| /* |
| * Copyright 2016-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| */ |
| |
| #include <openssl/ocsp.h> |
| #include "../ssl_local.h" |
| #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
| #include "statem_local.h" |
| |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
| unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| /* Add RI if renegotiating */ |
| if (!s->renegotiate) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3.previous_client_finished, |
| s->s3.previous_client_finished_len) |
| || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| return EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| } |
| |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
| unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) |
| /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */ |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
| /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/ |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) |
| || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.hostname, |
| strlen(s->ext.hostname)) |
| || !WPACKET_close(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| return EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| } |
| |
| /* Push a Max Fragment Len extension into ClientHello */ |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
| unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| if (s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode == TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| /* Add Max Fragment Length extension if client enabled it. */ |
| /*- |
| * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length |
| * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value. |
| */ |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length) |
| /* Sub-packet for Max Fragment Length extension (1 byte) */ |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) |
| || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| return EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, |
| X509 *x, size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| /* Add SRP username if there is one */ |
| if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) |
| /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */ |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) |
| /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */ |
| || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH) |
| || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login, |
| strlen(s->srp_ctx.login)) |
| || !WPACKET_close(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| return EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| static int use_ecc(SSL *s, int min_version, int max_version) |
| { |
| int i, end, ret = 0; |
| unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL; |
| const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL; |
| size_t num_groups, j; |
| |
| /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */ |
| if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) |
| return 0; |
| |
| cipher_stack = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(s); |
| end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); |
| for (i = 0; i < end; i++) { |
| const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); |
| |
| alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; |
| alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; |
| if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) |
| || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) |
| || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
| ret = 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_stack); |
| if (!ret) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Check we have at least one EC supported group */ |
| tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups); |
| for (j = 0; j < num_groups; j++) { |
| uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[j]; |
| |
| if (tls_valid_group(s, ctmp, min_version, max_version, 1, NULL) |
| && tls_group_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
| unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| const unsigned char *pformats; |
| size_t num_formats; |
| int reason, min_version, max_version; |
| |
| reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL); |
| if (reason != 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, reason); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| if (!use_ecc(s, min_version, max_version)) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ |
| tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats); |
| |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) |
| /* Sub-packet for formats extension */ |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats) |
| || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| return EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| } |
| |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
| unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL; |
| size_t num_groups = 0, i, tls13added = 0, added = 0; |
| int min_version, max_version, reason; |
| |
| reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL); |
| if (reason != 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, reason); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * We only support EC groups in TLSv1.2 or below, and in DTLS. Therefore |
| * if we don't have EC support then we don't send this extension. |
| */ |
| if (!use_ecc(s, min_version, max_version) |
| && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| /* |
| * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message |
| */ |
| tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups); |
| |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) |
| /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */ |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| /* Copy group ID if supported */ |
| for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { |
| uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[i]; |
| int okfortls13; |
| |
| if (tls_valid_group(s, ctmp, min_version, max_version, 0, &okfortls13) |
| && tls_group_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
| int ctmp13 = ssl_group_id_internal_to_tls13(ctmp); |
| |
| if (ctmp13 != 0 && ctmp13 != ctmp |
| && max_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ctmp13)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| tls13added++; |
| added++; |
| if (min_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) |
| continue; |
| } |
| #endif |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ctmp)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| if (okfortls13 && max_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) |
| tls13added++; |
| added++; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
| if (added == 0) |
| SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_GROUPS, |
| "No groups enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version"); |
| else |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| if (tls13added == 0 && max_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
| SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_GROUPS, |
| "No groups enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version"); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| return EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| } |
| |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
| unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| size_t ticklen; |
| |
| if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL |
| && s->session->ext.tick != NULL |
| && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
| ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen; |
| } else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL |
| && s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) { |
| ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length; |
| s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); |
| if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| memcpy(s->session->ext.tick, |
| s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen); |
| s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen; |
| } else { |
| ticklen = 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL && |
| s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) |
| || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| return EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| } |
| |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
| unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| size_t salglen; |
| const uint16_t *salg; |
| |
| if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg); |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) |
| /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */ |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
| /* Sub-packet for the actual list */ |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
| || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen) |
| || !WPACKET_close(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| return EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
| unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */ |
| if (x != NULL) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) |
| /* Sub-packet for status request extension */ |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) |
| /* Sub-packet for the ids */ |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) { |
| unsigned char *idbytes; |
| OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i); |
| int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); |
| |
| if (idlen <= 0 |
| /* Sub-packet for an individual id */ |
| || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes) |
| || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) { |
| unsigned char *extbytes; |
| int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL); |
| |
| if (extlen < 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes) |
| || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes) |
| != extlen) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| return EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, |
| X509 *x, size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| /* |
| * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support |
| * for Next Protocol Negotiation |
| */ |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) |
| || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| return EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, |
| X509 *x, size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| s->s3.alpn_sent = 0; |
| |
| if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, |
| TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) |
| /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */ |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len) |
| || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| s->s3.alpn_sent = 1; |
| |
| return EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| } |
| |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
| unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); |
| int i, end; |
| |
| if (clnt == NULL) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) |
| /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */ |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
| /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */ |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); |
| for (i = 0; i < end; i++) { |
| const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof = |
| sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i); |
| |
| if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) |
| /* Add an empty use_mki value */ |
| || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) |
| || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| return EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, |
| X509 *x, size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) |
| || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| return EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, |
| X509 *x, size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| /* Not defined for client Certificates */ |
| if (x != NULL) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp) |
| || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| return EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, |
| X509 *x, size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) |
| || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| return EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| } |
| |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
| unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| int currv, min_version, max_version, reason; |
| |
| reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL); |
| if (reason != 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, reason); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Don't include this if we can't negotiate TLSv1.3. We can do a straight |
| * comparison here because we will never be called in DTLS. |
| */ |
| if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) { |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| return EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension. |
| */ |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
| unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
| int nodhe = s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX; |
| |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes) |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE) |
| || (nodhe && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE)) |
| || !WPACKET_close(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE; |
| if (nodhe) |
| s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE; |
| #endif |
| |
| return EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
| static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id) |
| { |
| unsigned char *encoded_point = NULL; |
| EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL; |
| size_t encodedlen; |
| |
| if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) { |
| if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* |
| * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share |
| */ |
| key_share_key = s->s3.tmp.pkey; |
| } else { |
| key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id); |
| if (key_share_key == NULL) { |
| /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Encode the public key. */ |
| encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(key_share_key, |
| &encoded_point); |
| if (encodedlen == 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Create KeyShareEntry */ |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ssl_group_id_internal_to_tls13(curve_id)) |
| || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * When changing to send more than one key_share we're |
| * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now |
| * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey |
| */ |
| s->s3.tmp.pkey = key_share_key; |
| s->s3.group_id = curve_id; |
| OPENSSL_free(encoded_point); |
| |
| return 1; |
| err: |
| if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) |
| EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key); |
| OPENSSL_free(encoded_point); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
| unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
| size_t i, num_groups = 0; |
| const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL; |
| uint16_t curve_id = 0; |
| |
| /* key_share extension */ |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) |
| /* Extension data sub-packet */ |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
| /* KeyShare list sub-packet */ |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups); |
| |
| /* |
| * Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For |
| * now, we just send one |
| */ |
| if (s->s3.group_id != 0) { |
| curve_id = s->s3.group_id; |
| } else { |
| for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { |
| if (ssl_group_id_internal_to_tls13(pgroups[i]) == 0) |
| continue; |
| |
| if (!tls_group_allowed(s, pgroups[i], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) |
| continue; |
| |
| curve_id = pgroups[i]; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (curve_id == 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id)) { |
| /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| return EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| #else |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, |
| X509 *x, size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| |
| /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */ |
| if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie) |
| /* Extension data sub-packet */ |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie, |
| s->ext.tls13_cookie_len) |
| || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| end: |
| OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie); |
| s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL; |
| s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0; |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
| unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
| char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; |
| #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ |
| const unsigned char *id = NULL; |
| size_t idlen = 0; |
| SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL; |
| SSL_SESSION *edsess = NULL; |
| const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL; |
| |
| if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) |
| handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s); |
| |
| if (s->psk_use_session_cb != NULL |
| && (!s->psk_use_session_cb(s, handmd, &id, &idlen, &psksess) |
| || (psksess != NULL |
| && psksess->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION))) { |
| SSL_SESSION_free(psksess); |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
| if (psksess == NULL && s->psk_client_callback != NULL) { |
| unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; |
| size_t psklen = 0; |
| |
| memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); |
| psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, NULL, identity, sizeof(identity) - 1, |
| psk, sizeof(psk)); |
| |
| if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } else if (psklen > 0) { |
| const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 }; |
| const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; |
| |
| idlen = strlen(identity); |
| if (idlen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| id = (unsigned char *)identity; |
| |
| /* |
| * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know |
| * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec |
| */ |
| cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id); |
| if (cipher == NULL) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| psksess = SSL_SESSION_new(); |
| if (psksess == NULL |
| || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(psksess, psk, psklen) |
| || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(psksess, cipher) |
| || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(psksess, TLS1_3_VERSION)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ |
| |
| SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession); |
| s->psksession = psksess; |
| if (psksess != NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id); |
| s->psksession_id = OPENSSL_memdup(id, idlen); |
| if (s->psksession_id == NULL) { |
| s->psksession_id_len = 0; |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| s->psksession_id_len = idlen; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING |
| || (s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0 |
| && (psksess == NULL || psksess->ext.max_early_data == 0))) { |
| s->max_early_data = 0; |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| } |
| edsess = s->session->ext.max_early_data != 0 ? s->session : psksess; |
| s->max_early_data = edsess->ext.max_early_data; |
| |
| if (edsess->ext.hostname != NULL) { |
| if (s->ext.hostname == NULL |
| || (s->ext.hostname != NULL |
| && strcmp(s->ext.hostname, edsess->ext.hostname) != 0)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
| SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if ((s->ext.alpn == NULL && edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early |
| * data. |
| */ |
| if (edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) { |
| PACKET prots, alpnpkt; |
| int found = 0; |
| |
| if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots, &alpnpkt)) { |
| if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt, edsess->ext.alpn_selected, |
| edsess->ext.alpn_selected_len)) { |
| found = 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!found) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
| SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the |
| * extension, we set it to accepted. |
| */ |
| s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED; |
| s->ext.early_data_ok = 1; |
| |
| return EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| } |
| |
| #define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff |
| #define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200 |
| |
| /* |
| * PSK pre binder overhead = |
| * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk |
| * 2 bytes for extension length |
| * 2 bytes for identities list length |
| * 2 bytes for identity length |
| * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age |
| * 2 bytes for binder list length |
| * 1 byte for binder length |
| * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the |
| * subsequent binder bytes |
| */ |
| #define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1) |
| |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
| unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| unsigned char *padbytes; |
| size_t hlen; |
| |
| if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| /* |
| * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685. |
| * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but |
| * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore |
| * this extension MUST always appear second to last. |
| */ |
| if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this |
| * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be. |
| */ |
| if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION |
| && s->session->ext.ticklen != 0 |
| && s->session->cipher != NULL) { |
| const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->ctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2); |
| |
| if (md != NULL) { |
| /* |
| * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder |
| * length. |
| */ |
| hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen |
| + EVP_MD_get_size(md); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) { |
| /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */ |
| hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen; |
| |
| /* |
| * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and |
| * 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least |
| * 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x, |
| * 8.x are intolerant of that condition) |
| */ |
| if (hlen > 4) |
| hlen -= 4; |
| else |
| hlen = 1; |
| |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding) |
| || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| memset(padbytes, 0, hlen); |
| } |
| |
| return EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Construct the pre_shared_key extension |
| */ |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, |
| X509 *x, size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
| uint32_t now, agesec, agems = 0; |
| size_t reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0, binderoffset, msglen; |
| unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL; |
| const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL; |
| int dores = 0; |
| |
| s->ext.tick_identity = 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single |
| * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length |
| * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted. |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume |
| * so don't add this extension. |
| */ |
| if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION |
| || (s->session->ext.ticklen == 0 && s->psksession == NULL)) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) |
| handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s); |
| |
| if (s->session->ext.ticklen != 0) { |
| /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */ |
| if (s->session->cipher == NULL) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| mdres = ssl_md(s->ctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2); |
| if (mdres == NULL) { |
| /* |
| * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session. |
| * Ignore it |
| */ |
| goto dopsksess; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdres != handmd) { |
| /* |
| * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session |
| * so we can't use it. |
| */ |
| goto dopsksess; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says |
| * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most |
| * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in |
| * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do |
| * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an |
| * issue. |
| */ |
| now = (uint32_t)time(NULL); |
| agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time; |
| /* |
| * We calculate the age in seconds but the server may work in ms. Due to |
| * rounding errors we could overestimate the age by up to 1s. It is |
| * better to underestimate it. Otherwise, if the RTT is very short, when |
| * the server calculates the age reported by the client it could be |
| * bigger than the age calculated on the server - which should never |
| * happen. |
| */ |
| if (agesec > 0) |
| agesec--; |
| |
| if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) { |
| /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */ |
| goto dopsksess; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be |
| * good enough. |
| */ |
| agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000; |
| |
| if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) { |
| /* |
| * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session. |
| * If so we just ignore it. |
| */ |
| goto dopsksess; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed |
| * to be mod 2^32. |
| */ |
| agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add; |
| |
| reshashsize = EVP_MD_get_size(mdres); |
| s->ext.tick_identity++; |
| dores = 1; |
| } |
| |
| dopsksess: |
| if (!dores && s->psksession == NULL) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| if (s->psksession != NULL) { |
| mdpsk = ssl_md(s->ctx, s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2); |
| if (mdpsk == NULL) { |
| /* |
| * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session. |
| * If this happens it's an application bug. |
| */ |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdpsk != handmd) { |
| /* |
| * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK |
| * session. This is an application bug. |
| */ |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| pskhashsize = EVP_MD_get_size(mdpsk); |
| } |
| |
| /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */ |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk) |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| if (dores) { |
| if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, |
| s->session->ext.ticklen) |
| || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (s->psksession != NULL) { |
| if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->psksession_id, |
| s->psksession_id_len) |
| || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| s->ext.tick_identity++; |
| } |
| |
| if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset) |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
| || (dores |
| && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, reshashsize, &resbinder)) |
| || (s->psksession != NULL |
| && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, pskhashsize, &pskbinder)) |
| || !WPACKET_close(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_close(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen) |
| /* |
| * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can |
| * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders |
| */ |
| || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen; |
| |
| if (dores |
| && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL, |
| resbinder, s->session, 1, 0) != 1) { |
| /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->psksession != NULL |
| && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL, |
| pskbinder, s->psksession, 1, 1) != 1) { |
| /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| return EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| #else |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
| ossl_unused unsigned int context, |
| ossl_unused X509 *x, |
| ossl_unused size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
| if (!s->pha_enabled) |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| |
| /* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */ |
| if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth) |
| || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
| || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; |
| } |
| |
| s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; |
| |
| return EXT_RETURN_SENT; |
| #else |
| return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right |
| */ |
| int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, |
| X509 *x, size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| size_t expected_len = s->s3.previous_client_finished_len |
| + s->s3.previous_server_finished_len; |
| size_t ilen; |
| const unsigned char *data; |
| |
| /* Check for logic errors */ |
| if (!ossl_assert(expected_len == 0 |
| || s->s3.previous_client_finished_len != 0) |
| || !ossl_assert(expected_len == 0 |
| || s->s3.previous_server_finished_len != 0)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Parse the length byte */ |
| if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Consistency check */ |
| if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check that the extension matches */ |
| if (ilen != expected_len) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3.previous_client_finished_len) |
| || memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_client_finished, |
| s->s3.previous_client_finished_len) != 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3.previous_server_finished_len) |
| || memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_server_finished, |
| s->s3.previous_server_finished_len) != 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Parse the server's max fragment len extension packet */ |
| int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, |
| X509 *x, size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| unsigned int value; |
| |
| if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |value| should contains a valid max-fragment-length code. */ |
| if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
| SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Must be the same value as client-configured one who was sent to server */ |
| /*- |
| * RFC 6066: if a client receives a maximum fragment length negotiation |
| * response that differs from the length it requested, ... |
| * It must abort with SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER alert |
| */ |
| if (value != s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
| SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation succeeded. |
| * The negotiated Maximum Fragment Length is binding now. |
| */ |
| s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, |
| X509 *x, size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!s->hit) { |
| if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname); |
| if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, |
| X509 *x, size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| size_t ecpointformats_len; |
| PACKET ecptformatlist; |
| |
| if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (!s->hit) { |
| ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist); |
| if (ecpointformats_len == 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0; |
| OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats); |
| s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len); |
| if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL) { |
| s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0; |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len; |
| |
| if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist, |
| s->ext.peer_ecpointformats, |
| ecpointformats_len)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, |
| X509 *x, size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL && |
| !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt), |
| PACKET_remaining(pkt), |
| s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP |
| int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, |
| X509 *x, size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { |
| /* We ignore this if the server sends a CertificateRequest */ |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status |
| * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty. |
| */ |
| if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
| /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in |
| * the chain. We ignore any other responses. |
| */ |
| if (chainidx != 0) |
| return 1; |
| |
| /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
| return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt); |
| } |
| |
| /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ |
| s->ext.status_expected = 1; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT |
| int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { |
| /* We ignore this if the server sends it in a CertificateRequest */ |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation |
| * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we |
| * need to let control continue to flow to that. |
| */ |
| if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { |
| size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt); |
| |
| /* Simply copy it off for later processing */ |
| OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts); |
| s->ext.scts = NULL; |
| |
| s->ext.scts_len = (uint16_t)size; |
| if (size > 0) { |
| s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size); |
| if (s->ext.scts == NULL) { |
| s->ext.scts_len = 0; |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| } else { |
| ENDPOINT role = (context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0 |
| ? ENDPOINT_CLIENT : ENDPOINT_BOTH; |
| |
| /* |
| * If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension, |
| * otherwise this is unsolicited. |
| */ |
| if (custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role, |
| TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, |
| NULL) == NULL) { |
| SSLfatal(s, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!custom_ext_parse(s, context, |
| TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, |
| PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt), |
| x, chainidx)) { |
| /* SSLfatal already called */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| /* |
| * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No |
| * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly |
| * fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_next_proto_validate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
| { |
| PACKET tmp_protocol; |
| |
| while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { |
| if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol) |
| || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| unsigned char *selected; |
| unsigned char selected_len; |
| PACKET tmppkt; |
| |
| /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */ |
| if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) |
| return 1; |
| |
| /* We must have requested it. */ |
| if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* The data must be valid */ |
| tmppkt = *pkt; |
| if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(s, &tmppkt)) { |
| /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, |
| PACKET_data(pkt), |
| PACKET_remaining(pkt), |
| s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) != |
| SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in |
| * a single Serverhello |
| */ |
| OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn); |
| s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); |
| if (s->ext.npn == NULL) { |
| s->ext.npn_len = 0; |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len); |
| s->ext.npn_len = selected_len; |
| s->s3.npn_seen = 1; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| size_t len; |
| |
| /* We must have requested it. */ |
| if (!s->s3.alpn_sent) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /*- |
| * The extension data consists of: |
| * uint16 list_length |
| * uint8 proto_length; |
| * uint8 proto[proto_length]; |
| */ |
| if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt, &len) |
| || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &len) |
| || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected); |
| s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len); |
| if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) { |
| s->s3.alpn_selected_len = 0; |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.alpn_selected, len)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s->s3.alpn_selected_len = len; |
| |
| if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL |
| || s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len != len |
| || memcmp(s->session->ext.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected, len) |
| != 0) { |
| /* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */ |
| s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; |
| } |
| if (!s->hit) { |
| /* |
| * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have been |
| * initialised to NULL. We should update it with the selected ALPN. |
| */ |
| if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s->session->ext.alpn_selected = |
| OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len); |
| if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { |
| s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0; |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP |
| int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| unsigned int id, ct, mki; |
| int i; |
| STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt; |
| SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof; |
| |
| if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2 |
| || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id) |
| || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki) |
| || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
| SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (mki != 0) { |
| /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */ |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */ |
| clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); |
| if (clnt == NULL) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and |
| * presumably offered) |
| */ |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); i++) { |
| prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i); |
| |
| if (prof->id == id) { |
| s->srtp_profile = prof; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
| SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */ |
| if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) |
| && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD |
| && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4 |
| && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_eGOST2814789CNT |
| && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12 |
| && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_MAGMA |
| && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_KUZNYECHIK) |
| s->ext.use_etm = 1; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) |
| return 1; |
| s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; |
| if (!s->hit) |
| s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, |
| X509 *x, size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| unsigned int version; |
| |
| if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version) |
| || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * The only protocol version we support which is valid in this extension in |
| * a ServerHello is TLSv1.3 therefore we shouldn't be getting anything else. |
| */ |
| if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
| SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */ |
| if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) |
| return 1; |
| |
| /* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */ |
| s->version = version; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
| unsigned int group_id; |
| PACKET encoded_pt; |
| EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3.tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL; |
| const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL; |
| |
| /* Sanity check */ |
| if (ckey == NULL || s->s3.peer_tmp != NULL) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| group_id = ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(group_id); |
| if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) { |
| const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL; |
| size_t i, num_groups; |
| |
| if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we |
| * already sent in the first ClientHello |
| */ |
| if (group_id == s->s3.group_id) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Validate the selected group is one we support */ |
| tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups); |
| for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { |
| if (group_id == pgroups[i]) |
| break; |
| } |
| if (i >= num_groups |
| || !tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| s->s3.group_id = group_id; |
| EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey); |
| s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (group_id != s->s3.group_id) { |
| /* |
| * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original |
| * key_share! |
| */ |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* Retain this group in the SSL_SESSION */ |
| if (!s->hit) { |
| s->session->kex_group = group_id; |
| } else if (group_id != s->session->kex_group) { |
| /* |
| * If this is a resumption but changed what group was used, we need |
| * to record the new group in the session, but the session is not |
| * a new session and could be in use by other threads. So, make |
| * a copy of the session to record the new information so that it's |
| * useful for any sessions resumed from tickets issued on this |
| * connection. |
| */ |
| SSL_SESSION *new_sess; |
| |
| if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == NULL) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); |
| s->session = new_sess; |
| s->session->kex_group = group_id; |
| } |
| |
| if ((ginf = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group_id)) == NULL) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt) |
| || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ginf->is_kem) { |
| /* Regular KEX */ |
| skey = EVP_PKEY_new(); |
| if (skey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(skey, ckey) <= 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(skey); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), |
| PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt)) <= 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(skey); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) { |
| /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
| EVP_PKEY_free(skey); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s->s3.peer_tmp = skey; |
| } else { |
| /* KEM Mode */ |
| const unsigned char *ct = PACKET_data(&encoded_pt); |
| size_t ctlen = PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt); |
| |
| if (ssl_decapsulate(s, ckey, ct, ctlen, 1) == 0) { |
| /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| s->s3.did_kex = 1; |
| #endif |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| PACKET cookie; |
| |
| if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie) |
| || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie, |
| &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, |
| X509 *x, size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) { |
| unsigned long max_early_data; |
| |
| if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data) |
| || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!s->ext.early_data_ok |
| || !s->hit) { |
| /* |
| * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume |
| * using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the |
| * server should not be accepting it. |
| */ |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, |
| size_t chainidx) |
| { |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 |
| unsigned int identity; |
| |
| if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (identity >= (unsigned int)s->ext.tick_identity) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Session resumption tickets are always sent before PSK tickets. If the |
| * ticket index is 0 then it must be for a session resumption ticket if we |
| * sent two tickets, or if we didn't send a PSK ticket. |
| */ |
| if (identity == 0 && (s->psksession == NULL || s->ext.tick_identity == 2)) { |
| s->hit = 1; |
| SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession); |
| s->psksession = NULL; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->psksession == NULL) { |
| /* Should never happen */ |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret |
| * is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the |
| * early_secret across that we generated earlier. |
| */ |
| if ((s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY |
| && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) |
| || s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0 |
| || s->psksession->ext.max_early_data == 0) |
| memcpy(s->early_secret, s->psksession->early_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
| |
| SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); |
| s->session = s->psksession; |
| s->psksession = NULL; |
| s->hit = 1; |
| /* Early data is only allowed if we used the first ticket */ |
| if (identity != 0) |
| s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; |
| #endif |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |