| /* crypto/rand/md_rand.c */ |
| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| */ |
| |
| #define ENTROPY_NEEDED 16 /* require 128 bits = 16 bytes of randomness */ |
| |
| #ifndef MD_RAND_DEBUG |
| # ifndef NDEBUG |
| # define NDEBUG |
| # endif |
| #endif |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <time.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include "openssl/e_os.h" |
| |
| #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| |
| #if !defined(USE_MD5_RAND) && !defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) && !defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) && !defined(USE_MD2_RAND) |
| #if !defined(NO_SHA) && !defined(NO_SHA1) |
| #define USE_SHA1_RAND |
| #elif !defined(NO_MD5) |
| #define USE_MD5_RAND |
| #elif !defined(NO_MDC2) && !defined(NO_DES) |
| #define USE_MDC2_RAND |
| #elif !defined(NO_MD2) |
| #define USE_MD2_RAND |
| #else |
| #error No message digest algorithm available |
| #endif |
| #endif |
| |
| /* Changed how the state buffer used. I now attempt to 'wrap' such |
| * that I don't run over the same locations the next time go through |
| * the 1023 bytes - many thanks to |
| * Robert J. LeBlanc <rjl@renaissoft.com> for his comments |
| */ |
| |
| #if defined(USE_MD5_RAND) |
| #include <openssl/md5.h> |
| #define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH |
| #define MD_CTX MD5_CTX |
| #define MD_Init(a) MD5_Init(a) |
| #define MD_Update(a,b,c) MD5_Update(a,b,c) |
| #define MD_Final(a,b) MD5_Final(a,b) |
| #define MD(a,b,c) MD5(a,b,c) |
| #elif defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) |
| #include <openssl/sha.h> |
| #define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH |
| #define MD_CTX SHA_CTX |
| #define MD_Init(a) SHA1_Init(a) |
| #define MD_Update(a,b,c) SHA1_Update(a,b,c) |
| #define MD_Final(a,b) SHA1_Final(a,b) |
| #define MD(a,b,c) SHA1(a,b,c) |
| #elif defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) |
| #include <openssl/mdc2.h> |
| #define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH |
| #define MD_CTX MDC2_CTX |
| #define MD_Init(a) MDC2_Init(a) |
| #define MD_Update(a,b,c) MDC2_Update(a,b,c) |
| #define MD_Final(a,b) MDC2_Final(a,b) |
| #define MD(a,b,c) MDC2(a,b,c) |
| #elif defined(USE_MD2_RAND) |
| #include <openssl/md2.h> |
| #define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH |
| #define MD_CTX MD2_CTX |
| #define MD_Init(a) MD2_Init(a) |
| #define MD_Update(a,b,c) MD2_Update(a,b,c) |
| #define MD_Final(a,b) MD2_Final(a,b) |
| #define MD(a,b,c) MD2(a,b,c) |
| #endif |
| |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| |
| #ifdef BN_DEBUG |
| # define PREDICT |
| #endif |
| |
| /* #define NORAND 1 */ |
| /* #define PREDICT 1 */ |
| |
| #define STATE_SIZE 1023 |
| static int state_num=0,state_index=0; |
| static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| static long md_count[2]={0,0}; |
| static double entropy=0; |
| static int initialized=0; |
| |
| #ifdef PREDICT |
| int rand_predictable=0; |
| #endif |
| |
| const char *RAND_version="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; |
| |
| static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void); |
| static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); |
| static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); |
| static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); |
| static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); |
| static int ssleay_rand_status(void); |
| |
| RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={ |
| ssleay_rand_seed, |
| ssleay_rand_bytes, |
| ssleay_rand_cleanup, |
| ssleay_rand_add, |
| ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes, |
| ssleay_rand_status |
| }; |
| |
| RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void) |
| { |
| return(&rand_ssleay_meth); |
| } |
| |
| static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void) |
| { |
| memset(state,0,sizeof(state)); |
| state_num=0; |
| state_index=0; |
| memset(md,0,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| md_count[0]=0; |
| md_count[1]=0; |
| entropy=0; |
| } |
| |
| static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) |
| { |
| int i,j,k,st_idx; |
| long md_c[2]; |
| unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| MD_CTX m; |
| |
| #ifdef NORAND |
| return; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * (Based on the rand(3) manpage) |
| * |
| * The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for |
| * the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash |
| * function as follows: The data passed to the hash function |
| * is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state' |
| * (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as |
| * the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count' |
| * (which is incremented after each use). |
| * The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the |
| * 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the |
| * hash function. |
| */ |
| |
| CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
| st_idx=state_index; |
| |
| /* use our own copies of the counters so that even |
| * if a concurrent thread seeds with exactly the |
| * same data and uses the same subarray there's _some_ |
| * difference */ |
| md_c[0] = md_count[0]; |
| md_c[1] = md_count[1]; |
| |
| memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md); |
| |
| /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ |
| state_index += num; |
| if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE) |
| { |
| state_index%=STATE_SIZE; |
| state_num=STATE_SIZE; |
| } |
| else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE) |
| { |
| if (state_index > state_num) |
| state_num=state_index; |
| } |
| /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ |
| |
| /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] |
| * are what we will use now, but other threads may use them |
| * as well */ |
| |
| md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0); |
| |
| CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
| |
| for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) |
| { |
| j=(num-i); |
| j=(j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH:j; |
| |
| MD_Init(&m); |
| MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| k=(st_idx+j)-STATE_SIZE; |
| if (k > 0) |
| { |
| MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k); |
| MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k); |
| } |
| else |
| MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j); |
| |
| MD_Update(&m,buf,j); |
| MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)); |
| MD_Final(local_md,&m); |
| md_c[1]++; |
| |
| buf=(const char *)buf + j; |
| |
| for (k=0; k<j; k++) |
| { |
| /* Parallel threads may interfere with this, |
| * but always each byte of the new state is |
| * the XOR of some previous value of its |
| * and local_md (itermediate values may be lost). |
| * Alway using locking could hurt performance more |
| * than necessary given that conflicts occur only |
| * when the total seeding is longer than the random |
| * state. */ |
| state[st_idx++]^=local_md[k]; |
| if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE) |
| st_idx=0; |
| } |
| } |
| memset((char *)&m,0,sizeof(m)); |
| |
| CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
| /* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that |
| * other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for |
| * the incremented counter). By XORing it we keep at least as |
| * much entropy as fits into md. */ |
| for (k = 0; k < sizeof md; k++) |
| { |
| md[k] ^= local_md[k]; |
| } |
| if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */ |
| entropy += add; |
| CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
| |
| #ifndef THREADS |
| assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]); |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) |
| { |
| ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, num); |
| } |
| |
| static void ssleay_rand_initialize(void) |
| { |
| unsigned long l; |
| #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS |
| pid_t curr_pid = getpid(); |
| #endif |
| #ifdef DEVRANDOM |
| FILE *fh; |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifdef NORAND |
| return; |
| #endif |
| |
| CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
| /* put in some default random data, we need more than just this */ |
| #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS |
| l=curr_pid; |
| RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0); |
| l=getuid(); |
| RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0); |
| #endif |
| l=time(NULL); |
| RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0); |
| |
| #ifdef DEVRANDOM |
| /* Use a random entropy pool device. Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD |
| * have this. Use /dev/urandom if you can as /dev/random may block |
| * if it runs out of random entries. */ |
| |
| if ((fh = fopen(DEVRANDOM, "r")) != NULL) |
| { |
| unsigned char tmpbuf[ENTROPY_NEEDED]; |
| int n; |
| |
| setvbuf(fh, NULL, _IONBF, 0); |
| n=fread((unsigned char *)tmpbuf,1,ENTROPY_NEEDED,fh); |
| fclose(fh); |
| RAND_add(tmpbuf,sizeof tmpbuf,n); |
| memset(tmpbuf,0,n); |
| } |
| #endif |
| #ifdef PURIFY |
| memset(state,0,STATE_SIZE); |
| memset(md,0,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| #endif |
| CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
| initialized=1; |
| } |
| |
| static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) |
| { |
| int i,j,k,st_num,st_idx; |
| int ok; |
| long md_c[2]; |
| unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| MD_CTX m; |
| #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS |
| pid_t curr_pid = getpid(); |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifdef PREDICT |
| if (rand_predictable) |
| { |
| static unsigned char val=0; |
| |
| for (i=0; i<num; i++) |
| buf[i]=val++; |
| return(1); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:) |
| * |
| * For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following: |
| * |
| * Input into the hash function the top 10 bytes from the |
| * local 'md' (which is initialized from the global 'md' |
| * before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are |
| * to be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the |
| * 'state' (incrementing looping index). From this digest output |
| * (which is kept in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are |
| * returned to the caller and the bottom (up to) 10 bytes are xored |
| * into the 'state'. |
| * Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the |
| * caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md' |
| * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the |
| * global 'md'. |
| */ |
| |
| CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
| |
| if (!initialized) |
| ssleay_rand_initialize(); |
| |
| ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED); |
| if (!ok) |
| { |
| /* If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing |
| * the PRNG output may help attackers to determine the new |
| * state; thus we have to decrease the entropy estimate. |
| * Once we've had enough initial seeding we don't bother to |
| * adjust the entropy count, though, because we're not ambitious |
| * to provide *information-theoretic* randomness. |
| */ |
| entropy -= num; |
| if (entropy < 0) |
| entropy = 0; |
| } |
| |
| st_idx=state_index; |
| st_num=state_num; |
| md_c[0] = md_count[0]; |
| md_c[1] = md_count[1]; |
| memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md); |
| |
| state_index+=num; |
| if (state_index > state_num) |
| state_index %= state_num; |
| |
| /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % st_num] |
| * are now ours (but other threads may use them too) */ |
| |
| md_count[0] += 1; |
| CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
| |
| while (num > 0) |
| { |
| j=(num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2:num; |
| num-=j; |
| MD_Init(&m); |
| #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS |
| if (curr_pid) /* just in the first iteration to save time */ |
| { |
| MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid,sizeof curr_pid); |
| curr_pid = 0; |
| } |
| #endif |
| MD_Update(&m,&(local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2); |
| MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)); |
| #ifndef PURIFY |
| MD_Update(&m,buf,j); /* purify complains */ |
| #endif |
| k=(st_idx+j)-st_num; |
| if (k > 0) |
| { |
| MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k); |
| MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k); |
| } |
| else |
| MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j); |
| MD_Final(local_md,&m); |
| |
| for (i=0; i<j; i++) |
| { |
| state[st_idx++]^=local_md[i]; /* may compete with other threads */ |
| *(buf++)=local_md[i+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2]; |
| if (st_idx >= st_num) |
| st_idx=0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| MD_Init(&m); |
| MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)); |
| MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
| MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| MD_Final(md,&m); |
| CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); |
| |
| memset(&m,0,sizeof(m)); |
| if (ok) |
| return(1); |
| else |
| { |
| RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not |
| unpredictable */ |
| static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) |
| { |
| int ret, err; |
| |
| ret = RAND_bytes(buf, num); |
| if (ret == 0) |
| { |
| err = ERR_peek_error(); |
| if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_RAND && |
| ERR_GET_REASON(err) == RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED) |
| (void)ERR_get_error(); |
| } |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| static int ssleay_rand_status(void) |
| { |
| if (!initialized) |
| ssleay_rand_initialize(); |
| return (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED); |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef WINDOWS |
| #include <windows.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| |
| /***************************************************************************** |
| * Initialisation function for the SSL random generator. Takes the contents |
| * of the screen as random seed. |
| * |
| * Created 960901 by Gertjan van Oosten, gertjan@West.NL, West Consulting B.V. |
| * |
| * Code adapted from |
| * <URL:http://www.microsoft.com/kb/developr/win_dk/q97193.htm>; |
| * the original copyright message is: |
| * |
| * (C) Copyright Microsoft Corp. 1993. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * You have a royalty-free right to use, modify, reproduce and |
| * distribute the Sample Files (and/or any modified version) in |
| * any way you find useful, provided that you agree that |
| * Microsoft has no warranty obligations or liability for any |
| * Sample Application Files which are modified. |
| */ |
| /* |
| * I have modified the loading of bytes via RAND_seed() mechanism since |
| * the original would have been very very CPU intensive since RAND_seed() |
| * does an MD5 per 16 bytes of input. The cost to digest 16 bytes is the same |
| * as that to digest 56 bytes. So under the old system, a screen of |
| * 1024*768*256 would have been CPU cost of approximately 49,000 56 byte MD5 |
| * digests or digesting 2.7 mbytes. What I have put in place would |
| * be 48 16k MD5 digests, or effectively 48*16+48 MD5 bytes or 816 kbytes |
| * or about 3.5 times as much. |
| * - eric |
| */ |
| void RAND_screen(void) |
| { |
| HDC hScrDC; /* screen DC */ |
| HDC hMemDC; /* memory DC */ |
| HBITMAP hBitmap; /* handle for our bitmap */ |
| HBITMAP hOldBitmap; /* handle for previous bitmap */ |
| BITMAP bm; /* bitmap properties */ |
| unsigned int size; /* size of bitmap */ |
| char *bmbits; /* contents of bitmap */ |
| int w; /* screen width */ |
| int h; /* screen height */ |
| int y; /* y-coordinate of screen lines to grab */ |
| int n = 16; /* number of screen lines to grab at a time */ |
| |
| /* Create a screen DC and a memory DC compatible to screen DC */ |
| hScrDC = CreateDC("DISPLAY", NULL, NULL, NULL); |
| hMemDC = CreateCompatibleDC(hScrDC); |
| |
| /* Get screen resolution */ |
| w = GetDeviceCaps(hScrDC, HORZRES); |
| h = GetDeviceCaps(hScrDC, VERTRES); |
| |
| /* Create a bitmap compatible with the screen DC */ |
| hBitmap = CreateCompatibleBitmap(hScrDC, w, n); |
| |
| /* Select new bitmap into memory DC */ |
| hOldBitmap = SelectObject(hMemDC, hBitmap); |
| |
| /* Get bitmap properties */ |
| GetObject(hBitmap, sizeof(BITMAP), (LPSTR)&bm); |
| size = (unsigned int)bm.bmWidthBytes * bm.bmHeight * bm.bmPlanes; |
| |
| bmbits = Malloc(size); |
| if (bmbits) { |
| /* Now go through the whole screen, repeatedly grabbing n lines */ |
| for (y = 0; y < h-n; y += n) |
| { |
| unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| |
| /* Bitblt screen DC to memory DC */ |
| BitBlt(hMemDC, 0, 0, w, n, hScrDC, 0, y, SRCCOPY); |
| |
| /* Copy bitmap bits from memory DC to bmbits */ |
| GetBitmapBits(hBitmap, size, bmbits); |
| |
| /* Get the MD5 of the bitmap */ |
| MD(bmbits,size,md); |
| |
| /* Seed the random generator with the MD5 digest */ |
| RAND_seed(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| } |
| |
| Free(bmbits); |
| } |
| |
| /* Select old bitmap back into memory DC */ |
| hBitmap = SelectObject(hMemDC, hOldBitmap); |
| |
| /* Clean up */ |
| DeleteObject(hBitmap); |
| DeleteDC(hMemDC); |
| DeleteDC(hScrDC); |
| } |
| #endif |