal = 1; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (sess_timedout(time(NULL), ret)) { |
| ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout); |
| if (try_session_cache) { |
| /* session was from the cache, so remove it */ |
| SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, ret); |
| } |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check extended master secret extension consistency */ |
| if (ret->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) { |
| /* If old session includes extms, but new does not: abort handshake */ |
| if (!(s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS); |
| fatal = 1; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } else if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) { |
| /* If new session includes extms, but old does not: do not resume */ |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
| /* We already did this for TLS1.3 */ |
| SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); |
| s->session = ret; |
| } |
| |
| ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit); |
| s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result; |
| return 1; |
| |
| err: |
| if (ret != NULL) { |
| SSL_SESSION_free(ret); |
| /* In TLSv1.3 s->session was already set to ret, so we NULL it out */ |
| if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) |
| s->session = NULL; |
| |
| if (!try_session_cache) { |
| /* |
| * The session was from a ticket, so we should issue a ticket for |
| * the new session |
| */ |
| s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; |
| } |
| } |
| if (fatal) |
| return -1; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| SSL_SESSION *s; |
| |
| /* |
| * add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache even though |
| * it has two ways of access: each session is in a doubly linked list and |
| * an lhash |
| */ |
| SSL_SESSION_up_ref(c); |
| /* |
| * if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later |
| */ |
| |
| if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock)) { |
| SSL_SESSION_free(c); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s = lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, c); |
| |
| /* |
| * s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. In this |
| * case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify |
| * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble. |
| */ |
| if (s != NULL && s != c) { |
| /* We *are* in trouble ... */ |
| SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s); |
| SSL_SESSION_free(s); |
| /* |
| * ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache (we cannot |
| * handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical session ID in the |
| * same cache, which could happen e.g. when two threads concurrently |
| * obtain the same session from an external cache) |
| */ |
| s = NULL; |
| } else if (s == NULL && |
| lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c) == NULL) { |
| /* s == NULL can also mean OOM error in lh_SSL_SESSION_insert ... */ |
| |
| /* |
| * ... so take back the extra reference and also don't add |
| * the session to the SSL_SESSION_list at this time |
| */ |
| s = c; |
| } |
| |
| /* Adjust last used time, and add back into the cache at the appropriate spot */ |
| if (ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_UPDATE_TIME) { |
| c->time = time(NULL); |
| ssl_session_calculate_timeout(c); |
| } |
| SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, c); |
| |
| if (s != NULL) { |
| /* |
| * existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference |
| * count because it already takes into account the cache |
| */ |
| |
| SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */ |
| ret = 0; |
| } else { |
| /* |
| * new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large |
| */ |
| |
| ret = 1; |
| |
| if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) { |
| while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) { |
| if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0)) |
| break; |
| else |
| ssl_tsan_counter(ctx, &ctx->stats.sess_cache_full); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) |
| { |
| return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1); |
| } |
| |
| static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck) |
| { |
| SSL_SESSION *r; |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0)) { |
| if (lck) { |
| if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if ((r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c)) != NULL) { |
| ret = 1; |
| r = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, r); |
| SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, r); |
| } |
| c->not_resumable = 1; |
| |
| if (lck) |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock); |
| |
| if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) |
| ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, c); |
| |
| if (ret) |
| SSL_SESSION_free(r); |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| if (ss == NULL) |
| return; |
| CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&ss->references, &i, ss->lock); |
| REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_SESSION", ss); |
| if (i > 0) |
| return; |
| REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); |
| |
| CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data); |
| |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key, sizeof(ss->master_key)); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id, sizeof(ss->session_id)); |
| X509_free(ss->peer); |
| OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(ss->peer_chain); |
| OPENSSL_free(ss->ext.hostname); |
| OPENSSL_free(ss->ext.tick); |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
| OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity_hint); |
| OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity); |
| #endif |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
| OPENSSL_free(ss->srp_username); |
| #endif |
| OPENSSL_free(ss->ext.alpn_selected); |
| OPENSSL_free(ss->ticket_appdata); |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ss->lock); |
| OPENSSL_clear_free(ss, sizeof(*ss)); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *ss) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&ss->references, &i, ss->lock) <= 0) |
| return 0; |
| |
| REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_SESSION", ss); |
| REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); |
| return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session) |
| { |
| ssl_clear_bad_session(s); |
| if (s->ctx->method != s->method) { |
| if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s, s->ctx->method)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (session != NULL) { |
| SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session); |
| s->verify_result = session->verify_result; |
| } |
| SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); |
| s->session = session; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_set1_id(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid, |
| unsigned int sid_len) |
| { |
| if (sid_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s->session_id_length = sid_len; |
| if (sid != s->session_id) |
| memcpy(s->session_id, sid, sid_len); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) |
| { |
| time_t new_timeout = (time_t)t; |
| |
| if (s == NULL || t < 0) |
| return 0; |
| if (s->owner != NULL) { |
| if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(s->owner->lock)) |
| return 0; |
| s->timeout = new_timeout; |
| ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s); |
| SSL_SESSION_list_add(s->owner, s); |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->owner->lock); |
| } else { |
| s->timeout = new_timeout; |
| ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s); |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s) |
| { |
| if (s == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| return (long)s->timeout; |
| } |
| |
| long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s) |
| { |
| if (s == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| return (long)s->time; |
| } |
| |
| long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) |
| { |
| time_t new_time = (time_t)t; |
| |
| if (s == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| if (s->owner != NULL) { |
| if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(s->owner->lock)) |
| return 0; |
| s->time = new_time; |
| ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s); |
| SSL_SESSION_list_add(s->owner, s); |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->owner->lock); |
| } else { |
| s->time = new_time; |
| ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s); |
| } |
| return t; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version(const SSL_SESSION *s) |
| { |
| return s->ssl_version; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(SSL_SESSION *s, int version) |
| { |
| s->ssl_version = version; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(const SSL_SESSION *s) |
| { |
| return s->cipher; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(SSL_SESSION *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) |
| { |
| s->cipher = cipher; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| const char *SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname(const SSL_SESSION *s) |
| { |
| return s->ext.hostname; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_set1_hostname(SSL_SESSION *s, const char *hostname) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname); |
| if (hostname == NULL) { |
| s->ext.hostname = NULL; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| s->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(hostname); |
| |
| return s->ext.hostname != NULL; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_has_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s) |
| { |
| return (s->ext.ticklen > 0) ? 1 : 0; |
| } |
| |
| unsigned long SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(const SSL_SESSION *s) |
| { |
| return s->ext.tick_lifetime_hint; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char **tick, |
| size_t *len) |
| { |
| *len = s->ext.ticklen; |
| if (tick != NULL) |
| *tick = s->ext.tick; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_early_data(const SSL_SESSION *s) |
| { |
| return s->ext.max_early_data; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_set_max_early_data(SSL_SESSION *s, uint32_t max_early_data) |
| { |
| s->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_SESSION_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL_SESSION *s, |
| const unsigned char **alpn, |
| size_t *len) |
| { |
| *alpn = s->ext.alpn_selected; |
| *len = s->ext.alpn_selected_len; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_set1_alpn_selected(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *alpn, |
| size_t len) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_free(s->ext.alpn_selected); |
| if (alpn == NULL || len == 0) { |
| s->ext.alpn_selected = NULL; |
| s->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| s->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(alpn, len); |
| if (s->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { |
| s->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s->ext.alpn_selected_len = len; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s) |
| { |
| return s->peer; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, |
| unsigned int sid_ctx_len) |
| { |
| if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; |
| if (sid_ctx != s->sid_ctx) |
| memcpy(s->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(const SSL_SESSION *s) |
| { |
| /* |
| * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared "ticket" without a |
| * session ID. |
| */ |
| return !s->not_resumable |
| && (s->session_id_length > 0 || s->ext.ticklen > 0); |
| } |
| |
| long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t) |
| { |
| long l; |
| if (s == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| l = s->session_timeout; |
| s->session_timeout = t; |
| return l; |
| } |
| |
| long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s) |
| { |
| if (s == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| return s->session_timeout; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, |
| tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secret_cb, |
| void *arg) |
| { |
| if (s == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| s->ext.session_secret_cb = tls_session_secret_cb; |
| s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg = arg; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb, |
| void *arg) |
| { |
| if (s == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| s->ext.session_ticket_cb = cb; |
| s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg = arg; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len) |
| { |
| if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) { |
| OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket); |
| s->ext.session_ticket = NULL; |
| s->ext.session_ticket = |
| OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT) + ext_len); |
| if (s->ext.session_ticket == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ext_data != NULL) { |
| s->ext.session_ticket->length = ext_len; |
| s->ext.session_ticket->data = s->ext.session_ticket + 1; |
| memcpy(s->ext.session_ticket->data, ext_data, ext_len); |
| } else { |
| s->ext.session_ticket->length = 0; |
| s->ext.session_ticket->data = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t) |
| { |
| STACK_OF(SSL_SESSION) *sk; |
| SSL_SESSION *current; |
| unsigned long i; |
| |
| if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(s->lock)) |
| return; |
| |
| sk = sk_SSL_SESSION_new_null(); |
| i = lh_SSL_SESSION_get_down_load(s->sessions); |
| lh_SSL_SESSION_set_down_load(s->sessions, 0); |
| |
| /* |
| * Iterate over the list from the back (oldest), and stop |
| * when a session can no longer be removed. |
| * Add the session to a temporary list to be freed outside |
| * the SSL_CTX lock. |
| * But still do the remove_session_cb() within the lock. |
| */ |
| while (s->session_cache_tail != NULL) { |
| current = s->session_cache_tail; |
| if (t == 0 || sess_timedout((time_t)t, current)) { |
| lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(s->sessions, current); |
| SSL_SESSION_list_remove(s, current); |
| current->not_resumable = 1; |
| if (s->remove_session_cb != NULL) |
| s->remove_session_cb(s, current); |
| /* |
| * Throw the session on a stack, it's entirely plausible |
| * that while freeing outside the critical section, the |
| * session could be re-added, so avoid using the next/prev |
| * pointers. If the stack failed to create, or the session |
| * couldn't be put on the stack, just free it here |
| */ |
| if (sk == NULL || !sk_SSL_SESSION_push(sk, current)) |
| SSL_SESSION_free(current); |
| } else { |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| lh_SSL_SESSION_set_down_load(s->sessions, i); |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->lock); |
| |
| sk_SSL_SESSION_pop_free(sk, SSL_SESSION_free); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s) |
| { |
| if ((s->session != NULL) && |
| !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) && |
| !(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))) { |
| SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); |
| return 1; |
| } else |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */ |
| static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) |
| { |
| if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL)) |
| return; |
| |
| if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail)) { |
| /* last element in list */ |
| if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) { |
| /* only one element in list */ |
| ctx->session_cache_head = NULL; |
| ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL; |
| } else { |
| ctx->session_cache_tail = s->prev; |
| s->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail); |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) { |
| /* first element in list */ |
| ctx->session_cache_head = s->next; |
| s->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); |
| } else { |
| /* middle of list */ |
| s->next->prev = s->prev; |
| s->prev->next = s->next; |
| } |
| } |
| s->prev = s->next = NULL; |
| s->owner = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) |
| { |
| SSL_SESSION *next; |
| |
| if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL)) |
| SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s); |
| |
| if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) { |
| ctx->session_cache_head = s; |
| ctx->session_cache_tail = s; |
| s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); |
| s->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail); |
| } else { |
| if (timeoutcmp(s, ctx->session_cache_head) >= 0) { |
| /* |
| * if we timeout after (or the same time as) the first |
| * session, put us first - usual case |
| */ |
| s->next = ctx->session_cache_head; |
| s->next->prev = s; |
| s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); |
| ctx->session_cache_head = s; |
| } else if (timeoutcmp(s, ctx->session_cache_tail) < 0) { |
| /* if we timeout before the last session, put us last */ |
| s->prev = ctx->session_cache_tail; |
| s->prev->next = s; |
| s->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail); |
| ctx->session_cache_tail = s; |
| } else { |
| /* |
| * we timeout somewhere in-between - if there is only |
| * one session in the cache it will be caught above |
| */ |
| next = ctx->session_cache_head->next; |
| while (next != (SSL_SESSION*)&(ctx->session_cache_tail)) { |
| if (timeoutcmp(s, next) >= 0) { |
| s->next = next; |
| s->prev = next->prev; |
| next->prev->next = s; |
| next->prev = s; |
| break; |
| } |
| next = next->next; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| s->owner = ctx; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| int (*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)) |
| { |
| ctx->new_session_cb = cb; |
| } |
| |
| int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) { |
| return ctx->new_session_cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| void (*cb) (SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)) |
| { |
| ctx->remove_session_cb = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| SSL_SESSION *sess) { |
| return ctx->remove_session_cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| SSL_SESSION *(*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *data, |
| int len, int *copy)) |
| { |
| ctx->get_session_cb = cb; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, |
| const unsigned char |
| *data, int len, |
| int *copy) { |
| return ctx->get_session_cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)) |
| { |
| ctx->info_callback = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *ssl, int type, |
| int val) { |
| return ctx->info_callback; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, |
| EVP_PKEY **pkey)) |
| { |
| ctx->client_cert_cb = cb; |
| } |
| |
| int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, |
| EVP_PKEY **pkey) { |
| return ctx->client_cert_cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, |
| unsigned char *cookie, |
| unsigned int *cookie_len)) |
| { |
| ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *cookie, |
| unsigned int cookie_len)) |
| { |
| ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb = cb; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_set1_ticket_appdata(SSL_SESSION *ss, const void *data, size_t len) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_free(ss->ticket_appdata); |
| ss->ticket_appdata_len = 0; |
| if (data == NULL || len == 0) { |
| ss->ticket_appdata = NULL; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| ss->ticket_appdata = OPENSSL_memdup(data, len); |
| if (ss->ticket_appdata != NULL) { |
| ss->ticket_appdata_len = len; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket_appdata(SSL_SESSION *ss, void **data, size_t *len) |
| { |
| *data = ss->ticket_appdata; |
| *len = ss->ticket_appdata_len; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb( |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, |
| unsigned char *cookie, |
| size_t *cookie_len)) |
| { |
| ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb = cb; |
| } |
| |
| void SSL_CTX_set_stateless_cookie_verify_cb( |
| SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *cookie, |
| size_t cookie_len)) |
| { |
| ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb = cb; |
| } |
| |
| IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION) |
