| /* |
| * Copyright 1999-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| */ |
| |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
| #include "internal/numbers.h" |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h> |
| #include "crypto/x509.h" |
| #include "internal/tsan_assist.h" |
| #include "x509_local.h" |
| |
| static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x); |
| static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int require_ca); |
| static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int require_ca); |
| static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int require_ca); |
| static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int require_ca); |
| static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int require_ca); |
| static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int require_ca); |
| static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int require_ca); |
| static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int require_ca); |
| static int no_check_purpose(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int require_ca); |
| static int check_purpose_ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int require_ca); |
| |
| static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b); |
| static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p); |
| |
| static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = { |
| {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, |
| check_purpose_ssl_client, "SSL client", "sslclient", NULL}, |
| {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, |
| check_purpose_ssl_server, "SSL server", "sslserver", NULL}, |
| {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, |
| check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, "Netscape SSL server", "nssslserver", NULL}, |
| {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign, |
| "S/MIME signing", "smimesign", NULL}, |
| {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, |
| check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL}, |
| {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, |
| "CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL}, |
| {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check_purpose, |
| "Any Purpose", "any", |
| NULL}, |
| {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_ocsp_helper, |
| "OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL}, |
| {X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, |
| check_purpose_timestamp_sign, "Time Stamp signing", "timestampsign", |
| NULL}, |
| }; |
| |
| #define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT OSSL_NELEM(xstandard) |
| |
| static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL; |
| |
| static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b) |
| { |
| return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I really |
| * can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const things. |
| * If id == -1 it just calls x509v3_cache_extensions() for its side-effect. |
| * Returns 1 on success, 0 if x does not allow purpose, -1 on (internal) error. |
| */ |
| int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int require_ca) |
| { |
| int idx; |
| const X509_PURPOSE *pt; |
| |
| if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) |
| return -1; |
| if (id == -1) |
| return 1; |
| |
| idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); |
| if (idx == -1) |
| return -1; |
| pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); |
| return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, require_ca); |
| } |
| |
| int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose) |
| { |
| if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| *p = purpose; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void) |
| { |
| if (!xptable) |
| return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; |
| return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; |
| } |
| |
| X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx) |
| { |
| if (idx < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| if (idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) |
| return xstandard + idx; |
| return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT); |
| } |
| |
| int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(const char *sname) |
| { |
| int i; |
| X509_PURPOSE *xptmp; |
| for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) { |
| xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i); |
| if (strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname) == 0) |
| return i; |
| } |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Returns -1 on error, else an index => 0 in standard/extended purpose table */ |
| int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose) |
| { |
| X509_PURPOSE tmp; |
| int idx; |
| |
| if (purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN && purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX) |
| return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN; |
| if (xptable == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| tmp.purpose = purpose; |
| idx = sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &tmp); |
| if (idx < 0) |
| return -1; |
| return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags, |
| int (*ck) (const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int), |
| const char *name, const char *sname, void *arg) |
| { |
| int idx; |
| X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; |
| |
| /* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */ |
| flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; |
| /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */ |
| flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME; |
| /* Get existing entry if any */ |
| idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); |
| /* Need a new entry */ |
| if (idx == -1) { |
| if ((ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ptmp))) == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; |
| } else |
| ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); |
| |
| /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */ |
| if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { |
| OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name); |
| OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname); |
| } |
| /* Dup supplied name */ |
| ptmp->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name); |
| ptmp->sname = OPENSSL_strdup(sname); |
| if (ptmp->name == NULL|| ptmp->sname == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */ |
| ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; |
| /* Set all other flags */ |
| ptmp->flags |= flags; |
| |
| ptmp->purpose = id; |
| ptmp->trust = trust; |
| ptmp->check_purpose = ck; |
| ptmp->usr_data = arg; |
| |
| /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */ |
| if (idx == -1) { |
| if (xptable == NULL |
| && (xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp)) == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| return 1; |
| err: |
| if (idx == -1) { |
| OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name); |
| OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname); |
| OPENSSL_free(ptmp); |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p) |
| { |
| if (p == NULL) |
| return; |
| if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) { |
| if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { |
| OPENSSL_free(p->name); |
| OPENSSL_free(p->sname); |
| } |
| OPENSSL_free(p); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void) |
| { |
| sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free); |
| xptable = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) |
| { |
| return xp->purpose; |
| } |
| |
| char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) |
| { |
| return xp->name; |
| } |
| |
| char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) |
| { |
| return xp->sname; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) |
| { |
| return xp->trust; |
| } |
| |
| static int nid_cmp(const int *a, const int *b) |
| { |
| return *a - *b; |
| } |
| |
| DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid); |
| IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid); |
| |
| int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex) |
| { |
| /* |
| * This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: that is |
| * those which are used by the verify process. If an extension is |
| * critical and doesn't appear in this list then the verify process will |
| * normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical |
| * order because it will be searched using bsearch. |
| */ |
| static const int supported_nids[] = { |
| NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */ |
| NID_key_usage, /* 83 */ |
| NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */ |
| NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */ |
| NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */ |
| NID_crl_distribution_points, /* 103 */ |
| NID_ext_key_usage, /* 126 */ |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 |
| NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, /* 290 */ |
| NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, /* 291 */ |
| #endif |
| NID_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck, /* 369 */ |
| NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */ |
| NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 663 */ |
| NID_name_constraints, /* 666 */ |
| NID_policy_mappings, /* 747 */ |
| NID_inhibit_any_policy /* 748 */ |
| }; |
| |
| int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)); |
| |
| if (ex_nid == NID_undef) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (OBJ_bsearch_nid(&ex_nid, supported_nids, OSSL_NELEM(supported_nids))) |
| return 1; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Returns 1 on success, 0 if x is invalid, -1 on (internal) error. */ |
| static int setup_dp(const X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp) |
| { |
| const X509_NAME *iname = NULL; |
| int i; |
| |
| if (dp->distpoint == NULL && sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer) <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_INVALID_DISTPOINT); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (dp->reasons != NULL) { |
| if (dp->reasons->length > 0) |
| dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0]; |
| if (dp->reasons->length > 1) |
| dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8); |
| dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; |
| } else { |
| dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; |
| } |
| if (dp->distpoint == NULL || dp->distpoint->type != 1) |
| return 1; |
| |
| /* Handle name fragment given by nameRelativeToCRLIssuer */ |
| /* |
| * Note that the below way of determining iname is not really compliant |
| * with https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.13 |
| * According to it, sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer) MUST be <= 1 |
| * and any CRLissuer could be of type different to GEN_DIRNAME. |
| */ |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { |
| GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); |
| |
| if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { |
| iname = gen->d.directoryName; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (iname == NULL) |
| iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x); |
| return DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname) ? 1 : -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Return 1 on success, 0 if x is invalid, -1 on (internal) error. */ |
| static int setup_crldp(X509 *x) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, &i, NULL); |
| if (x->crldp == NULL && i != -1) |
| return 0; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { |
| int res = setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i)); |
| |
| if (res < 1) |
| return res; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check that issuer public key algorithm matches subject signature algorithm */ |
| static int check_sig_alg_match(const EVP_PKEY *issuer_key, const X509 *subject) |
| { |
| int subj_sig_nid; |
| |
| if (issuer_key == NULL) |
| return X509_V_ERR_NO_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; |
| if (OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(subject->cert_info.signature.algorithm), |
| NULL, &subj_sig_nid) == 0) |
| return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; |
| if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(issuer_key, OBJ_nid2sn(subj_sig_nid)) |
| || (EVP_PKEY_is_a(issuer_key, "RSA") && subj_sig_nid == NID_rsassaPss)) |
| return X509_V_OK; |
| return X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH; |
| } |
| |
| #define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS) |
| #define ku_reject(x, usage) \ |
| (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) != 0 && ((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)) == 0) |
| #define xku_reject(x, usage) \ |
| (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) != 0 && ((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)) == 0) |
| #define ns_reject(x, usage) \ |
| (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) != 0 && ((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)) == 0) |
| |
| /* |
| * Cache info on various X.509v3 extensions and further derived information, |
| * e.g., if cert 'x' is self-issued, in x->ex_flags and other internal fields. |
| * x->sha1_hash is filled in, or else EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT is set in x->flags. |
| * X509_SIG_INFO_VALID is set in x->flags if x->siginf was filled successfully. |
| * Set EXFLAG_INVALID and return 0 in case the certificate is invalid. |
| */ |
| int ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) |
| { |
| BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs; |
| PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci; |
| ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage; |
| ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns; |
| EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage; |
| int i; |
| int res; |
| |
| #ifdef tsan_ld_acq |
| /* Fast lock-free check, see end of the function for details. */ |
| if (tsan_ld_acq((TSAN_QUALIFIER int *)&x->ex_cached)) |
| return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0; |
| #endif |
| |
| if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(x->lock)) |
| return 0; |
| if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) { /* Cert has already been processed */ |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock); |
| return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Cache the SHA1 digest of the cert */ |
| if (!X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL)) |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT; |
| |
| ERR_set_mark(); |
| |
| /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */ |
| if (X509_get_version(x) == X509_VERSION_1) |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1; |
| |
| /* Handle basic constraints */ |
| x->ex_pathlen = -1; |
| if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, &i, NULL)) != NULL) { |
| if (bs->ca) |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA; |
| if (bs->pathlen != NULL) { |
| /* |
| * The error case !bs->ca is checked by check_chain() |
| * in case ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT |
| */ |
| if (bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509V3_R_NEGATIVE_PATHLEN); |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| } else { |
| x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen); |
| } |
| } |
| BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs); |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS; |
| } else if (i != -1) { |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| } |
| |
| /* Handle proxy certificates */ |
| if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, &i, NULL)) != NULL) { |
| if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA |
| || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0 |
| || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) { |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| } |
| if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint != NULL) |
| x->ex_pcpathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint); |
| else |
| x->ex_pcpathlen = -1; |
| PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci); |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY; |
| } else if (i != -1) { |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| } |
| |
| /* Handle (basic) key usage */ |
| if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, &i, NULL)) != NULL) { |
| x->ex_kusage = 0; |
| if (usage->length > 0) { |
| x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0]; |
| if (usage->length > 1) |
| x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8; |
| } |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE; |
| ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage); |
| /* Check for empty key usage according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.3 */ |
| if (x->ex_kusage == 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509V3_R_EMPTY_KEY_USAGE); |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| } |
| } else if (i != -1) { |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| } |
| |
| /* Handle extended key usage */ |
| x->ex_xkusage = 0; |
| if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, &i, NULL)) != NULL) { |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE; |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) { |
| switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) { |
| case NID_server_auth: |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER; |
| break; |
| case NID_client_auth: |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT; |
| break; |
| case NID_email_protect: |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME; |
| break; |
| case NID_code_sign: |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN; |
| break; |
| case NID_ms_sgc: |
| case NID_ns_sgc: |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC; |
| break; |
| case NID_OCSP_sign: |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN; |
| break; |
| case NID_time_stamp: |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP; |
| break; |
| case NID_dvcs: |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS; |
| break; |
| case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage: |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU; |
| break; |
| default: |
| /* Ignore unknown extended key usage */ |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free); |
| } else if (i != -1) { |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| } |
| |
| /* Handle legacy Netscape extension */ |
| if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, &i, NULL)) != NULL) { |
| if (ns->length > 0) |
| x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0]; |
| else |
| x->ex_nscert = 0; |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT; |
| ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns); |
| } else if (i != -1) { |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| } |
| |
| /* Handle subject key identifier and issuer/authority key identifier */ |
| x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, &i, NULL); |
| if (x->skid == NULL && i != -1) |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| |
| x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, &i, NULL); |
| if (x->akid == NULL && i != -1) |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| |
| /* Check if subject name matches issuer */ |
| if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x)) == 0) { |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI; /* Cert is self-issued */ |
| if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK /* SKID matches AKID */ |
| /* .. and the signature alg matches the PUBKEY alg: */ |
| && check_sig_alg_match(X509_get0_pubkey(x), x) == X509_V_OK) |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS; /* indicate self-signed */ |
| /* This is very related to ossl_x509_likely_issued(x, x) == X509_V_OK */ |
| } |
| |
| /* Handle subject alternative names and various other extensions */ |
| x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, &i, NULL); |
| if (x->altname == NULL && i != -1) |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &i, NULL); |
| if (x->nc == NULL && i != -1) |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| |
| /* Handle CRL distribution point entries */ |
| res = setup_crldp(x); |
| if (res == 0) |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| else if (res < 0) |
| goto err; |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 |
| x->rfc3779_addr = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, &i, NULL); |
| if (x->rfc3779_addr == NULL && i != -1) |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| x->rfc3779_asid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, &i, NULL); |
| if (x->rfc3779_asid == NULL && i != -1) |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| #endif |
| for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++) { |
| X509_EXTENSION *ex = X509_get_ext(x, i); |
| int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)); |
| |
| if (nid == NID_freshest_crl) |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST; |
| if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex)) |
| continue; |
| if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) { |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL; |
| break; |
| } |
| switch (nid) { |
| case NID_basic_constraints: |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS_CRITICAL; |
| break; |
| case NID_authority_key_identifier: |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_AKID_CRITICAL; |
| break; |
| case NID_subject_key_identifier: |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SKID_CRITICAL; |
| break; |
| case NID_subject_alt_name: |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SAN_CRITICAL; |
| break; |
| default: |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Set x->siginf, ignoring errors due to unsupported algos */ |
| (void)ossl_x509_init_sig_info(x); |
| |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; /* Indicate that cert has been processed */ |
| #ifdef tsan_st_rel |
| tsan_st_rel((TSAN_QUALIFIER int *)&x->ex_cached, 1); |
| /* |
| * Above store triggers fast lock-free check in the beginning of the |
| * function. But one has to ensure that the structure is "stable", i.e. |
| * all stores are visible on all processors. Hence the release fence. |
| */ |
| #endif |
| ERR_pop_to_mark(); |
| if ((x->ex_flags & (EXFLAG_INVALID | EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT)) == 0) { |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) != 0) |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509V3_R_INVALID_CERTIFICATE); |
| /* If computing sha1_hash failed the error queue already reflects this. */ |
| |
| err: |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; /* indicate that cert has been processed */ |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * CA checks common to all purposes |
| * return codes: |
| * 0 not a CA |
| * 1 is a CA |
| * 2 Only possible in older versions of openSSL when basicConstraints are absent |
| * new versions will not return this value. May be a CA |
| * 3 basicConstraints absent but self-signed V1. |
| * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted. |
| * 5 Netscape specific CA Flags present |
| */ |
| |
| static int check_ca(const X509 *x) |
| { |
| /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */ |
| if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) |
| return 0; |
| if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) != 0) { |
| /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */ |
| return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0; |
| } else { |
| /* We support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */ |
| if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) |
| return 3; |
| /* |
| * If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it |
| */ |
| else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) |
| return 4; |
| /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */ |
| else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) |
| return 5; |
| /* Can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it. */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void X509_set_proxy_flag(X509 *x) |
| { |
| if (CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(x->lock)) { |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY; |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void X509_set_proxy_pathlen(X509 *x, long l) |
| { |
| x->ex_pcpathlen = l; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_check_ca(X509 *x) |
| { |
| /* Note 0 normally means "not a CA" - but in this case means error. */ |
| if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return check_ca(x); |
| } |
| |
| /* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server. */ |
| static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x) |
| { |
| int ca_ret = check_ca(x); |
| |
| if (ca_ret == 0) |
| return 0; |
| /* Check nsCertType if present */ |
| return ca_ret != 5 || (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) != 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int require_ca) |
| { |
| if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) |
| return 0; |
| if (require_ca) |
| return check_ssl_ca(x); |
| /* We need to do digital signatures or key agreement */ |
| if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) |
| return 0; |
| /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */ |
| if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) |
| return 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or |
| * key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual |
| * key types. |
| */ |
| #define KU_TLS \ |
| KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT |
| |
| static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int require_ca) |
| { |
| if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER | XKU_SGC)) |
| return 0; |
| if (require_ca) |
| return check_ssl_ca(x); |
| |
| if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) |
| return 0; |
| if (ku_reject(x, KU_TLS)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return 1; |
| |
| } |
| |
| static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int require_ca) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, require_ca); |
| if (!ret || require_ca) |
| return ret; |
| /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */ |
| if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) |
| return 0; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* common S/MIME checks */ |
| static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int require_ca) |
| { |
| if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME)) |
| return 0; |
| if (require_ca) { |
| int ca_ret; |
| ca_ret = check_ca(x); |
| if (ca_ret == 0) |
| return 0; |
| /* Check nsCertType if present */ |
| if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) |
| return ca_ret; |
| else |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) { |
| if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) |
| return 1; |
| /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */ |
| if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) |
| return 2; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int require_ca) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| ret = purpose_smime(x, require_ca); |
| if (!ret || require_ca) |
| return ret; |
| if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) |
| return 0; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int require_ca) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| ret = purpose_smime(x, require_ca); |
| if (!ret || require_ca) |
| return ret; |
| if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) |
| return 0; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int require_ca) |
| { |
| if (require_ca) { |
| int ca_ret; |
| if ((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2) |
| return ca_ret; |
| else |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) |
| return 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA |
| * is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain. |
| */ |
| static int check_purpose_ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int require_ca) |
| { |
| /* |
| * Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know" value |
| * (2)? |
| */ |
| if (require_ca) |
| return check_ca(x); |
| /* Leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */ |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int require_ca) |
| { |
| int i_ext; |
| |
| /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */ |
| if (require_ca) |
| return check_ca(x); |
| |
| /* |
| * Check the optional key usage field: |
| * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature |
| * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall |
| * be rejected). |
| */ |
| if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) |
| && ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) || |
| !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)))) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */ |
| if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */ |
| i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1); |
| if (i_ext >= 0) { |
| X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext); |
| if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int no_check_purpose(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, |
| int require_ca) |
| { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Various checks to see if one certificate potentially issued the second. |
| * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates which |
| * have been looked up using some simple method such as by subject name. |
| * These are: |
| * 1. issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) |
| * 2. If akid(subject) exists, it matches the respective issuer fields. |
| * 3. subject signature algorithm == issuer public key algorithm |
| * 4. If key_usage(issuer) exists, it allows for signing subject. |
| * Note that this does not include actually checking the signature. |
| * Returns 0 for OK, or positive for reason for mismatch |
| * where reason codes match those for X509_verify_cert(). |
| */ |
| int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| |
| if ((ret = ossl_x509_likely_issued(issuer, subject)) != X509_V_OK) |
| return ret; |
| return ossl_x509_signing_allowed(issuer, subject); |
| } |
| |
| /* do the checks 1., 2., and 3. as described above for X509_check_issued() */ |
| int ossl_x509_likely_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| |
| if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer), |
| X509_get_issuer_name(subject)) != 0) |
| return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH; |
| |
| /* set issuer->skid and subject->akid */ |
| if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer) |
| || !ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(subject)) |
| return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; |
| |
| ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid); |
| if (ret != X509_V_OK) |
| return ret; |
| |
| /* Check if the subject signature alg matches the issuer's PUBKEY alg */ |
| return check_sig_alg_match(X509_get0_pubkey(issuer), subject); |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Check if certificate I<issuer> is allowed to issue certificate I<subject> |
| * according to the B<keyUsage> field of I<issuer> if present |
| * depending on any proxyCertInfo extension of I<subject>. |
| * Returns 0 for OK, or positive for reason for rejection |
| * where reason codes match those for X509_verify_cert(). |
| */ |
| int ossl_x509_signing_allowed(const X509 *issuer, const X509 *subject) |
| { |
| if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { |
| if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) |
| return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; |
| } else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) |
| return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN; |
| return X509_V_OK; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_check_akid(const X509 *issuer, const AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) |
| { |
| if (akid == NULL) |
| return X509_V_OK; |
| |
| /* Check key ids (if present) */ |
| if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid && |
| ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid)) |
| return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH; |
| /* Check serial number */ |
| if (akid->serial && |
| ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get0_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial)) |
| return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; |
| /* Check issuer name */ |
| if (akid->issuer) { |
| /* |
| * Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes SEQUENCE OF |
| * GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but |
| * we only take any notice of the first. |
| */ |
| GENERAL_NAMES *gens; |
| GENERAL_NAME *gen; |
| X509_NAME *nm = NULL; |
| int i; |
| gens = akid->issuer; |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { |
| gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); |
| if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { |
| nm = gen->d.dirn; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (nm != NULL && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)) != 0) |
| return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; |
| } |
| return X509_V_OK; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t X509_get_extension_flags(X509 *x) |
| { |
| /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ |
| X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); |
| return x->ex_flags; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t X509_get_key_usage(X509 *x) |
| { |
| /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ |
| if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1) |
| return 0; |
| if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) |
| return x->ex_kusage; |
| return UINT32_MAX; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509 *x) |
| { |
| /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ |
| if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1) |
| return 0; |
| if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) |
| return x->ex_xkusage; |
| return UINT32_MAX; |
| } |
| |
| const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_subject_key_id(X509 *x) |
| { |
| /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ |
| if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1) |
| return NULL; |
| return x->skid; |
| } |
| |
| const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_authority_key_id(X509 *x) |
| { |
| /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ |
| if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1) |
| return NULL; |
| return (x->akid != NULL ? x->akid->keyid : NULL); |
| } |
| |
| const GENERAL_NAMES *X509_get0_authority_issuer(X509 *x) |
| { |
| /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ |
| if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1) |
| return NULL; |
| return (x->akid != NULL ? x->akid->issuer : NULL); |
| } |
| |
| const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_authority_serial(X509 *x) |
| { |
| /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */ |
| if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1) |
| return NULL; |
| return (x->akid != NULL ? x->akid->serial : NULL); |
| } |
| |
| long X509_get_pathlen(X509 *x) |
| { |
| /* Called for side effect of caching extensions */ |
| if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1 |
| || (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) == 0) |
| return -1; |
| return x->ex_pathlen; |
| } |
| |
| long X509_get_proxy_pathlen(X509 *x) |
| { |
| /* Called for side effect of caching extensions */ |
| if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1 |
| || (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) == 0) |
| return -1; |
| return x->ex_pcpathlen; |
| } |
