| /* |
| * Copyright 2020-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for |
| * internal use. |
| */ |
| #include "internal/deprecated.h" |
| |
| #include <string.h> |
| #include <openssl/core_names.h> |
| #include <openssl/params.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| # include <openssl/x509.h> |
| # include "crypto/asn1.h" |
| #endif |
| #include "internal/sizes.h" |
| #include "internal/param_build_set.h" |
| #include "crypto/rsa.h" |
| #include "rsa_local.h" |
| |
| #include "internal/e_os.h" /* strcasecmp for Windows() */ |
| |
| /* |
| * The intention with the "backend" source file is to offer backend support |
| * for legacy backends (EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD and EVP_PKEY_METHOD) and provider |
| * implementations alike. |
| */ |
| |
| DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM) |
| |
| static int collect_numbers(STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *numbers, |
| const OSSL_PARAM params[], const char *names[]) |
| { |
| const OSSL_PARAM *p = NULL; |
| int i; |
| |
| if (numbers == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| for (i = 0; names[i] != NULL; i++) { |
| p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, names[i]); |
| if (p != NULL) { |
| BIGNUM *tmp = NULL; |
| |
| if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(p, &tmp) |
| || sk_BIGNUM_push(numbers, tmp) == 0) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ossl_rsa_fromdata(RSA *rsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[], int include_private) |
| { |
| const OSSL_PARAM *param_n, *param_e, *param_d = NULL; |
| BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL; |
| STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *factors = NULL, *exps = NULL, *coeffs = NULL; |
| int is_private = 0; |
| |
| if (rsa == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| param_n = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N); |
| param_e = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E); |
| if (include_private) |
| param_d = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D); |
| |
| if ((param_n != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_n, &n)) |
| || (param_e != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_e, &e)) |
| || (param_d != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_d, &d))) |
| goto err; |
| |
| is_private = (d != NULL); |
| |
| if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, d)) |
| goto err; |
| n = e = d = NULL; |
| |
| if (is_private) { |
| if (!collect_numbers(factors = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params, |
| ossl_rsa_mp_factor_names) |
| || !collect_numbers(exps = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params, |
| ossl_rsa_mp_exp_names) |
| || !collect_numbers(coeffs = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params, |
| ossl_rsa_mp_coeff_names)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| /* It's ok if this private key just has n, e and d */ |
| if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) != 0 |
| && !ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs)) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| |
| sk_BIGNUM_free(factors); |
| sk_BIGNUM_free(exps); |
| sk_BIGNUM_free(coeffs); |
| return 1; |
| |
| err: |
| BN_free(n); |
| BN_free(e); |
| BN_free(d); |
| sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(factors, BN_free); |
| sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(exps, BN_free); |
| sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(coeffs, BN_free); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(BIGNUM_const, BIGNUM) |
| |
| int ossl_rsa_todata(RSA *rsa, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[], |
| int include_private) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| const BIGNUM *rsa_d = NULL, *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL; |
| STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *factors = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null(); |
| STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null(); |
| STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null(); |
| |
| if (rsa == NULL || factors == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| |
| RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d); |
| ossl_rsa_get0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs); |
| |
| if (!ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, rsa_n) |
| || !ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, rsa_e)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| /* Check private key data integrity */ |
| if (include_private && rsa_d != NULL) { |
| int numprimes = sk_BIGNUM_const_num(factors); |
| int numexps = sk_BIGNUM_const_num(exps); |
| int numcoeffs = sk_BIGNUM_const_num(coeffs); |
| |
| /* |
| * It's permissible to have zero primes, i.e. no CRT params. |
| * Otherwise, there must be at least two, as many exponents, |
| * and one coefficient less. |
| */ |
| if (numprimes != 0 |
| && (numprimes < 2 || numexps < 2 || numcoeffs < 1)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| if (!ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D, |
| rsa_d) |
| || !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params, |
| ossl_rsa_mp_factor_names, |
| factors) |
| || !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params, |
| ossl_rsa_mp_exp_names, exps) |
| || !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params, |
| ossl_rsa_mp_coeff_names, |
| coeffs)) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS) |
| /* The acvp test results are not meant for export so check for bld == NULL */ |
| if (bld == NULL) |
| ossl_rsa_acvp_test_get_params(rsa, params); |
| #endif |
| ret = 1; |
| err: |
| sk_BIGNUM_const_free(factors); |
| sk_BIGNUM_const_free(exps); |
| sk_BIGNUM_const_free(coeffs); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_todata(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss, |
| OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
| { |
| if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) { |
| int hashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss); |
| int maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(pss); |
| int maskgenhashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss); |
| int saltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss); |
| int default_hashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(NULL); |
| int default_maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(NULL); |
| int default_maskgenhashalg_nid = |
| ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(NULL); |
| const char *mdname = |
| (hashalg_nid == default_hashalg_nid |
| ? NULL : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(hashalg_nid)); |
| const char *mgfname = |
| (maskgenalg_nid == default_maskgenalg_nid |
| ? NULL : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(maskgenalg_nid)); |
| const char *mgf1mdname = |
| (maskgenhashalg_nid == default_maskgenhashalg_nid |
| ? NULL : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(maskgenhashalg_nid)); |
| const char *key_md = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST; |
| const char *key_mgf = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MASKGENFUNC; |
| const char *key_mgf1_md = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MGF1_DIGEST; |
| const char *key_saltlen = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN; |
| |
| /* |
| * To ensure that the key isn't seen as unrestricted by the recipient, |
| * we make sure that at least one PSS-related parameter is passed, even |
| * if it has a default value; saltlen. |
| */ |
| if ((mdname != NULL |
| && !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params, key_md, mdname)) |
| || (mgfname != NULL |
| && !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params, |
| key_mgf, mgfname)) |
| || (mgf1mdname != NULL |
| && !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params, |
| key_mgf1_md, mgf1mdname)) |
| || (!ossl_param_build_set_int(bld, params, key_saltlen, saltlen))) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_fromdata(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss_params, |
| int *defaults_set, |
| const OSSL_PARAM params[], |
| OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx) |
| { |
| const OSSL_PARAM *param_md, *param_mgf, *param_mgf1md, *param_saltlen; |
| const OSSL_PARAM *param_propq; |
| const char *propq = NULL; |
| EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mgf1md = NULL; |
| int saltlen; |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| if (pss_params == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| param_propq = |
| OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST_PROPS); |
| param_md = |
| OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST); |
| param_mgf = |
| OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MASKGENFUNC); |
| param_mgf1md = |
| OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MGF1_DIGEST); |
| param_saltlen = |
| OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN); |
| |
| if (param_propq != NULL) { |
| if (param_propq->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) |
| propq = param_propq->data; |
| } |
| /* |
| * If we get any of the parameters, we know we have at least some |
| * restrictions, so we start by setting default values, and let each |
| * parameter override their specific restriction data. |
| */ |
| if (!*defaults_set |
| && (param_md != NULL || param_mgf != NULL || param_mgf1md != NULL |
| || param_saltlen != NULL)) { |
| if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(pss_params)) |
| return 0; |
| *defaults_set = 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (param_mgf != NULL) { |
| int default_maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(NULL); |
| const char *mgfname = NULL; |
| |
| if (param_mgf->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) |
| mgfname = param_mgf->data; |
| else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mgfname)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (strcasecmp(param_mgf->data, |
| ossl_rsa_mgf_nid2name(default_maskgenalg_nid)) != 0) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * We're only interested in the NIDs that correspond to the MDs, so the |
| * exact propquery is unimportant in the EVP_MD_fetch() calls below. |
| */ |
| |
| if (param_md != NULL) { |
| const char *mdname = NULL; |
| |
| if (param_md->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) |
| mdname = param_md->data; |
| else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mdname)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| if ((md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, mdname, propq)) == NULL |
| || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(pss_params, |
| ossl_rsa_oaeppss_md2nid(md))) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (param_mgf1md != NULL) { |
| const char *mgf1mdname = NULL; |
| |
| if (param_mgf1md->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) |
| mgf1mdname = param_mgf1md->data; |
| else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mgf1mdname)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| if ((mgf1md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, mgf1mdname, propq)) == NULL |
| || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg( |
| pss_params, ossl_rsa_oaeppss_md2nid(mgf1md))) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (param_saltlen != NULL) { |
| if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(param_saltlen, &saltlen) |
| || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(pss_params, saltlen)) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| ret = 1; |
| |
| err: |
| EVP_MD_free(md); |
| EVP_MD_free(mgf1md); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int ossl_rsa_is_foreign(const RSA *rsa) |
| { |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| if (rsa->engine != NULL || RSA_get_method(rsa) != RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL()) |
| return 1; |
| #endif |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static ossl_inline int rsa_bn_dup_check(BIGNUM **out, const BIGNUM *f) |
| { |
| if (f != NULL && (*out = BN_dup(f)) == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| RSA *ossl_rsa_dup(const RSA *rsa, int selection) |
| { |
| RSA *dupkey = NULL; |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| int pnum, i; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* Do not try to duplicate foreign RSA keys */ |
| if (ossl_rsa_is_foreign(rsa)) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| if ((dupkey = ossl_rsa_new_with_ctx(rsa->libctx)) == NULL) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| /* public key */ |
| if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) != 0) { |
| if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->n, rsa->n)) |
| goto err; |
| if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->e, rsa->e)) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0) { |
| |
| /* private key */ |
| if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->d, rsa->d)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| /* factors and crt params */ |
| if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->p, rsa->p)) |
| goto err; |
| if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->q, rsa->q)) |
| goto err; |
| if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->dmp1, rsa->dmp1)) |
| goto err; |
| if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->dmq1, rsa->dmq1)) |
| goto err; |
| if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->iqmp, rsa->iqmp)) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| dupkey->version = rsa->version; |
| dupkey->flags = rsa->flags; |
| /* we always copy the PSS parameters regardless of selection */ |
| dupkey->pss_params = rsa->pss_params; |
| |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| /* multiprime */ |
| if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0 |
| && (pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos)) > 0) { |
| dupkey->prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum); |
| if (dupkey->prime_infos == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { |
| const RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL; |
| RSA_PRIME_INFO *duppinfo = NULL; |
| |
| if ((duppinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*duppinfo))) == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| /* push first so cleanup in error case works */ |
| (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(dupkey->prime_infos, duppinfo); |
| |
| pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i); |
| if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->r, pinfo->r)) |
| goto err; |
| if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->d, pinfo->d)) |
| goto err; |
| if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->t, pinfo->t)) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (!ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(dupkey)) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (rsa->pss != NULL) { |
| dupkey->pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_dup(rsa->pss); |
| if (rsa->pss->maskGenAlgorithm != NULL |
| && dupkey->pss->maskGenAlgorithm == NULL) { |
| dupkey->pss->maskHash = ossl_x509_algor_mgf1_decode(rsa->pss->maskGenAlgorithm); |
| if (dupkey->pss->maskHash == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, |
| &dupkey->ex_data, &rsa->ex_data)) |
| goto err; |
| #endif |
| |
| return dupkey; |
| |
| err: |
| RSA_free(dupkey); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| RSA_PSS_PARAMS *ossl_rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg) |
| { |
| RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; |
| |
| pss = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), |
| alg->parameter); |
| |
| if (pss == NULL) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm != NULL) { |
| pss->maskHash = ossl_x509_algor_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenAlgorithm); |
| if (pss->maskHash == NULL) { |
| RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return pss; |
| } |
| |
| static int ossl_rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(RSA *rsa) |
| { |
| const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *legacy_pss = NULL; |
| RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss = NULL; |
| |
| if (rsa != NULL |
| && (legacy_pss = RSA_get0_pss_params(rsa)) != NULL |
| && (pss = ossl_rsa_get0_pss_params_30(rsa)) != NULL) { |
| const EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mgf1md = NULL; |
| int md_nid, mgf1md_nid, saltlen, trailerField; |
| RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params; |
| |
| /* |
| * We don't care about the validity of the fields here, we just |
| * want to synchronise values. Verifying here makes it impossible |
| * to even read a key with invalid values, making it hard to test |
| * a bad situation. |
| * |
| * Other routines use ossl_rsa_pss_get_param(), so the values will |
| * be checked, eventually. |
| */ |
| if (!ossl_rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(legacy_pss, &md, &mgf1md, |
| &saltlen, &trailerField)) |
| return 0; |
| md_nid = EVP_MD_get_type(md); |
| mgf1md_nid = EVP_MD_get_type(mgf1md); |
| if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params) |
| || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(&pss_params, md_nid) |
| || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg(&pss_params, |
| mgf1md_nid) |
| || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(&pss_params, saltlen) |
| || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_trailerfield(&pss_params, |
| trailerField)) |
| return 0; |
| *pss = pss_params; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ossl_rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, |
| const EVP_MD **pmd, const EVP_MD **pmgf1md, |
| int *psaltlen, int *ptrailerField) |
| { |
| RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params; |
| |
| /* Get the defaults from the ONE place */ |
| (void)ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params); |
| |
| if (pss == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| *pmd = ossl_x509_algor_get_md(pss->hashAlgorithm); |
| if (*pmd == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| *pmgf1md = ossl_x509_algor_get_md(pss->maskHash); |
| if (*pmgf1md == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| if (pss->saltLength) |
| *psaltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength); |
| else |
| *psaltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(&pss_params); |
| if (pss->trailerField) |
| *ptrailerField = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField); |
| else |
| *ptrailerField = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_trailerfield(&pss_params); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ossl_rsa_param_decode(RSA *rsa, const X509_ALGOR *alg) |
| { |
| RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; |
| const ASN1_OBJECT *algoid; |
| const void *algp; |
| int algptype; |
| |
| X509_ALGOR_get0(&algoid, &algptype, &algp, alg); |
| if (OBJ_obj2nid(algoid) != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) |
| return 1; |
| if (algptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF) |
| return 1; |
| if (algptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if ((pss = ossl_rsa_pss_decode(alg)) == NULL |
| || !ossl_rsa_set0_pss_params(rsa, pss)) { |
| RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (!ossl_rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(rsa)) |
| return 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| RSA *ossl_rsa_key_from_pkcs8(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf, |
| OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq) |
| { |
| const unsigned char *p; |
| RSA *rsa; |
| int pklen; |
| const X509_ALGOR *alg; |
| |
| if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &alg, p8inf)) |
| return 0; |
| rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, pklen); |
| if (rsa == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| if (!ossl_rsa_param_decode(rsa, alg)) { |
| RSA_free(rsa); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| RSA_clear_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK); |
| switch (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm)) { |
| case EVP_PKEY_RSA: |
| RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA); |
| break; |
| case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS: |
| RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS); |
| break; |
| default: |
| /* Leave the type bits zero */ |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| return rsa; |
| } |
| #endif |
