| /* |
| * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| */ |
| |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <time.h> |
| #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
| #include "crypto/rand.h" |
| #include "bn_local.h" |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| #include <openssl/sha.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| |
| typedef enum bnrand_flag_e { |
| NORMAL, TESTING, PRIVATE |
| } BNRAND_FLAG; |
| |
| static int bnrand(BNRAND_FLAG flag, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom, |
| unsigned int strength, BN_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| unsigned char *buf = NULL; |
| int b, ret = 0, bit, bytes, mask; |
| OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = ossl_bn_get_libctx(ctx); |
| |
| if (bits == 0) { |
| if (top != BN_RAND_TOP_ANY || bottom != BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY) |
| goto toosmall; |
| BN_zero(rnd); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| if (bits < 0 || (bits == 1 && top > 0)) |
| goto toosmall; |
| |
| bytes = (bits + 7) / 8; |
| bit = (bits - 1) % 8; |
| mask = 0xff << (bit + 1); |
| |
| buf = OPENSSL_malloc(bytes); |
| if (buf == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* make a random number and set the top and bottom bits */ |
| b = flag == NORMAL ? RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, buf, bytes, strength) |
| : RAND_priv_bytes_ex(libctx, buf, bytes, strength); |
| if (b <= 0) |
| goto err; |
| |
| if (flag == TESTING) { |
| /* |
| * generate patterns that are more likely to trigger BN library bugs |
| */ |
| int i; |
| unsigned char c; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) { |
| if (RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, &c, 1, strength) <= 0) |
| goto err; |
| if (c >= 128 && i > 0) |
| buf[i] = buf[i - 1]; |
| else if (c < 42) |
| buf[i] = 0; |
| else if (c < 84) |
| buf[i] = 255; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (top >= 0) { |
| if (top) { |
| if (bit == 0) { |
| buf[0] = 1; |
| buf[1] |= 0x80; |
| } else { |
| buf[0] |= (3 << (bit - 1)); |
| } |
| } else { |
| buf[0] |= (1 << bit); |
| } |
| } |
| buf[0] &= ~mask; |
| if (bottom) /* set bottom bit if requested */ |
| buf[bytes - 1] |= 1; |
| if (!BN_bin2bn(buf, bytes, rnd)) |
| goto err; |
| ret = 1; |
| err: |
| OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, bytes); |
| bn_check_top(rnd); |
| return ret; |
| |
| toosmall: |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int BN_rand_ex(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom, |
| unsigned int strength, BN_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return bnrand(NORMAL, rnd, bits, top, bottom, strength, ctx); |
| } |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom) |
| { |
| return bnrand(NORMAL, rnd, bits, top, bottom, 0, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| int BN_bntest_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom) |
| { |
| return bnrand(TESTING, rnd, bits, top, bottom, 0, NULL); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| int BN_priv_rand_ex(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom, |
| unsigned int strength, BN_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return bnrand(PRIVATE, rnd, bits, top, bottom, strength, ctx); |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| int BN_priv_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom) |
| { |
| return bnrand(PRIVATE, rnd, bits, top, bottom, 0, NULL); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* random number r: 0 <= r < range */ |
| static int bnrand_range(BNRAND_FLAG flag, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range, |
| unsigned int strength, BN_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| int n; |
| int count = 100; |
| |
| if (range->neg || BN_is_zero(range)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_R_INVALID_RANGE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| n = BN_num_bits(range); /* n > 0 */ |
| |
| /* BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 1) always holds */ |
| |
| if (n == 1) |
| BN_zero(r); |
| else if (!BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 2) && !BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 3)) { |
| /* |
| * range = 100..._2, so 3*range (= 11..._2) is exactly one bit longer |
| * than range |
| */ |
| do { |
| if (!bnrand(flag, r, n + 1, BN_RAND_TOP_ANY, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY, |
| strength, ctx)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * If r < 3*range, use r := r MOD range (which is either r, r - |
| * range, or r - 2*range). Otherwise, iterate once more. Since |
| * 3*range = 11..._2, each iteration succeeds with probability >= |
| * .75. |
| */ |
| if (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0) { |
| if (!BN_sub(r, r, range)) |
| return 0; |
| if (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0) |
| if (!BN_sub(r, r, range)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!--count) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| } |
| while (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0); |
| } else { |
| do { |
| /* range = 11..._2 or range = 101..._2 */ |
| if (!bnrand(flag, r, n, BN_RAND_TOP_ANY, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY, 0, |
| ctx)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!--count) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| while (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0); |
| } |
| |
| bn_check_top(r); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int BN_rand_range_ex(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range, unsigned int strength, |
| BN_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return bnrand_range(NORMAL, r, range, strength, ctx); |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range) |
| { |
| return bnrand_range(NORMAL, r, range, 0, NULL); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| int BN_priv_rand_range_ex(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range, unsigned int strength, |
| BN_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| return bnrand_range(PRIVATE, r, range, strength, ctx); |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| int BN_priv_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range) |
| { |
| return bnrand_range(PRIVATE, r, range, 0, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0 |
| int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom) |
| { |
| return BN_rand(rnd, bits, top, bottom); |
| } |
| |
| int BN_pseudo_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range) |
| { |
| return BN_rand_range(r, range); |
| } |
| # endif |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * BN_generate_dsa_nonce generates a random number 0 <= out < range. Unlike |
| * BN_rand_range, it also includes the contents of |priv| and |message| in |
| * the generation so that an RNG failure isn't fatal as long as |priv| |
| * remains secret. This is intended for use in DSA and ECDSA where an RNG |
| * weakness leads directly to private key exposure unless this function is |
| * used. |
| */ |
| int BN_generate_dsa_nonce(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *range, |
| const BIGNUM *priv, const unsigned char *message, |
| size_t message_len, BN_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
| /* |
| * We use 512 bits of random data per iteration to ensure that we have at |
| * least |range| bits of randomness. |
| */ |
| unsigned char random_bytes[64]; |
| unsigned char digest[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| unsigned done, todo; |
| /* We generate |range|+8 bytes of random output. */ |
| const unsigned num_k_bytes = BN_num_bytes(range) + 8; |
| unsigned char private_bytes[96]; |
| unsigned char *k_bytes = NULL; |
| int ret = 0; |
| EVP_MD *md = NULL; |
| OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = ossl_bn_get_libctx(ctx); |
| |
| if (mdctx == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| |
| k_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(num_k_bytes); |
| if (k_bytes == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| |
| /* We copy |priv| into a local buffer to avoid exposing its length. */ |
| if (BN_bn2binpad(priv, private_bytes, sizeof(private_bytes)) < 0) { |
| /* |
| * No reasonable DSA or ECDSA key should have a private key this |
| * large and we don't handle this case in order to avoid leaking the |
| * length of the private key. |
| */ |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_R_PRIVATE_KEY_TOO_LARGE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, "SHA512", NULL); |
| if (md == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| for (done = 0; done < num_k_bytes;) { |
| if (RAND_priv_bytes_ex(libctx, random_bytes, sizeof(random_bytes), 0) <= 0) |
| goto err; |
| |
| if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL) |
| || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, &done, sizeof(done)) |
| || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, private_bytes, |
| sizeof(private_bytes)) |
| || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, message, message_len) |
| || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, random_bytes, sizeof(random_bytes)) |
| || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, digest, NULL)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| todo = num_k_bytes - done; |
| if (todo > SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH) |
| todo = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; |
| memcpy(k_bytes + done, digest, todo); |
| done += todo; |
| } |
| |
| if (!BN_bin2bn(k_bytes, num_k_bytes, out)) |
| goto err; |
| if (BN_mod(out, out, range, ctx) != 1) |
| goto err; |
| ret = 1; |
| |
| err: |
| EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx); |
| EVP_MD_free(md); |
| OPENSSL_free(k_bytes); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(private_bytes, sizeof(private_bytes)); |
| return ret; |
| } |