| /* |
| * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| * |
| * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| */ |
| |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <time.h> |
| #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
| #include <openssl/opensslconf.h> |
| #include "internal/rand_int.h" |
| #include <openssl/engine.h> |
| #include "internal/thread_once.h" |
| #include "rand_lcl.h" |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
| /* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */ |
| static ENGINE *funct_ref; |
| static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_engine_lock; |
| #endif |
| static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_meth_lock; |
| static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth; |
| static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; |
| |
| int rand_fork_count; |
| |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC |
| /* |
| * IMPORTANT NOTE: It is not currently possible to use this code |
| * because we are not sure about the amount of randomness it provides. |
| * Some SP900 tests have been run, but there is internal skepticism. |
| * So for now this code is not used. |
| */ |
| # error "RDTSC enabled? Should not be possible!" |
| |
| /* |
| * Acquire entropy from high-speed clock |
| * |
| * Since we get some randomness from the low-order bits of the |
| * high-speed clock, it can help. |
| * |
| * Returns the total entropy count, if it exceeds the requested |
| * entropy count. Otherwise, returns an entropy count of 0. |
| */ |
| size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool) |
| { |
| unsigned char c; |
| int i; |
| |
| if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 4)) != 0) { |
| for (i = 0; i < TSC_READ_COUNT; i++) { |
| c = (unsigned char)(OPENSSL_rdtsc() & 0xFF); |
| RAND_POOL_add(pool, &c, 1, 4); |
| } |
| } |
| return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU |
| size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len); |
| size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len); |
| |
| extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[]; |
| |
| /* |
| * Acquire entropy using Intel-specific cpu instructions |
| * |
| * Uses the RDSEED instruction if available, otherwise uses |
| * RDRAND if available. |
| * |
| * For the differences between RDSEED and RDRAND, and why RDSEED |
| * is the preferred choice, see https://goo.gl/oK3KcN |
| * |
| * Returns the total entropy count, if it exceeds the requested |
| * entropy count. Otherwise, returns an entropy count of 0. |
| */ |
| size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool) |
| { |
| size_t bytes_needed; |
| unsigned char *buffer; |
| |
| bytes_needed = RAND_POOL_bytes_needed(pool, 8 /*entropy_per_byte*/); |
| if (bytes_needed > 0) { |
| buffer = RAND_POOL_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); |
| |
| if (buffer != NULL) { |
| |
| /* If RDSEED is available, use that. */ |
| if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] & (1 << 18)) != 0) { |
| if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed) |
| == bytes_needed) |
| return RAND_POOL_add_end(pool, |
| bytes_needed, |
| 8 * bytes_needed); |
| } |
| |
| /* Second choice is RDRAND. */ |
| if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))) != 0) { |
| if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed) |
| == bytes_needed) |
| return RAND_POOL_add_end(pool, |
| bytes_needed, |
| 8 * bytes_needed); |
| } |
| |
| return RAND_POOL_add_end(pool, 0, 0); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * Implements the get_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks()) |
| * |
| * If the DRBG has a parent, then the required amount of entropy input |
| * is fetched using the parent's RAND_DRBG_generate(). |
| * |
| * Otherwise, the entropy is polled from the system entropy sources |
| * using RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). |
| * |
| * If a random pool has been added to the DRBG using RAND_add(), then |
| * its entropy will be used up first. |
| */ |
| size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, |
| unsigned char **pout, |
| int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len) |
| { |
| size_t ret = 0; |
| size_t entropy_available = 0; |
| RAND_POOL *pool = RAND_POOL_new(entropy, min_len, max_len); |
| |
| if (pool == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (drbg->pool) { |
| RAND_POOL_add(pool, |
| RAND_POOL_buffer(drbg->pool), |
| RAND_POOL_length(drbg->pool), |
| RAND_POOL_entropy(drbg->pool)); |
| RAND_POOL_free(drbg->pool); |
| drbg->pool = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (drbg->parent) { |
| size_t bytes_needed = RAND_POOL_bytes_needed(pool, 8); |
| unsigned char *buffer = RAND_POOL_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); |
| |
| if (buffer != NULL) { |
| size_t bytes = 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * Get random from parent, include our state as additional input. |
| * Our lock is already held, but we need to lock our parent before |
| * generating bits from it. |
| */ |
| if (drbg->parent->lock) |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->parent->lock); |
| if (RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg->parent, |
| buffer, bytes_needed, |
| 0, |
| (unsigned char *)drbg, sizeof(*drbg)) != 0) |
| bytes = bytes_needed; |
| if (drbg->parent->lock) |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->parent->lock); |
| |
| entropy_available = RAND_POOL_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes); |
| } |
| |
| } else { |
| /* Get entropy by polling system entropy sources. */ |
| entropy_available = RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(pool); |
| } |
| |
| if (entropy_available > 0) { |
| ret = RAND_POOL_length(pool); |
| *pout = RAND_POOL_detach(pool); |
| } |
| |
| RAND_POOL_free(pool); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * Implements the cleanup_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks()) |
| * |
| */ |
| void rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, |
| unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen); |
| } |
| |
| void rand_fork() |
| { |
| rand_fork_count++; |
| } |
| |
| DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init) |
| { |
| int ret = 1; |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
| rand_engine_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_glock_new("rand_engine"); |
| ret &= rand_engine_lock != NULL; |
| #endif |
| rand_meth_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_glock_new("rand_meth"); |
| ret &= rand_meth_lock != NULL; |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| void rand_cleanup_int(void) |
| { |
| const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth; |
| |
| if (meth != NULL && meth->cleanup != NULL) |
| meth->cleanup(); |
| RAND_set_rand_method(NULL); |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock); |
| #endif |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * RAND_poll() reseeds the default RNG using random input |
| * |
| * The random input is obtained from polling various entropy |
| * sources which depend on the operating system and are |
| * configurable via the --with-rand-seed configure option. |
| */ |
| int RAND_poll(void) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| RAND_POOL *pool = NULL; |
| |
| const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); |
| |
| if (meth == RAND_OpenSSL()) { |
| /* fill random pool and seed the default DRBG */ |
| RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_global(); |
| |
| if (drbg == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock); |
| ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0); |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock); |
| |
| return ret; |
| |
| } else { |
| /* fill random pool and seed the current legacy RNG */ |
| pool = RAND_POOL_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH, |
| RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8, |
| DRBG_MINMAX_FACTOR * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8)); |
| if (pool == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(pool) == 0) |
| goto err; |
| |
| if (meth->add == NULL |
| || meth->add(RAND_POOL_buffer(pool), |
| RAND_POOL_length(pool), |
| (RAND_POOL_entropy(pool) / 8.0)) == 0) |
| goto err; |
| |
| ret = 1; |
| } |
| |
| err: |
| RAND_POOL_free(pool); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * The 'random pool' acts as a dumb container for collecting random |
| * input from various entropy sources. The pool has no knowledge about |
| * whether its randomness is fed into a legacy RAND_METHOD via RAND_add() |
| * or into a new style RAND_DRBG. It is the callers duty to 1) initialize the |
| * random pool, 2) pass it to the polling callbacks, 3) seed the RNG, and |
| * 4) cleanup the random pool again. |
| * |
| * The random pool contains no locking mechanism because its scope and |
| * lifetime is intended to be restricted to a single stack frame. |
| */ |
| struct rand_pool_st { |
| unsigned char *buffer; /* points to the beginning of the random pool */ |
| size_t len; /* current number of random bytes contained in the pool */ |
| |
| size_t min_len; /* minimum number of random bytes requested */ |
| size_t max_len; /* maximum number of random bytes (allocated buffer size) */ |
| size_t entropy; /* current entropy count in bits */ |
| size_t requested_entropy; /* requested entropy count in bits */ |
| }; |
| |
| /* |
| * Allocate memory and initialize a new random pool |
| */ |
| |
| RAND_POOL *RAND_POOL_new(int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len) |
| { |
| RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool)); |
| |
| if (pool == NULL) { |
| RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| pool->min_len = min_len; |
| pool->max_len = max_len; |
| |
| pool->buffer = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(pool->max_len); |
| if (pool->buffer == NULL) { |
| RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| pool->requested_entropy = entropy; |
| |
| return pool; |
| |
| err: |
| OPENSSL_free(pool); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Free |pool|, securely erasing its buffer. |
| */ |
| void RAND_POOL_free(RAND_POOL *pool) |
| { |
| if (pool == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->max_len); |
| OPENSSL_free(pool); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Return the |pool|'s buffer to the caller (readonly). |
| */ |
| const unsigned char *RAND_POOL_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool) |
| { |
| return pool->buffer; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Return the |pool|'s entropy to the caller. |
| */ |
| size_t RAND_POOL_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) |
| { |
| return pool->entropy; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Return the |pool|'s buffer length to the caller. |
| */ |
| size_t RAND_POOL_length(RAND_POOL *pool) |
| { |
| return pool->len; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Detach the |pool| buffer and return it to the caller. |
| * It's the responsibility of the caller to free the buffer |
| * using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(). |
| */ |
| unsigned char *RAND_POOL_detach(RAND_POOL *pool) |
| { |
| unsigned char *ret = pool->buffer; |
| pool->buffer = NULL; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * If every byte of the input contains |entropy_per_bytes| bits of entropy, |
| * how many bytes does one need to obtain at least |bits| bits of entropy? |
| */ |
| #define ENTROPY_TO_BYTES(bits, entropy_per_bytes) \ |
| (((bits) + ((entropy_per_bytes) - 1))/(entropy_per_bytes)) |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * Checks whether the |pool|'s entropy is available to the caller. |
| * This is the case when entropy count and buffer length are high enough. |
| * Returns |
| * |
| * |entropy| if the entropy count and buffer size is large enough |
| * 0 otherwise |
| */ |
| size_t RAND_POOL_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool) |
| { |
| if (pool->entropy < pool->requested_entropy) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (pool->len < pool->min_len) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return pool->entropy; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Returns the (remaining) amount of entropy needed to fill |
| * the random pool. |
| */ |
| |
| size_t RAND_POOL_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool) |
| { |
| if (pool->entropy < pool->requested_entropy) |
| return pool->requested_entropy - pool->entropy; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Returns the number of bytes needed to fill the pool, assuming |
| * the input has 'entropy_per_byte' entropy bits per byte. |
| * In case of an error, 0 is returned. |
| */ |
| |
| size_t RAND_POOL_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_per_byte) |
| { |
| size_t bytes_needed; |
| size_t entropy_needed = RAND_POOL_entropy_needed(pool); |
| |
| if (entropy_per_byte < 1 || entropy_per_byte > 8) { |
| RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_BYTES_NEEDED, RAND_R_ARGUMENT_OUT_OF_RANGE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| bytes_needed = ENTROPY_TO_BYTES(entropy_needed, entropy_per_byte); |
| |
| if (bytes_needed > pool->max_len - pool->len) { |
| /* not enough space left */ |
| RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_BYTES_NEEDED, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (pool->len < pool->min_len && |
| bytes_needed < pool->min_len - pool->len) |
| /* to meet the min_len requirement */ |
| bytes_needed = pool->min_len - pool->len; |
| |
| return bytes_needed; |
| } |
| |
| /* Returns the remaining number of bytes available */ |
| size_t RAND_POOL_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool) |
| { |
| return pool->max_len - pool->len; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Add random bytes to the random pool. |
| * |
| * It is expected that the |buffer| contains |len| bytes of |
| * random input which contains at least |entropy| bits of |
| * randomness. |
| * |
| * Return available amount of entropy after this operation. |
| * (see RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool)) |
| */ |
| size_t RAND_POOL_add(RAND_POOL *pool, |
| const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy) |
| { |
| if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) { |
| RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD, RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (len > 0) { |
| memcpy(pool->buffer + pool->len, buffer, len); |
| pool->len += len; |
| pool->entropy += entropy; |
| } |
| |
| return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Start to add random bytes to the random pool in-place. |
| * |
| * Reserves the next |len| bytes for adding random bytes in-place |
| * and returns a pointer to the buffer. |
| * The caller is allowed to copy up to |len| bytes into the buffer. |
| * If |len| == 0 this is considered a no-op and a NULL pointer |
| * is returned without producing an error message. |
| * |
| * After updating the buffer, RAND_POOL_add_end() needs to be called |
| * to finish the udpate operation (see next comment). |
| */ |
| unsigned char *RAND_POOL_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len) |
| { |
| if (len == 0) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) { |
| RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_BEGIN, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| return pool->buffer + pool->len; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Finish to add random bytes to the random pool in-place. |
| * |
| * Finishes an in-place update of the random pool started by |
| * RAND_POOL_add_begin() (see previous comment). |
| * It is expected that |len| bytes of random input have been added |
| * to the buffer which contain at least |entropy| bits of randomness. |
| * It is allowed to add less bytes than originally reserved. |
| */ |
| size_t RAND_POOL_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy) |
| { |
| if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) { |
| RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_END, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (len > 0) { |
| pool->len += len; |
| pool->entropy += entropy; |
| } |
| |
| return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool); |
| } |
| |
| int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth) |
| { |
| if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock); |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
| ENGINE_finish(funct_ref); |
| funct_ref = NULL; |
| #endif |
| default_RAND_meth = meth; |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void) |
| { |
| const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL; |
| |
| if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init)) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock); |
| if (default_RAND_meth == NULL) { |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
| ENGINE *e; |
| |
| /* If we have an engine that can do RAND, use it. */ |
| if ((e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND()) != NULL |
| && (tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e)) != NULL) { |
| funct_ref = e; |
| default_RAND_meth = tmp_meth; |
| } else { |
| ENGINE_finish(e); |
| default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth; |
| } |
| #else |
| default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth; |
| #endif |
| } |
| tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth; |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock); |
| return tmp_meth; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
| int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine) |
| { |
| const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL; |
| |
| if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (engine != NULL) { |
| if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) |
| return 0; |
| tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(engine); |
| if (tmp_meth == NULL) { |
| ENGINE_finish(engine); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_engine_lock); |
| /* This function releases any prior ENGINE so call it first */ |
| RAND_set_rand_method(tmp_meth); |
| funct_ref = engine; |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_engine_lock); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num) |
| { |
| const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); |
| |
| if (meth->seed != NULL) |
| meth->seed(buf, num); |
| } |
| |
| void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness) |
| { |
| const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); |
| |
| if (meth->add != NULL) |
| meth->add(buf, num, randomness); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This function is not part of RAND_METHOD, so if we're not using |
| * the default method, then just call RAND_bytes(). Otherwise make |
| * sure we're instantiated and use the private DRBG. |
| */ |
| int RAND_priv_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) |
| { |
| const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); |
| RAND_DRBG *drbg; |
| int ret; |
| |
| if (meth != RAND_OpenSSL()) |
| return RAND_bytes(buf, num); |
| |
| drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_priv_global(); |
| if (drbg == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* We have to lock the DRBG before generating bits from it. */ |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock); |
| ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buf, num, 0, NULL, 0); |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) |
| { |
| const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); |
| |
| if (meth->bytes != NULL) |
| return meth->bytes(buf, num); |
| RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L |
| int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) |
| { |
| const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); |
| |
| if (meth->pseudorand != NULL) |
| return meth->pseudorand(buf, num); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| int RAND_status(void) |
| { |
| const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method(); |
| |
| if (meth->status != NULL) |
| return meth->status(); |
| return 0; |
| } |