| /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */ |
| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include "cryptlib.h" |
| #include <openssl/bn.h> |
| #include <openssl/rsa.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| |
| #ifndef RSA_NULL |
| |
| static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
| unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); |
| static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
| unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); |
| static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
| unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); |
| static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
| unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); |
| static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx); |
| static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa); |
| static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa); |
| static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={ |
| "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA", |
| RSA_eay_public_encrypt, |
| RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */ |
| RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */ |
| RSA_eay_private_decrypt, |
| RSA_eay_mod_exp, |
| BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */ |
| RSA_eay_init, |
| RSA_eay_finish, |
| 0, /* flags */ |
| NULL, |
| 0, /* rsa_sign */ |
| 0, /* rsa_verify */ |
| NULL /* rsa_keygen */ |
| }; |
| |
| const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void) |
| { |
| return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth); |
| } |
| |
| /* Static helper to reduce oodles of code duplication. As a slight |
| * optimisation, the "MONT_HELPER() macro must be used as front-end to this |
| * function, to prevent unnecessary function calls - there is an initial test |
| * that is performed by the macro-generated code. */ |
| static int rsa_eay_mont_helper(BN_MONT_CTX **ptr, const BIGNUM *modulus, BN_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| BN_MONT_CTX *bn_mont_ctx; |
| if((bn_mont_ctx = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| if(!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx, modulus, ctx)) |
| { |
| BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (*ptr == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */ |
| { |
| CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); |
| if (*ptr == NULL) /* check again in the lock to stop races */ |
| { |
| *ptr = bn_mont_ctx; |
| bn_mont_ctx = NULL; |
| } |
| CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); |
| } |
| if (bn_mont_ctx) |
| BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| /* Usage example; |
| * MONT_HELPER(rsa, bn_ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err); |
| */ |
| #define MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, m, pre_cond, err_instr) \ |
| if((pre_cond) && ((rsa)->_method_mod_##m == NULL) && \ |
| !rsa_eay_mont_helper(&((rsa)->_method_mod_##m), \ |
| (rsa)->m, (ctx))) \ |
| err_instr |
| |
| static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
| unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) |
| { |
| BIGNUM *f,*ret; |
| int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1; |
| unsigned char *buf=NULL; |
| BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; |
| |
| if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; |
| BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
| f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); |
| buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); |
| if (!f || !ret || !buf) |
| { |
| RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| switch (padding) |
| { |
| case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
| i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen); |
| break; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
| case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: |
| i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0); |
| break; |
| #endif |
| case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: |
| i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen); |
| break; |
| case RSA_NO_PADDING: |
| i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen); |
| break; |
| default: |
| RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (i <= 0) goto err; |
| |
| if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err; |
| |
| if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) |
| { |
| /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ |
| RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err); |
| |
| if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx, |
| rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; |
| |
| /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the |
| * length of the modulus */ |
| j=BN_num_bytes(ret); |
| i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j])); |
| for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++) |
| to[k]=0; |
| |
| r=num; |
| err: |
| if (ctx != NULL) |
| { |
| BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
| BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
| } |
| if (buf != NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num); |
| OPENSSL_free(buf); |
| } |
| return(r); |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_eay_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| int ret = 1; |
| CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); |
| /* Check again inside the lock - the macro's check is racey */ |
| if(rsa->blinding == NULL) |
| ret = RSA_blinding_on(rsa, ctx); |
| CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| #define BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, err_instr) \ |
| do { \ |
| if((!((rsa)->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) && \ |
| ((rsa)->blinding == NULL) && \ |
| !rsa_eay_blinding(rsa, ctx)) \ |
| err_instr \ |
| } while(0) |
| |
| static BN_BLINDING *setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| BIGNUM *A, *Ai; |
| BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL; |
| |
| /* added in OpenSSL 0.9.6j and 0.9.7b */ |
| |
| /* NB: similar code appears in RSA_blinding_on (rsa_lib.c); |
| * this should be placed in a new function of its own, but for reasons |
| * of binary compatibility can't */ |
| |
| BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
| A = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL) |
| { |
| /* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret exponent as unpredictable seed */ |
| RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0.0); |
| if (!BN_pseudo_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| if (!BN_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err; |
| } |
| if ((Ai=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,A,rsa->n,ctx)) == NULL) goto err; |
| |
| if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(A,A,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) |
| goto err; |
| ret = BN_BLINDING_new(A,Ai,rsa->n); |
| BN_free(Ai); |
| err: |
| BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* signing */ |
| static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
| unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) |
| { |
| BIGNUM *f,*ret; |
| int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1; |
| unsigned char *buf=NULL; |
| BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; |
| int local_blinding = 0; |
| BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; |
| |
| if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; |
| BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
| f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); |
| buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); |
| if(!f || !ret || !buf) |
| { |
| RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| switch (padding) |
| { |
| case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
| i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen); |
| break; |
| case RSA_NO_PADDING: |
| i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen); |
| break; |
| case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: |
| default: |
| RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (i <= 0) goto err; |
| |
| if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err; |
| |
| if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) |
| { |
| /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ |
| RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;); |
| blinding = rsa->blinding; |
| |
| /* Now unless blinding is disabled, 'blinding' is non-NULL. |
| * But the BN_BLINDING object may be owned by some other thread |
| * (we don't want to keep it constant and we don't want to use |
| * lots of locking to avoid race conditions, so only a single |
| * thread can use it; other threads have to use local blinding |
| * factors) */ |
| if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) |
| { |
| if (blinding == NULL) |
| { |
| RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (blinding != NULL) |
| { |
| if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id()) |
| { |
| /* we need a local one-time blinding factor */ |
| |
| blinding = setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); |
| if (blinding == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| local_blinding = 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (blinding) |
| if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(f, blinding, ctx)) goto err; |
| |
| if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || |
| ((rsa->p != NULL) && |
| (rsa->q != NULL) && |
| (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && |
| (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && |
| (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) ) |
| { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa,ctx)) goto err; } |
| else |
| { |
| MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err); |
| if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx, |
| rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (blinding) |
| if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err; |
| |
| /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the |
| * length of the modulus */ |
| j=BN_num_bytes(ret); |
| i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j])); |
| for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++) |
| to[k]=0; |
| |
| r=num; |
| err: |
| if (ctx != NULL) |
| { |
| BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
| BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
| } |
| if (local_blinding) |
| BN_BLINDING_free(blinding); |
| if (buf != NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num); |
| OPENSSL_free(buf); |
| } |
| return(r); |
| } |
| |
| static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
| unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) |
| { |
| BIGNUM *f,*ret; |
| int j,num=0,r= -1; |
| unsigned char *p; |
| unsigned char *buf=NULL; |
| BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; |
| int local_blinding = 0; |
| BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; |
| |
| if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; |
| BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
| f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); |
| buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); |
| if(!f || !ret || !buf) |
| { |
| RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things |
| * and chops off the top '0' bytes */ |
| if (flen > num) |
| { |
| RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* make data into a big number */ |
| if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,f) == NULL) goto err; |
| |
| if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) |
| { |
| RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;); |
| blinding = rsa->blinding; |
| |
| /* Now unless blinding is disabled, 'blinding' is non-NULL. |
| * But the BN_BLINDING object may be owned by some other thread |
| * (we don't want to keep it constant and we don't want to use |
| * lots of locking to avoid race conditions, so only a single |
| * thread can use it; other threads have to use local blinding |
| * factors) */ |
| if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) |
| { |
| if (blinding == NULL) |
| { |
| RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (blinding != NULL) |
| { |
| if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id()) |
| { |
| /* we need a local one-time blinding factor */ |
| |
| blinding = setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); |
| if (blinding == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| local_blinding = 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (blinding) |
| if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(f, blinding, ctx)) goto err; |
| |
| /* do the decrypt */ |
| if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || |
| ((rsa->p != NULL) && |
| (rsa->q != NULL) && |
| (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && |
| (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && |
| (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) ) |
| { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa,ctx)) goto err; } |
| else |
| { |
| MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err); |
| if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx, |
| rsa->_method_mod_n)) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (blinding) |
| if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err; |
| |
| p=buf; |
| j=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ |
| |
| switch (padding) |
| { |
| case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
| r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num); |
| break; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
| case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: |
| r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0); |
| break; |
| #endif |
| case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: |
| r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num); |
| break; |
| case RSA_NO_PADDING: |
| r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num); |
| break; |
| default: |
| RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (r < 0) |
| RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); |
| |
| err: |
| if (ctx != NULL) |
| { |
| BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
| BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
| } |
| if (local_blinding) |
| BN_BLINDING_free(blinding); |
| if (buf != NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num); |
| OPENSSL_free(buf); |
| } |
| return(r); |
| } |
| |
| /* signature verification */ |
| static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, |
| unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) |
| { |
| BIGNUM *f,*ret; |
| int i,num=0,r= -1; |
| unsigned char *p; |
| unsigned char *buf=NULL; |
| BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; |
| |
| if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; |
| BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
| f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); |
| buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); |
| if(!f || !ret || !buf) |
| { |
| RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things |
| * and chops off the top '0' bytes */ |
| if (flen > num) |
| { |
| RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,f) == NULL) goto err; |
| |
| if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) |
| { |
| RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err); |
| |
| if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx, |
| rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; |
| |
| p=buf; |
| i=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); |
| |
| switch (padding) |
| { |
| case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
| r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num); |
| break; |
| case RSA_NO_PADDING: |
| r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num); |
| break; |
| default: |
| RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (r < 0) |
| RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); |
| |
| err: |
| if (ctx != NULL) |
| { |
| BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
| BN_CTX_free(ctx); |
| } |
| if (buf != NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num); |
| OPENSSL_free(buf); |
| } |
| return(r); |
| } |
| |
| static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy; |
| int ret=0; |
| |
| BN_CTX_start(ctx); |
| r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx); |
| |
| MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err); |
| MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, q, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err); |
| MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err); |
| |
| if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; |
| if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx, |
| rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err; |
| |
| if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; |
| if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx, |
| rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err; |
| |
| if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err; |
| /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does |
| * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */ |
| if (BN_get_sign(r0)) |
| if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; |
| |
| if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err; |
| if (!BN_mod(r0,r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; |
| /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of |
| * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still |
| * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following |
| * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence. |
| * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because |
| * they ensure p > q [steve] |
| */ |
| if (BN_get_sign(r0)) |
| if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; |
| if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; |
| if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err; |
| |
| if (rsa->e && rsa->n) |
| { |
| if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; |
| /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation |
| * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of |
| * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check |
| * for absolute equality, just congruency. */ |
| if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err; |
| if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; |
| if (BN_get_sign(vrfy)) |
| if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err; |
| if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) |
| /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak |
| * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) |
| * mod_exp and return that instead. */ |
| if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx, |
| rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; |
| } |
| ret=1; |
| err: |
| BN_CTX_end(ctx); |
| return(ret); |
| } |
| |
| static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa) |
| { |
| rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE; |
| return(1); |
| } |
| |
| static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa) |
| { |
| if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) |
| BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); |
| if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) |
| BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); |
| if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) |
| BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); |
| return(1); |
| } |
| |
| #endif |