| /* |
| * Copyright 2022-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| */ |
| |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/core_names.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| #include <openssl/ssl.h> |
| #include "internal/ssl3_cbc.h" |
| #include "../../ssl_local.h" |
| #include "../record_local.h" |
| #include "recmethod_local.h" |
| |
| static int tls1_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level, |
| unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, |
| unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen, |
| unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen, |
| const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, |
| size_t taglen, |
| int mactype, |
| const EVP_MD *md, |
| COMP_METHOD *comp) |
| { |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx; |
| EVP_PKEY *mac_key; |
| int enc = (rl->direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE) ? 1 : 0; |
| |
| if (level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION) |
| return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; |
| |
| if ((rl->enc_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) { |
| RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
| return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| ciph_ctx = rl->enc_ctx; |
| |
| rl->md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
| if (rl->md_ctx == NULL) { |
| RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; |
| } |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
| if (comp != NULL) { |
| rl->compctx = COMP_CTX_new(comp); |
| if (rl->compctx == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR); |
| return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * If we have an AEAD Cipher, then there is no separate MAC, so we can skip |
| * setting up the MAC key. |
| */ |
| if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) == 0) { |
| if (mactype == EVP_PKEY_HMAC) { |
| mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(rl->libctx, "HMAC", |
| rl->propq, mackey, |
| mackeylen); |
| } else { |
| /* |
| * If its not HMAC then the only other types of MAC we support are |
| * the GOST MACs, so we need to use the old style way of creating |
| * a MAC key. |
| */ |
| mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mactype, NULL, mackey, |
| (int)mackeylen); |
| } |
| if (mac_key == NULL |
| || EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(rl->md_ctx, NULL, EVP_MD_get0_name(md), |
| rl->libctx, rl->propq, mac_key, |
| NULL) |
| <= 0) { |
| EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; |
| } |
| EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); |
| } |
| |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { |
| if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, NULL, enc) |
| || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, |
| (int)ivlen, iv) |
| <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; |
| } |
| } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { |
| if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, enc) |
| || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12, |
| NULL) |
| <= 0 |
| || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, |
| (int)taglen, NULL) |
| <= 0 |
| || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED, |
| (int)ivlen, iv) |
| <= 0 |
| || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, enc)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, iv, enc)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; |
| } |
| } |
| /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */ |
| if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0 |
| && mackeylen != 0 |
| && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY, |
| (int)mackeylen, mackey) |
| <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * The cipher we actually ended up using in the EVP_CIPHER_CTX may be |
| * different to that in ciph if we have an ENGINE in use |
| */ |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ciph_ctx)) != NULL |
| && !ossl_set_tls_provider_parameters(rl, ciph_ctx, ciph, md)) { |
| /* ERR_raise already called */ |
| return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; |
| } |
| |
| /* Calculate the explicit IV length */ |
| if (RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl)) { |
| int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ciph_ctx); |
| int eivlen = 0; |
| |
| if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { |
| eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ciph_ctx); |
| if (eivlen < 0) { |
| RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); |
| return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; |
| } |
| if (eivlen <= 1) |
| eivlen = 0; |
| } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { |
| /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ |
| eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { |
| eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| } |
| rl->eivlen = (size_t)eivlen; |
| } |
| |
| return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS; |
| } |
| |
| #define MAX_PADDING 256 |
| /*- |
| * tls1_cipher encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Calls RLAYERfatal on |
| * internal error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller to |
| * report a bad_record_mac - if appropriate (DTLS just drops the record). |
| * |
| * Returns: |
| * 0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error, or AEAD |
| * decryption failed, or Encrypt-then-mac decryption failed. |
| * 1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised) |
| */ |
| static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, TLS_RL_RECORD *recs, |
| size_t n_recs, int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *macs, |
| size_t macsize) |
| { |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; |
| size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; |
| unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN]; |
| unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; |
| int pad = 0, tmpr, provided; |
| size_t bs, ctr, padnum, loop; |
| unsigned char padval; |
| const EVP_CIPHER *enc; |
| |
| if (n_recs == 0) { |
| RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(rl->md_ctx)) { |
| int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(rl->md_ctx); |
| |
| if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) { |
| RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| ds = rl->enc_ctx; |
| if (!ossl_assert(rl->enc_ctx != NULL)) { |
| RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(rl->enc_ctx); |
| |
| if (sending) { |
| int ivlen; |
| |
| /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */ |
| if (RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl) |
| && EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
| ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(enc); |
| else |
| ivlen = 0; |
| if (ivlen > 1) { |
| for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
| if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) { |
| RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } else if (RAND_bytes_ex(rl->libctx, recs[ctr].input, |
| ivlen, 0) |
| <= 0) { |
| RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| if (!ossl_assert(enc != NULL)) { |
| RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| provided = (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL); |
| |
| bs = EVP_CIPHER_get_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds)); |
| |
| if (bs == 0) { |
| RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (n_recs > 1) { |
| if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds)) |
| & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) |
| == 0) { |
| /* |
| * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the |
| * cipher doesn't support pipelining |
| */ |
| RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
| reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length; |
| |
| if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds)) |
| & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) |
| != 0) { |
| unsigned char *seq; |
| |
| seq = rl->sequence; |
| |
| if (rl->isdtls) { |
| unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq; |
| |
| s2n(rl->epoch, p); |
| memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); |
| memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8); |
| } else { |
| memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8); |
| if (!tls_increment_sequence_ctr(rl)) { |
| /* RLAYERfatal already called */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type; |
| buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(rl->version >> 8); |
| buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(rl->version); |
| buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8); |
| buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff); |
| pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, |
| EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]); |
| if (pad <= 0) { |
| RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (sending) { |
| reclen[ctr] += pad; |
| recs[ctr].length += pad; |
| } |
| } else if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) { |
| /* |
| * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the |
| * padding on the provider side. |
| */ |
| padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs); |
| |
| /* Add weird padding of up to 256 bytes */ |
| |
| if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) { |
| RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */ |
| padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1); |
| for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++) |
| recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval; |
| reclen[ctr] += padnum; |
| recs[ctr].length += padnum; |
| } |
| |
| if (!sending) { |
| if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) { |
| /* Publicly invalid */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| if (n_recs > 1) { |
| /* Set the output buffers */ |
| for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) |
| data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data; |
| |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS, |
| (int)n_recs, data) |
| <= 0) { |
| RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* Set the input buffers */ |
| for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) |
| data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input; |
| |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS, |
| (int)n_recs, data) |
| <= 0 |
| || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS, |
| (int)n_recs, reclen) |
| <= 0) { |
| RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!rl->isdtls && rl->tlstree) { |
| int decrement_seq = 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * When sending, seq is incremented after MAC calculation. |
| * So if we are in ETM mode, we use seq 'as is' in the ctrl-function. |
| * Otherwise we have to decrease it in the implementation |
| */ |
| if (sending && !rl->use_etm) |
| decrement_seq = 1; |
| |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_TLSTREE, decrement_seq, |
| rl->sequence) |
| <= 0) { |
| |
| RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (provided) { |
| int outlen; |
| |
| /* Provided cipher - we do not support pipelining on this path */ |
| if (n_recs > 1) { |
| RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, recs[0].data, &outlen, recs[0].input, |
| (unsigned int)reclen[0])) |
| return 0; |
| recs[0].length = outlen; |
| |
| /* |
| * The length returned from EVP_CipherUpdate above is the actual |
| * payload length. We need to adjust the data/input ptr to skip over |
| * any explicit IV |
| */ |
| if (!sending) { |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { |
| recs[0].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| recs[0].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { |
| recs[0].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| recs[0].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| } else if (bs != 1 && RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl)) { |
| recs[0].data += bs; |
| recs[0].input += bs; |
| recs[0].orig_len -= bs; |
| } |
| |
| /* Now get a pointer to the MAC (if applicable) */ |
| if (macs != NULL) { |
| OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params; |
| |
| /* Get the MAC */ |
| macs[0].alloced = 0; |
| |
| *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC, |
| (void **)&macs[0].mac, |
| macsize); |
| *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); |
| |
| if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) { |
| /* Shouldn't normally happen */ |
| RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
| ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } else { |
| /* Legacy cipher */ |
| |
| tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input, |
| (unsigned int)reclen[0]); |
| if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds)) |
| & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) |
| != 0 |
| ? (tmpr < 0) |
| : (tmpr == 0)) { |
| /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!sending) { |
| for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { |
| /* Adjust the record to remove the explicit IV/MAC/Tag */ |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { |
| recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { |
| recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| } else if (bs != 1 && RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl)) { |
| if (recs[ctr].length < bs) |
| return 0; |
| recs[ctr].data += bs; |
| recs[ctr].input += bs; |
| recs[ctr].length -= bs; |
| recs[ctr].orig_len -= bs; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * If using Mac-then-encrypt, then this will succeed but |
| * with a random MAC if padding is invalid |
| */ |
| if (!tls1_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&recs[ctr].length, |
| recs[ctr].orig_len, |
| recs[ctr].data, |
| (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].mac : NULL, |
| (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].alloced |
| : NULL, |
| bs, |
| pad ? (size_t)pad : macsize, |
| (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(enc) |
| & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) |
| != 0, |
| rl->libctx)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int tls1_mac(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, TLS_RL_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, |
| int sending) |
| { |
| unsigned char *seq = rl->sequence; |
| EVP_MD_CTX *hash; |
| size_t md_size; |
| EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx; |
| unsigned char header[13]; |
| int t; |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| hash = rl->md_ctx; |
| |
| t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash); |
| if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0)) |
| return 0; |
| md_size = t; |
| |
| if (rl->stream_mac) { |
| mac_ctx = hash; |
| } else { |
| hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
| if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) { |
| goto end; |
| } |
| mac_ctx = hmac; |
| } |
| |
| if (!rl->isdtls |
| && rl->tlstree |
| && EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_TLSTREE, 0, seq) <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| |
| if (rl->isdtls) { |
| unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq; |
| |
| s2n(rl->epoch, p); |
| memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); |
| |
| memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8); |
| } else { |
| memcpy(header, seq, 8); |
| } |
| |
| header[8] = rec->type; |
| header[9] = (unsigned char)(rl->version >> 8); |
| header[10] = (unsigned char)(rl->version); |
| header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8); |
| header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff); |
| |
| if (!sending && !rl->use_etm |
| && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(rl->enc_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE |
| && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { |
| OSSL_PARAM tls_hmac_params[2], *p = tls_hmac_params; |
| |
| *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE, |
| &rec->orig_len); |
| *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); |
| |
| if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(mac_ctx), |
| tls_hmac_params)) |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0 |
| || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 |
| || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| |
| OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) |
| { |
| BIO_printf(trc_out, "seq:\n"); |
| BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, seq, 8, 4); |
| BIO_printf(trc_out, "rec:\n"); |
| BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rec->data, rec->length, 4); |
| } |
| OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS); |
| |
| if (!rl->isdtls && !tls_increment_sequence_ctr(rl)) { |
| /* RLAYERfatal already called */ |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) |
| { |
| BIO_printf(trc_out, "md:\n"); |
| BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, md, md_size, 4); |
| } |
| OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS); |
| ret = 1; |
| end: |
| EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0 |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
| #define MAX_PREFIX_LEN ((SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1) \ |
| + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \ |
| + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH \ |
| + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD) |
| #else |
| #define MAX_PREFIX_LEN ((SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1) \ |
| + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \ |
| + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) |
| #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_COMP */ |
| #else |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
| #define MAX_PREFIX_LEN (SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \ |
| + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH \ |
| + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD) |
| #else |
| #define MAX_PREFIX_LEN (SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \ |
| + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) |
| #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_COMP */ |
| #endif |
| |
| /* This function is also used by the SSLv3 implementation */ |
| int tls1_allocate_write_buffers(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, |
| OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE *templates, |
| size_t numtempl, size_t *prefix) |
| { |
| /* Do we need to add an empty record prefix? */ |
| *prefix = rl->need_empty_fragments |
| && templates[0].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA; |
| |
| /* |
| * In the prefix case we can allocate a much smaller buffer. Otherwise we |
| * just allocate the default buffer size |
| */ |
| if (!tls_setup_write_buffer(rl, numtempl + *prefix, |
| *prefix ? MAX_PREFIX_LEN : 0, 0)) { |
| /* RLAYERfatal() already called */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* This function is also used by the SSLv3 implementation */ |
| int tls1_initialise_write_packets(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, |
| OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE *templates, |
| size_t numtempl, |
| OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE *prefixtempl, |
| WPACKET *pkt, |
| TLS_BUFFER *bufs, |
| size_t *wpinited) |
| { |
| size_t align = 0; |
| TLS_BUFFER *wb; |
| size_t prefix; |
| |
| /* Do we need to add an empty record prefix? */ |
| prefix = rl->need_empty_fragments |
| && templates[0].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA; |
| |
| if (prefix) { |
| /* |
| * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see |
| * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) |
| */ |
| prefixtempl->buf = NULL; |
| prefixtempl->version = templates[0].version; |
| prefixtempl->buflen = 0; |
| prefixtempl->type = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA; |
| |
| wb = &bufs[0]; |
| |
| #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0 |
| align = (size_t)TLS_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 |
| - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); |
| #endif |
| TLS_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); |
| |
| if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], TLS_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), |
| TLS_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)) { |
| RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| *wpinited = 1; |
| if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) { |
| RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return tls_initialise_write_packets_default(rl, templates, numtempl, |
| NULL, |
| pkt + prefix, bufs + prefix, |
| wpinited); |
| } |
| |
| /* TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 all use the same funcs */ |
| const struct record_functions_st tls_1_funcs = { |
| tls1_set_crypto_state, |
| tls1_cipher, |
| tls1_mac, |
| tls_default_set_protocol_version, |
| tls_default_read_n, |
| tls_get_more_records, |
| tls_default_validate_record_header, |
| tls_default_post_process_record, |
| tls_get_max_records_multiblock, |
| tls_write_records_multiblock, /* Defined in tls_multib.c */ |
| tls1_allocate_write_buffers, |
| tls1_initialise_write_packets, |
| NULL, |
| tls_prepare_record_header_default, |
| NULL, |
| tls_prepare_for_encryption_default, |
| tls_post_encryption_processing_default, |
| NULL |
| }; |
| |
| const struct record_functions_st dtls_1_funcs = { |
| tls1_set_crypto_state, |
| tls1_cipher, |
| tls1_mac, |
| tls_default_set_protocol_version, |
| tls_default_read_n, |
| dtls_get_more_records, |
| NULL, |
| NULL, |
| NULL, |
| tls_write_records_default, |
| /* |
| * Don't use tls1_allocate_write_buffers since that handles empty fragment |
| * records which aren't needed in DTLS. We just use the default allocation |
| * instead. |
| */ |
| tls_allocate_write_buffers_default, |
| /* Don't use tls1_initialise_write_packets for same reason as above */ |
| tls_initialise_write_packets_default, |
| NULL, |
| dtls_prepare_record_header, |
| NULL, |
| tls_prepare_for_encryption_default, |
| dtls_post_encryption_processing, |
| NULL |
| }; |
