| /* |
| * Copyright 2019-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for |
| * internal use. |
| */ |
| #include "internal/deprecated.h" |
| |
| #include <string.h> |
| #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
| #include <openssl/core_dispatch.h> |
| #include <openssl/core_names.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/rsa.h> |
| #include <openssl/params.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/proverr.h> |
| #include "internal/cryptlib.h" |
| #include "internal/nelem.h" |
| #include "internal/sizes.h" |
| #include "crypto/rsa.h" |
| #include "prov/providercommon.h" |
| #include "prov/implementations.h" |
| #include "prov/provider_ctx.h" |
| #include "prov/der_rsa.h" |
| #include "prov/securitycheck.h" |
| |
| #define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 |
| |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx; |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init; |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init; |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init; |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign; |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify; |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover; |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_sign_init; |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update; |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final; |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init; |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update; |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final; |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx; |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx; |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params; |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params; |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params; |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params; |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params; |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params; |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params; |
| static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params; |
| |
| static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = { |
| { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PKCSV15 }, |
| { RSA_NO_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE }, |
| { RSA_X931_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_X931 }, |
| { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PSS }, |
| { 0, NULL } |
| }; |
| |
| /* |
| * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface. |
| * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes RSA structures, so |
| * we use that here too. |
| */ |
| |
| typedef struct { |
| OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx; |
| char *propq; |
| RSA *rsa; |
| int operation; |
| |
| /* |
| * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0) |
| * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify |
| * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again |
| * by their Final function. |
| */ |
| unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1; |
| unsigned int mgf1_md_set : 1; |
| |
| /* main digest */ |
| EVP_MD *md; |
| EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx; |
| int mdnid; |
| char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */ |
| |
| /* RSA padding mode */ |
| int pad_mode; |
| /* message digest for MGF1 */ |
| EVP_MD *mgf1_md; |
| int mgf1_mdnid; |
| char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */ |
| /* PSS salt length */ |
| int saltlen; |
| /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */ |
| int min_saltlen; |
| |
| /* Temp buffer */ |
| unsigned char *tbuf; |
| |
| } PROV_RSA_CTX; |
| |
| /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */ |
| #define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1) |
| |
| static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx) |
| { |
| if (prsactx->md != NULL) |
| return EVP_MD_get_size(prsactx->md); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_check_padding(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx, |
| const char *mdname, const char *mgf1_mdname, |
| int mdnid) |
| { |
| switch (prsactx->pad_mode) { |
| case RSA_NO_PADDING: |
| if (mdname != NULL || mdnid != NID_undef) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| break; |
| case RSA_X931_PADDING: |
| if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| break; |
| case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING: |
| if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) |
| if ((mdname != NULL && !EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname)) |
| || (mgf1_mdname != NULL |
| && !EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mgf1_mdname))) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| break; |
| default: |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_check_parameters(PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx, int min_saltlen) |
| { |
| if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { |
| int max_saltlen; |
| |
| /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */ |
| max_saltlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) - EVP_MD_get_size(prsactx->md); |
| if ((RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) & 0x7) == 1) |
| max_saltlen--; |
| if (min_saltlen < 0 || min_saltlen > max_saltlen) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| prsactx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = NULL; |
| char *propq_copy = NULL; |
| |
| if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| if ((prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX))) == NULL |
| || (propq != NULL |
| && (propq_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(propq)) == NULL)) { |
| OPENSSL_free(prsactx); |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx); |
| prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1; |
| prsactx->propq = propq_copy; |
| /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */ |
| prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO; |
| prsactx->min_saltlen = -1; |
| return prsactx; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_pss_compute_saltlen(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| int saltlen = ctx->saltlen; |
| |
| if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) { |
| saltlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ctx->md); |
| } else if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO || saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) { |
| saltlen = RSA_size(ctx->rsa) - EVP_MD_get_size(ctx->md) - 2; |
| if ((RSA_bits(ctx->rsa) & 0x7) == 1) |
| saltlen--; |
| } |
| if (saltlen < 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } else if (saltlen < ctx->min_saltlen) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL, |
| "minimum salt length: %d, actual salt length: %d", |
| ctx->min_saltlen, saltlen); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| return saltlen; |
| } |
| |
| static unsigned char *rsa_generate_signature_aid(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, |
| unsigned char *aid_buf, |
| size_t buf_len, |
| size_t *aid_len) |
| { |
| WPACKET pkt; |
| unsigned char *aid = NULL; |
| int saltlen; |
| RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params; |
| int ret; |
| |
| if (!WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, aid_buf, buf_len)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| switch (ctx->pad_mode) { |
| case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
| ret = ossl_DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_MDWithRSAEncryption(&pkt, -1, |
| ctx->mdnid); |
| |
| if (ret > 0) { |
| break; |
| } else if (ret == 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED, |
| "Algorithm ID generation - md NID: %d", |
| ctx->mdnid); |
| goto cleanup; |
| case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING: |
| saltlen = rsa_pss_compute_saltlen(ctx); |
| if (saltlen < 0) |
| goto cleanup; |
| if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params) |
| || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(&pss_params, ctx->mdnid) |
| || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg(&pss_params, |
| ctx->mgf1_mdnid) |
| || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(&pss_params, saltlen) |
| || !ossl_DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_RSA_PSS(&pkt, -1, |
| RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS, |
| &pss_params)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| break; |
| default: |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED, |
| "Algorithm ID generation - pad mode: %d", |
| ctx->pad_mode); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| if (WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) { |
| WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, aid_len); |
| aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt); |
| } |
| cleanup: |
| WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); |
| return aid; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname, |
| const char *mdprops) |
| { |
| if (mdprops == NULL) |
| mdprops = ctx->propq; |
| |
| if (mdname != NULL) { |
| EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops); |
| int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN); |
| int md_nid = ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(ctx->libctx, md, |
| sha1_allowed); |
| size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname); |
| |
| if (md == NULL |
| || md_nid <= 0 |
| || !rsa_check_padding(ctx, mdname, NULL, md_nid) |
| || mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname)) { |
| if (md == NULL) |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, |
| "%s could not be fetched", mdname); |
| if (md_nid <= 0) |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED, |
| "digest=%s", mdname); |
| if (mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname)) |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, |
| "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname); |
| EVP_MD_free(md); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ctx->flag_allow_md) { |
| if (ctx->mdname[0] != '\0' && !EVP_MD_is_a(md, ctx->mdname)) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED, |
| "digest %s != %s", mdname, ctx->mdname); |
| EVP_MD_free(md); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| EVP_MD_free(md); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ctx->mgf1_md_set) { |
| if (!EVP_MD_up_ref(md)) { |
| EVP_MD_free(md); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md); |
| ctx->mgf1_md = md; |
| ctx->mgf1_mdnid = md_nid; |
| OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname)); |
| } |
| |
| EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx); |
| EVP_MD_free(ctx->md); |
| |
| ctx->mdctx = NULL; |
| ctx->md = md; |
| ctx->mdnid = md_nid; |
| OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname)); |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname, |
| const char *mdprops) |
| { |
| size_t len; |
| EVP_MD *md = NULL; |
| int mdnid; |
| |
| if (mdprops == NULL) |
| mdprops = ctx->propq; |
| |
| if ((md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops)) == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, |
| "%s could not be fetched", mdname); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* The default for mgf1 is SHA1 - so allow SHA1 */ |
| if ((mdnid = ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(ctx->libctx, md, 1)) <= 0 |
| || !rsa_check_padding(ctx, NULL, mdname, mdnid)) { |
| if (mdnid <= 0) |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED, |
| "digest=%s", mdname); |
| EVP_MD_free(md); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname)); |
| if (len >= sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname)) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, |
| "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname); |
| EVP_MD_free(md); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md); |
| ctx->mgf1_md = md; |
| ctx->mgf1_mdnid = mdnid; |
| ctx->mgf1_md_set = 1; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, |
| const OSSL_PARAM params[], int operation) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| |
| if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || prsactx == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (vrsa == NULL && prsactx->rsa == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NO_KEY_SET); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (vrsa != NULL) { |
| if (!ossl_rsa_check_key(prsactx->libctx, vrsa, operation)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!RSA_up_ref(vrsa)) |
| return 0; |
| RSA_free(prsactx->rsa); |
| prsactx->rsa = vrsa; |
| } |
| |
| prsactx->operation = operation; |
| |
| /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */ |
| prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO; |
| prsactx->min_saltlen = -1; |
| |
| switch (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK)) { |
| case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA: |
| prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; |
| break; |
| case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS: |
| prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING; |
| |
| { |
| const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss = |
| ossl_rsa_get0_pss_params_30(prsactx->rsa); |
| |
| if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) { |
| int md_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss); |
| int mgf1md_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss); |
| int min_saltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss); |
| const char *mdname, *mgf1mdname; |
| size_t len; |
| |
| mdname = ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(md_nid); |
| mgf1mdname = ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(mgf1md_nid); |
| |
| if (mdname == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, |
| "PSS restrictions lack hash algorithm"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (mgf1mdname == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, |
| "PSS restrictions lack MGF1 hash algorithm"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mdname, mdname, |
| sizeof(prsactx->mdname)); |
| if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mdname)) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, |
| "hash algorithm name too long"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mgf1_mdname, mgf1mdname, |
| sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname)); |
| if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname)) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST, |
| "MGF1 hash algorithm name too long"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| prsactx->saltlen = min_saltlen; |
| |
| /* call rsa_setup_mgf1_md before rsa_setup_md to avoid duplication */ |
| if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mgf1mdname, prsactx->propq) |
| || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, prsactx->propq) |
| || !rsa_check_parameters(prsactx, min_saltlen)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| break; |
| default: |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, PROV_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!rsa_set_ctx_params(prsactx, params)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int setup_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| if (ctx->tbuf != NULL) |
| return 1; |
| if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(ctx->rsa))) == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static void clean_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| if (ctx->tbuf != NULL) |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa)); |
| } |
| |
| static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| clean_tbuf(ctx); |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->tbuf); |
| ctx->tbuf = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_sign_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
| { |
| if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) |
| return 0; |
| return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, params, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN); |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, |
| size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| int ret; |
| size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa); |
| size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx); |
| |
| if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (sig == NULL) { |
| *siglen = rsasize; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (sigsize < rsasize) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_SIZE, |
| "is %zu, should be at least %zu", sigsize, rsasize); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (mdsize != 0) { |
| if (tbslen != mdsize) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| if (EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2)) { |
| unsigned int sltmp; |
| |
| if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE, |
| "only PKCS#1 padding supported with MDC2"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, |
| prsactx->rsa); |
| |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ret = sltmp; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| #endif |
| switch (prsactx->pad_mode) { |
| case RSA_X931_PADDING: |
| if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL, |
| "RSA key size = %d, expected minimum = %d", |
| RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), tbslen + 1); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| memcpy(prsactx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen); |
| prsactx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid); |
| ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, prsactx->tbuf, |
| sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING); |
| clean_tbuf(prsactx); |
| break; |
| |
| case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
| { |
| unsigned int sltmp; |
| |
| ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, |
| prsactx->rsa); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ret = sltmp; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING: |
| /* Check PSS restrictions */ |
| if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) { |
| switch (prsactx->saltlen) { |
| case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST: |
| if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_get_size(prsactx->md)) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, |
| PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL, |
| "minimum salt length set to %d, " |
| "but the digest only gives %d", |
| prsactx->min_saltlen, |
| EVP_MD_get_size(prsactx->md)); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* FALLTHRU */ |
| default: |
| if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0 |
| && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, |
| PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL, |
| "minimum salt length set to %d, but the" |
| "actual salt length is only set to %d", |
| prsactx->min_saltlen, |
| prsactx->saltlen); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) |
| return 0; |
| if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, |
| prsactx->tbuf, tbs, |
| prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md, |
| prsactx->saltlen)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf, |
| sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); |
| clean_tbuf(prsactx); |
| break; |
| |
| default: |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE, |
| "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } else { |
| ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, prsactx->rsa, |
| prsactx->pad_mode); |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
| end: |
| #endif |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| *siglen = ret; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_verify_recover_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, |
| const OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
| { |
| if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) |
| return 0; |
| return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, params, |
| EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER); |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx, |
| unsigned char *rout, |
| size_t *routlen, |
| size_t routsize, |
| const unsigned char *sig, |
| size_t siglen) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| int ret; |
| |
| if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (rout == NULL) { |
| *routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (prsactx->md != NULL) { |
| switch (prsactx->pad_mode) { |
| case RSA_X931_PADDING: |
| if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) |
| return 0; |
| ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa, |
| RSA_X931_PADDING); |
| if (ret < 1) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ret--; |
| if (prsactx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (ret != EVP_MD_get_size(prsactx->md)) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH, |
| "Should be %d, but got %d", |
| EVP_MD_get_size(prsactx->md), ret); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| *routlen = ret; |
| if (rout != prsactx->tbuf) { |
| if (routsize < (size_t)ret) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, |
| "buffer size is %d, should be %d", |
| routsize, ret); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret); |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
| { |
| size_t sltmp; |
| |
| ret = ossl_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp, |
| sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ret = sltmp; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| default: |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE, |
| "Only X.931 or PKCS#1 v1.5 padding allowed"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } else { |
| ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa, |
| prsactx->pad_mode); |
| if (ret < 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| *routlen = ret; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_verify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, |
| const OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
| { |
| if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) |
| return 0; |
| return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, params, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY); |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, |
| const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| size_t rslen; |
| |
| if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) |
| return 0; |
| if (prsactx->md != NULL) { |
| switch (prsactx->pad_mode) { |
| case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
| if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, |
| prsactx->rsa)) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| case RSA_X931_PADDING: |
| if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) |
| return 0; |
| if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, prsactx->tbuf, &rslen, 0, |
| sig, siglen) <= 0) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING: |
| { |
| int ret; |
| size_t mdsize; |
| |
| /* |
| * We need to check this for the RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1() |
| * call |
| */ |
| mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx); |
| if (tbslen != mdsize) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH, |
| "Should be %d, but got %d", |
| mdsize, tbslen); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) |
| return 0; |
| ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, |
| prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs, |
| prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md, |
| prsactx->tbuf, |
| prsactx->saltlen); |
| if (ret <= 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| default: |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE, |
| "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) |
| return 0; |
| rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa, |
| prsactx->pad_mode); |
| if (rslen == 0) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, prsactx->tbuf, rslen)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname, |
| void *vrsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[], |
| int operation) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| |
| if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, params, operation)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (mdname != NULL |
| /* was rsa_setup_md already called in rsa_signverify_init()? */ |
| && (mdname[0] == '\0' || OPENSSL_strcasecmp(prsactx->mdname, mdname) != 0) |
| && !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, prsactx->propq)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0; |
| |
| if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) { |
| prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
| if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex2(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, params)) |
| goto error; |
| |
| return 1; |
| |
| error: |
| EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx); |
| prsactx->mdctx = NULL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx, |
| const unsigned char *data, |
| size_t datalen) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| |
| if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return EVP_DigestUpdate(prsactx->mdctx, data, datalen); |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_digest_sign_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname, |
| void *vrsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
| { |
| if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) |
| return 0; |
| return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa, |
| params, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN); |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, |
| size_t *siglen, size_t sigsize) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| unsigned int dlen = 0; |
| |
| if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || prsactx == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1; |
| if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| /* |
| * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields |
| * are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign. |
| */ |
| if (sig != NULL) { |
| /* |
| * The digests used here are all known (see rsa_get_md_nid()), so they |
| * should not exceed the internal buffer size of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. |
| */ |
| if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return rsa_sign(vprsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen); |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_digest_verify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname, |
| void *vrsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
| { |
| if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) |
| return 0; |
| return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa, |
| params, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY); |
| } |
| |
| int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, |
| size_t siglen) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| unsigned int dlen = 0; |
| |
| if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (prsactx == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1; |
| if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * The digests used here are all known (see rsa_get_md_nid()), so they |
| * should not exceed the internal buffer size of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. |
| */ |
| if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen); |
| } |
| |
| static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| |
| if (prsactx == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx); |
| EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md); |
| EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md); |
| OPENSSL_free(prsactx->propq); |
| free_tbuf(prsactx); |
| RSA_free(prsactx->rsa); |
| |
| OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(*prsactx)); |
| } |
| |
| static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx; |
| |
| if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx)); |
| if (dstctx == NULL) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| *dstctx = *srcctx; |
| dstctx->rsa = NULL; |
| dstctx->md = NULL; |
| dstctx->mdctx = NULL; |
| dstctx->tbuf = NULL; |
| dstctx->propq = NULL; |
| |
| if (srcctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(srcctx->rsa)) |
| goto err; |
| dstctx->rsa = srcctx->rsa; |
| |
| if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md)) |
| goto err; |
| dstctx->md = srcctx->md; |
| |
| if (srcctx->mgf1_md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->mgf1_md)) |
| goto err; |
| dstctx->mgf1_md = srcctx->mgf1_md; |
| |
| if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) { |
| dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
| if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL |
| || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx)) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (srcctx->propq != NULL) { |
| dstctx->propq = OPENSSL_strdup(srcctx->propq); |
| if (dstctx->propq == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| return dstctx; |
| err: |
| rsa_freectx(dstctx); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| OSSL_PARAM *p; |
| |
| if (prsactx == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID); |
| if (p != NULL) { |
| /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature algorithm */ |
| unsigned char aid_buf[128]; |
| unsigned char *aid; |
| size_t aid_len; |
| |
| aid = rsa_generate_signature_aid(prsactx, aid_buf, |
| sizeof(aid_buf), &aid_len); |
| if (aid == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, aid, aid_len)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE); |
| if (p != NULL) |
| switch (p->data_type) { |
| case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: |
| if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->pad_mode)) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING: |
| { |
| int i; |
| const char *word = NULL; |
| |
| for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) { |
| if (prsactx->pad_mode == (int)padding_item[i].id) { |
| word = padding_item[i].ptr; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (word != NULL) { |
| if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, word)) |
| return 0; |
| } else { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| } |
| } |
| break; |
| default: |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST); |
| if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mdname)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST); |
| if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mgf1_mdname)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN); |
| if (p != NULL) { |
| if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER) { |
| if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen)) |
| return 0; |
| } else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) { |
| const char *value = NULL; |
| |
| switch (prsactx->saltlen) { |
| case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST: |
| value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST; |
| break; |
| case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX: |
| value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX; |
| break; |
| case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO: |
| value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO; |
| break; |
| default: |
| { |
| int len = BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d", |
| prsactx->saltlen); |
| |
| if (len <= 0) |
| return 0; |
| p->return_size = len; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (value != NULL |
| && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, value)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = { |
| OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_END |
| }; |
| |
| static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vprsactx, |
| ossl_unused void *provctx) |
| { |
| return known_gettable_ctx_params; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| const OSSL_PARAM *p; |
| int pad_mode; |
| int saltlen; |
| char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = NULL; |
| char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = NULL; |
| char mgf1mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmgf1mdname = NULL; |
| char mgf1mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmgf1mdprops = NULL; |
| |
| if (prsactx == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| if (params == NULL) |
| return 1; |
| |
| pad_mode = prsactx->pad_mode; |
| saltlen = prsactx->saltlen; |
| |
| p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST); |
| if (p != NULL) { |
| const OSSL_PARAM *propsp = |
| OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, |
| OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES); |
| |
| pmdname = mdname; |
| if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname))) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (propsp != NULL) { |
| pmdprops = mdprops; |
| if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, |
| &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops))) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE); |
| if (p != NULL) { |
| const char *err_extra_text = NULL; |
| |
| switch (p->data_type) { |
| case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */ |
| if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pad_mode)) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING: |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| if (p->data == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) { |
| if (strcmp(p->data, padding_item[i].ptr) == 0) { |
| pad_mode = padding_item[i].id; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| break; |
| default: |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| switch (pad_mode) { |
| case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: |
| /* |
| * OAEP padding is for asymmetric cipher only so is not compatible |
| * with signature use. |
| */ |
| err_extra_text = "OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying"; |
| goto bad_pad; |
| case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING: |
| if ((prsactx->operation |
| & (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)) == 0) { |
| err_extra_text = |
| "PSS padding only allowed for sign and verify operations"; |
| goto bad_pad; |
| } |
| break; |
| case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: |
| err_extra_text = "PKCS#1 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS"; |
| goto cont; |
| case RSA_NO_PADDING: |
| err_extra_text = "No padding not allowed with RSA-PSS"; |
| goto cont; |
| case RSA_X931_PADDING: |
| err_extra_text = "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS"; |
| cont: |
| if (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, |
| RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA) |
| break; |
| /* FALLTHRU */ |
| default: |
| bad_pad: |
| if (err_extra_text == NULL) |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, |
| PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE); |
| else |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, |
| PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE, |
| err_extra_text); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN); |
| if (p != NULL) { |
| if (pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED, |
| "PSS saltlen can only be specified if " |
| "PSS padding has been specified first"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| switch (p->data_type) { |
| case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */ |
| if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &saltlen)) |
| return 0; |
| break; |
| case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING: |
| if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST) == 0) |
| saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST; |
| else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX) == 0) |
| saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX; |
| else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO) == 0) |
| saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO; |
| else |
| saltlen = atoi(p->data); |
| break; |
| default: |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check. |
| * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently |
| * lowest saltlen number possible. |
| */ |
| if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) { |
| switch (saltlen) { |
| case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO: |
| if (prsactx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH, |
| "Cannot use autodetected salt length"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| break; |
| case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST: |
| if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_get_size(prsactx->md)) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, |
| PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL, |
| "Should be more than %d, but would be " |
| "set to match digest size (%d)", |
| prsactx->min_saltlen, |
| EVP_MD_get_size(prsactx->md)); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| break; |
| default: |
| if (saltlen >= 0 && saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) { |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, |
| PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL, |
| "Should be more than %d, " |
| "but would be set to %d", |
| prsactx->min_saltlen, saltlen); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST); |
| if (p != NULL) { |
| const OSSL_PARAM *propsp = |
| OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, |
| OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES); |
| |
| pmgf1mdname = mgf1mdname; |
| if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmgf1mdname, sizeof(mgf1mdname))) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (propsp != NULL) { |
| pmgf1mdprops = mgf1mdprops; |
| if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, |
| &pmgf1mdprops, sizeof(mgf1mdprops))) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| prsactx->saltlen = saltlen; |
| prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode; |
| |
| if (prsactx->md == NULL && pmdname == NULL |
| && pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) |
| pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME; |
| |
| if (pmgf1mdname != NULL |
| && !rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, pmgf1mdname, pmgf1mdprops)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (pmdname != NULL) { |
| if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, pmdname, pmdprops)) |
| return 0; |
| } else { |
| if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx, NULL, NULL, prsactx->mdnid)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static const OSSL_PARAM settable_ctx_params[] = { |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_END |
| }; |
| |
| static const OSSL_PARAM settable_ctx_params_no_digest[] = { |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0), |
| OSSL_PARAM_END |
| }; |
| |
| static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, |
| ossl_unused void *provctx) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| |
| if (prsactx != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md) |
| return settable_ctx_params_no_digest; |
| return settable_ctx_params; |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| |
| if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(prsactx->mdctx, params); |
| } |
| |
| static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| |
| if (prsactx->md == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(prsactx->md); |
| } |
| |
| static int rsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| |
| if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(prsactx->mdctx, params); |
| } |
| |
| static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx) |
| { |
| PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; |
| |
| if (prsactx->md == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md); |
| } |
| |
| const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_rsa_signature_functions[] = { |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign_init }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_init }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover_init }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_init }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_final }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_init }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_final }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_freectx }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_dupctx }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_params }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_params }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_params }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_params }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_md_params }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_md_params }, |
| { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, |
| (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_md_params }, |
| { 0, NULL } |
| }; |
