Fix warnings: signed/unisgned comparison, shadowing (in some cases global
functions such as rand() ).

apps/s_client.c

diff --git a/apps/s_client.c b/apps/s_client.c
index 5e2a5ef..8a57dcf 100644
--- a/apps/s_client.c
+++ b/apps/s_client.c
@@ -403,11 +403,11 @@
 	BIGNUM *r = BN_new();
 	int ret =
 		g != NULL && N != NULL && bn_ctx != NULL && BN_is_odd(N) &&
-		BN_is_prime(N,SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME,NULL,bn_ctx,NULL) &&
+		BN_is_prime_ex(N,SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME,bn_ctx,NULL) &&
 		p != NULL && BN_rshift1(p, N) &&
 
 		/* p = (N-1)/2 */
-		BN_is_prime(p,SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME,NULL,bn_ctx,NULL) &&
+		BN_is_prime_ex(p,SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME,bn_ctx,NULL) &&
 		r != NULL &&
 
 		/* verify g^((N-1)/2) == -1 (mod N) */

apps/srp.c

diff --git a/apps/srp.c b/apps/srp.c
index 5e1b23c..e397011 100644
--- a/apps/srp.c
+++ b/apps/srp.c
@@ -140,12 +140,12 @@
 	return -1 ; 
 	}
 
-static void print_entry(CA_DB *db, BIO * bio, int index, int verbose, char * s)
+static void print_entry(CA_DB *db, BIO * bio, int indx, int verbose, char * s)
 	{
-	if (index >= 0 && verbose)
+	if (indx >= 0 && verbose)
 		{
 		int j;
-		char **pp=sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,index);
+		char **pp=sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,indx);
 		BIO_printf(bio,"%s \"%s\"\n",s,pp[DB_srpid]);
 		for (j = 0; j < DB_NUMBER; j++)
 			{
@@ -696,10 +696,10 @@
 				}
 			else
 				{
-				char ** pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,userindex);
+				char ** xpp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,userindex);
 				BIO_printf(bio_err,"user \"%s\" revoked. t\n",user);
 
-				pp[DB_srptype][0] = 'R' ;
+				xpp[DB_srptype][0] = 'R' ;
 				
 				doupdatedb = 1;
 				}

crypto/srp/srp_lib.c

diff --git a/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c b/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c
index dbf464b..9f63182 100644
--- a/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@
 */
 char *  SRP_check_known_gN_param(BIGNUM* g, BIGNUM* N)
 	{
-	int i;
+	size_t i;
 	if ((g == NULL) || (N == NULL))
 		return 0;
 
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@
 
 SRP_gN *SRP_get_default_gN(const char * id)
 	{
-	int i; 
+	size_t i; 
 
 	if (id == NULL) 
 		return knowngN;

crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c

diff --git a/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c b/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
index 8b96a20..ba3dca0 100644
--- a/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
@@ -414,14 +414,14 @@
 		else if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_VALID)
 			{
 			/* it is a user .... */
-			SRP_gN *gN;
-			if ((gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(pp[DB_srpgN],SRP_gN_tab))!=NULL)
+			SRP_gN *lgN;
+			if ((lgN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(pp[DB_srpgN],SRP_gN_tab))!=NULL)
 				{
 				error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY;
 				if ((user_pwd = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL) 
 					goto err;
 				
-				SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user_pwd,gN->g,gN->N);
+				SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user_pwd,lgN->g,lgN->N);
 				if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(user_pwd, pp[DB_srpid],
 										  pp[DB_srpinfo]))
 					goto err;

ssl/tls_srp.c

diff --git a/ssl/tls_srp.c b/ssl/tls_srp.c
index de5ee99..e6c109b 100644
--- a/ssl/tls_srp.c
+++ b/ssl/tls_srp.c
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@
 
 int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
 	{
-	unsigned char rand[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+	unsigned char rnd[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
 
 	if (BN_num_bits(s->srp_ctx.N) < s->srp_ctx.strength)
 		return 0;
@@ -423,10 +423,10 @@
 		!SRP_check_known_gN_param(s->srp_ctx.g,s->srp_ctx.N))
 		return 0;
 
-	if (RAND_bytes(rand, sizeof(rand)) <= 0)
+	if (RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd)) <= 0)
 		return 0;
-	s->srp_ctx.a = BN_bin2bn(rand,sizeof(rand), s->srp_ctx.a);
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(rand,sizeof(rand));
+	s->srp_ctx.a = BN_bin2bn(rnd,sizeof(rnd), s->srp_ctx.a);
+	OPENSSL_cleanse(rnd,sizeof(rnd));
 
 	if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = SRP_Calc_A(s->srp_ctx.a,s->srp_ctx.N,s->srp_ctx.g)))
 		return 0;