crypto/engine/README

NOTES, THOUGHTS, and EVERYTHING
-------------------------------

(1) Concurrency and locking ... I made a change to the ENGINE_free code
    because I spotted a potential hold-up in proceedings (doing too
    much inside a lock including calling a callback), there may be
    other bits like this. What do the speed/optimisation freaks think
    of this aspect of the code and design? There's lots of locking for
    manipulation functions and I need that to keep things nice and
    solid, but this manipulation is mostly (de)initialisation, I would
    think that most run-time locking is purely in the ENGINE_init and
    ENGINE_finish calls that might be made when getting handles for
    RSA (and friends') structures. These would be mostly reference
    count operations as the functional references should always be 1
    or greater at run-time to prevent init/deinit thrashing.

(2) nCipher support, via the HWCryptoHook API, is now in the code.
    Apparently this hasn't been tested too much yet, but it looks
    good. :-) Atalla support has been added too, but shares a lot in
    common with Ben's original hooks in bn_exp.c (although it has been
    ENGINE-ified, and error handling wrapped around it) and it's also
    had some low-volume testing, so it should be usable.

(3) Of more concern, we need to work out (a) how to put together usable
    RAND_METHODs for units that just have one "get n or less random
    bytes" function, (b) we also need to determine how to hook the code
    in crypto/rand/ to use the ENGINE defaults in a way similar to what
    has been done in crypto/rsa/, crypto/dsa/, etc.

(4) ENGINE should really grow to encompass more than 3 public key
    algorithms and randomness gathering. The structure/data level of
    the engine code is hidden from code outside the crypto/engine/
    directory so change shouldn't be too viral. More important though
    is how things should evolve ... this needs thought and discussion.


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More notes 2000-08-01
---------------------

Geoff Thorpe, who designed the engine part, wrote a pretty good description
of the thoughts he had when he built it, good enough to include verbatim here
(with his permission)					-- Richard Levitte


Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2000 16:54:08 +0100 (BST)
From: Geoff Thorpe
Subject: Re: The thoughts to merge BRANCH_engine into the main trunk are
 emerging

Hi there,

I'm going to try and do some justice to this, but I'm a little short on
time and the there is an endless amount that could be discussed on this
subject. sigh ... please bear with me :-)

> The changes in BRANCH_engine dig deep into the core of OpenSSL, for example
> into the RSA and RAND routines, adding a level of indirection which is needed
> to keep the abstraction, as far as I understand.  It would be a good thing if
> those who do play with those things took a look at the changes that have been
> done in the branch and say out loud how much (or hopefully little) we've made
> fools of ourselves.

The point here is that the code that has emerged in the BRANCH_engine
branch was based on some initial requirements of mine that I went in and
addressed, and Richard has picked up the ball and run with it too. It
would be really useful to get some review of the approach we've taken, but
first I think I need to describe as best I can the reasons behind what has
been done so far, in particular what issues we have tried to address when
doing this, and what issues we have intentionally (or necessarily) tried
to avoid.

methods, engines, and evps
--------------------------

There has been some dicussion, particularly with Steve, about where this
ENGINE stuff might fit into the conceptual picture as/when we start to
abstract algorithms a little bit to make the library more extensible. In
particular, it would desirable to have algorithms (symmetric, hash, pkc,
etc) abstracted in some way that allows them to be just objects sitting in
a list (or database) ... it'll just happen that the "DSA" object doesn't
support encryption whereas the "RSA" object does. This requires a lot of
consideration to begin to know how to tackle it; in particular how
encapsulated should these things be? If the objects also understand their
own ASN1 encodings and what-not, then it would for example be possible to
add support for elliptic-curve DSA in as a new algorithm and automatically
have ECC-DSA certificates supported in SSL applications. Possible, but not
easy. :-)

Whatever, it seems that the way to go (if I've grok'd Steve's comments on
this in the past) is to amalgamate these things in EVP as is already done
(I think) for ciphers or hashes (Steve, please correct/elaborate). I
certainly think something should be done in this direction because right
now we have different source directories, types, functions, and methods
for each algorithm - even when conceptually they are very much different
feathers of the same bird. (This is certainly all true for the public-key
stuff, and may be partially true for the other parts.)

ENGINE was *not* conceived as a way of solving this, far from it. Nor was
it conceived as a way of replacing the various "***_METHOD"s. It was
conceived as an abstraction of a sort of "virtual crypto device". If we
lived in a world where "EVP_ALGO"s (or something like them) encapsulated
particular algorithms like RSA,DSA,MD5,RC4,etc, and "***_METHOD"s
encapsulated interfaces to algorithms (eg. some algo's might support a
PKC_METHOD, a HASH_METHOD, or a CIPHER_METHOD, who knows?), then I would
think that ENGINE would encapsulate an implementation of arbitrarily many
of those algorithms - perhaps as alternatives to existing algorithms
and/or perhaps as new previously unimplemented algorithms. An ENGINE could
be used to contain an alternative software implementation, a wrapper for a
hardware acceleration and/or key-management unit, a comms-wrapper for
distributing cryptographic operations to remote machines, or any other
"devices" your imagination can dream up.

However, what has been done in the ENGINE branch so far is nothing more
than starting to get our toes wet. I had a couple of self-imposed
requirements when putting the initial abstraction together, and I may have
already posed these in one form or another on the list, but briefly;

   (i) only bother with public key algorithms for now, and maybe RAND too
       (motivated by the need to get hardware support going and the fact
       this was a comparitively easy subset to address to begin with).

  (ii) don't change (if at all possible) the existing crypto code, ie. the
       implementations, the way the ***_METHODs work, etc.

 (iii) ensure that if no function from the ENGINE code is ever called then
       things work the way they always did, and there is no memory
       allocation (otherwise the failure to cleanup would be a problem -
       this is part of the reason no STACKs were used, the other part of
       the reason being I found them inappropriate).

  (iv) ensure that all the built-in crypto was encapsulated by one of
       these "ENGINE"s and that this engine was automatically selected as
       the default.

   (v) provide the minimum hooking possible in the existing crypto code
       so that global functions (eg. RSA_public_encrypt) do not need any
       extra parameter, yet will use whatever the current default ENGINE
       for that RSA key is, and that the default can be set "per-key"
       and globally (new keys will assume the global default, and keys
       without their own default will be operated on using the global
       default). NB: Try and make (v) conflict as little as possible with
       (ii). :-)

  (vi) wrap the ENGINE code up in duct tape so you can't even see the
       corners. Ie. expose no structures at all, just black-box pointers.

   (v) maintain internally a list of ENGINEs on which a calling
       application can iterate, interrogate, etc. Allow a calling
       application to hook in new ENGINEs, remove ENGINEs from the list,
       and enforce uniqueness within the global list of each ENGINE's
       "unique id".

  (vi) keep reference counts for everything - eg. this includes storing a
       reference inside each RSA structure to the ENGINE that it uses.
       This is freed when the RSA structure is destroyed, or has its
       ENGINE explicitly changed. The net effect needs to be that at any
       time, it is deterministic to know whether an ENGINE is in use or
       can be safely removed (or unloaded in the case of the other type
       of reference) without invalidating function pointers that may or
       may not be used indavertently in the future. This was actually
       one of the biggest problems to overcome in the existing OpenSSL
       code - implementations had always been assumed to be ever-present,
       so there was no trivial way to get round this.

 (vii) distinguish between structural references and functional
       references.

A *little* detail
-----------------

While my mind is on it; I'll illustrate the bit in item (vii). This idea
turned out to be very handy - the ENGINEs themselves need to be operated
on and manipulated simply as objects without necessarily trying to
"enable" them for use. Eg. most host machines will not have the necessary
hardware or software to support all the engines one might compile into
OpenSSL, yet it needs to be possible to iterate across the ENGINEs,
querying their names, properties, etc - all happening in a thread-safe
manner that uses reference counts (if you imagine two threads iterating
through a list and one thread removing the ENGINE the other is currently
looking at - you can see the gotcha waiting to happen). For all of this,
*structural references* are used and operate much like the other reference
counts in OpenSSL.

The other kind of reference count is for *functional* references - these
indicate a reference on which the caller can actually assume the
particular ENGINE to be initialised and usable to perform the operations
it implements. Any increment or decrement of the functional reference
count automatically invokes a corresponding change in the structural
reference count, as it is fairly obvious that a functional reference is a
restricted case of a structural reference. So struct_ref >= funct_ref at
all times. NB: functional references are usually obtained by a call to
ENGINE_init(), but can also be created implicitly by calls that require a
new functional reference to be created, eg. ENGINE_set_default(). Either
way the only time the underlying ENGINE's "init" function is really called
is when the (functional) reference count increases to 1, similarly the
underlying "finish" handler is only called as the count goes down to 0.
The effect of this, for example, is that if you set the default ENGINE for
RSA operations to be "cswift", then its functional reference count will
already be at least 1 so the CryptoSwift shared-library and the card will
stay loaded and initialised until such time as all RSA keys using the
cswift ENGINE are changed or destroyed and the default ENGINE for RSA
operations has been changed. This prevents repeated thrashing of init and
finish handling if the count keeps getting down as far as zero.

Otherwise, the way the ENGINE code has been put together I think pretty
much reflects the above points. The reason for the ENGINE structure having
individual RSA_METHOD, DSA_METHOD, etc pointers is simply that it was the
easiest way to go about things for now, to hook it all into the raw
RSA,DSA,etc code, and I was trying to the keep the structure invisible
anyway so that the way this is internally managed could be easily changed
later on when we start to work out what's to be done about these other
abstractions.

Down the line, if some EVP-based technique emerges for adequately
encapsulating algorithms and all their various bits and pieces, then I can
imagine that "ENGINE" would turn into a reference-counting database of
these EVP things, of which the default "openssl" ENGINE would be the
library's own object database of pre-built software implemented algorithms
(and such). It would also be cool to see the idea of "METHOD"s detached
from the algorithms themselves ... so RSA, DSA, ElGamal, etc can all
expose essentially the same METHOD (aka interface), which would include
any querying/flagging stuff to identify what the algorithm can/can't do,
its name, and other stuff like max/min block sizes, key sizes, etc. This
would result in ENGINE similarly detaching its internal database of
algorithm implementations from the function definitions that return
interfaces to them. I think ...

As for DSOs etc. Well the DSO code is pretty handy (but could be made much
more so) for loading vendor's driver-libraries and talking to them in some
generic way, but right now there's still big problems associated with
actually putting OpenSSL code (ie. new ENGINEs, or anything else for that
matter) in dynamically loadable libraries. These problems won't go away in
a hurry so I don't think we should expect to have any kind of
shared-library extensions any time soon - but solving the problems is a
good thing to aim for, and would as a side-effect probably help make
OpenSSL more usable as a shared-library itself (looking at the things
needed to do this will show you why).

One of the problems is that if you look at any of the ENGINE
implementations, eg. hw_cswift.c or hw_ncipher.c, you'll see how it needs
a variety of functionality and definitions from various areas of OpenSSL,
including crypto/bn/, crypto/err/, crypto/ itself (locking for example),
crypto/dso/, crypto/engine/, crypto/rsa, etc etc etc. So if similar code
were to be suctioned off into shared libraries, the shared libraries would
either have to duplicate all the definitions and code and avoid loader
conflicts, or OpenSSL would have to somehow expose all that functionality
to the shared-library. If this isn't a big enough problem, the issue of
binary compatibility will be - anyone writing Apache modules can tell you
that (Ralf? Ben? :-). However, I don't think OpenSSL would need to be
quite so forgiving as Apache should be, so OpenSSL could simply tell its
version to the DSO and leave the DSO with the problem of deciding whether
to proceed or bail out for fear of binary incompatibilities.

Certainly one thing that would go a long way to addressing this is to
embark on a bit of an opaqueness mission. I've set the ENGINE code up with
this in mind - it's so draconian that even to declare your own ENGINE, you
have to get the engine code to create the underlying ENGINE structure, and
then feed in the new ENGINE's function/method pointers through various
"set" functions. The more of the code that takes on such a black-box
approach, the more of the code that will be (a) easy to expose to shared
libraries that need it, and (b) easy to expose to applications wanting to
use OpenSSL itself as a shared-library. From my own explorations in
OpenSSL, the biggest leviathan I've seen that is a problem in this respect
is the BIGNUM code. Trying to "expose" the bignum code through any kind of
organised "METHODs", let alone do all the necessary bignum operations
solely through functions rather than direct access to the structures and
macros, will be a massive pain in the "r"s.

Anyway, I'm done for now - hope it was readable. Thoughts?

Cheers,
Geoff


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