| /* |
| * Copyright 1999-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| */ |
| |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| #include "crypto/x509.h" |
| |
| static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST *const *a, const X509_TRUST *const *b); |
| static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p); |
| |
| static int trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags); |
| static int trust_1oid(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags); |
| static int trust_compat(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags); |
| |
| static int obj_trust(int id, X509 *x, int flags); |
| static int (*default_trust) (int id, X509 *x, int flags) = obj_trust; |
| |
| /* |
| * WARNING: the following table should be kept in order of trust and without |
| * any gaps so we can just subtract the minimum trust value to get an index |
| * into the table |
| */ |
| |
| static X509_TRUST trstandard[] = { |
| {X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, trust_compat, "compatible", 0, NULL}, |
| {X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, trust_1oidany, "SSL Client", NID_client_auth, |
| NULL}, |
| {X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, trust_1oidany, "SSL Server", NID_server_auth, |
| NULL}, |
| {X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, trust_1oidany, "S/MIME email", NID_email_protect, |
| NULL}, |
| {X509_TRUST_OBJECT_SIGN, 0, trust_1oidany, "Object Signer", NID_code_sign, |
| NULL}, |
| {X509_TRUST_OCSP_SIGN, 0, trust_1oid, "OCSP responder", NID_OCSP_sign, |
| NULL}, |
| {X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST, 0, trust_1oid, "OCSP request", NID_ad_OCSP, |
| NULL}, |
| {X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, trust_1oidany, "TSA server", NID_time_stamp, NULL} |
| }; |
| |
| #define X509_TRUST_COUNT OSSL_NELEM(trstandard) |
| |
| static STACK_OF(X509_TRUST) *trtable = NULL; |
| |
| static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST *const *a, const X509_TRUST *const *b) |
| { |
| return (*a)->trust - (*b)->trust; |
| } |
| |
| int (*X509_TRUST_set_default(int (*trust) (int, X509 *, int))) (int, X509 *, |
| int) { |
| int (*oldtrust) (int, X509 *, int); |
| oldtrust = default_trust; |
| default_trust = trust; |
| return oldtrust; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_check_trust(X509 *x, int id, int flags) |
| { |
| X509_TRUST *pt; |
| int idx; |
| |
| /* We get this as a default value */ |
| if (id == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) |
| return obj_trust(NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage, x, |
| flags | X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT); |
| idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id); |
| if (idx < 0) |
| return default_trust(id, x, flags); |
| pt = X509_TRUST_get0(idx); |
| return pt->check_trust(pt, x, flags); |
| } |
| |
| int X509_TRUST_get_count(void) |
| { |
| if (!trtable) |
| return X509_TRUST_COUNT; |
| return sk_X509_TRUST_num(trtable) + X509_TRUST_COUNT; |
| } |
| |
| X509_TRUST *X509_TRUST_get0(int idx) |
| { |
| if (idx < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| if (idx < (int)X509_TRUST_COUNT) |
| return trstandard + idx; |
| return sk_X509_TRUST_value(trtable, idx - X509_TRUST_COUNT); |
| } |
| |
| int X509_TRUST_get_by_id(int id) |
| { |
| X509_TRUST tmp; |
| int idx; |
| |
| if ((id >= X509_TRUST_MIN) && (id <= X509_TRUST_MAX)) |
| return id - X509_TRUST_MIN; |
| if (trtable == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| tmp.trust = id; |
| idx = sk_X509_TRUST_find(trtable, &tmp); |
| if (idx < 0) |
| return -1; |
| return idx + X509_TRUST_COUNT; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_TRUST_set(int *t, int trust) |
| { |
| if (X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust) < 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_INVALID_TRUST); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| *t = trust; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_TRUST_add(int id, int flags, int (*ck) (X509_TRUST *, X509 *, int), |
| const char *name, int arg1, void *arg2) |
| { |
| int idx; |
| X509_TRUST *trtmp; |
| /* |
| * This is set according to what we change: application can't set it |
| */ |
| flags &= ~X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC; |
| /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */ |
| flags |= X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME; |
| /* Get existing entry if any */ |
| idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id); |
| /* Need a new entry */ |
| if (idx < 0) { |
| if ((trtmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*trtmp))) == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| trtmp->flags = X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC; |
| } else |
| trtmp = X509_TRUST_get0(idx); |
| |
| /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */ |
| if (trtmp->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME) |
| OPENSSL_free(trtmp->name); |
| /* dup supplied name */ |
| if ((trtmp->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name)) == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */ |
| trtmp->flags &= X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC; |
| /* Set all other flags */ |
| trtmp->flags |= flags; |
| |
| trtmp->trust = id; |
| trtmp->check_trust = ck; |
| trtmp->arg1 = arg1; |
| trtmp->arg2 = arg2; |
| |
| /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */ |
| if (idx < 0) { |
| if (trtable == NULL |
| && (trtable = sk_X509_TRUST_new(tr_cmp)) == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (!sk_X509_TRUST_push(trtable, trtmp)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| return 1; |
| err: |
| if (idx < 0) { |
| OPENSSL_free(trtmp->name); |
| OPENSSL_free(trtmp); |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p) |
| { |
| if (p == NULL) |
| return; |
| if (p->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC) { |
| if (p->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME) |
| OPENSSL_free(p->name); |
| OPENSSL_free(p); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void X509_TRUST_cleanup(void) |
| { |
| sk_X509_TRUST_pop_free(trtable, trtable_free); |
| trtable = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_TRUST_get_flags(const X509_TRUST *xp) |
| { |
| return xp->flags; |
| } |
| |
| char *X509_TRUST_get0_name(const X509_TRUST *xp) |
| { |
| return xp->name; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_TRUST_get_trust(const X509_TRUST *xp) |
| { |
| return xp->trust; |
| } |
| |
| static int trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags) |
| { |
| /* |
| * Declare the chain verified if the desired trust OID is not rejected in |
| * any auxiliary trust info for this certificate, and the OID is either |
| * expressly trusted, or else either "anyEKU" is trusted, or the |
| * certificate is self-signed and X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT is not set. |
| */ |
| flags |= X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT | X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU; |
| return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags); |
| } |
| |
| static int trust_1oid(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags) |
| { |
| /* |
| * Declare the chain verified only if the desired trust OID is not |
| * rejected and is expressly trusted. Neither "anyEKU" nor "compat" |
| * trust in self-signed certificates apply. |
| */ |
| flags &= ~(X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT | X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU); |
| return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags); |
| } |
| |
| static int trust_compat(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags) |
| { |
| /* Call for side-effect of setting EXFLAG_SS for self-signed-certs */ |
| if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1) |
| return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; |
| if ((flags & X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT) == 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)) |
| return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; |
| else |
| return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; |
| } |
| |
| static int obj_trust(int id, X509 *x, int flags) |
| { |
| X509_CERT_AUX *ax = x->aux; |
| int i; |
| |
| if (ax && ax->reject) { |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->reject); i++) { |
| ASN1_OBJECT *obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->reject, i); |
| int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj); |
| |
| if (nid == id || (nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage && |
| (flags & X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU))) |
| return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (ax && ax->trust) { |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->trust); i++) { |
| ASN1_OBJECT *obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->trust, i); |
| int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj); |
| |
| if (nid == id || (nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage && |
| (flags & X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU))) |
| return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; |
| } |
| /* |
| * Reject when explicit trust EKU are set and none match. |
| * |
| * Returning untrusted is enough for for full chains that end in |
| * self-signed roots, because when explicit trust is specified it |
| * suppresses the default blanket trust of self-signed objects. |
| * |
| * But for partial chains, this is not enough, because absent a similar |
| * trust-self-signed policy, non matching EKUs are indistinguishable |
| * from lack of EKU constraints. |
| * |
| * Therefore, failure to match any trusted purpose must trigger an |
| * explicit reject. |
| */ |
| return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; |
| } |
| |
| if ((flags & X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT) == 0) |
| return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; |
| |
| /* |
| * Not rejected, and there is no list of accepted uses, try compat. |
| */ |
| return trust_compat(NULL, x, flags); |
| } |