| =pod |
| |
| =head1 NAME |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc - X509 verification parameters |
| |
| =head1 SYNOPSIS |
| |
| #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h> |
| |
| int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, unsigned long flags); |
| int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, |
| unsigned long flags); |
| unsigned long X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param); |
| |
| int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int purpose); |
| int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int trust); |
| |
| void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, time_t t); |
| |
| int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, |
| ASN1_OBJECT *policy); |
| int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, |
| STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policies); |
| |
| void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int depth); |
| int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param); |
| |
| int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, |
| const char *name, size_t namelen); |
| int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, |
| const char *name, size_t namelen); |
| void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, |
| unsigned int flags); |
| char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param); |
| int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, |
| const char *email, size_t emaillen); |
| int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, |
| const unsigned char *ip, size_t iplen); |
| int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *ipasc); |
| |
| =head1 DESCRIPTION |
| |
| These functions manipulate the B<X509_VERIFY_PARAM> structure associated with |
| a certificate verification operation. |
| |
| The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags() function sets the flags in B<param> by oring |
| it with B<flags>. See the B<VERIFICATION FLAGS> section for a complete |
| description of values the B<flags> parameter can take. |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags() returns the flags in B<param>. |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags() clears the flags B<flags> in B<param>. |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose() sets the verification purpose in B<param> |
| to B<purpose>. This determines the acceptable purpose of the certificate |
| chain, for example SSL client or SSL server. |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust() sets the trust setting in B<param> to |
| B<trust>. |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() sets the verification time in B<param> to |
| B<t>. Normally the current time is used. |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() enables policy checking (it is disabled |
| by default) and adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set. |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() enables policy checking (it is disabled |
| by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to B<policies>. Any existing |
| policy set is cleared. The B<policies> parameter can be B<NULL> to clear |
| an existing policy set. |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth() sets the maximum verification depth to B<depth>. |
| That is the maximum number of untrusted CA certificates that can appear in a |
| chain. |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host() sets the expected DNS hostname to |
| B<name> clearing any previously specified host name or names. If |
| B<name> is NULL, or empty the list of hostnames is cleared, and |
| name checks are not performed on the peer certificate. If B<name> |
| is NUL-terminated, B<namelen> may be zero, otherwise B<namelen> |
| must be set to the length of B<name>. When a hostname is specified, |
| certificate verification automatically invokes L<X509_check_host(3)> |
| with flags equal to the B<flags> argument given to |
| B<X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags()> (default zero). Applications |
| are strongly advised to use this interface in preference to explicitly |
| calling L<X509_check_host(3)>, hostname checks are out of scope |
| with the DANE-EE(3) certificate usage, and the internal check will |
| be suppressed as appropriate when DANE support is added to OpenSSL. |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host() adds B<name> as an additional reference |
| identifer that can match the peer's certificate. Any previous names |
| set via X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host() or X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host() |
| are retained, no change is made if B<name> is NULL or empty. When |
| multiple names are configured, the peer is considered verified when |
| any name matches. |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername() returns the DNS hostname or subject |
| CommonName from the peer certificate that matched one of the reference |
| identifiers. When wildcard matching is not disabled, or when a |
| reference identifier specifies a parent domain (starts with ".") |
| rather than a hostname, the peer name may be a wildcard name or a |
| sub-domain of the reference identifier respectively. The return |
| string is allocated by the library and is no longer valid once the |
| associated B<param> argument is freed. Applications must not free |
| the return value. |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email() sets the expected RFC822 email address to |
| B<email>. If B<email> is NUL-terminated, B<emaillen> may be zero, otherwise |
| B<emaillen> must be set to the length of B<email>. When an email address |
| is specified, certificate verification automatically invokes |
| L<X509_check_email(3)>. |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip() sets the expected IP address to B<ip>. |
| The B<ip> argument is in binary format, in network byte-order and |
| B<iplen> must be set to 4 for IPv4 and 16 for IPv6. When an IP |
| address is specified, certificate verification automatically invokes |
| L<X509_check_ip(3)>. |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc() sets the expected IP address to |
| B<ipasc>. The B<ipasc> argument is a NUL-terminal ASCII string: |
| dotted decimal quad for IPv4 and colon-separated hexadecimal for |
| IPv6. The condensed "::" notation is supported for IPv6 addresses. |
| |
| =head1 RETURN VALUES |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(), |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(), |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(), |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(), |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip() and |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc() return 1 for success and 0 for |
| failure. |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags() returns the current verification flags. |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() and X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth() do not return |
| values. |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth() returns the current verification depth. |
| |
| =head1 VERIFICATION FLAGS |
| |
| The verification flags consists of zero or more of the following flags |
| ored together. |
| |
| B<X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK> enables CRL checking for the certificate chain leaf |
| certificate. An error occurs if a suitable CRL cannot be found. |
| |
| B<X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL> enables CRL checking for the entire certificate |
| chain. |
| |
| B<X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL> disabled critical extension checking. By default |
| any unhandled critical extensions in certificates or (if checked) CRLs results |
| in a fatal error. If this flag is set unhandled critical extensions are |
| ignored. B<WARNING> setting this option for anything other than debugging |
| purposes can be a security risk. Finer control over which extensions are |
| supported can be performed in the verification callback. |
| |
| THe B<X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT> flag disables workarounds for some broken |
| certificates and makes the verification strictly apply B<X509> rules. |
| |
| B<X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS> enables proxy certificate verification. |
| |
| B<X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK> enables certificate policy checking, by default |
| no policy checking is peformed. Additional information is sent to the |
| verification callback relating to policy checking. |
| |
| B<X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY>, B<X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY> and |
| B<X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP> set the B<require explicit policy>, B<inhibit any |
| policy> and B<inhibit policy mapping> flags respectively as defined in |
| B<RFC3280>. Policy checking is automatically enabled if any of these flags |
| are set. |
| |
| If B<X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY> is set and the policy checking is successful |
| a special status code is set to the verification callback. This permits it |
| to examine the valid policy tree and perform additional checks or simply |
| log it for debugging purposes. |
| |
| By default some additional features such as indirect CRLs and CRLs signed by |
| different keys are disabled. If B<X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT> is set |
| they are enabled. |
| |
| If B<X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS> ise set delta CRLs (if present) are used to |
| determine certificate status. If not set deltas are ignored. |
| |
| B<X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE> enables checking of the root CA self signed |
| cerificate signature. By default this check is disabled because it doesn't |
| add any additional security but in some cases applications might want to |
| check the signature anyway. A side effect of not checking the root CA |
| signature is that disabled or unsupported message digests on the root CA |
| are not treated as fatal errors. |
| |
| The B<X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK> flag enables debugging of certificate |
| issuer checks. It is B<not> needed unless you are logging certificate |
| verification. If this flag is set then additional status codes will be sent |
| to the verification callback and it B<must> be prepared to handle such cases |
| without assuming they are hard errors. |
| |
| =head1 NOTES |
| |
| The above functions should be used to manipulate verification parameters |
| instead of legacy functions which work in specific structures such as |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(). |
| |
| =head1 BUGS |
| |
| Delta CRL checking is currently primitive. Only a single delta can be used and |
| (partly due to limitations of B<X509_STORE>) constructed CRLs are not |
| maintained. |
| |
| If CRLs checking is enable CRLs are expected to be available in the |
| corresponding B<X509_STORE> structure. No attempt is made to download |
| CRLs from the CRL distribution points extension. |
| |
| =head1 EXAMPLE |
| |
| Enable CRL checking when performing certificate verification during SSL |
| connections associated with an B<SSL_CTX> structure B<ctx>: |
| |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; |
| param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(param, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK); |
| SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx, param); |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(param); |
| |
| =head1 SEE ALSO |
| |
| L<X509_verify_cert(3)|X509_verify_cert(3)>, |
| L<X509_check_host(3)|X509_check_host(3)>, |
| L<X509_check_email(3)|X509_check_email(3)>, |
| L<X509_check_ip(3)|X509_check_ip(3)> |
| |
| =head1 HISTORY |
| |
| TBA |
| |
| =cut |