| /* |
| * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| * |
| * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| */ |
| |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/bio.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h> |
| #include <openssl/ssl.h> |
| |
| #include "handshake_helper.h" |
| #include "testutil.h" |
| |
| HANDSHAKE_RESULT *HANDSHAKE_RESULT_new() |
| { |
| HANDSHAKE_RESULT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); |
| TEST_check(ret != NULL); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| void HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result) |
| { |
| if (result == NULL) |
| return; |
| OPENSSL_free(result->client_npn_negotiated); |
| OPENSSL_free(result->server_npn_negotiated); |
| OPENSSL_free(result->client_alpn_negotiated); |
| OPENSSL_free(result->server_alpn_negotiated); |
| OPENSSL_free(result); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Since there appears to be no way to extract the sent/received alert |
| * from the SSL object directly, we use the info callback and stash |
| * the result in ex_data. |
| */ |
| typedef struct handshake_ex_data_st { |
| int alert_sent; |
| int num_fatal_alerts_sent; |
| int alert_received; |
| int session_ticket_do_not_call; |
| ssl_servername_t servername; |
| } HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA; |
| |
| typedef struct ctx_data_st { |
| unsigned char *npn_protocols; |
| size_t npn_protocols_len; |
| unsigned char *alpn_protocols; |
| size_t alpn_protocols_len; |
| } CTX_DATA; |
| |
| /* |ctx_data| itself is stack-allocated. */ |
| static void ctx_data_free_data(CTX_DATA *ctx_data) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx_data->npn_protocols); |
| ctx_data->npn_protocols = NULL; |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx_data->alpn_protocols); |
| ctx_data->alpn_protocols = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| static int ex_data_idx; |
| |
| static void info_cb(const SSL *s, int where, int ret) |
| { |
| if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) { |
| HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data = |
| (HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx)); |
| if (where & SSL_CB_WRITE) { |
| ex_data->alert_sent = ret; |
| if (strcmp(SSL_alert_type_string(ret), "F") == 0 |
| || strcmp(SSL_alert_desc_string(ret), "CN") == 0) |
| ex_data->num_fatal_alerts_sent++; |
| } else { |
| ex_data->alert_received = ret; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Select the appropriate server CTX. |
| * Returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if a match was found. |
| * If |ignore| is 1, returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK on mismatch. |
| * Otherwise, returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL on mismatch. |
| * An empty SNI extension also returns SSL_TSLEXT_ERR_NOACK. |
| */ |
| static int select_server_ctx(SSL *s, void *arg, int ignore) |
| { |
| const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); |
| HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data = |
| (HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx)); |
| |
| if (servername == NULL) { |
| ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1; |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| } |
| |
| if (strcmp(servername, "server2") == 0) { |
| SSL_CTX *new_ctx = (SSL_CTX*)arg; |
| SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, new_ctx); |
| /* |
| * Copy over all the SSL_CTX options - reasonable behavior |
| * allows testing of cases where the options between two |
| * contexts differ/conflict |
| */ |
| SSL_clear_options(s, 0xFFFFFFFFL); |
| SSL_set_options(s, SSL_CTX_get_options(new_ctx)); |
| |
| ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER2; |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| } else if (strcmp(servername, "server1") == 0) { |
| ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1; |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| } else if (ignore) { |
| ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1; |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| } else { |
| /* Don't set an explicit alert, to test library defaults. */ |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * (RFC 6066): |
| * If the server understood the ClientHello extension but |
| * does not recognize the server name, the server SHOULD take one of two |
| * actions: either abort the handshake by sending a fatal-level |
| * unrecognized_name(112) alert or continue the handshake. |
| * |
| * This behaviour is up to the application to configure; we test both |
| * configurations to ensure the state machine propagates the result |
| * correctly. |
| */ |
| static int servername_ignore_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg) |
| { |
| return select_server_ctx(s, arg, 1); |
| } |
| |
| static int servername_reject_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg) |
| { |
| return select_server_ctx(s, arg, 0); |
| } |
| |
| static int verify_reject_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) { |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int verify_accept_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int broken_session_ticket_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char *key_name, unsigned char *iv, |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc) |
| { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int do_not_call_session_ticket_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char *key_name, |
| unsigned char *iv, |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, |
| HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc) |
| { |
| HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data = |
| (HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx)); |
| ex_data->session_ticket_do_not_call = 1; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Parse the comma-separated list into TLS format. */ |
| static void parse_protos(const char *protos, unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen) |
| { |
| size_t len, i, prefix; |
| |
| len = strlen(protos); |
| |
| /* Should never have reuse. */ |
| TEST_check(*out == NULL); |
| |
| /* Test values are small, so we omit length limit checks. */ |
| *out = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1); |
| TEST_check(*out != NULL); |
| *outlen = len + 1; |
| |
| /* |
| * foo => '3', 'f', 'o', 'o' |
| * foo,bar => '3', 'f', 'o', 'o', '3', 'b', 'a', 'r' |
| */ |
| memcpy(*out + 1, protos, len); |
| |
| prefix = 0; |
| i = prefix + 1; |
| while (i <= len) { |
| if ((*out)[i] == ',') { |
| TEST_check(i - 1 - prefix > 0); |
| (*out)[prefix] = i - 1 - prefix; |
| prefix = i; |
| } |
| i++; |
| } |
| TEST_check(len - prefix > 0); |
| (*out)[prefix] = len - prefix; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| /* |
| * The client SHOULD select the first protocol advertised by the server that it |
| * also supports. In the event that the client doesn't support any of server's |
| * protocols, or the server doesn't advertise any, it SHOULD select the first |
| * protocol that it supports. |
| */ |
| static int client_npn_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, |
| const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, |
| void *arg) |
| { |
| CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg); |
| int ret; |
| |
| ret = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen, |
| ctx_data->npn_protocols, |
| ctx_data->npn_protocols_len); |
| /* Accept both OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED and OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP. */ |
| TEST_check(ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED || ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP); |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| } |
| |
| static int server_npn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, |
| unsigned int *len, void *arg) |
| { |
| CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg); |
| *data = ctx_data->npn_protocols; |
| *len = ctx_data->npn_protocols_len; |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * The server SHOULD select the most highly preferred protocol that it supports |
| * and that is also advertised by the client. In the event that the server |
| * supports no protocols that the client advertises, then the server SHALL |
| * respond with a fatal "no_application_protocol" alert. |
| */ |
| static int server_alpn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out, |
| unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, |
| unsigned int inlen, void *arg) |
| { |
| CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg); |
| int ret; |
| |
| /* SSL_select_next_proto isn't const-correct... */ |
| unsigned char *tmp_out; |
| |
| /* |
| * The result points either to |in| or to |ctx_data->alpn_protocols|. |
| * The callback is allowed to point to |in| or to a long-lived buffer, |
| * so we can return directly without storing a copy. |
| */ |
| ret = SSL_select_next_proto(&tmp_out, outlen, |
| ctx_data->alpn_protocols, |
| ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len, in, inlen); |
| |
| *out = tmp_out; |
| /* Unlike NPN, we don't tolerate a mismatch. */ |
| return ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED ? SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK |
| : SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Configure callbacks and other properties that can't be set directly |
| * in the server/client CONF. |
| */ |
| static void configure_handshake_ctx(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx, |
| SSL_CTX *client_ctx, |
| const SSL_TEST_CTX *test, |
| const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra, |
| CTX_DATA *server_ctx_data, |
| CTX_DATA *server2_ctx_data, |
| CTX_DATA *client_ctx_data) |
| { |
| unsigned char *ticket_keys; |
| size_t ticket_key_len; |
| |
| TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(server_ctx, |
| test->max_fragment_size) == 1); |
| if (server2_ctx != NULL) { |
| TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(server2_ctx, |
| test->max_fragment_size) == 1); |
| } |
| TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(client_ctx, |
| test->max_fragment_size) == 1); |
| |
| switch (extra->client.verify_callback) { |
| case SSL_TEST_VERIFY_ACCEPT_ALL: |
| SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(client_ctx, &verify_accept_cb, |
| NULL); |
| break; |
| case SSL_TEST_VERIFY_REJECT_ALL: |
| SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(client_ctx, &verify_reject_cb, |
| NULL); |
| break; |
| default: |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| /* link the two contexts for SNI purposes */ |
| switch (extra->server.servername_callback) { |
| case SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_IGNORE_MISMATCH: |
| SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_ctx, servername_ignore_cb); |
| SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_ctx, server2_ctx); |
| break; |
| case SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_REJECT_MISMATCH: |
| SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_ctx, servername_reject_cb); |
| SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_ctx, server2_ctx); |
| break; |
| default: |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * The initial_ctx/session_ctx always handles the encrypt/decrypt of the |
| * session ticket. This ticket_key callback is assigned to the second |
| * session (assigned via SNI), and should never be invoked |
| */ |
| if (server2_ctx != NULL) |
| SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(server2_ctx, |
| do_not_call_session_ticket_cb); |
| |
| if (extra->server.broken_session_ticket) { |
| SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(server_ctx, broken_session_ticket_cb); |
| } |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| if (extra->server.npn_protocols != NULL) { |
| parse_protos(extra->server.npn_protocols, |
| &server_ctx_data->npn_protocols, |
| &server_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len); |
| SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(server_ctx, server_npn_cb, |
| server_ctx_data); |
| } |
| if (extra->server2.npn_protocols != NULL) { |
| parse_protos(extra->server2.npn_protocols, |
| &server2_ctx_data->npn_protocols, |
| &server2_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len); |
| TEST_check(server2_ctx != NULL); |
| SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(server2_ctx, server_npn_cb, |
| server2_ctx_data); |
| } |
| if (extra->client.npn_protocols != NULL) { |
| parse_protos(extra->client.npn_protocols, |
| &client_ctx_data->npn_protocols, |
| &client_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len); |
| SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(client_ctx, client_npn_cb, |
| client_ctx_data); |
| } |
| #endif |
| if (extra->server.alpn_protocols != NULL) { |
| parse_protos(extra->server.alpn_protocols, |
| &server_ctx_data->alpn_protocols, |
| &server_ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len); |
| SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(server_ctx, server_alpn_cb, server_ctx_data); |
| } |
| if (extra->server2.alpn_protocols != NULL) { |
| TEST_check(server2_ctx != NULL); |
| parse_protos(extra->server2.alpn_protocols, |
| &server2_ctx_data->alpn_protocols, |
| &server2_ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len); |
| SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(server2_ctx, server_alpn_cb, server2_ctx_data); |
| } |
| if (extra->client.alpn_protocols != NULL) { |
| unsigned char *alpn_protos = NULL; |
| size_t alpn_protos_len; |
| parse_protos(extra->client.alpn_protocols, |
| &alpn_protos, &alpn_protos_len); |
| /* Reversed return value convention... */ |
| TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(client_ctx, alpn_protos, |
| alpn_protos_len) == 0); |
| OPENSSL_free(alpn_protos); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Use fixed session ticket keys so that we can decrypt a ticket created with |
| * one CTX in another CTX. Don't address server2 for the moment. |
| */ |
| ticket_key_len = SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(server_ctx, NULL, 0); |
| ticket_keys = OPENSSL_zalloc(ticket_key_len); |
| TEST_check(ticket_keys != NULL); |
| TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(server_ctx, ticket_keys, |
| ticket_key_len) == 1); |
| OPENSSL_free(ticket_keys); |
| |
| /* The default log list includes EC keys, so CT can't work without EC. */ |
| #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) |
| TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(client_ctx)); |
| switch (extra->client.ct_validation) { |
| case SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE: |
| TEST_check(SSL_CTX_enable_ct(client_ctx, SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE)); |
| break; |
| case SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT: |
| TEST_check(SSL_CTX_enable_ct(client_ctx, SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT)); |
| break; |
| case SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_NONE: |
| break; |
| } |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| /* Configure per-SSL callbacks and other properties. */ |
| static void configure_handshake_ssl(SSL *server, SSL *client, |
| const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra) |
| { |
| if (extra->client.servername != SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_NONE) |
| SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(client, |
| ssl_servername_name(extra->client.servername)); |
| } |
| |
| /* The status for each connection phase. */ |
| typedef enum { |
| PEER_SUCCESS, |
| PEER_RETRY, |
| PEER_ERROR |
| } peer_status_t; |
| |
| /* An SSL object and associated read-write buffers. */ |
| typedef struct peer_st { |
| SSL *ssl; |
| /* Buffer lengths are int to match the SSL read/write API. */ |
| unsigned char *write_buf; |
| int write_buf_len; |
| unsigned char *read_buf; |
| int read_buf_len; |
| int bytes_to_write; |
| int bytes_to_read; |
| peer_status_t status; |
| } PEER; |
| |
| static void create_peer(PEER *peer, SSL_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| static const int peer_buffer_size = 64 * 1024; |
| |
| peer->ssl = SSL_new(ctx); |
| TEST_check(peer->ssl != NULL); |
| peer->write_buf = OPENSSL_zalloc(peer_buffer_size); |
| TEST_check(peer->write_buf != NULL); |
| peer->read_buf = OPENSSL_zalloc(peer_buffer_size); |
| TEST_check(peer->read_buf != NULL); |
| peer->write_buf_len = peer->read_buf_len = peer_buffer_size; |
| } |
| |
| static void peer_free_data(PEER *peer) |
| { |
| SSL_free(peer->ssl); |
| OPENSSL_free(peer->write_buf); |
| OPENSSL_free(peer->read_buf); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Note that we could do the handshake transparently under an SSL_write, |
| * but separating the steps is more helpful for debugging test failures. |
| */ |
| static void do_handshake_step(PEER *peer) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| |
| TEST_check(peer->status == PEER_RETRY); |
| ret = SSL_do_handshake(peer->ssl); |
| |
| if (ret == 1) { |
| peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS; |
| } else if (ret == 0) { |
| peer->status = PEER_ERROR; |
| } else { |
| int error = SSL_get_error(peer->ssl, ret); |
| /* Memory bios should never block with SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE. */ |
| if (error != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) |
| peer->status = PEER_ERROR; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Send/receive some application data. The read-write sequence is |
| * Peer A: (R) W - first read will yield no data |
| * Peer B: R W |
| * ... |
| * Peer A: R W |
| * Peer B: R W |
| * Peer A: R |
| */ |
| static void do_app_data_step(PEER *peer) |
| { |
| int ret = 1, write_bytes; |
| |
| TEST_check(peer->status == PEER_RETRY); |
| |
| /* We read everything available... */ |
| while (ret > 0 && peer->bytes_to_read) { |
| ret = SSL_read(peer->ssl, peer->read_buf, peer->read_buf_len); |
| if (ret > 0) { |
| TEST_check(ret <= peer->bytes_to_read); |
| peer->bytes_to_read -= ret; |
| } else if (ret == 0) { |
| peer->status = PEER_ERROR; |
| return; |
| } else { |
| int error = SSL_get_error(peer->ssl, ret); |
| if (error != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) { |
| peer->status = PEER_ERROR; |
| return; |
| } /* Else continue with write. */ |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* ... but we only write one write-buffer-full of data. */ |
| write_bytes = peer->bytes_to_write < peer->write_buf_len ? peer->bytes_to_write : |
| peer->write_buf_len; |
| if (write_bytes) { |
| ret = SSL_write(peer->ssl, peer->write_buf, write_bytes); |
| if (ret > 0) { |
| /* SSL_write will only succeed with a complete write. */ |
| TEST_check(ret == write_bytes); |
| peer->bytes_to_write -= ret; |
| } else { |
| /* |
| * We should perhaps check for SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ/WRITE here |
| * but this doesn't yet occur with current app data sizes. |
| */ |
| peer->status = PEER_ERROR; |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * We could simply finish when there was nothing to read, and we have |
| * nothing left to write. But keeping track of the expected number of bytes |
| * to read gives us somewhat better guarantees that all data sent is in fact |
| * received. |
| */ |
| if (!peer->bytes_to_write && !peer->bytes_to_read) { |
| peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * RFC 5246 says: |
| * |
| * Note that as of TLS 1.1, |
| * failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a |
| * session not be resumed. This is a change from TLS 1.0 to conform |
| * with widespread implementation practice. |
| * |
| * However, |
| * (a) OpenSSL requires that a connection be shutdown for all protocol versions. |
| * (b) We test lower versions, too. |
| * So we just implement shutdown. We do a full bidirectional shutdown so that we |
| * can compare sent and received close_notify alerts and get some test coverage |
| * for SSL_shutdown as a bonus. |
| */ |
| static void do_shutdown_step(PEER *peer) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| |
| TEST_check(peer->status == PEER_RETRY); |
| ret = SSL_shutdown(peer->ssl); |
| |
| if (ret == 1) { |
| peer->status = PEER_SUCCESS; |
| } else if (ret < 0) { /* On 0, we retry. */ |
| int error = SSL_get_error(peer->ssl, ret); |
| /* Memory bios should never block with SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE. */ |
| if (error != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) |
| peer->status = PEER_ERROR; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| typedef enum { |
| HANDSHAKE, |
| APPLICATION_DATA, |
| SHUTDOWN, |
| CONNECTION_DONE |
| } connect_phase_t; |
| |
| static connect_phase_t next_phase(connect_phase_t phase) |
| { |
| switch (phase) { |
| case HANDSHAKE: |
| return APPLICATION_DATA; |
| case APPLICATION_DATA: |
| return SHUTDOWN; |
| case SHUTDOWN: |
| return CONNECTION_DONE; |
| default: |
| TEST_check(0); /* Should never call next_phase when done. */ |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void do_connect_step(PEER *peer, connect_phase_t phase) |
| { |
| switch (phase) { |
| case HANDSHAKE: |
| do_handshake_step(peer); |
| break; |
| case APPLICATION_DATA: |
| do_app_data_step(peer); |
| break; |
| case SHUTDOWN: |
| do_shutdown_step(peer); |
| break; |
| default: |
| TEST_check(0); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| typedef enum { |
| /* Both parties succeeded. */ |
| HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS, |
| /* Client errored. */ |
| CLIENT_ERROR, |
| /* Server errored. */ |
| SERVER_ERROR, |
| /* Peers are in inconsistent state. */ |
| INTERNAL_ERROR, |
| /* One or both peers not done. */ |
| HANDSHAKE_RETRY |
| } handshake_status_t; |
| |
| /* |
| * Determine the handshake outcome. |
| * last_status: the status of the peer to have acted last. |
| * previous_status: the status of the peer that didn't act last. |
| * client_spoke_last: 1 if the client went last. |
| */ |
| static handshake_status_t handshake_status(peer_status_t last_status, |
| peer_status_t previous_status, |
| int client_spoke_last) |
| { |
| switch (last_status) { |
| case PEER_SUCCESS: |
| switch (previous_status) { |
| case PEER_SUCCESS: |
| /* Both succeeded. */ |
| return HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS; |
| case PEER_RETRY: |
| /* Let the first peer finish. */ |
| return HANDSHAKE_RETRY; |
| case PEER_ERROR: |
| /* |
| * Second peer succeeded despite the fact that the first peer |
| * already errored. This shouldn't happen. |
| */ |
| return INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| case PEER_RETRY: |
| if (previous_status == PEER_RETRY) { |
| /* Neither peer is done. */ |
| return HANDSHAKE_RETRY; |
| } else { |
| /* |
| * Deadlock: second peer is waiting for more input while first |
| * peer thinks they're done (no more input is coming). |
| */ |
| return INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| case PEER_ERROR: |
| switch (previous_status) { |
| case PEER_SUCCESS: |
| /* |
| * First peer succeeded but second peer errored. |
| * TODO(emilia): we should be able to continue here (with some |
| * application data?) to ensure the first peer receives the |
| * alert / close_notify. |
| * (No tests currently exercise this branch.) |
| */ |
| return client_spoke_last ? CLIENT_ERROR : SERVER_ERROR; |
| case PEER_RETRY: |
| /* We errored; let the peer finish. */ |
| return HANDSHAKE_RETRY; |
| case PEER_ERROR: |
| /* Both peers errored. Return the one that errored first. */ |
| return client_spoke_last ? SERVER_ERROR : CLIENT_ERROR; |
| } |
| } |
| /* Control should never reach here. */ |
| return INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| /* Convert unsigned char buf's that shouldn't contain any NUL-bytes to char. */ |
| static char *dup_str(const unsigned char *in, size_t len) |
| { |
| char *ret; |
| |
| if(len == 0) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| /* Assert that the string does not contain NUL-bytes. */ |
| TEST_check(OPENSSL_strnlen((const char*)(in), len) == len); |
| ret = OPENSSL_strndup((const char*)(in), len); |
| TEST_check(ret != NULL); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Note that |extra| points to the correct client/server configuration |
| * within |test_ctx|. When configuring the handshake, general mode settings |
| * are taken from |test_ctx|, and client/server-specific settings should be |
| * taken from |extra|. |
| * |
| * The configuration code should never reach into |test_ctx->extra| or |
| * |test_ctx->resume_extra| directly. |
| * |
| * (We could refactor test mode settings into a substructure. This would result |
| * in cleaner argument passing but would complicate the test configuration |
| * parsing.) |
| */ |
| static HANDSHAKE_RESULT *do_handshake_internal( |
| SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx, SSL_CTX *client_ctx, |
| const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx, const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra, |
| SSL_SESSION *session_in, SSL_SESSION **session_out) |
| { |
| PEER server, client; |
| BIO *client_to_server, *server_to_client; |
| HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA server_ex_data, client_ex_data; |
| CTX_DATA client_ctx_data, server_ctx_data, server2_ctx_data; |
| HANDSHAKE_RESULT *ret = HANDSHAKE_RESULT_new(); |
| int client_turn = 1; |
| connect_phase_t phase = HANDSHAKE; |
| handshake_status_t status = HANDSHAKE_RETRY; |
| const unsigned char* tick = NULL; |
| size_t tick_len = 0; |
| SSL_SESSION* sess = NULL; |
| const unsigned char *proto = NULL; |
| /* API dictates unsigned int rather than size_t. */ |
| unsigned int proto_len = 0; |
| |
| memset(&server_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(server_ctx_data)); |
| memset(&server2_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(server2_ctx_data)); |
| memset(&client_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(client_ctx_data)); |
| memset(&server, 0, sizeof(server)); |
| memset(&client, 0, sizeof(client)); |
| |
| configure_handshake_ctx(server_ctx, server2_ctx, client_ctx, test_ctx, extra, |
| &server_ctx_data, &server2_ctx_data, &client_ctx_data); |
| |
| /* Setup SSL and buffers; additional configuration happens below. */ |
| create_peer(&server, server_ctx); |
| create_peer(&client, client_ctx); |
| |
| server.bytes_to_write = client.bytes_to_read = test_ctx->app_data_size; |
| client.bytes_to_write = server.bytes_to_read = test_ctx->app_data_size; |
| |
| configure_handshake_ssl(server.ssl, client.ssl, extra); |
| if (session_in != NULL) { |
| /* In case we're testing resumption without tickets. */ |
| TEST_check(SSL_CTX_add_session(server_ctx, session_in)); |
| TEST_check(SSL_set_session(client.ssl, session_in)); |
| } |
| |
| memset(&server_ex_data, 0, sizeof(server_ex_data)); |
| memset(&client_ex_data, 0, sizeof(client_ex_data)); |
| |
| ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| |
| client_to_server = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); |
| server_to_client = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); |
| |
| TEST_check(client_to_server != NULL); |
| TEST_check(server_to_client != NULL); |
| |
| /* Non-blocking bio. */ |
| BIO_set_nbio(client_to_server, 1); |
| BIO_set_nbio(server_to_client, 1); |
| |
| SSL_set_connect_state(client.ssl); |
| SSL_set_accept_state(server.ssl); |
| |
| /* The bios are now owned by the SSL object. */ |
| SSL_set_bio(client.ssl, server_to_client, client_to_server); |
| TEST_check(BIO_up_ref(server_to_client) > 0); |
| TEST_check(BIO_up_ref(client_to_server) > 0); |
| SSL_set_bio(server.ssl, client_to_server, server_to_client); |
| |
| ex_data_idx = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "ex data", NULL, NULL, NULL); |
| TEST_check(ex_data_idx >= 0); |
| |
| TEST_check(SSL_set_ex_data(server.ssl, ex_data_idx, &server_ex_data) == 1); |
| TEST_check(SSL_set_ex_data(client.ssl, ex_data_idx, &client_ex_data) == 1); |
| |
| SSL_set_info_callback(server.ssl, &info_cb); |
| SSL_set_info_callback(client.ssl, &info_cb); |
| |
| client.status = server.status = PEER_RETRY; |
| |
| /* |
| * Half-duplex handshake loop. |
| * Client and server speak to each other synchronously in the same process. |
| * We use non-blocking BIOs, so whenever one peer blocks for read, it |
| * returns PEER_RETRY to indicate that it's the other peer's turn to write. |
| * The handshake succeeds once both peers have succeeded. If one peer |
| * errors out, we also let the other peer retry (and presumably fail). |
| */ |
| for(;;) { |
| if (client_turn) { |
| do_connect_step(&client, phase); |
| status = handshake_status(client.status, server.status, |
| 1 /* client went last */); |
| } else { |
| do_connect_step(&server, phase); |
| status = handshake_status(server.status, client.status, |
| 0 /* server went last */); |
| } |
| |
| switch (status) { |
| case HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS: |
| phase = next_phase(phase); |
| if (phase == CONNECTION_DONE) { |
| ret->result = SSL_TEST_SUCCESS; |
| goto err; |
| } else { |
| client.status = server.status = PEER_RETRY; |
| /* |
| * For now, client starts each phase. Since each phase is |
| * started separately, we can later control this more |
| * precisely, for example, to test client-initiated and |
| * server-initiated shutdown. |
| */ |
| client_turn = 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| case CLIENT_ERROR: |
| ret->result = SSL_TEST_CLIENT_FAIL; |
| goto err; |
| case SERVER_ERROR: |
| ret->result = SSL_TEST_SERVER_FAIL; |
| goto err; |
| case INTERNAL_ERROR: |
| ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| goto err; |
| case HANDSHAKE_RETRY: |
| /* Continue. */ |
| client_turn ^= 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| err: |
| ret->server_alert_sent = server_ex_data.alert_sent; |
| ret->server_num_fatal_alerts_sent = server_ex_data.num_fatal_alerts_sent; |
| ret->server_alert_received = client_ex_data.alert_received; |
| ret->client_alert_sent = client_ex_data.alert_sent; |
| ret->client_num_fatal_alerts_sent = client_ex_data.num_fatal_alerts_sent; |
| ret->client_alert_received = server_ex_data.alert_received; |
| ret->server_protocol = SSL_version(server.ssl); |
| ret->client_protocol = SSL_version(client.ssl); |
| ret->servername = server_ex_data.servername; |
| if ((sess = SSL_get0_session(client.ssl)) != NULL) |
| SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(sess, &tick, &tick_len); |
| if (tick == NULL || tick_len == 0) |
| ret->session_ticket = SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_NO; |
| else |
| ret->session_ticket = SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_YES; |
| ret->session_ticket_do_not_call = server_ex_data.session_ticket_do_not_call; |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(client.ssl, &proto, &proto_len); |
| ret->client_npn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len); |
| |
| SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(server.ssl, &proto, &proto_len); |
| ret->server_npn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len); |
| #endif |
| |
| SSL_get0_alpn_selected(client.ssl, &proto, &proto_len); |
| ret->client_alpn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len); |
| |
| SSL_get0_alpn_selected(server.ssl, &proto, &proto_len); |
| ret->server_alpn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len); |
| |
| ret->client_resumed = SSL_session_reused(client.ssl); |
| ret->server_resumed = SSL_session_reused(server.ssl); |
| |
| if (session_out != NULL) |
| *session_out = SSL_get1_session(client.ssl); |
| |
| ctx_data_free_data(&server_ctx_data); |
| ctx_data_free_data(&server2_ctx_data); |
| ctx_data_free_data(&client_ctx_data); |
| |
| peer_free_data(&server); |
| peer_free_data(&client); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| HANDSHAKE_RESULT *do_handshake(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx, |
| SSL_CTX *client_ctx, SSL_CTX *resume_server_ctx, |
| SSL_CTX *resume_client_ctx, |
| const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx) |
| { |
| HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result; |
| SSL_SESSION *session = NULL; |
| |
| result = do_handshake_internal(server_ctx, server2_ctx, client_ctx, |
| test_ctx, &test_ctx->extra, |
| NULL, &session); |
| if (test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_SIMPLE) |
| goto end; |
| |
| TEST_check(test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RESUME); |
| |
| if (result->result != SSL_TEST_SUCCESS) { |
| result->result = SSL_TEST_FIRST_HANDSHAKE_FAILED; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(result); |
| /* We don't support SNI on second handshake yet, so server2_ctx is NULL. */ |
| result = do_handshake_internal(resume_server_ctx, NULL, resume_client_ctx, |
| test_ctx, &test_ctx->resume_extra, |
| session, NULL); |
| end: |
| SSL_SESSION_free(session); |
| return result; |
| } |
