| =pod |
| |
| =head1 NAME |
| |
| des_modes - the variants of DES and other crypto algorithms of OpenSSL |
| |
| =head1 DESCRIPTION |
| |
| Several crypto algorithms for OpenSSL can be used in a number of modes. Those |
| are used for using block ciphers in a way similar to stream ciphers, among |
| other things. |
| |
| =head1 OVERVIEW |
| |
| =head2 Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB) |
| |
| Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ecb_encrypt(). |
| |
| =over 2 |
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| =item * |
| |
| 64 bits are enciphered at a time. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| The order of the blocks can be rearranged without detection. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| The same plaintext block always produces the same ciphertext block |
| (for the same key) making it vulnerable to a 'dictionary attack'. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| An error will only affect one ciphertext block. |
| |
| =back |
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| =head2 Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC) |
| |
| Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_cbc_encrypt(). |
| Be aware that des_cbc_encrypt() is not really DES CBC (it does |
| not update the IV); use des_ncbc_encrypt() instead. |
| |
| =over 2 |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| a multiple of 64 bits are enciphered at a time. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| The CBC mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same |
| plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| The chaining operation makes the ciphertext blocks dependent on the |
| current and all preceding plaintext blocks and therefore blocks can not |
| be rearranged. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext |
| enciphering to the same ciphertext. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext blocks. |
| |
| =back |
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| =head2 Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) |
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| Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_cfb_encrypt(). |
| |
| =over 2 |
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| =item * |
| |
| a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| The CFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same |
| plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| The chaining operation makes the ciphertext variables dependent on the |
| current and all preceding variables and therefore j-bit variables are |
| chained together and can not be rearranged. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext |
| enciphering to the same ciphertext. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| The strength of the CFB mode depends on the size of k (maximal if |
| j == k). In my implementation this is always the case. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through |
| the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause |
| greater processing overheads. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext variables. |
| |
| =back |
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| =head2 Output Feedback Mode (OFB) |
| |
| Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ofb_encrypt(). |
| |
| =over 2 |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| The OFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same |
| plaintext enciphered using the same key and starting variable. More |
| over, in the OFB mode the same key stream is produced when the same |
| key and start variable are used. Consequently, for security reasons |
| a specific start variable should be used only once for a given key. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| The absence of chaining makes the OFB more vulnerable to specific attacks. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| The use of different start variables values prevents the same |
| plaintext enciphering to the same ciphertext, by producing different |
| key streams. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through |
| the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause |
| greater processing overheads. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| OFB mode of operation does not extend ciphertext errors in the |
| resultant plaintext output. Every bit error in the ciphertext causes |
| only one bit to be in error in the deciphered plaintext. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| OFB mode is not self-synchronizing. If the two operation of |
| encipherment and decipherment get out of synchronism, the system needs |
| to be re-initialized. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| Each re-initialization should use a value of the start variable |
| different from the start variable values used before with the same |
| key. The reason for this is that an identical bit stream would be |
| produced each time from the same parameters. This would be |
| susceptible to a 'known plaintext' attack. |
| |
| =back |
| |
| =head2 Triple ECB Mode |
| |
| Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ecb3_encrypt(). |
| |
| =over 2 |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and encrypt with key3 again. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| As for ECB encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits. |
| There are theoretic attacks that can be used that make the effective |
| key length 112 bits, but this attack also requires 2^56 blocks of |
| memory, not very likely, even for the NSA. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| If both keys are the same it is equivalent to encrypting once with |
| just one key. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| If the first and last key are the same, the key length is 112 bits. |
| There are attacks that could reduce the effective key strength |
| to only slightly more than 56 bits, but these require a lot of memory. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| If all 3 keys are the same, this is effectively the same as normal |
| ecb mode. |
| |
| =back |
| |
| =head2 Triple CBC Mode |
| |
| Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ede3_cbc_encrypt(). |
| |
| =over 2 |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and then encrypt with key3. |
| |
| =item * |
| |
| As for CBC encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits with |
| the same restrictions as for triple ecb mode. |
| |
| =back |
| |
| =head1 NOTES |
| |
| This text was been written in large parts by Eric Young in his original |
| documentation for SSLeay, the predecessor of OpenSSL. In turn, he attributed |
| it to: |
| |
| AS 2805.5.2 |
| Australian Standard |
| Electronic funds transfer - Requirements for interfaces, |
| Part 5.2: Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher algorithm |
| Appendix A |
| |
| =head1 SEE ALSO |
| |
| L<BF_encrypt(3)>, L<DES_crypt(3)> |
| |
| =head1 COPYRIGHT |
| |
| Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| |
| Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>. |
| |
| =cut |