| /* |
| * Copyright 2019-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| */ |
| |
| /* chacha20 cipher implementation */ |
| |
| #include "cipher_chacha20.h" |
| |
| static int chacha20_initkey(PROV_CIPHER_CTX *bctx, const uint8_t *key, |
| size_t keylen) |
| { |
| PROV_CHACHA20_CTX *ctx = (PROV_CHACHA20_CTX *)bctx; |
| unsigned int i; |
| |
| if (key != NULL) { |
| for (i = 0; i < CHACHA_KEY_SIZE; i += 4) |
| ctx->key.d[i / 4] = CHACHA_U8TOU32(key + i); |
| } |
| ctx->partial_len = 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int chacha20_initiv(PROV_CIPHER_CTX *bctx) |
| { |
| PROV_CHACHA20_CTX *ctx = (PROV_CHACHA20_CTX *)bctx; |
| unsigned int i; |
| |
| if (bctx->iv_set) { |
| for (i = 0; i < CHACHA_CTR_SIZE; i += 4) |
| ctx->counter[i / 4] = CHACHA_U8TOU32(bctx->oiv + i); |
| } |
| ctx->partial_len = 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int chacha20_cipher(PROV_CIPHER_CTX *bctx, unsigned char *out, |
| const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) |
| { |
| PROV_CHACHA20_CTX *ctx = (PROV_CHACHA20_CTX *)bctx; |
| unsigned int n, rem, ctr32; |
| |
| n = ctx->partial_len; |
| if (n > 0) { |
| while (inl > 0 && n < CHACHA_BLK_SIZE) { |
| *out++ = *in++ ^ ctx->buf[n++]; |
| inl--; |
| } |
| ctx->partial_len = n; |
| |
| if (inl == 0) |
| return 1; |
| |
| if (n == CHACHA_BLK_SIZE) { |
| ctx->partial_len = 0; |
| ctx->counter[0]++; |
| if (ctx->counter[0] == 0) |
| ctx->counter[1]++; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| rem = (unsigned int)(inl % CHACHA_BLK_SIZE); |
| inl -= rem; |
| ctr32 = ctx->counter[0]; |
| while (inl >= CHACHA_BLK_SIZE) { |
| size_t blocks = inl / CHACHA_BLK_SIZE; |
| |
| /* |
| * 1<<28 is just a not-so-small yet not-so-large number... |
| * Below condition is practically never met, but it has to |
| * be checked for code correctness. |
| */ |
| if (sizeof(size_t) > sizeof(unsigned int) && blocks > (1U << 28)) |
| blocks = (1U << 28); |
| |
| /* |
| * As ChaCha20_ctr32 operates on 32-bit counter, caller |
| * has to handle overflow. 'if' below detects the |
| * overflow, which is then handled by limiting the |
| * amount of blocks to the exact overflow point... |
| */ |
| ctr32 += (unsigned int)blocks; |
| if (ctr32 < blocks) { |
| blocks -= ctr32; |
| ctr32 = 0; |
| } |
| blocks *= CHACHA_BLK_SIZE; |
| ChaCha20_ctr32(out, in, blocks, ctx->key.d, ctx->counter); |
| inl -= blocks; |
| in += blocks; |
| out += blocks; |
| |
| ctx->counter[0] = ctr32; |
| if (ctr32 == 0) ctx->counter[1]++; |
| } |
| |
| if (rem > 0) { |
| memset(ctx->buf, 0, sizeof(ctx->buf)); |
| ChaCha20_ctr32(ctx->buf, ctx->buf, CHACHA_BLK_SIZE, |
| ctx->key.d, ctx->counter); |
| for (n = 0; n < rem; n++) |
| out[n] = in[n] ^ ctx->buf[n]; |
| ctx->partial_len = rem; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static const PROV_CIPHER_HW_CHACHA20 chacha20_hw = { |
| { chacha20_initkey, chacha20_cipher }, |
| chacha20_initiv |
| }; |
| |
| const PROV_CIPHER_HW *ossl_prov_cipher_hw_chacha20(size_t keybits) |
| { |
| return (PROV_CIPHER_HW *)&chacha20_hw; |
| } |
| |