|  | /* | 
|  | * Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | 
|  | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved | 
|  | * | 
|  | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use | 
|  | * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy | 
|  | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | 
|  | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | 
|  | */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for internal use. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | #include "internal/deprecated.h" | 
|  |  | 
|  | #include <openssl/opensslconf.h> /* To see if OPENSSL_NO_EC is defined */ | 
|  | #include "testutil.h" | 
|  |  | 
|  | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | 
|  |  | 
|  | # include <openssl/evp.h> | 
|  | # include <openssl/bn.h> | 
|  | # include <openssl/ec.h> | 
|  | # include <openssl/rand.h> | 
|  | # include "internal/nelem.h" | 
|  | # include "ecdsatest.h" | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* functions to change the RAND_METHOD */ | 
|  | static int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); | 
|  |  | 
|  | static RAND_METHOD fake_rand; | 
|  | static const RAND_METHOD *old_rand; | 
|  | static int use_fake = 0; | 
|  | static const char *numbers[2]; | 
|  | static size_t crv_len = 0; | 
|  | static EC_builtin_curve *curves = NULL; | 
|  |  | 
|  | static int change_rand(void) | 
|  | { | 
|  | /* save old rand method */ | 
|  | if (!TEST_ptr(old_rand = RAND_get_rand_method())) | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | fake_rand = *old_rand; | 
|  | /* use own random function */ | 
|  | fake_rand.bytes = fbytes; | 
|  | /* set new RAND_METHOD */ | 
|  | if (!TEST_true(RAND_set_rand_method(&fake_rand))) | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | return 1; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static int restore_rand(void) | 
|  | { | 
|  | if (!TEST_true(RAND_set_rand_method(old_rand))) | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | return 1; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) | 
|  | { | 
|  | int ret = 0; | 
|  | static int fbytes_counter = 0; | 
|  | BIGNUM *tmp = NULL; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (use_fake == 0) | 
|  | return old_rand->bytes(buf, num); | 
|  |  | 
|  | use_fake = 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!TEST_ptr(tmp = BN_new()) | 
|  | || !TEST_int_lt(fbytes_counter, OSSL_NELEM(numbers)) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(BN_hex2bn(&tmp, numbers[fbytes_counter])) | 
|  | /* tmp might need leading zeros so pad it out */ | 
|  | || !TEST_int_le(BN_num_bytes(tmp), num) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(BN_bn2binpad(tmp, buf, num))) | 
|  | goto err; | 
|  |  | 
|  | fbytes_counter = (fbytes_counter + 1) % OSSL_NELEM(numbers); | 
|  | ret = 1; | 
|  | err: | 
|  | BN_free(tmp); | 
|  | return ret; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /*- | 
|  | * This function hijacks the RNG to feed it the chosen ECDSA key and nonce. | 
|  | * The ECDSA KATs are from: | 
|  | * - the X9.62 draft (4) | 
|  | * - NIST CAVP (720) | 
|  | * | 
|  | * It uses the low-level ECDSA_sign_setup instead of EVP to control the RNG. | 
|  | * NB: This is not how applications should use ECDSA; this is only for testing. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * Tests the library can successfully: | 
|  | * - generate public keys that matches those KATs | 
|  | * - create ECDSA signatures that match those KATs | 
|  | * - accept those signatures as valid | 
|  | */ | 
|  | static int x9_62_tests(int n) | 
|  | { | 
|  | int nid, md_nid, ret = 0; | 
|  | const char *r_in = NULL, *s_in = NULL, *tbs = NULL; | 
|  | unsigned char *pbuf = NULL, *qbuf = NULL, *message = NULL; | 
|  | unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | 
|  | unsigned int dgst_len = 0; | 
|  | long q_len, msg_len = 0; | 
|  | size_t p_len; | 
|  | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; | 
|  | EC_KEY *key = NULL; | 
|  | ECDSA_SIG *signature = NULL; | 
|  | BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; | 
|  | BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *rp = NULL; | 
|  | const BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL; | 
|  |  | 
|  | nid = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].nid; | 
|  | md_nid = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].md_nid; | 
|  | r_in = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].r; | 
|  | s_in = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].s; | 
|  | tbs = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].msg; | 
|  | numbers[0] = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].d; | 
|  | numbers[1] = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].k; | 
|  |  | 
|  | TEST_info("ECDSA KATs for curve %s", OBJ_nid2sn(nid)); | 
|  |  | 
|  | #ifdef FIPS_MODULE | 
|  | if (EC_curve_nid2nist(nid) == NULL) | 
|  | return TEST_skip("skip non approved curves"); | 
|  | #endif /* FIPS_MODULE */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!TEST_ptr(mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) | 
|  | /* get the message digest */ | 
|  | || !TEST_ptr(message = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(tbs, &msg_len)) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid), NULL)) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, message, msg_len)) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, digest, &dgst_len)) | 
|  | /* create the key */ | 
|  | || !TEST_ptr(key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)) | 
|  | /* load KAT variables */ | 
|  | || !TEST_ptr(r = BN_new()) | 
|  | || !TEST_ptr(s = BN_new()) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(BN_hex2bn(&r, r_in)) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(BN_hex2bn(&s, s_in)) | 
|  | /* swap the RNG source */ | 
|  | || !TEST_true(change_rand())) | 
|  | goto err; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* public key must match KAT */ | 
|  | use_fake = 1; | 
|  | if (!TEST_true(EC_KEY_generate_key(key)) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(p_len = EC_KEY_key2buf(key, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, | 
|  | &pbuf, NULL)) | 
|  | || !TEST_ptr(qbuf = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].Q, &q_len)) | 
|  | || !TEST_int_eq(q_len, p_len) | 
|  | || !TEST_mem_eq(qbuf, q_len, pbuf, p_len)) | 
|  | goto err; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* create the signature via ECDSA_sign_setup to avoid use of ECDSA nonces */ | 
|  | use_fake = 1; | 
|  | if (!TEST_true(ECDSA_sign_setup(key, NULL, &kinv, &rp)) | 
|  | || !TEST_ptr(signature = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, dgst_len, | 
|  | kinv, rp, key)) | 
|  | /* verify the signature */ | 
|  | || !TEST_int_eq(ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dgst_len, signature, key), 1)) | 
|  | goto err; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* compare the created signature with the expected signature */ | 
|  | ECDSA_SIG_get0(signature, &sig_r, &sig_s); | 
|  | if (!TEST_BN_eq(sig_r, r) | 
|  | || !TEST_BN_eq(sig_s, s)) | 
|  | goto err; | 
|  |  | 
|  | ret = 1; | 
|  |  | 
|  | err: | 
|  | /* restore the RNG source */ | 
|  | if (!TEST_true(restore_rand())) | 
|  | ret = 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | OPENSSL_free(message); | 
|  | OPENSSL_free(pbuf); | 
|  | OPENSSL_free(qbuf); | 
|  | EC_KEY_free(key); | 
|  | ECDSA_SIG_free(signature); | 
|  | BN_free(r); | 
|  | BN_free(s); | 
|  | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | 
|  | BN_clear_free(kinv); | 
|  | BN_clear_free(rp); | 
|  | return ret; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /*- | 
|  | * Positive and negative ECDSA testing through EVP interface: | 
|  | * - EVP_DigestSign (this is the one-shot version) | 
|  | * - EVP_DigestVerify | 
|  | * | 
|  | * Tests the library can successfully: | 
|  | * - create a key | 
|  | * - create a signature | 
|  | * - accept that signature | 
|  | * - reject that signature with a different public key | 
|  | * - reject that signature if its length is not correct | 
|  | * - reject that signature after modifying the message | 
|  | * - accept that signature after un-modifying the message | 
|  | * - reject that signature after modifying the signature | 
|  | * - accept that signature after un-modifying the signature | 
|  | */ | 
|  | static int set_sm2_id(EVP_MD_CTX *mctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) | 
|  | { | 
|  | /* With the SM2 key type, the SM2 ID is mandatory */ | 
|  | static const char sm2_id[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4, 'l', 'e', 't', 't', 'e', 'r' }; | 
|  | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!TEST_ptr(pctx = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(mctx)) | 
|  | || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id(pctx, sm2_id, sizeof(sm2_id)), 0)) | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | return 1; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static int test_builtin(int n, int as) | 
|  | { | 
|  | EC_KEY *eckey_neg = NULL, *eckey = NULL; | 
|  | unsigned char dirt, offset, tbs[128]; | 
|  | unsigned char *sig = NULL; | 
|  | EVP_PKEY *pkey_neg = NULL, *pkey = NULL; | 
|  | EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; | 
|  | size_t sig_len; | 
|  | int nid, ret = 0; | 
|  | int temp; | 
|  |  | 
|  | nid = curves[n].nid; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* skip built-in curves where ord(G) is not prime */ | 
|  | if (nid == NID_ipsec4 || nid == NID_ipsec3) { | 
|  | TEST_info("skipped: ECDSA unsupported for curve %s", OBJ_nid2sn(nid)); | 
|  | return 1; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | TEST_info("testing ECDSA for curve %s as %s key type", OBJ_nid2sn(nid), | 
|  | as == EVP_PKEY_EC ? "EC" : "SM2"); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!TEST_ptr(mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) | 
|  | /* get some random message data */ | 
|  | || !TEST_true(RAND_bytes(tbs, sizeof(tbs))) | 
|  | /* real key */ | 
|  | || !TEST_ptr(eckey = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey)) | 
|  | || !TEST_ptr(pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, eckey)) | 
|  | /* fake key for negative testing */ | 
|  | || !TEST_ptr(eckey_neg = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey_neg)) | 
|  | || !TEST_ptr(pkey_neg = EVP_PKEY_new()) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey_neg, eckey_neg))) | 
|  | goto err; | 
|  |  | 
|  | temp = ECDSA_size(eckey); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * |as| indicates how we want to treat the key, i.e. what sort of | 
|  | * computation we want to do with it.  The two choices are the key | 
|  | * types EVP_PKEY_EC and EVP_PKEY_SM2.  It's perfectly possible to | 
|  | * switch back and forth between those two key types, regardless of | 
|  | * curve, even though the default is to have EVP_PKEY_SM2 for the | 
|  | * SM2 curve and EVP_PKEY_EC for all other curves. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if (!TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type(pkey, as)) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type(pkey_neg, as))) | 
|  | goto err; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!TEST_int_ge(temp, 0) | 
|  | || !TEST_ptr(sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len = (size_t)temp)) | 
|  | /* create a signature */ | 
|  | || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey)) | 
|  | || (as == EVP_PKEY_SM2 && !set_sm2_id(mctx, pkey)) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs))) | 
|  | || !TEST_int_le(sig_len, ECDSA_size(eckey)) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx)) | 
|  | /* negative test, verify with wrong key, 0 return */ | 
|  | || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey_neg)) | 
|  | || (as == EVP_PKEY_SM2 && !set_sm2_id(mctx, pkey_neg)) | 
|  | || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 0) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx)) | 
|  | /* negative test, verify with wrong signature length, -1 return */ | 
|  | || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey)) | 
|  | || (as == EVP_PKEY_SM2 && !set_sm2_id(mctx, pkey)) | 
|  | || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len - 1, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), -1) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx)) | 
|  | /* positive test, verify with correct key, 1 return */ | 
|  | || !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey)) | 
|  | || (as == EVP_PKEY_SM2 && !set_sm2_id(mctx, pkey)) | 
|  | || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 1) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx))) | 
|  | goto err; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* muck with the message, test it fails with 0 return */ | 
|  | tbs[0] ^= 1; | 
|  | if (!TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey)) | 
|  | || (as == EVP_PKEY_SM2 && !set_sm2_id(mctx, pkey)) | 
|  | || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 0) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx))) | 
|  | goto err; | 
|  | /* un-muck and test it verifies */ | 
|  | tbs[0] ^= 1; | 
|  | if (!TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey)) | 
|  | || (as == EVP_PKEY_SM2 && !set_sm2_id(mctx, pkey)) | 
|  | || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 1) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx))) | 
|  | goto err; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /*- | 
|  | * Muck with the ECDSA signature. The DER encoding is one of: | 
|  | * - 30 LL 02 .. | 
|  | * - 30 81 LL 02 .. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * - Sometimes this mucks with the high level DER sequence wrapper: | 
|  | *   in that case, DER-parsing of the whole signature should fail. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * - Sometimes this mucks with the DER-encoding of ECDSA.r: | 
|  | *   in that case, DER-parsing of ECDSA.r should fail. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * - Sometimes this mucks with the DER-encoding of ECDSA.s: | 
|  | *   in that case, DER-parsing of ECDSA.s should fail. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * - Sometimes this mucks with ECDSA.r: | 
|  | *   in that case, the signature verification should fail. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * - Sometimes this mucks with ECDSA.s: | 
|  | *   in that case, the signature verification should fail. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * The usual case is changing the integer value of ECDSA.r or ECDSA.s. | 
|  | * Because the ratio of DER overhead to signature bytes is small. | 
|  | * So most of the time it will be one of the last two cases. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * In any case, EVP_PKEY_verify should not return 1 for valid. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | offset = tbs[0] % sig_len; | 
|  | dirt = tbs[1] ? tbs[1] : 1; | 
|  | sig[offset] ^= dirt; | 
|  | if (!TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey)) | 
|  | || (as == EVP_PKEY_SM2 && !set_sm2_id(mctx, pkey)) | 
|  | || !TEST_int_ne(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 1) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx))) | 
|  | goto err; | 
|  | /* un-muck and test it verifies */ | 
|  | sig[offset] ^= dirt; | 
|  | if (!TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey)) | 
|  | || (as == EVP_PKEY_SM2 && !set_sm2_id(mctx, pkey)) | 
|  | || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 1) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx))) | 
|  | goto err; | 
|  |  | 
|  | ret = 1; | 
|  | err: | 
|  | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | 
|  | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey_neg); | 
|  | EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); | 
|  | OPENSSL_free(sig); | 
|  | return ret; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static int test_builtin_as_ec(int n) | 
|  | { | 
|  | return test_builtin(n, EVP_PKEY_EC); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2 | 
|  | static int test_builtin_as_sm2(int n) | 
|  | { | 
|  | return test_builtin(n, EVP_PKEY_SM2); | 
|  | } | 
|  | # endif | 
|  | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | int setup_tests(void) | 
|  | { | 
|  | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC | 
|  | TEST_note("Elliptic curves are disabled."); | 
|  | #else | 
|  | /* get a list of all internal curves */ | 
|  | crv_len = EC_get_builtin_curves(NULL, 0); | 
|  | if (!TEST_ptr(curves = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*curves) * crv_len)) | 
|  | || !TEST_true(EC_get_builtin_curves(curves, crv_len))) | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_builtin_as_ec, crv_len); | 
|  | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2 | 
|  | ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_builtin_as_sm2, crv_len); | 
|  | # endif | 
|  | ADD_ALL_TESTS(x9_62_tests, OSSL_NELEM(ecdsa_cavs_kats)); | 
|  | #endif | 
|  | return 1; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | void cleanup_tests(void) | 
|  | { | 
|  | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | 
|  | OPENSSL_free(curves); | 
|  | #endif | 
|  | } |