| /* |
| * Copyright 2006-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for |
| * internal use. |
| */ |
| #include "internal/deprecated.h" |
| |
| #include "internal/constant_time.h" |
| |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
| #include <openssl/asn1t.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| #include <openssl/rsa.h> |
| #include <openssl/bn.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| #include <openssl/cms.h> |
| #include "crypto/evp.h" |
| #include "crypto/rsa.h" |
| #include "rsa_local.h" |
| |
| /* RSA pkey context structure */ |
| |
| typedef struct { |
| /* Key gen parameters */ |
| int nbits; |
| BIGNUM *pub_exp; |
| int primes; |
| /* Keygen callback info */ |
| int gentmp[2]; |
| /* RSA padding mode */ |
| int pad_mode; |
| /* message digest */ |
| const EVP_MD *md; |
| /* message digest for MGF1 */ |
| const EVP_MD *mgf1md; |
| /* PSS salt length */ |
| int saltlen; |
| /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */ |
| int min_saltlen; |
| /* Temp buffer */ |
| unsigned char *tbuf; |
| /* OAEP label */ |
| unsigned char *oaep_label; |
| size_t oaep_labellen; |
| } RSA_PKEY_CTX; |
| |
| /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */ |
| #define rsa_pss_restricted(rctx) (rctx->min_saltlen != -1) |
| |
| static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*rctx)); |
| |
| if (rctx == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| rctx->nbits = 2048; |
| rctx->primes = RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM; |
| if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) |
| rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING; |
| else |
| rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; |
| /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */ |
| rctx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO; |
| rctx->min_saltlen = -1; |
| ctx->data = rctx; |
| ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp; |
| ctx->keygen_info_count = 2; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, const EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) |
| { |
| RSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx; |
| |
| if (!pkey_rsa_init(dst)) |
| return 0; |
| sctx = src->data; |
| dctx = dst->data; |
| dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits; |
| if (sctx->pub_exp) { |
| dctx->pub_exp = BN_dup(sctx->pub_exp); |
| if (!dctx->pub_exp) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode; |
| dctx->md = sctx->md; |
| dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md; |
| dctx->saltlen = sctx->saltlen; |
| if (sctx->oaep_label) { |
| OPENSSL_free(dctx->oaep_label); |
| dctx->oaep_label = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen); |
| if (!dctx->oaep_label) |
| return 0; |
| dctx->oaep_labellen = sctx->oaep_labellen; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk) |
| { |
| if (ctx->tbuf != NULL) |
| return 1; |
| if ((ctx->tbuf = |
| OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pk->pkey)))) == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static void pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; |
| if (rctx) { |
| BN_free(rctx->pub_exp); |
| OPENSSL_free(rctx->tbuf); |
| OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label); |
| OPENSSL_free(rctx); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, |
| size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, |
| size_t tbslen) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; |
| /* |
| * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of |
| * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to |
| * be reflected back in the "original" key. |
| */ |
| RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); |
| |
| if (rctx->md) { |
| if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md) == NID_mdc2) { |
| unsigned int sltmp; |
| if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) |
| return -1; |
| ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa); |
| |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| return ret; |
| ret = sltmp; |
| } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) { |
| if ((size_t)RSA_size(rsa) < tbslen + 1) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen); |
| rctx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md)); |
| ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, rctx->tbuf, |
| sig, rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING); |
| } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { |
| unsigned int sltmp; |
| ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md), |
| tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| return ret; |
| ret = sltmp; |
| } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { |
| if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) |
| return -1; |
| if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, |
| rctx->tbuf, tbs, |
| rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md, |
| rctx->saltlen)) |
| return -1; |
| ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf, |
| sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); |
| } else { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } else { |
| ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, rsa, rctx->pad_mode); |
| } |
| if (ret < 0) |
| return ret; |
| *siglen = ret; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, |
| unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen, |
| const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; |
| /* |
| * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of |
| * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to |
| * be reflected back in the "original" key. |
| */ |
| RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); |
| |
| if (rctx->md) { |
| if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) { |
| if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) |
| return -1; |
| ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, rsa, |
| RSA_X931_PADDING); |
| if (ret < 1) |
| return 0; |
| ret--; |
| if (rctx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md))) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (ret != EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (rout) |
| memcpy(rout, rctx->tbuf, ret); |
| } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { |
| size_t sltmp; |
| ret = ossl_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md), |
| NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp, |
| sig, siglen, rsa); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| return 0; |
| ret = sltmp; |
| } else { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } else { |
| ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, rsa, rctx->pad_mode); |
| } |
| if (ret < 0) |
| return ret; |
| *routlen = ret; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, |
| const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, |
| const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) |
| { |
| RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; |
| /* |
| * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of |
| * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to |
| * be reflected back in the "original" key. |
| */ |
| RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); |
| size_t rslen; |
| |
| if (rctx->md) { |
| if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) |
| return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen, |
| sig, siglen, rsa); |
| if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) { |
| if (pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &rslen, sig, siglen) <= 0) |
| return 0; |
| } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { |
| int ret; |
| if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) |
| return -1; |
| ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, |
| rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| return 0; |
| ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs, |
| rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md, |
| rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| return 0; |
| return 1; |
| } else { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) |
| return -1; |
| rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, |
| rsa, rctx->pad_mode); |
| if (rslen == 0) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return 1; |
| |
| } |
| |
| static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, |
| unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; |
| /* |
| * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of |
| * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to |
| * be reflected back in the "original" key. |
| */ |
| RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); |
| |
| if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { |
| int klen = RSA_size(rsa); |
| if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) |
| return -1; |
| if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, klen, |
| in, inlen, |
| rctx->oaep_label, |
| rctx->oaep_labellen, |
| rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md)) |
| return -1; |
| ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); |
| } else { |
| ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, rctx->pad_mode); |
| } |
| if (ret < 0) |
| return ret; |
| *outlen = ret; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, |
| unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; |
| /* |
| * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of |
| * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to |
| * be reflected back in the "original" key. |
| */ |
| RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); |
| |
| if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { |
| if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) |
| return -1; |
| ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, rctx->tbuf, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| return ret; |
| ret = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out, ret, rctx->tbuf, |
| ret, ret, |
| rctx->oaep_label, |
| rctx->oaep_labellen, |
| rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md); |
| } else { |
| ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, rctx->pad_mode); |
| } |
| *outlen = constant_time_select_s(constant_time_msb_s(ret), *outlen, ret); |
| ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_msb(ret), ret, 1); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding) |
| { |
| int mdnid; |
| |
| if (!md) |
| return 1; |
| |
| mdnid = EVP_MD_get_type(md); |
| |
| if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) { |
| if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } else { |
| switch (mdnid) { |
| /* List of all supported RSA digests */ |
| case NID_sha1: |
| case NID_sha224: |
| case NID_sha256: |
| case NID_sha384: |
| case NID_sha512: |
| case NID_sha512_224: |
| case NID_sha512_256: |
| case NID_md5: |
| case NID_md5_sha1: |
| case NID_md2: |
| case NID_md4: |
| case NID_mdc2: |
| case NID_ripemd160: |
| case NID_sha3_224: |
| case NID_sha3_256: |
| case NID_sha3_384: |
| case NID_sha3_512: |
| return 1; |
| |
| default: |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST); |
| return 0; |
| |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) |
| { |
| RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; |
| |
| switch (type) { |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING: |
| if ((p1 >= RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) && (p1 <= RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)) { |
| if (!check_padding_md(rctx->md, p1)) |
| return 0; |
| if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { |
| if (!(ctx->operation & |
| (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY))) |
| goto bad_pad; |
| if (!rctx->md) |
| rctx->md = EVP_sha1(); |
| } else if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) { |
| goto bad_pad; |
| } |
| if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { |
| if (!(ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT)) |
| goto bad_pad; |
| if (!rctx->md) |
| rctx->md = EVP_sha1(); |
| } |
| rctx->pad_mode = p1; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| bad_pad: |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE); |
| return -2; |
| |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING: |
| *(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN: |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN: |
| if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN); |
| return -2; |
| } |
| if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN) { |
| *(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen; |
| } else { |
| if (p1 < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) |
| return -2; |
| if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) { |
| if (p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO |
| && ctx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN); |
| return -2; |
| } |
| if ((p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST |
| && rctx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md)) |
| || (p1 >= 0 && p1 < rctx->min_saltlen)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| rctx->saltlen = p1; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS: |
| if (p1 < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); |
| return -2; |
| } |
| rctx->nbits = p1; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP: |
| if (p2 == NULL || !BN_is_odd((BIGNUM *)p2) || BN_is_one((BIGNUM *)p2)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); |
| return -2; |
| } |
| BN_free(rctx->pub_exp); |
| rctx->pub_exp = p2; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES: |
| if (p1 < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM || p1 > RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID); |
| return -2; |
| } |
| rctx->primes = p1; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD: |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD: |
| if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); |
| return -2; |
| } |
| if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD) |
| *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md; |
| else |
| rctx->md = p2; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD: |
| if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode)) |
| return 0; |
| if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) { |
| if (EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md) == EVP_MD_get_type(p2)) |
| return 1; |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| rctx->md = p2; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD: |
| *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md; |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD: |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD: |
| if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING |
| && rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD); |
| return -2; |
| } |
| if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD) { |
| if (rctx->mgf1md) |
| *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md; |
| else |
| *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md; |
| } else { |
| if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) { |
| if (EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->mgf1md) == EVP_MD_get_type(p2)) |
| return 1; |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_MGF1_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| rctx->mgf1md = p2; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL: |
| if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); |
| return -2; |
| } |
| OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label); |
| if (p2 && p1 > 0) { |
| rctx->oaep_label = p2; |
| rctx->oaep_labellen = p1; |
| } else { |
| rctx->oaep_label = NULL; |
| rctx->oaep_labellen = 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL: |
| if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); |
| return -2; |
| } |
| *(unsigned char **)p2 = rctx->oaep_label; |
| return rctx->oaep_labellen; |
| |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT: |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN: |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN: |
| #endif |
| return 1; |
| |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT: |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT: |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT: |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT: |
| #endif |
| if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) |
| return 1; |
| /* fall through */ |
| case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY: |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); |
| return -2; |
| |
| default: |
| return -2; |
| |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, |
| const char *type, const char *value) |
| { |
| if (value == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (strcmp(type, "rsa_padding_mode") == 0) { |
| int pm; |
| |
| if (strcmp(value, "pkcs1") == 0) { |
| pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; |
| } else if (strcmp(value, "none") == 0) { |
| pm = RSA_NO_PADDING; |
| } else if (strcmp(value, "oeap") == 0) { |
| pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING; |
| } else if (strcmp(value, "oaep") == 0) { |
| pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING; |
| } else if (strcmp(value, "x931") == 0) { |
| pm = RSA_X931_PADDING; |
| } else if (strcmp(value, "pss") == 0) { |
| pm = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING; |
| } else { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); |
| return -2; |
| } |
| return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pm); |
| } |
| |
| if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_saltlen") == 0) { |
| int saltlen; |
| |
| if (!strcmp(value, "digest")) |
| saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST; |
| else if (!strcmp(value, "max")) |
| saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX; |
| else if (!strcmp(value, "auto")) |
| saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO; |
| else |
| saltlen = atoi(value); |
| return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, saltlen); |
| } |
| |
| if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_bits") == 0) { |
| int nbits = atoi(value); |
| |
| return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, nbits); |
| } |
| |
| if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_pubexp") == 0) { |
| int ret; |
| |
| BIGNUM *pubexp = NULL; |
| if (!BN_asc2bn(&pubexp, value)) |
| return 0; |
| ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, pubexp); |
| BN_free(pubexp); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_primes") == 0) { |
| int nprimes = atoi(value); |
| |
| return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(ctx, nprimes); |
| } |
| |
| if (strcmp(type, "rsa_mgf1_md") == 0) |
| return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, |
| EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, |
| EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value); |
| |
| if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) { |
| |
| if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md") == 0) |
| return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, |
| EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value); |
| |
| if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_md") == 0) |
| return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, |
| EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, value); |
| |
| if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen") == 0) { |
| int saltlen = atoi(value); |
| |
| return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(ctx, saltlen); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_md") == 0) |
| return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, |
| EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, value); |
| |
| if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_label") == 0) { |
| unsigned char *lab; |
| long lablen; |
| int ret; |
| |
| lab = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(value, &lablen); |
| if (!lab) |
| return 0; |
| ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, lab, lablen); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| OPENSSL_free(lab); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| return -2; |
| } |
| |
| /* Set PSS parameters when generating a key, if necessary */ |
| static int rsa_set_pss_param(RSA *rsa, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; |
| |
| if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) |
| return 1; |
| /* If all parameters are default values don't set pss */ |
| if (rctx->md == NULL && rctx->mgf1md == NULL && rctx->saltlen == -2) |
| return 1; |
| rsa->pss = ossl_rsa_pss_params_create(rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md, |
| rctx->saltlen == -2 |
| ? 0 : rctx->saltlen); |
| if (rsa->pss == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) |
| { |
| RSA *rsa = NULL; |
| RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; |
| BN_GENCB *pcb; |
| int ret; |
| |
| if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL) { |
| rctx->pub_exp = BN_new(); |
| if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL || !BN_set_word(rctx->pub_exp, RSA_F4)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| rsa = RSA_new(); |
| if (rsa == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| if (ctx->pkey_gencb) { |
| pcb = BN_GENCB_new(); |
| if (pcb == NULL) { |
| RSA_free(rsa); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx); |
| } else { |
| pcb = NULL; |
| } |
| ret = RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->primes, |
| rctx->pub_exp, pcb); |
| BN_GENCB_free(pcb); |
| if (ret > 0 && !rsa_set_pss_param(rsa, ctx)) { |
| RSA_free(rsa); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (ret > 0) |
| EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, ctx->pmeth->pkey_id, rsa); |
| else |
| RSA_free(rsa); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth = { |
| EVP_PKEY_RSA, |
| EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN, |
| pkey_rsa_init, |
| pkey_rsa_copy, |
| pkey_rsa_cleanup, |
| |
| 0, 0, |
| |
| 0, |
| pkey_rsa_keygen, |
| |
| 0, |
| pkey_rsa_sign, |
| |
| 0, |
| pkey_rsa_verify, |
| |
| 0, |
| pkey_rsa_verifyrecover, |
| |
| 0, 0, 0, 0, |
| |
| 0, |
| pkey_rsa_encrypt, |
| |
| 0, |
| pkey_rsa_decrypt, |
| |
| 0, 0, |
| |
| pkey_rsa_ctrl, |
| pkey_rsa_ctrl_str |
| }; |
| |
| const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pkey_method(void) |
| { |
| return &rsa_pkey_meth; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Called for PSS sign or verify initialisation: checks PSS parameter |
| * sanity and sets any restrictions on key usage. |
| */ |
| |
| static int pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| const RSA *rsa; |
| RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; |
| const EVP_MD *md; |
| const EVP_MD *mgf1md; |
| int min_saltlen, max_saltlen; |
| |
| /* Should never happen */ |
| if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) |
| return 0; |
| rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); |
| /* If no restrictions just return */ |
| if (rsa->pss == NULL) |
| return 1; |
| /* Get and check parameters */ |
| if (!ossl_rsa_pss_get_param(rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md, &min_saltlen)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */ |
| max_saltlen = RSA_size(rsa) - EVP_MD_get_size(md); |
| if ((RSA_bits(rsa) & 0x7) == 1) |
| max_saltlen--; |
| if (min_saltlen > max_saltlen) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| rctx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen; |
| |
| /* |
| * Set PSS restrictions as defaults: we can then block any attempt to |
| * use invalid values in pkey_rsa_ctrl |
| */ |
| |
| rctx->md = md; |
| rctx->mgf1md = mgf1md; |
| rctx->saltlen = min_saltlen; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pss_pkey_meth = { |
| EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, |
| EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN, |
| pkey_rsa_init, |
| pkey_rsa_copy, |
| pkey_rsa_cleanup, |
| |
| 0, 0, |
| |
| 0, |
| pkey_rsa_keygen, |
| |
| pkey_pss_init, |
| pkey_rsa_sign, |
| |
| pkey_pss_init, |
| pkey_rsa_verify, |
| |
| 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, |
| |
| pkey_rsa_ctrl, |
| pkey_rsa_ctrl_str |
| }; |
| |
| const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pss_pkey_method(void) |
| { |
| return &rsa_pss_pkey_meth; |
| } |
