| /* |
| * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for |
| * internal use. |
| */ |
| #include "internal/deprecated.h" |
| |
| #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
| #include <openssl/core_names.h> |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| # include <openssl/engine.h> |
| #endif |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/param_build.h> |
| #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
| #include "internal/refcount.h" |
| #include "crypto/bn.h" |
| #include "crypto/evp.h" |
| #include "crypto/rsa.h" |
| #include "crypto/security_bits.h" |
| #include "rsa_local.h" |
| |
| static RSA *rsa_new_intern(ENGINE *engine, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx); |
| |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| RSA *RSA_new(void) |
| { |
| return rsa_new_intern(NULL, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa) |
| { |
| return rsa->meth; |
| } |
| |
| int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth) |
| { |
| /* |
| * NB: The caller is specifically setting a method, so it's not up to us |
| * to deal with which ENGINE it comes from. |
| */ |
| const RSA_METHOD *mtmp; |
| mtmp = rsa->meth; |
| if (mtmp->finish) |
| mtmp->finish(rsa); |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
| ENGINE_finish(rsa->engine); |
| rsa->engine = NULL; |
| #endif |
| rsa->meth = meth; |
| if (meth->init) |
| meth->init(rsa); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine) |
| { |
| return rsa_new_intern(engine, NULL); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| RSA *ossl_rsa_new_with_ctx(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx) |
| { |
| return rsa_new_intern(NULL, libctx); |
| } |
| |
| static RSA *rsa_new_intern(ENGINE *engine, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx) |
| { |
| RSA *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); |
| |
| if (ret == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| ret->references = 1; |
| ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); |
| if (ret->lock == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| OPENSSL_free(ret); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| ret->libctx = libctx; |
| ret->meth = RSA_get_default_method(); |
| #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE) |
| ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW; |
| if (engine) { |
| if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| ret->engine = engine; |
| } else { |
| ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_RSA(); |
| } |
| if (ret->engine) { |
| ret->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(ret->engine); |
| if (ret->meth == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW; |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| |
| err: |
| RSA_free(ret); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| void RSA_free(RSA *r) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| if (r == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock); |
| REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r); |
| if (i > 0) |
| return; |
| REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); |
| |
| if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL) |
| r->meth->finish(r); |
| #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE) |
| ENGINE_finish(r->engine); |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, r, &r->ex_data); |
| #endif |
| |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock); |
| |
| BN_free(r->n); |
| BN_free(r->e); |
| BN_clear_free(r->d); |
| BN_clear_free(r->p); |
| BN_clear_free(r->q); |
| BN_clear_free(r->dmp1); |
| BN_clear_free(r->dmq1); |
| BN_clear_free(r->iqmp); |
| |
| #if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS) |
| ossl_rsa_acvp_test_free(r->acvp_test); |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss); |
| sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(r->prime_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free); |
| #endif |
| BN_BLINDING_free(r->blinding); |
| BN_BLINDING_free(r->mt_blinding); |
| OPENSSL_free(r); |
| } |
| |
| int RSA_up_ref(RSA *r) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock) <= 0) |
| return 0; |
| |
| REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r); |
| REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); |
| return i > 1 ? 1 : 0; |
| } |
| |
| OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_rsa_get0_libctx(RSA *r) |
| { |
| return r->libctx; |
| } |
| |
| void ossl_rsa_set0_libctx(RSA *r, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx) |
| { |
| r->libctx = libctx; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg) |
| { |
| return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg); |
| } |
| |
| void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx) |
| { |
| return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * Define a scaling constant for our fixed point arithmetic. |
| * This value must be a power of two because the base two logarithm code |
| * makes this assumption. The exponent must also be a multiple of three so |
| * that the scale factor has an exact cube root. Finally, the scale factor |
| * should not be so large that a multiplication of two scaled numbers |
| * overflows a 64 bit unsigned integer. |
| */ |
| static const unsigned int scale = 1 << 18; |
| static const unsigned int cbrt_scale = 1 << (2 * 18 / 3); |
| |
| /* Define some constants, none exceed 32 bits */ |
| static const unsigned int log_2 = 0x02c5c8; /* scale * log(2) */ |
| static const unsigned int log_e = 0x05c551; /* scale * log2(M_E) */ |
| static const unsigned int c1_923 = 0x07b126; /* scale * 1.923 */ |
| static const unsigned int c4_690 = 0x12c28f; /* scale * 4.690 */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Multiply two scaled integers together and rescale the result. |
| */ |
| static ossl_inline uint64_t mul2(uint64_t a, uint64_t b) |
| { |
| return a * b / scale; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Calculate the cube root of a 64 bit scaled integer. |
| * Although the cube root of a 64 bit number does fit into a 32 bit unsigned |
| * integer, this is not guaranteed after scaling, so this function has a |
| * 64 bit return. This uses the shifting nth root algorithm with some |
| * algebraic simplifications. |
| */ |
| static uint64_t icbrt64(uint64_t x) |
| { |
| uint64_t r = 0; |
| uint64_t b; |
| int s; |
| |
| for (s = 63; s >= 0; s -= 3) { |
| r <<= 1; |
| b = 3 * r * (r + 1) + 1; |
| if ((x >> s) >= b) { |
| x -= b << s; |
| r++; |
| } |
| } |
| return r * cbrt_scale; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Calculate the natural logarithm of a 64 bit scaled integer. |
| * This is done by calculating a base two logarithm and scaling. |
| * The maximum logarithm (base 2) is 64 and this reduces base e, so |
| * a 32 bit result should not overflow. The argument passed must be |
| * greater than unity so we don't need to handle negative results. |
| */ |
| static uint32_t ilog_e(uint64_t v) |
| { |
| uint32_t i, r = 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * Scale down the value into the range 1 .. 2. |
| * |
| * If fractional numbers need to be processed, another loop needs |
| * to go here that checks v < scale and if so multiplies it by 2 and |
| * reduces r by scale. This also means making r signed. |
| */ |
| while (v >= 2 * scale) { |
| v >>= 1; |
| r += scale; |
| } |
| for (i = scale / 2; i != 0; i /= 2) { |
| v = mul2(v, v); |
| if (v >= 2 * scale) { |
| v >>= 1; |
| r += i; |
| } |
| } |
| r = (r * (uint64_t)scale) / log_e; |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * NIST SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D: Maximum Security Strength Estimates for IFC |
| * Modulus Lengths. |
| * |
| * Note that this formula is also referred to in SP800-56A rev3 Appendix D: |
| * for FFC safe prime groups for modp and ffdhe. |
| * After Table 25 and Table 26 it refers to |
| * "The maximum security strength estimates were calculated using the formula in |
| * Section 7.5 of the FIPS 140 IG and rounded to the nearest multiple of eight |
| * bits". |
| * |
| * The formula is: |
| * |
| * E = \frac{1.923 \sqrt[3]{nBits \cdot log_e(2)} |
| * \cdot(log_e(nBits \cdot log_e(2))^{2/3} - 4.69}{log_e(2)} |
| * The two cube roots are merged together here. |
| */ |
| uint16_t ossl_ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(int n) |
| { |
| uint64_t x; |
| uint32_t lx; |
| uint16_t y, cap; |
| |
| /* |
| * Look for common values as listed in standards. |
| * These values are not exactly equal to the results from the formulae in |
| * the standards but are defined to be canonical. |
| */ |
| switch (n) { |
| case 2048: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D and FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */ |
| return 112; |
| case 3072: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D and FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */ |
| return 128; |
| case 4096: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */ |
| return 152; |
| case 6144: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */ |
| return 176; |
| case 7680: /* FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */ |
| return 192; |
| case 8192: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */ |
| return 200; |
| case 15360: /* FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */ |
| return 256; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * The first incorrect result (i.e. not accurate or off by one low) occurs |
| * for n = 699668. The true value here is 1200. Instead of using this n |
| * as the check threshold, the smallest n such that the correct result is |
| * 1200 is used instead. |
| */ |
| if (n >= 687737) |
| return 1200; |
| if (n < 8) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * To ensure that the output is non-decreasing with respect to n, |
| * a cap needs to be applied to the two values where the function over |
| * estimates the strength (according to the above fast path). |
| */ |
| if (n <= 7680) |
| cap = 192; |
| else if (n <= 15360) |
| cap = 256; |
| else |
| cap = 1200; |
| |
| x = n * (uint64_t)log_2; |
| lx = ilog_e(x); |
| y = (uint16_t)((mul2(c1_923, icbrt64(mul2(mul2(x, lx), lx))) - c4_690) |
| / log_2); |
| y = (y + 4) & ~7; |
| if (y > cap) |
| y = cap; |
| return y; |
| } |
| |
| |
| |
| int RSA_security_bits(const RSA *rsa) |
| { |
| int bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n); |
| |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| if (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) { |
| /* This ought to mean that we have private key at hand. */ |
| int ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos); |
| |
| if (ex_primes <= 0 || (ex_primes + 2) > ossl_rsa_multip_cap(bits)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif |
| return ossl_ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(bits); |
| } |
| |
| int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) |
| { |
| /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input |
| * parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e. d may be |
| * left NULL (in case only the public key is used). |
| */ |
| if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL) |
| || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (n != NULL) { |
| BN_free(r->n); |
| r->n = n; |
| } |
| if (e != NULL) { |
| BN_free(r->e); |
| r->e = e; |
| } |
| if (d != NULL) { |
| BN_clear_free(r->d); |
| r->d = d; |
| BN_set_flags(r->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| } |
| r->dirty_cnt++; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q) |
| { |
| /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input |
| * parameters MUST be non-NULL. |
| */ |
| if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL) |
| || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (p != NULL) { |
| BN_clear_free(r->p); |
| r->p = p; |
| BN_set_flags(r->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| } |
| if (q != NULL) { |
| BN_clear_free(r->q); |
| r->q = q; |
| BN_set_flags(r->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| } |
| r->dirty_cnt++; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp) |
| { |
| /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input |
| * parameters MUST be non-NULL. |
| */ |
| if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL) |
| || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL) |
| || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (dmp1 != NULL) { |
| BN_clear_free(r->dmp1); |
| r->dmp1 = dmp1; |
| BN_set_flags(r->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| } |
| if (dmq1 != NULL) { |
| BN_clear_free(r->dmq1); |
| r->dmq1 = dmq1; |
| BN_set_flags(r->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| } |
| if (iqmp != NULL) { |
| BN_clear_free(r->iqmp); |
| r->iqmp = iqmp; |
| BN_set_flags(r->iqmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| } |
| r->dirty_cnt++; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| /* |
| * Is it better to export RSA_PRIME_INFO structure |
| * and related functions to let user pass a triplet? |
| */ |
| int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[], |
| BIGNUM *coeffs[], int pnum) |
| { |
| STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old = NULL; |
| RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; |
| int i; |
| |
| if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL || pnum == 0) |
| return 0; |
| |
| prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum); |
| if (prime_infos == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (r->prime_infos != NULL) |
| old = r->prime_infos; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { |
| pinfo = ossl_rsa_multip_info_new(); |
| if (pinfo == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| if (primes[i] != NULL && exps[i] != NULL && coeffs[i] != NULL) { |
| BN_clear_free(pinfo->r); |
| BN_clear_free(pinfo->d); |
| BN_clear_free(pinfo->t); |
| pinfo->r = primes[i]; |
| pinfo->d = exps[i]; |
| pinfo->t = coeffs[i]; |
| BN_set_flags(pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| } else { |
| ossl_rsa_multip_info_free(pinfo); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo); |
| } |
| |
| r->prime_infos = prime_infos; |
| |
| if (!ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) { |
| r->prime_infos = old; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (old != NULL) { |
| /* |
| * This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could |
| * also be set by this function and r, d, t should not |
| * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent |
| * with other *set0* functions: just free it... |
| */ |
| sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free); |
| } |
| |
| r->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI; |
| r->dirty_cnt++; |
| |
| return 1; |
| err: |
| /* r, d, t should not be freed */ |
| sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free_ex); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, |
| const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d) |
| { |
| if (n != NULL) |
| *n = r->n; |
| if (e != NULL) |
| *e = r->e; |
| if (d != NULL) |
| *d = r->d; |
| } |
| |
| void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q) |
| { |
| if (p != NULL) |
| *p = r->p; |
| if (q != NULL) |
| *q = r->q; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| int RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(const RSA *r) |
| { |
| int pnum; |
| |
| pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(r->prime_infos); |
| if (pnum <= 0) |
| pnum = 0; |
| return pnum; |
| } |
| |
| int RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *primes[]) |
| { |
| int pnum, i; |
| RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; |
| |
| if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * return other primes |
| * it's caller's responsibility to allocate oth_primes[pnum] |
| */ |
| for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { |
| pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i); |
| primes[i] = pinfo->r; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, |
| const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, |
| const BIGNUM **iqmp) |
| { |
| if (dmp1 != NULL) |
| *dmp1 = r->dmp1; |
| if (dmq1 != NULL) |
| *dmq1 = r->dmq1; |
| if (iqmp != NULL) |
| *iqmp = r->iqmp; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| int RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *exps[], |
| const BIGNUM *coeffs[]) |
| { |
| int pnum; |
| |
| if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* return other primes */ |
| if (exps != NULL || coeffs != NULL) { |
| RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; |
| int i; |
| |
| /* it's the user's job to guarantee the buffer length */ |
| for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { |
| pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i); |
| if (exps != NULL) |
| exps[i] = pinfo->d; |
| if (coeffs != NULL) |
| coeffs[i] = pinfo->t; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_n(const RSA *r) |
| { |
| return r->n; |
| } |
| |
| const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_e(const RSA *r) |
| { |
| return r->e; |
| } |
| |
| const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_d(const RSA *r) |
| { |
| return r->d; |
| } |
| |
| const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_p(const RSA *r) |
| { |
| return r->p; |
| } |
| |
| const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_q(const RSA *r) |
| { |
| return r->q; |
| } |
| |
| const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmp1(const RSA *r) |
| { |
| return r->dmp1; |
| } |
| |
| const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmq1(const RSA *r) |
| { |
| return r->dmq1; |
| } |
| |
| const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_iqmp(const RSA *r) |
| { |
| return r->iqmp; |
| } |
| |
| const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *RSA_get0_pss_params(const RSA *r) |
| { |
| #ifdef FIPS_MODULE |
| return NULL; |
| #else |
| return r->pss; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| /* Internal */ |
| int ossl_rsa_set0_pss_params(RSA *r, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss) |
| { |
| #ifdef FIPS_MODULE |
| return 0; |
| #else |
| RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss); |
| r->pss = pss; |
| return 1; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| /* Internal */ |
| RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *ossl_rsa_get0_pss_params_30(RSA *r) |
| { |
| return &r->pss_params; |
| } |
| |
| void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags) |
| { |
| r->flags &= ~flags; |
| } |
| |
| int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *r, int flags) |
| { |
| return r->flags & flags; |
| } |
| |
| void RSA_set_flags(RSA *r, int flags) |
| { |
| r->flags |= flags; |
| } |
| |
| int RSA_get_version(RSA *r) |
| { |
| /* { two-prime(0), multi(1) } */ |
| return r->version; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(const RSA *r) |
| { |
| return r->engine; |
| } |
| |
| int RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int optype, int cmd, int p1, void *p2) |
| { |
| /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */ |
| if (ctx != NULL && ctx->pmeth != NULL |
| && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA |
| && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) |
| return -1; |
| return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, optype, cmd, p1, p2); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM) |
| |
| int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes, |
| const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps, |
| const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs) |
| { |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old_infos = NULL; |
| #endif |
| int pnum; |
| |
| if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| pnum = sk_BIGNUM_num(primes); |
| if (pnum < 2 |
| || pnum != sk_BIGNUM_num(exps) |
| || pnum != sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) + 1) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!RSA_set0_factors(r, sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, 0), |
| sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, 1)) |
| || !RSA_set0_crt_params(r, sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, 0), |
| sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, 1), |
| sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, 0))) |
| return 0; |
| |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| old_infos = r->prime_infos; |
| #endif |
| |
| if (pnum > 2) { |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| int i; |
| |
| prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum); |
| if (prime_infos == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| for (i = 2; i < pnum; i++) { |
| BIGNUM *prime = sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, i); |
| BIGNUM *exp = sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, i); |
| BIGNUM *coeff = sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, i - 1); |
| RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL; |
| |
| if (!ossl_assert(prime != NULL && exp != NULL && coeff != NULL)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| /* Using ossl_rsa_multip_info_new() is wasteful, so allocate directly */ |
| if ((pinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pinfo))) == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| pinfo->r = prime; |
| pinfo->d = exp; |
| pinfo->t = coeff; |
| BN_set_flags(pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); |
| (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo); |
| } |
| |
| r->prime_infos = prime_infos; |
| |
| if (!ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) { |
| r->prime_infos = old_infos; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| #else |
| return 0; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| if (old_infos != NULL) { |
| /* |
| * This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could |
| * also be set by this function and r, d, t should not |
| * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent |
| * with other *set0* functions: just free it... |
| */ |
| sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| r->version = pnum > 2 ? RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI : RSA_ASN1_VERSION_DEFAULT; |
| r->dirty_cnt++; |
| |
| return 1; |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| err: |
| /* r, d, t should not be freed */ |
| sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free_ex); |
| return 0; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(BIGNUM_const, BIGNUM) |
| |
| int ossl_rsa_get0_all_params(RSA *r, STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *primes, |
| STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps, |
| STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs) |
| { |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; |
| int i, pnum; |
| #endif |
| |
| if (r == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* If |p| is NULL, there are no CRT parameters */ |
| if (RSA_get0_p(r) == NULL) |
| return 1; |
| |
| sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, RSA_get0_p(r)); |
| sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, RSA_get0_q(r)); |
| sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, RSA_get0_dmp1(r)); |
| sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, RSA_get0_dmq1(r)); |
| sk_BIGNUM_const_push(coeffs, RSA_get0_iqmp(r)); |
| |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r); |
| for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { |
| pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i); |
| sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, pinfo->r); |
| sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, pinfo->d); |
| sk_BIGNUM_const_push(coeffs, pinfo->t); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| /* Helpers to set or get diverse hash algorithm names */ |
| static int int_set_rsa_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, |
| /* For checks */ |
| int keytype, int optype, |
| /* For EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params() */ |
| const char *mdkey, const char *mdname, |
| const char *propkey, const char *mdprops) |
| { |
| OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params; |
| |
| if (ctx == NULL || mdname == NULL || (ctx->operation & optype) == 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
| /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ |
| return -2; |
| } |
| |
| /* If key type not RSA return error */ |
| switch (keytype) { |
| case -1: |
| if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA") |
| && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS")) |
| return -1; |
| break; |
| default: |
| if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, evp_pkey_type2name(keytype))) |
| return -1; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */ |
| *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(mdkey, (char *)mdname, 0); |
| if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_provided(ctx) && mdprops != NULL) { |
| /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */ |
| *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(propkey, (char *)mdprops, 0); |
| } |
| *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); |
| |
| return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params); |
| } |
| |
| /* Helpers to set or get diverse hash algorithm names */ |
| static int int_get_rsa_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, |
| /* For checks */ |
| int keytype, int optype, |
| /* For EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params() */ |
| const char *mdkey, |
| char *mdname, size_t mdnamesize) |
| { |
| OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params; |
| |
| if (ctx == NULL || mdname == NULL || (ctx->operation & optype) == 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
| /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ |
| return -2; |
| } |
| |
| /* If key type not RSA return error */ |
| switch (keytype) { |
| case -1: |
| if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA") |
| && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS")) |
| return -1; |
| break; |
| default: |
| if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, evp_pkey_type2name(keytype))) |
| return -1; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */ |
| *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(mdkey, (char *)mdname, mdnamesize); |
| *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); |
| |
| return evp_pkey_ctx_get_params_strict(ctx, params); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, |
| * simply because that's easier. |
| */ |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pad_mode) |
| { |
| return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING, |
| pad_mode, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, |
| * simply because that's easier. |
| */ |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *pad_mode) |
| { |
| return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING, |
| 0, pad_mode); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, |
| * simply because that's easier. |
| */ |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) |
| { |
| return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, |
| EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, 0, (void *)(md)); |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, |
| const char *mdname, |
| const char *mdprops) |
| { |
| return int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, |
| OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST, mdname, |
| OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST_PROPS, mdprops); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, |
| * simply because that's easier. |
| */ |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) |
| { |
| return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, |
| EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)(md)); |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname, |
| const char *mdprops) |
| { |
| return |
| int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, |
| OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST, mdname, |
| OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST_PROPS, mdprops); |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name, |
| size_t namesize) |
| { |
| return int_get_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, |
| OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST, |
| name, namesize); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, |
| * simply because that's easier. |
| */ |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md) |
| { |
| return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, |
| EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, |
| * simply because that's easier. |
| */ |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) |
| { |
| return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, |
| EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)(md)); |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname, |
| const char *mdprops) |
| { |
| return int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, -1, |
| EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, |
| OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, mdname, |
| OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, mdprops); |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name, |
| size_t namesize) |
| { |
| return int_get_rsa_md_name(ctx, -1, |
| EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, |
| OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, name, namesize); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, |
| * simply because that's easier. |
| */ |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) |
| { |
| return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, |
| EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)(md)); |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, |
| const char *mdname) |
| { |
| return int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, |
| OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, mdname, |
| NULL, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, |
| * simply because that's easier. |
| */ |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md) |
| { |
| return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, |
| EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)(md)); |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *label, int llen) |
| { |
| OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params; |
| |
| if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
| /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ |
| return -2; |
| } |
| |
| /* If key type not RSA return error */ |
| if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")) |
| return -1; |
| |
| /* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */ |
| *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL, |
| (void *)label, (size_t)llen); |
| *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); |
| |
| if (!evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, rsa_params)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Ownership is supposed to be transferred to the callee. */ |
| OPENSSL_free(label); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **label) |
| { |
| OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params; |
| size_t labellen; |
| |
| if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
| /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ |
| return -2; |
| } |
| |
| /* If key type not RSA return error */ |
| if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")) |
| return -1; |
| |
| *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL, |
| (void **)label, 0); |
| *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); |
| |
| if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, rsa_params)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| labellen = rsa_params[0].return_size; |
| if (labellen > INT_MAX) |
| return -1; |
| |
| return (int)labellen; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, |
| * simply because that's easier. |
| */ |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen) |
| { |
| /* |
| * For some reason, the optype was set to this: |
| * |
| * EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY |
| * |
| * However, we do use RSA-PSS with the whole gamut of diverse signature |
| * and verification operations, so the optype gets upgraded to this: |
| * |
| * EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG |
| */ |
| return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, |
| EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, saltlen, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper, |
| * simply because that's easier. |
| */ |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *saltlen) |
| { |
| /* |
| * Because of circumstances, the optype is updated from: |
| * |
| * EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY |
| * |
| * to: |
| * |
| * EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG |
| */ |
| return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, |
| EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, 0, saltlen); |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen) |
| { |
| OSSL_PARAM pad_params[2], *p = pad_params; |
| |
| if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
| /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ |
| return -2; |
| } |
| |
| if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS")) |
| return -1; |
| |
| *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, |
| &saltlen); |
| *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); |
| |
| return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, pad_params); |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int bits) |
| { |
| OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params; |
| size_t bits2 = bits; |
| |
| if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
| /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ |
| return -2; |
| } |
| |
| /* If key type not RSA return error */ |
| if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA") |
| && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS")) |
| return -1; |
| |
| *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_BITS, &bits2); |
| *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); |
| |
| return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params); |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp) |
| { |
| int ret = RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, |
| EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp); |
| |
| /* |
| * Satisfy memory semantics for pre-3.0 callers of |
| * EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(): their expectation is that input |
| * pubexp BIGNUM becomes managed by the EVP_PKEY_CTX on success. |
| */ |
| if (ret > 0 && evp_pkey_ctx_is_provided(ctx)) { |
| BN_free(ctx->rsa_pubexp); |
| ctx->rsa_pubexp = pubexp; |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * When we're dealing with a provider, there's no need to duplicate |
| * pubexp, as it gets copied when transforming to an OSSL_PARAM anyway. |
| */ |
| if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_legacy(ctx)) { |
| pubexp = BN_dup(pubexp); |
| if (pubexp == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, |
| EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp); |
| if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_legacy(ctx) && ret <= 0) |
| BN_free(pubexp); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int primes) |
| { |
| OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params; |
| size_t primes2 = primes; |
| |
| if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
| /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ |
| return -2; |
| } |
| |
| /* If key type not RSA return error */ |
| if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA") |
| && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS")) |
| return -1; |
| |
| *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PRIMES, &primes2); |
| *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); |
| |
| return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params); |
| } |
| #endif |
