| /* |
| * Copyright 2005-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| */ |
| |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <errno.h> |
| #include "../ssl_local.h" |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
| #include "record_local.h" |
| #include "internal/packet.h" |
| #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
| #include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h" |
| |
| int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl) |
| { |
| DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d; |
| |
| if ((d = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d))) == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| rl->d = d; |
| |
| d->buffered_app_data = pqueue_new(); |
| |
| if (d->buffered_app_data == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_free(d); |
| rl->d = NULL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(RECORD_LAYER *rl) |
| { |
| if (rl->d == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl); |
| pqueue_free(rl->d->buffered_app_data); |
| OPENSSL_free(rl->d); |
| rl->d = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl) |
| { |
| DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d; |
| pitem *item = NULL; |
| TLS_RECORD *rec; |
| pqueue *buffered_app_data; |
| |
| d = rl->d; |
| |
| while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->buffered_app_data)) != NULL) { |
| rec = (TLS_RECORD *)item->data; |
| |
| if (rl->s->options & SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT) |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(rec->allocdata, rec->length); |
| OPENSSL_free(rec->allocdata); |
| OPENSSL_free(item->data); |
| pitem_free(item); |
| } |
| |
| buffered_app_data = d->buffered_app_data; |
| memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d)); |
| d->buffered_app_data = buffered_app_data; |
| } |
| |
| static int dtls_buffer_record(SSL_CONNECTION *s, TLS_RECORD *rec) |
| { |
| TLS_RECORD *rdata; |
| pitem *item; |
| struct pqueue_st *queue = s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data; |
| |
| /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */ |
| if (pqueue_size(queue) >= 100) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* We don't buffer partially read records */ |
| if (!ossl_assert(rec->off == 0)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*rdata)); |
| item = pitem_new(rec->seq_num, rdata); |
| if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_free(rdata); |
| pitem_free(item); |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| *rdata = *rec; |
| /* |
| * We will release the record from the record layer soon, so we take a copy |
| * now. Copying data isn't good - but this should be infrequent so we |
| * accept it here. |
| */ |
| rdata->data = rdata->allocdata = OPENSSL_memdup(rec->data, rec->length); |
| if (rdata->data == NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_free(rdata); |
| pitem_free(item); |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| /* |
| * We use a NULL rechandle to indicate that the data field has been |
| * allocated by us. |
| */ |
| rdata->rechandle = NULL; |
| |
| item->data = rdata; |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */ |
| if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(s->rbio) && (ossl_statem_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED || ossl_statem_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED)) { |
| BIO_ctrl(s->rbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO, |
| sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| if (pqueue_insert(queue, item) == NULL) { |
| /* Must be a duplicate so ignore it */ |
| OPENSSL_free(rdata->allocdata); |
| OPENSSL_free(rdata); |
| pitem_free(item); |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Unbuffer a previously buffered TLS_RECORD structure if any */ |
| static void dtls_unbuffer_record(SSL_CONNECTION *s) |
| { |
| TLS_RECORD *rdata; |
| pitem *item; |
| |
| /* If we already have records to handle then do nothing */ |
| if (s->rlayer.curr_rec < s->rlayer.num_recs) |
| return; |
| |
| item = pqueue_pop(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data); |
| if (item != NULL) { |
| rdata = (TLS_RECORD *)item->data; |
| |
| s->rlayer.tlsrecs[0] = *rdata; |
| s->rlayer.num_recs = 1; |
| s->rlayer.curr_rec = 0; |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */ |
| if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(s->rbio)) { |
| BIO_ctrl(s->rbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO, |
| sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(item->data); |
| pitem_free(item); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. |
| * 'type' is one of the following: |
| * |
| * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE |
| * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) |
| * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) |
| * |
| * If we don't have stored data to work from, read an SSL/TLS record first |
| * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). |
| * |
| * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as |
| * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec |
| * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type| |
| * argument is non NULL. |
| * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store |
| * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol |
| * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): |
| * Change cipher spec protocol |
| * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored |
| * Alert protocol |
| * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) |
| * Handshake protocol |
| * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have |
| * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages |
| * here, anything else is handled by higher layers |
| * Application data protocol |
| * none of our business |
| */ |
| int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, uint8_t type, uint8_t *recvd_type, |
| unsigned char *buf, size_t len, |
| int peek, size_t *readbytes) |
| { |
| int i, j, ret; |
| size_t n; |
| TLS_RECORD *rr; |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); |
| |
| if (sc == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { |
| SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(sc) && SSL_in_init(s)) { |
| /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ |
| i = sc->handshake_func(s); |
| /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ |
| if (i < 0) |
| return i; |
| if (i == 0) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| start: |
| sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| |
| /* |
| * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered |
| * during the last handshake in advance, if any. |
| */ |
| if (SSL_is_init_finished(s)) |
| dtls_unbuffer_record(sc); |
| |
| /* Check for timeout */ |
| if (dtls1_handle_timeout(sc) > 0) { |
| goto start; |
| } else if (ossl_statem_in_error(sc)) { |
| /* dtls1_handle_timeout() has failed with a fatal error */ |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* get new packet if necessary */ |
| if (sc->rlayer.curr_rec >= sc->rlayer.num_recs) { |
| sc->rlayer.curr_rec = sc->rlayer.num_recs = 0; |
| do { |
| rr = &sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[sc->rlayer.num_recs]; |
| |
| ret = HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(sc, |
| sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->read_record(sc->rlayer.rrl, |
| &rr->rechandle, |
| &rr->version, &rr->type, |
| &rr->data, &rr->length, |
| &rr->epoch, rr->seq_num)); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| ret = dtls1_read_failed(sc, ret); |
| /* |
| * Anything other than a timeout is an error. SSLfatal() already |
| * called if appropriate. |
| */ |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| return ret; |
| else |
| goto start; |
| } |
| rr->off = 0; |
| sc->rlayer.num_recs++; |
| } while (sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->processed_read_pending(sc->rlayer.rrl) |
| && sc->rlayer.num_recs < SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); |
| } |
| rr = &sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[sc->rlayer.curr_rec]; |
| |
| /* |
| * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty |
| * record that isn't an alert. |
| */ |
| if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0) |
| sc->rlayer.alert_count = 0; |
| |
| /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ |
| |
| if (sc->s3.change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, |
| * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ |
| && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { |
| /* |
| * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely |
| * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application |
| * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection. |
| */ |
| if (dtls_buffer_record(sc, rr) < 0) { |
| /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
| return -1; |
| } |
| if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0)) |
| return -1; |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in |
| * 'peek' mode) |
| */ |
| if (sc->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { |
| if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0)) |
| return -1; |
| sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (type == rr->type |
| || (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC |
| && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) { |
| /* |
| * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or |
| * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or |
| * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC |
| */ |
| /* |
| * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are |
| * doing a handshake for the first time |
| */ |
| if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) |
| && (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(sc))) { |
| SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
| SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (recvd_type != NULL) |
| *recvd_type = rr->type; |
| |
| if (len == 0) { |
| /* |
| * Release a zero length record. This ensures multiple calls to |
| * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause |
| * SSL_pending() to report data as being available. |
| */ |
| if (rr->length == 0 && !ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0)) |
| return -1; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (len > rr->length) |
| n = rr->length; |
| else |
| n = len; |
| |
| memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); |
| if (peek) { |
| if (rr->length == 0 && !ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0)) |
| return -1; |
| } else { |
| if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, n)) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| /* |
| * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered |
| * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read |
| * anymore, finally set shutdown. |
| */ |
| if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && sc->d1->shutdown_received |
| && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)) <= 0) { |
| sc->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif |
| *readbytes = n; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, |
| * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). |
| */ |
| |
| if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { |
| unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr; |
| const unsigned char *alert_bytes = rr->data + rr->off; |
| PACKET alert; |
| |
| if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, rr->length) |
| || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level) |
| || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr) |
| || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) { |
| SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (sc->msg_callback) |
| sc->msg_callback(0, sc->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s, |
| sc->msg_callback_arg); |
| |
| if (sc->info_callback != NULL) |
| cb = sc->info_callback; |
| else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) |
| cb = s->ctx->info_callback; |
| |
| if (cb != NULL) { |
| j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; |
| cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); |
| } |
| |
| if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { |
| sc->s3.warn_alert = alert_descr; |
| if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| sc->rlayer.alert_count++; |
| if (sc->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { |
| SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
| SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| /* |
| * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data |
| * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so |
| * that nothing gets discarded. |
| */ |
| if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)) > 0) { |
| sc->d1->shutdown_received = 1; |
| sc->rwstate = SSL_READING; |
| BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); |
| BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| #endif |
| sc->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
| return 0; |
| } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { |
| /* |
| * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested |
| * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal |
| * alert because if the application tried to renegotiate it |
| * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In |
| * the future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care |
| * if the peer refused it where we carry on. |
| */ |
| SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { |
| sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| sc->s3.fatal_alert = alert_descr; |
| SSLfatal_data(sc, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, |
| SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr, |
| "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr); |
| sc->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
| if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0)) |
| return -1; |
| SSL_CTX_remove_session(sc->session_ctx, sc->session); |
| return 0; |
| } else { |
| SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| if (sc->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a |
| * shutdown */ |
| sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0)) |
| return -1; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
| /* |
| * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages |
| * are still missing, so just drop it. |
| */ |
| if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0)) |
| return -1; |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) |
| */ |
| if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(sc)) { |
| struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; |
| |
| /* |
| * This may just be a stale retransmit. Also sanity check that we have |
| * at least enough record bytes for a message header |
| */ |
| if (rr->epoch != sc->rlayer.d->r_epoch |
| || rr->length < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { |
| if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0)) |
| return -1; |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr); |
| |
| /* |
| * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client |
| * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED. |
| */ |
| if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
| if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(sc) < 0) { |
| /* SSLfatal) already called */ |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(sc) <= 0) { |
| /* Fail if we encountered a fatal error */ |
| if (ossl_statem_in_error(sc)) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0)) |
| return -1; |
| if (!(sc->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { |
| if (!sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->unprocessed_read_pending(sc->rlayer.rrl)) { |
| /* no read-ahead left? */ |
| BIO *bio; |
| |
| sc->rwstate = SSL_READING; |
| bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); |
| BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); |
| BIO_set_retry_read(bio); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * To get here we must be trying to read app data but found handshake |
| * data. But if we're trying to read app data, and we're not in init |
| * (which is tested for at the top of this function) then init must be |
| * finished |
| */ |
| if (!ossl_assert(SSL_is_init_finished(s))) { |
| SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */ |
| ossl_statem_set_in_init(sc, 1); |
| |
| i = sc->handshake_func(s); |
| /* SSLfatal() called if appropriate */ |
| if (i < 0) |
| return i; |
| if (i == 0) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if (!(sc->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { |
| if (!sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->unprocessed_read_pending(sc->rlayer.rrl)) { |
| /* no read-ahead left? */ |
| BIO *bio; |
| /* |
| * In the case where we try to read application data, but we |
| * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry |
| * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty |
| * problems in the blocking world |
| */ |
| sc->rwstate = SSL_READING; |
| bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); |
| BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); |
| BIO_set_retry_read(bio); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| goto start; |
| } |
| |
| switch (rr->type) { |
| default: |
| SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
| return -1; |
| case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: |
| case SSL3_RT_ALERT: |
| case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: |
| /* |
| * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of |
| * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but |
| * that should not happen when type != rr->type |
| */ |
| SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: |
| /* |
| * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have |
| * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() |
| * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read |
| * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet |
| * started), we will indulge it. |
| */ |
| if (sc->s3.in_read_app_data && (sc->s3.total_renegotiations != 0) && ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(sc)) { |
| sc->s3.in_read_app_data = 2; |
| return -1; |
| } else { |
| SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| /* not reached */ |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if |
| * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. |
| */ |
| int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint8_t type, const void *buf, |
| size_t len, size_t *written) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| if (!ossl_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, written); |
| return i; |
| } |
| |
| int do_dtls1_write(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, uint8_t type, const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len, size_t *written) |
| { |
| int i; |
| OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE tmpl; |
| SSL *s = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc); |
| int ret; |
| |
| /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ |
| if (sc->s3.alert_dispatch > 0) { |
| i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); |
| if (i <= 0) |
| return i; |
| /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ |
| } |
| |
| if (len == 0) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (len > ssl_get_max_send_fragment(sc)) { |
| SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_EXCEEDS_MAX_FRAGMENT_SIZE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| tmpl.type = type; |
| /* |
| * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we |
| * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0 |
| * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it. |
| */ |
| if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION |
| && sc->max_proto_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
| tmpl.version = DTLS1_VERSION; |
| else |
| tmpl.version = sc->version; |
| tmpl.buf = buf; |
| tmpl.buflen = len; |
| |
| ret = HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(sc, |
| sc->rlayer.wrlmethod->write_records(sc->rlayer.wrl, &tmpl, 1)); |
| |
| if (ret > 0) |
| *written = (int)len; |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| void dtls1_increment_epoch(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int rw) |
| { |
| if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) { |
| s->rlayer.d->r_epoch++; |
| |
| /* |
| * We must not use any buffered messages received from the previous |
| * epoch |
| */ |
| dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); |
| } else { |
| s->rlayer.d->w_epoch++; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| uint16_t dtls1_get_epoch(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int rw) |
| { |
| uint16_t epoch; |
| |
| if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) |
| epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch; |
| else |
| epoch = s->rlayer.d->w_epoch; |
| |
| return epoch; |
| } |
