| /* | |
| * Copyright 1995-2026 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
| * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved | |
| * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use | |
| * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
| * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
| * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
| */ | |
| #include "internal/e_os.h" | |
| #include "internal/e_winsock.h" | |
| #include "ssl_local.h" | |
| #include <openssl/err.h> | |
| #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
| #include <openssl/ocsp.h> | |
| #include <openssl/dh.h> | |
| #include <openssl/async.h> | |
| #include <openssl/ct.h> | |
| #include <openssl/trace.h> | |
| #include <openssl/core_names.h> | |
| #include <openssl/provider.h> | |
| #include "internal/cryptlib.h" | |
| #include "internal/nelem.h" | |
| #include "internal/refcount.h" | |
| #include "internal/thread_once.h" | |
| #include "internal/ktls.h" | |
| #include "internal/to_hex.h" | |
| #include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h" | |
| #include "quic/quic_local.h" | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSLKEYLOG | |
| #include <sys/stat.h> | |
| #include <fcntl.h> | |
| #endif | |
| static int ssl_undefined_function_3(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, unsigned char *r, | |
| unsigned char *s, size_t t, size_t *u) | |
| { | |
| return ssl_undefined_function(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc)); | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_undefined_function_4(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, int r) | |
| { | |
| return ssl_undefined_function(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc)); | |
| } | |
| static size_t ssl_undefined_function_5(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, const char *r, | |
| size_t s, unsigned char *t) | |
| { | |
| return ssl_undefined_function(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc)); | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_undefined_function_6(int r) | |
| { | |
| return ssl_undefined_function(NULL); | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_undefined_function_7(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, unsigned char *r, | |
| size_t s, const char *t, size_t u, | |
| const unsigned char *v, size_t w, int x) | |
| { | |
| return ssl_undefined_function(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc)); | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_undefined_function_8(SSL_CONNECTION *sc) | |
| { | |
| return ssl_undefined_function(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc)); | |
| } | |
| const SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method = { | |
| ssl_undefined_function_8, | |
| ssl_undefined_function_3, | |
| ssl_undefined_function_4, | |
| ssl_undefined_function_5, | |
| NULL, /* client_finished_label */ | |
| 0, /* client_finished_label_len */ | |
| NULL, /* server_finished_label */ | |
| 0, /* server_finished_label_len */ | |
| ssl_undefined_function_6, | |
| ssl_undefined_function_7, | |
| }; | |
| struct ssl_async_args { | |
| SSL *s; | |
| void *buf; | |
| size_t num; | |
| enum { READFUNC, | |
| WRITEFUNC, | |
| OTHERFUNC } type; | |
| union { | |
| int (*func_read)(SSL *, void *, size_t, size_t *); | |
| int (*func_write)(SSL *, const void *, size_t, size_t *); | |
| int (*func_other)(SSL *); | |
| } f; | |
| }; | |
| static const struct { | |
| uint8_t mtype; | |
| uint8_t ord; | |
| int nid; | |
| } dane_mds[] = { | |
| { DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL, 0, NID_undef }, | |
| { DANETLS_MATCHING_2256, 1, NID_sha256 }, | |
| { DANETLS_MATCHING_2512, 2, NID_sha512 }, | |
| }; | |
| static int dane_ctx_enable(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx) | |
| { | |
| const EVP_MD **mdevp; | |
| uint8_t *mdord; | |
| uint8_t mdmax = DANETLS_MATCHING_LAST; | |
| int n = ((int)mdmax) + 1; /* int to handle PrivMatch(255) */ | |
| size_t i; | |
| if (dctx->mdevp != NULL) | |
| return 1; | |
| mdevp = OPENSSL_calloc(n, sizeof(*mdevp)); | |
| mdord = OPENSSL_calloc(n, sizeof(*mdord)); | |
| if (mdord == NULL || mdevp == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(mdord); | |
| OPENSSL_free(mdevp); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Install default entries */ | |
| for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(dane_mds); ++i) { | |
| const EVP_MD *md; | |
| if (dane_mds[i].nid == NID_undef || (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(dane_mds[i].nid)) == NULL) | |
| continue; | |
| mdevp[dane_mds[i].mtype] = md; | |
| mdord[dane_mds[i].mtype] = dane_mds[i].ord; | |
| } | |
| dctx->mdevp = mdevp; | |
| dctx->mdord = mdord; | |
| dctx->mdmax = mdmax; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static void dane_ctx_final(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx) | |
| { | |
| OPENSSL_free(dctx->mdevp); | |
| dctx->mdevp = NULL; | |
| OPENSSL_free(dctx->mdord); | |
| dctx->mdord = NULL; | |
| dctx->mdmax = 0; | |
| } | |
| static void tlsa_free(danetls_record *t) | |
| { | |
| if (t == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| OPENSSL_free(t->data); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(t->spki); | |
| OPENSSL_free(t); | |
| } | |
| static void dane_final(SSL_DANE *dane) | |
| { | |
| sk_danetls_record_pop_free(dane->trecs, tlsa_free); | |
| dane->trecs = NULL; | |
| OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(dane->certs); | |
| dane->certs = NULL; | |
| X509_free(dane->mcert); | |
| dane->mcert = NULL; | |
| dane->mtlsa = NULL; | |
| dane->mdpth = -1; | |
| dane->pdpth = -1; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * dane_copy - Copy dane configuration, sans verification state. | |
| */ | |
| static int ssl_dane_dup(SSL_CONNECTION *to, SSL_CONNECTION *from) | |
| { | |
| int num; | |
| int i; | |
| if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(&from->dane)) | |
| return 1; | |
| num = sk_danetls_record_num(from->dane.trecs); | |
| dane_final(&to->dane); | |
| to->dane.flags = from->dane.flags; | |
| to->dane.dctx = &SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(to)->dane; | |
| to->dane.trecs = sk_danetls_record_new_reserve(NULL, num); | |
| if (to->dane.trecs == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { | |
| danetls_record *t = sk_danetls_record_value(from->dane.trecs, i); | |
| if (SSL_dane_tlsa_add(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(to), t->usage, | |
| t->selector, t->mtype, t->data, t->dlen) | |
| <= 0) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int dane_mtype_set(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx, | |
| const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t mtype, uint8_t ord) | |
| { | |
| int i; | |
| if (mtype == DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL && md != NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_DANE_CANNOT_OVERRIDE_MTYPE_FULL); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (mtype > dctx->mdmax) { | |
| const EVP_MD **mdevp; | |
| uint8_t *mdord; | |
| int n = ((int)mtype) + 1; | |
| mdevp = OPENSSL_realloc_array(dctx->mdevp, n, sizeof(*mdevp)); | |
| if (mdevp == NULL) | |
| return -1; | |
| dctx->mdevp = mdevp; | |
| mdord = OPENSSL_realloc_array(dctx->mdord, n, sizeof(*mdord)); | |
| if (mdord == NULL) | |
| return -1; | |
| dctx->mdord = mdord; | |
| /* Zero-fill any gaps */ | |
| for (i = dctx->mdmax + 1; i < mtype; ++i) { | |
| mdevp[i] = NULL; | |
| mdord[i] = 0; | |
| } | |
| dctx->mdmax = mtype; | |
| } | |
| dctx->mdevp[mtype] = md; | |
| /* Coerce ordinal of disabled matching types to 0 */ | |
| dctx->mdord[mtype] = (md == NULL) ? 0 : ord; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static const EVP_MD *tlsa_md_get(SSL_DANE *dane, uint8_t mtype) | |
| { | |
| if (mtype > dane->dctx->mdmax) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype]; | |
| } | |
| static int dane_tlsa_add(SSL_DANE *dane, | |
| uint8_t usage, | |
| uint8_t selector, | |
| uint8_t mtype, const unsigned char *data, size_t dlen) | |
| { | |
| danetls_record *t; | |
| const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
| int ilen = (int)dlen; | |
| int i; | |
| int num; | |
| int mdsize; | |
| if (dane->trecs == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_DANE_NOT_ENABLED); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (ilen < 0 || dlen != (size_t)ilen) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DATA_LENGTH); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (usage > DANETLS_USAGE_LAST) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE_USAGE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (selector > DANETLS_SELECTOR_LAST) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_SELECTOR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) { | |
| md = tlsa_md_get(dane, mtype); | |
| if (md == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_MATCHING_TYPE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (md != NULL) { | |
| mdsize = EVP_MD_get_size(md); | |
| if (mdsize <= 0 || dlen != (size_t)mdsize) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (!data) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_NULL_DATA); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if ((t = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*t))) == NULL) | |
| return -1; | |
| t->usage = usage; | |
| t->selector = selector; | |
| t->mtype = mtype; | |
| t->data = OPENSSL_malloc(dlen); | |
| if (t->data == NULL) { | |
| tlsa_free(t); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| memcpy(t->data, data, dlen); | |
| t->dlen = dlen; | |
| /* Validate and cache full certificate or public key */ | |
| if (mtype == DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) { | |
| const unsigned char *p = data; | |
| X509 *cert = NULL; | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
| switch (selector) { | |
| case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT: | |
| if (!d2i_X509(&cert, &p, ilen) || p < data || dlen != (size_t)(p - data)) { | |
| X509_free(cert); | |
| tlsa_free(t); | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (X509_get0_pubkey(cert) == NULL) { | |
| X509_free(cert); | |
| tlsa_free(t); | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_TA_MASK) == 0) { | |
| /* | |
| * The Full(0) certificate decodes to a seemingly valid X.509 | |
| * object with a plausible key, so the TLSA record is well | |
| * formed. However, we don't actually need the certificate for | |
| * usages PKIX-EE(1) or DANE-EE(3), because at least the EE | |
| * certificate is always presented by the peer. We discard the | |
| * certificate, and just use the TLSA data as an opaque blob | |
| * for matching the raw presented DER octets. | |
| * | |
| * DO NOT FREE `t` here, it will be added to the TLSA record | |
| * list below! | |
| */ | |
| X509_free(cert); | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * For usage DANE-TA(2), we support authentication via "2 0 0" TLSA | |
| * records that contain full certificates of trust-anchors that are | |
| * not present in the wire chain. For usage PKIX-TA(0), we augment | |
| * the chain with untrusted Full(0) certificates from DNS, in case | |
| * they are missing from the chain. | |
| */ | |
| if ((dane->certs == NULL && (dane->certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || !sk_X509_push(dane->certs, cert)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); | |
| X509_free(cert); | |
| tlsa_free(t); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| break; | |
| case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI: | |
| if (!d2i_PUBKEY(&pkey, &p, ilen) || p < data || dlen != (size_t)(p - data)) { | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| tlsa_free(t); | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_PUBLIC_KEY); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * For usage DANE-TA(2), we support authentication via "2 1 0" TLSA | |
| * records that contain full bare keys of trust-anchors that are | |
| * not present in the wire chain. | |
| */ | |
| if (usage == DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA) | |
| t->spki = pkey; | |
| else | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /*- | |
| * Find the right insertion point for the new record. | |
| * | |
| * See crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c. We sort DANE-EE(3) records first, so that | |
| * they can be processed first, as they require no chain building, and no | |
| * expiration or hostname checks. Because DANE-EE(3) is numerically | |
| * largest, this is accomplished via descending sort by "usage". | |
| * | |
| * We also sort in descending order by matching ordinal to simplify | |
| * the implementation of digest agility in the verification code. | |
| * | |
| * The choice of order for the selector is not significant, so we | |
| * use the same descending order for consistency. | |
| */ | |
| num = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs); | |
| for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { | |
| danetls_record *rec = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); | |
| if (rec->usage > usage) | |
| continue; | |
| if (rec->usage < usage) | |
| break; | |
| if (rec->selector > selector) | |
| continue; | |
| if (rec->selector < selector) | |
| break; | |
| if (dane->dctx->mdord[rec->mtype] > dane->dctx->mdord[mtype]) | |
| continue; | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| if (!sk_danetls_record_insert(dane->trecs, t, i)) { | |
| tlsa_free(t); | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| dane->umask |= DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Return 0 if there is only one version configured and it was disabled | |
| * at configure time. Return 1 otherwise. | |
| */ | |
| static int ssl_check_allowed_versions(int min_version, int max_version) | |
| { | |
| int minisdtls = 0, maxisdtls = 0; | |
| /* Figure out if we're doing DTLS versions or TLS versions */ | |
| if (min_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
| || min_version >> 8 == DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR) | |
| minisdtls = 1; | |
| if (max_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER | |
| || max_version >> 8 == DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR) | |
| maxisdtls = 1; | |
| /* A wildcard version of 0 could be DTLS or TLS. */ | |
| if ((minisdtls && !maxisdtls && max_version != 0) | |
| || (maxisdtls && !minisdtls && min_version != 0)) { | |
| /* Mixing DTLS and TLS versions will lead to sadness; deny it. */ | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (minisdtls || maxisdtls) { | |
| /* Do DTLS version checks. */ | |
| if (min_version == 0) | |
| /* Ignore DTLS1_BAD_VER */ | |
| min_version = DTLS1_VERSION; | |
| if (max_version == 0) | |
| max_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; | |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 | |
| if (max_version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) | |
| max_version = DTLS1_VERSION; | |
| #endif | |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
| if (min_version == DTLS1_VERSION) | |
| min_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; | |
| #endif | |
| /* Done massaging versions; do the check. */ | |
| if (0 | |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 | |
| || (DTLS_VERSION_GE(min_version, DTLS1_VERSION) | |
| && DTLS_VERSION_GE(DTLS1_VERSION, max_version)) | |
| #endif | |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 | |
| || (DTLS_VERSION_GE(min_version, DTLS1_2_VERSION) | |
| && DTLS_VERSION_GE(DTLS1_2_VERSION, max_version)) | |
| #endif | |
| ) | |
| return 0; | |
| } else { | |
| /* Regular TLS version checks. */ | |
| if (min_version == 0) | |
| min_version = TLS1_VERSION; | |
| if (max_version == 0) | |
| max_version = TLS1_3_VERSION; | |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 | |
| if (max_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
| max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
| #endif | |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 | |
| if (max_version == TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
| max_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; | |
| #endif | |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
| if (max_version == TLS1_1_VERSION) | |
| max_version = TLS1_VERSION; | |
| #endif | |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
| if (max_version == TLS1_VERSION) | |
| max_version = SSL3_VERSION; | |
| #endif | |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
| if (min_version == TLS1_VERSION) | |
| min_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; | |
| #endif | |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
| if (min_version == TLS1_1_VERSION) | |
| min_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; | |
| #endif | |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 | |
| if (min_version == TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
| min_version = TLS1_3_VERSION; | |
| #endif | |
| /* Done massaging versions; do the check. */ | |
| if (0 | |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 | |
| || (min_version <= TLS1_VERSION && TLS1_VERSION <= max_version) | |
| #endif | |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 | |
| || (min_version <= TLS1_1_VERSION && TLS1_1_VERSION <= max_version) | |
| #endif | |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 | |
| || (min_version <= TLS1_2_VERSION && TLS1_2_VERSION <= max_version) | |
| #endif | |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 | |
| || (min_version <= TLS1_3_VERSION && TLS1_3_VERSION <= max_version) | |
| #endif | |
| ) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| #if defined(__TANDEM) && defined(OPENSSL_VPROC) | |
| /* | |
| * Define a VPROC function for HP NonStop build ssl library. | |
| * This is used by platform version identification tools. | |
| * Do not inline this procedure or make it static. | |
| */ | |
| #define OPENSSL_VPROC_STRING_(x) x##_SSL | |
| #define OPENSSL_VPROC_STRING(x) OPENSSL_VPROC_STRING_(x) | |
| #define OPENSSL_VPROC_FUNC OPENSSL_VPROC_STRING(OPENSSL_VPROC) | |
| void OPENSSL_VPROC_FUNC(void) { } | |
| #endif | |
| int SSL_clear(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| if (s->method == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return s->method->ssl_reset(s); | |
| } | |
| int ossl_ssl_connection_reset(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (ssl_clear_bad_session(sc)) { | |
| SSL_SESSION_free(sc->session); | |
| sc->session = NULL; | |
| } | |
| SSL_SESSION_free(sc->psksession); | |
| sc->psksession = NULL; | |
| OPENSSL_free(sc->psksession_id); | |
| sc->psksession_id = NULL; | |
| sc->psksession_id_len = 0; | |
| sc->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_NONE; | |
| sc->sent_tickets = 0; | |
| sc->error = 0; | |
| sc->hit = 0; | |
| sc->shutdown = 0; | |
| if (sc->renegotiate) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ossl_statem_clear(sc); | |
| sc->version = s->method->version; | |
| sc->client_version = sc->version; | |
| sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| BUF_MEM_free(sc->init_buf); | |
| sc->init_buf = NULL; | |
| sc->first_packet = 0; | |
| sc->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; | |
| memset(sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer, 0, | |
| sizeof(sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer)); | |
| sc->ext.compress_certificate_sent = 0; | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_free(sc->pha_dgst); | |
| sc->pha_dgst = NULL; | |
| /* Reset DANE verification result state */ | |
| sc->dane.mdpth = -1; | |
| sc->dane.pdpth = -1; | |
| X509_free(sc->dane.mcert); | |
| sc->dane.mcert = NULL; | |
| sc->dane.mtlsa = NULL; | |
| /* Clear the verification result peername */ | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(sc->param, NULL); | |
| /* Clear any shared connection state */ | |
| OPENSSL_free(sc->shared_sigalgs); | |
| sc->shared_sigalgs = NULL; | |
| sc->shared_sigalgslen = 0; | |
| /* | |
| * Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if so, revert | |
| * back. | |
| */ | |
| if (s->method != s->defltmeth) { | |
| s->method->ssl_deinit(s); | |
| s->method = s->defltmeth; | |
| if (!s->method->ssl_init(s)) | |
| return 0; | |
| } else { | |
| if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s)) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ossl_quic_tls_clear(sc->qtls); | |
| if (!RECORD_LAYER_reset(&sc->rlayer)) | |
| return 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0 | |
| /** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */ | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth) | |
| { | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; | |
| if (IS_QUIC_CTX(ctx)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ctx->method = meth; | |
| if (!SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(ctx, OSSL_default_ciphersuites())) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx, | |
| ctx->tls13_ciphersuites, | |
| &(ctx->cipher_list), | |
| &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id), | |
| OSSL_default_cipher_list(), ctx->cert); | |
| if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| if (ctx == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (ctx->method == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| return ctx->method->ssl_new(ctx); | |
| } | |
| int ossl_ssl_init(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *method, int type) | |
| { | |
| if (!SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx)) | |
| return 0; | |
| ssl->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); | |
| if (ssl->lock == NULL || !CRYPTO_NEW_REF(&ssl->references, 1)) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, ssl, &ssl->ex_data)) { | |
| CRYPTO_FREE_REF(&ssl->references); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ssl->ctx = ctx; | |
| ssl->type = type; | |
| ssl->defltmeth = ssl->method = method; | |
| return 1; | |
| err: | |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ssl->lock); | |
| ssl->lock = NULL; | |
| SSL_CTX_free(ctx); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| SSL *ossl_ssl_connection_new_int(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL *user_ssl, | |
| const SSL_METHOD *method) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *s; | |
| SSL *ssl; | |
| s = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*s)); | |
| if (s == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| ssl = &s->ssl; | |
| s->user_ssl = (user_ssl == NULL) ? ssl : user_ssl; | |
| if (!ossl_ssl_init(ssl, ctx, method, SSL_TYPE_SSL_CONNECTION)) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(s); | |
| s = NULL; | |
| ssl = NULL; | |
| goto sslerr; | |
| } | |
| RECORD_LAYER_init(&s->rlayer, s); | |
| s->options = ctx->options; | |
| s->dane.flags = ctx->dane.flags; | |
| if (method->version == ctx->method->version) { | |
| s->min_proto_version = ctx->min_proto_version; | |
| s->max_proto_version = ctx->max_proto_version; | |
| } | |
| s->mode = ctx->mode; | |
| s->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list; | |
| s->max_early_data = ctx->max_early_data; | |
| s->recv_max_early_data = ctx->recv_max_early_data; | |
| s->num_tickets = ctx->num_tickets; | |
| s->pha_enabled = ctx->pha_enabled; | |
| /* Shallow copy of the ciphersuites stack */ | |
| s->tls13_ciphersuites = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(ctx->tls13_ciphersuites); | |
| if (s->tls13_ciphersuites == NULL) | |
| goto cerr; | |
| /* | |
| * Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to the CERT, not | |
| * its contents; only when setting new parameters for the per-SSL | |
| * copy, ssl_cert_new would be called (and the direct reference to | |
| * the per-SSL_CTX settings would be lost, but those still were | |
| * indirectly accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they | |
| * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert). Now we don't look at the | |
| * SSL_CTX's CERT after having duplicated it once. | |
| */ | |
| s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); | |
| if (s->cert == NULL) | |
| goto sslerr; | |
| RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, ctx->read_ahead); | |
| s->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback; | |
| s->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg; | |
| s->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode; | |
| s->not_resumable_session_cb = ctx->not_resumable_session_cb; | |
| s->rlayer.record_padding_cb = ctx->record_padding_cb; | |
| s->rlayer.record_padding_arg = ctx->record_padding_arg; | |
| s->rlayer.block_padding = ctx->block_padding; | |
| s->rlayer.hs_padding = ctx->hs_padding; | |
| s->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length; | |
| if (!ossl_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(s->sid_ctx))) | |
| goto err; | |
| memcpy(&s->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(s->sid_ctx)); | |
| s->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback; | |
| s->generate_session_id = ctx->generate_session_id; | |
| s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); | |
| if (s->param == NULL) | |
| goto asn1err; | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param); | |
| s->quiet_shutdown = IS_QUIC_CTX(ctx) ? 0 : ctx->quiet_shutdown; | |
| if (!IS_QUIC_CTX(ctx)) | |
| s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode; | |
| s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment; | |
| s->split_send_fragment = ctx->split_send_fragment; | |
| s->max_pipelines = ctx->max_pipelines; | |
| s->rlayer.default_read_buf_len = ctx->default_read_buf_len; | |
| s->ext.debug_cb = 0; | |
| s->ext.debug_arg = NULL; | |
| s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; | |
| s->ext.status_type = ctx->ext.status_type; | |
| s->ext.status_expected = 0; | |
| s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL; | |
| s->ext.ocsp.exts = NULL; | |
| s->ext.ocsp.resp = NULL; | |
| s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0; | |
| s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex = NULL; | |
| if (!SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx)) | |
| goto err; | |
| s->session_ctx = ctx; | |
| if (ctx->ext.ecpointformats != NULL) { | |
| s->ext.ecpointformats = OPENSSL_memdup(ctx->ext.ecpointformats, | |
| ctx->ext.ecpointformats_len); | |
| if (s->ext.ecpointformats == NULL) { | |
| s->ext.ecpointformats_len = 0; | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| s->ext.ecpointformats_len = ctx->ext.ecpointformats_len; | |
| } | |
| if (ctx->ext.supportedgroups != NULL) { | |
| size_t add = 0; | |
| if (ctx->ext.supportedgroups_len == 0) | |
| /* Add 1 so allocation won't fail */ | |
| add = 1; | |
| s->ext.supportedgroups = OPENSSL_memdup(ctx->ext.supportedgroups, | |
| (ctx->ext.supportedgroups_len + add) | |
| * sizeof(*ctx->ext.supportedgroups)); | |
| if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) { | |
| s->ext.supportedgroups_len = 0; | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| s->ext.supportedgroups_len = ctx->ext.supportedgroups_len; | |
| } | |
| if (ctx->ext.keyshares != NULL) { | |
| size_t add = 0; | |
| if (ctx->ext.keyshares_len == 0) | |
| /* Add 1 so allocation won't fail */ | |
| add = 1; | |
| s->ext.keyshares = OPENSSL_memdup(ctx->ext.keyshares, | |
| (ctx->ext.keyshares_len + add) | |
| * sizeof(*ctx->ext.keyshares)); | |
| if (s->ext.keyshares == NULL) { | |
| s->ext.keyshares_len = 0; | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| s->ext.keyshares_len = ctx->ext.keyshares_len; | |
| } | |
| if (ctx->ext.tuples != NULL) { | |
| size_t add = 0; | |
| if (ctx->ext.tuples_len == 0) | |
| /* Add 1 so allocation won't fail */ | |
| add = 1; | |
| s->ext.tuples = OPENSSL_memdup(ctx->ext.tuples, | |
| (ctx->ext.tuples_len + add) | |
| * sizeof(*ctx->ext.tuples)); | |
| if (s->ext.tuples == NULL) { | |
| s->ext.tuples_len = 0; | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| s->ext.tuples_len = ctx->ext.tuples_len; | |
| } | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
| s->ext.npn = NULL; | |
| #endif | |
| if (ctx->ext.alpn != NULL) { | |
| s->ext.alpn = OPENSSL_malloc(ctx->ext.alpn_len); | |
| if (s->ext.alpn == NULL) { | |
| s->ext.alpn_len = 0; | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| memcpy(s->ext.alpn, ctx->ext.alpn, ctx->ext.alpn_len); | |
| s->ext.alpn_len = ctx->ext.alpn_len; | |
| } | |
| s->verified_chain = NULL; | |
| s->verify_result = X509_V_OK; | |
| s->default_passwd_callback = ctx->default_passwd_callback; | |
| s->default_passwd_callback_userdata = ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata; | |
| s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; | |
| if (!IS_QUIC_CTX(ctx)) { | |
| s->allow_early_data_cb = ctx->allow_early_data_cb; | |
| s->allow_early_data_cb_data = ctx->allow_early_data_cb_data; | |
| } | |
| if (!method->ssl_init(ssl)) | |
| goto sslerr; | |
| s->server = (method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function) ? 0 : 1; | |
| if (!method->ssl_reset(ssl)) | |
| goto sslerr; | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
| s->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback; | |
| s->psk_server_callback = ctx->psk_server_callback; | |
| #endif | |
| s->psk_find_session_cb = ctx->psk_find_session_cb; | |
| s->psk_use_session_cb = ctx->psk_use_session_cb; | |
| s->async_cb = ctx->async_cb; | |
| s->async_cb_arg = ctx->async_cb_arg; | |
| s->job = NULL; | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG | |
| memcpy(s->cert_comp_prefs, ctx->cert_comp_prefs, sizeof(s->cert_comp_prefs)); | |
| #endif | |
| if (ctx->client_cert_type != NULL) { | |
| s->client_cert_type = OPENSSL_memdup(ctx->client_cert_type, | |
| ctx->client_cert_type_len); | |
| if (s->client_cert_type == NULL) | |
| goto sslerr; | |
| s->client_cert_type_len = ctx->client_cert_type_len; | |
| } | |
| if (ctx->server_cert_type != NULL) { | |
| s->server_cert_type = OPENSSL_memdup(ctx->server_cert_type, | |
| ctx->server_cert_type_len); | |
| if (s->server_cert_type == NULL) | |
| goto sslerr; | |
| s->server_cert_type_len = ctx->server_cert_type_len; | |
| } | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT | |
| if (!SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(ssl, ctx->ct_validation_callback, | |
| ctx->ct_validation_callback_arg)) | |
| goto sslerr; | |
| #endif | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH | |
| if (!ossl_ech_conn_init(s, ctx, method)) | |
| goto sslerr; | |
| #endif | |
| s->ssl_pkey_num = SSL_PKEY_NUM + ctx->sigalg_list_len; | |
| return ssl; | |
| cerr: | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| asn1err: | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| sslerr: | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SSL_LIB); | |
| err: | |
| SSL_free(ssl); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| SSL *ossl_ssl_connection_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ossl_ssl_connection_new_int(ctx, NULL, ctx->method); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_is_dtls(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (s->type == SSL_TYPE_QUIC_CONNECTION || s->type == SSL_TYPE_QUIC_XSO) | |
| return 0; | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc) ? 1 : 0; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_is_tls(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (s->type == SSL_TYPE_QUIC_CONNECTION || s->type == SSL_TYPE_QUIC_XSO) | |
| return 0; | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc) ? 0 : 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_is_quic(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| return IS_QUIC(s); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_is_quic(const SSL_CTX *c) | |
| { | |
| return IS_QUIC_CTX(c); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_is_server(const SSL_CTX *c) | |
| { | |
| if (c == NULL || c->method == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return (c->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function) ? 0 : 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_up_ref(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| int i; | |
| if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&s->references, &i) <= 0) | |
| return 0; | |
| REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL", i, s); | |
| REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); | |
| return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, | |
| unsigned int sid_ctx_len) | |
| { | |
| if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ctx->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; | |
| memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, | |
| unsigned int sid_ctx_len) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| sc->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; | |
| memcpy(sc->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) | |
| { | |
| if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock)) | |
| return 0; | |
| ctx->generate_session_id = cb; | |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl); | |
| if (sc == NULL || !CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ssl->lock)) | |
| return 0; | |
| sc->generate_session_id = cb; | |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ssl->lock); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, | |
| unsigned int id_len) | |
| { | |
| /* | |
| * A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how | |
| * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - i.e. to | |
| * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with | |
| * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in use | |
| * by this SSL. | |
| */ | |
| SSL_SESSION r, *p; | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(ssl); | |
| if (sc == NULL || id_len > sizeof(r.session_id)) | |
| return 0; | |
| r.ssl_version = sc->version; | |
| r.session_id_length = id_len; | |
| memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len); | |
| if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(sc->session_ctx->lock)) | |
| return 0; | |
| p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(sc->session_ctx->sessions, &r); | |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(sc->session_ctx->lock); | |
| return (p != NULL); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose) | |
| { | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(sc->param, purpose); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust) | |
| { | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(sc->param, trust); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set1_dnsname(SSL *s, const char *host) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(sc->param, host, 0); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_add1_dnsname(SSL *s, const char *host) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(sc->param, host, strlen(host)); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set1_ipaddr(SSL *s, const char *ipaddr) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(sc->param, ipaddr); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_add1_ipaddr(SSL *s, const char *ipaddr) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_ip_asc(sc->param, ipaddr); | |
| } | |
| #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_4_0) | |
| int SSL_set1_host(SSL *s, const char *host) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* clear hostname(s) and IP address in any case, also if host parses as an IP address */ | |
| (void)X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(sc->param, NULL, 0); | |
| (void)X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(sc->param, NULL, 0); | |
| if (host == NULL) | |
| return 1; | |
| /* If a host is provided and parses as an IP address, treat it as such. */ | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(sc->param, host) | |
| || X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(sc->param, host, 0); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_add1_host(SSL *s, const char *host) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* If a host is provided and parses as an IP address, treat it as such. */ | |
| if (host != NULL) { | |
| ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip; | |
| char *old_ip; | |
| ip = a2i_IPADDRESS(host); | |
| if (ip != NULL) { | |
| /* We didn't want it; only to check if it *is* an IP address */ | |
| ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ip); | |
| old_ip = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get1_ip_asc(sc->param); | |
| if (old_ip != NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(old_ip); | |
| /* There can be only one IP address */ | |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT, | |
| "IP address was already set"); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(sc->param, host); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(sc->param, host, 0); | |
| } | |
| #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_4_0) */ | |
| void SSL_set_hostflags(SSL *s, unsigned int flags) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(sc->param, flags); | |
| } | |
| const char *SSL_get0_peername(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername(sc->param); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_dane_enable(SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return dane_ctx_enable(&ctx->dane); | |
| } | |
| unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) | |
| { | |
| unsigned long orig = ctx->dane.flags; | |
| ctx->dane.flags |= flags; | |
| return orig; | |
| } | |
| unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) | |
| { | |
| unsigned long orig = ctx->dane.flags; | |
| ctx->dane.flags &= ~flags; | |
| return orig; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_dane_enable(SSL *s, const char *basedomain) | |
| { | |
| SSL_DANE *dane; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| dane = &sc->dane; | |
| if (s->ctx->dane.mdmax == 0) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CONTEXT_NOT_DANE_ENABLED); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (dane->trecs != NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_DANE_ALREADY_ENABLED); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Default SNI name. This rejects empty names, while set1_host below | |
| * accepts them and disables hostname checks. To avoid side-effects with | |
| * invalid input, set the SNI name first. | |
| */ | |
| if (sc->ext.hostname == NULL) { | |
| if (!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(s, basedomain)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_SETTING_TLSA_BASE_DOMAIN); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Primary RFC6125 reference identifier */ | |
| if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(sc->param, basedomain, 0)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_SETTING_TLSA_BASE_DOMAIN); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| dane->mdpth = -1; | |
| dane->pdpth = -1; | |
| dane->dctx = &s->ctx->dane; | |
| dane->trecs = sk_danetls_record_new_null(); | |
| if (dane->trecs == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| unsigned long SSL_dane_set_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags) | |
| { | |
| unsigned long orig; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| orig = sc->dane.flags; | |
| sc->dane.flags |= flags; | |
| return orig; | |
| } | |
| unsigned long SSL_dane_clear_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags) | |
| { | |
| unsigned long orig; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| orig = sc->dane.flags; | |
| sc->dane.flags &= ~flags; | |
| return orig; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get0_dane_authority(SSL *s, X509 **mcert, EVP_PKEY **mspki) | |
| { | |
| SSL_DANE *dane; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return -1; | |
| dane = &sc->dane; | |
| if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) || sc->verify_result != X509_V_OK) | |
| return -1; | |
| if (dane->mtlsa) { | |
| if (mcert) | |
| *mcert = dane->mcert; | |
| if (mspki) | |
| *mspki = (dane->mcert == NULL) ? dane->mtlsa->spki : NULL; | |
| } | |
| return dane->mdpth; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(SSL *s, uint8_t *usage, uint8_t *selector, | |
| uint8_t *mtype, const unsigned char **data, size_t *dlen) | |
| { | |
| SSL_DANE *dane; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return -1; | |
| dane = &sc->dane; | |
| if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) || sc->verify_result != X509_V_OK) | |
| return -1; | |
| if (dane->mtlsa) { | |
| if (usage) | |
| *usage = dane->mtlsa->usage; | |
| if (selector) | |
| *selector = dane->mtlsa->selector; | |
| if (mtype) | |
| *mtype = dane->mtlsa->mtype; | |
| if (data) | |
| *data = dane->mtlsa->data; | |
| if (dlen) | |
| *dlen = dane->mtlsa->dlen; | |
| } | |
| return dane->mdpth; | |
| } | |
| SSL_DANE *SSL_get0_dane(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return &sc->dane; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_dane_tlsa_add(SSL *s, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector, | |
| uint8_t mtype, const unsigned char *data, size_t dlen) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return dane_tlsa_add(&sc->dane, usage, selector, mtype, data, dlen); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t mtype, | |
| uint8_t ord) | |
| { | |
| return dane_mtype_set(&ctx->dane, md, mtype, ord); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) | |
| { | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(sc->param, vpm); | |
| } | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->param; | |
| } | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return sc->param; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| ssl_cert_clear_certs(sc->cert); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_free(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| int i; | |
| if (s == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&s->references, &i); | |
| REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL", i, s); | |
| if (i > 0) | |
| return; | |
| REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); | |
| if (s->method != NULL) | |
| s->method->ssl_free(s); | |
| CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); | |
| SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); | |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(s->lock); | |
| CRYPTO_FREE_REF(&s->references); | |
| OPENSSL_free(s); | |
| } | |
| void ossl_ssl_connection_free(SSL *ssl) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *s; | |
| s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl); | |
| if (s == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| /* | |
| * Ignore return values. This could result in user callbacks being called | |
| * e.g. for the QUIC TLS record layer. So we do this early before we have | |
| * freed other things. | |
| */ | |
| ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); | |
| RECORD_LAYER_clear(&s->rlayer); | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param); | |
| dane_final(&s->dane); | |
| BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); | |
| /* add extra stuff */ | |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); | |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); | |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->tls13_ciphersuites); | |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers); | |
| /* Make the next call work :-) */ | |
| if (s->session != NULL) { | |
| ssl_clear_bad_session(s); | |
| SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); | |
| } | |
| SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession); | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id); | |
| ssl_cert_free(s->cert); | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs); | |
| /* Free up if allocated */ | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname); | |
| SSL_CTX_free(s->session_ctx); | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->ext.ecpointformats); | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats); | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->ext.supportedgroups); | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->ext.keyshares); | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tuples); | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_supportedgroups); | |
| sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->ext.ocsp.resp); | |
| s->ext.ocsp.resp = NULL; | |
| s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0; | |
| sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); | |
| sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex, OCSP_RESPONSE_free); | |
| s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex = NULL; | |
| #endif | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT | |
| SCT_LIST_free(s->scts); | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts); | |
| #endif | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->ext.alpn); | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie); | |
| if (s->clienthello != NULL) | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello->pre_proc_exts); | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context); | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->pha_dgst); | |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->ca_names, X509_NAME_free); | |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->client_cert_type); | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->server_cert_type); | |
| OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->verified_chain); | |
| if (ssl->method != NULL) | |
| ssl->method->ssl_deinit(ssl); | |
| ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(s->waitctx); | |
| #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn); | |
| #endif | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP | |
| sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles); | |
| #endif | |
| /* | |
| * We do this late. We want to ensure that any other references we held to | |
| * these BIOs are freed first *before* we call BIO_free_all(), because | |
| * BIO_free_all() will only free each BIO in the chain if the number of | |
| * references to the first BIO have dropped to 0 | |
| */ | |
| BIO_free_all(s->wbio); | |
| s->wbio = NULL; | |
| BIO_free_all(s->rbio); | |
| s->rbio = NULL; | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.valid_flags); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH | |
| ossl_ech_conn_clear(&s->ext.ech); | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set0_rbio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) { | |
| ossl_quic_conn_set0_net_rbio(s, rbio); | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| BIO_free_all(sc->rbio); | |
| sc->rbio = rbio; | |
| sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->set1_bio(sc->rlayer.rrl, sc->rbio); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set0_wbio(SSL *s, BIO *wbio) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) { | |
| ossl_quic_conn_set0_net_wbio(s, wbio); | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| /* | |
| * If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it | |
| */ | |
| if (sc->bbio != NULL) | |
| sc->wbio = BIO_pop(sc->wbio); | |
| BIO_free_all(sc->wbio); | |
| sc->wbio = wbio; | |
| /* Re-attach |bbio| to the new |wbio|. */ | |
| if (sc->bbio != NULL) | |
| sc->wbio = BIO_push(sc->bbio, sc->wbio); | |
| sc->rlayer.wrlmethod->set1_bio(sc->rlayer.wrl, sc->wbio); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio) | |
| { | |
| /* | |
| * For historical reasons, this function has many different cases in | |
| * ownership handling. | |
| */ | |
| /* If nothing has changed, do nothing */ | |
| if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(s) && wbio == SSL_get_wbio(s)) | |
| return; | |
| /* | |
| * If the two arguments are equal then one fewer reference is granted by the | |
| * caller than we want to take | |
| */ | |
| if (rbio != NULL && rbio == wbio) { | |
| if (!BIO_up_ref(rbio)) | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * If only the wbio is changed only adopt one reference. | |
| */ | |
| if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(s)) { | |
| SSL_set0_wbio(s, wbio); | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * There is an asymmetry here for historical reasons. If only the rbio is | |
| * changed AND the rbio and wbio were originally different, then we only | |
| * adopt one reference. | |
| */ | |
| if (wbio == SSL_get_wbio(s) && SSL_get_rbio(s) != SSL_get_wbio(s)) { | |
| SSL_set0_rbio(s, rbio); | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| /* Otherwise, adopt both references. */ | |
| SSL_set0_rbio(s, rbio); | |
| SSL_set0_wbio(s, wbio); | |
| } | |
| BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_conn_get_net_rbio(s); | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return sc->rbio; | |
| } | |
| BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_conn_get_net_wbio(s); | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| if (sc->bbio != NULL) { | |
| /* | |
| * If |bbio| is active, the true caller-configured BIO is its | |
| * |next_bio|. | |
| */ | |
| return BIO_next(sc->bbio); | |
| } | |
| return sc->wbio; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| return SSL_get_rfd(s); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| int ret = -1; | |
| BIO *b, *r; | |
| b = SSL_get_rbio(s); | |
| r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); | |
| if (r != NULL) | |
| BIO_get_fd(r, &ret); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| int ret = -1; | |
| BIO *b, *r; | |
| b = SSL_get_wbio(s); | |
| r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); | |
| if (r != NULL) | |
| BIO_get_fd(r, &ret); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK | |
| static const BIO_METHOD *fd_method(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return BIO_s_datagram(); | |
| #endif | |
| return BIO_s_socket(); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd) | |
| { | |
| int ret = 0; | |
| BIO *bio = NULL; | |
| if (s->type == SSL_TYPE_QUIC_XSO) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CONN_USE_ONLY); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| bio = BIO_new(fd_method(s)); | |
| if (bio == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); | |
| SSL_set_bio(s, bio, bio); | |
| ret = 1; | |
| err: | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd) | |
| { | |
| BIO *rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); | |
| int desired_type = IS_QUIC(s) ? BIO_TYPE_DGRAM : BIO_TYPE_SOCKET; | |
| if (s->type == SSL_TYPE_QUIC_XSO) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CONN_USE_ONLY); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (rbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(rbio) != desired_type | |
| || (int)BIO_get_fd(rbio, NULL) != fd) { | |
| BIO *bio = BIO_new(fd_method(s)); | |
| if (bio == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); | |
| SSL_set0_wbio(s, bio); | |
| } else { | |
| if (!BIO_up_ref(rbio)) | |
| return 0; | |
| SSL_set0_wbio(s, rbio); | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd) | |
| { | |
| BIO *wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s); | |
| int desired_type = IS_QUIC(s) ? BIO_TYPE_DGRAM : BIO_TYPE_SOCKET; | |
| if (s->type == SSL_TYPE_QUIC_XSO) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CONN_USE_ONLY); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (wbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(wbio) != desired_type | |
| || ((int)BIO_get_fd(wbio, NULL) != fd)) { | |
| BIO *bio = BIO_new(fd_method(s)); | |
| if (bio == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); | |
| SSL_set0_rbio(s, bio); | |
| } else { | |
| if (!BIO_up_ref(wbio)) | |
| return 0; | |
| SSL_set0_rbio(s, wbio); | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| /* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */ | |
| size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) | |
| { | |
| size_t ret = 0; | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| ret = sc->s3.tmp.finish_md_len; | |
| if (count > ret) | |
| count = ret; | |
| memcpy(buf, sc->s3.tmp.finish_md, count); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| /* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */ | |
| size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) | |
| { | |
| size_t ret = 0; | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| ret = sc->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len; | |
| if (count > ret) | |
| count = ret; | |
| memcpy(buf, sc->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, count); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return sc->verify_mode; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(sc->param); | |
| } | |
| int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return sc->verify_callback; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->verify_mode; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param); | |
| } | |
| int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->default_verify_callback; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode, | |
| int (*callback)(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| sc->verify_mode = mode; | |
| if (callback != NULL) | |
| sc->verify_callback = callback; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(sc->param, depth); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| OSSL_PARAM options[2], *opts = options; | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&sc->rlayer, yes); | |
| *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_READ_AHEAD, | |
| &sc->rlayer.read_ahead); | |
| *opts = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); | |
| /* Ignore return value */ | |
| sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_options(sc->rlayer.rrl, options); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(&sc->rlayer); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_pending(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| size_t pending = s->method->ssl_pending(s); | |
| /* | |
| * SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled | |
| * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), and it is | |
| * impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report errors that may be | |
| * observed while scanning the new data. (Note that SSL_pending() is | |
| * often used as a boolean value, so we'd better not return -1.) | |
| * | |
| * SSL_pending also cannot work properly if the value >INT_MAX. In that case | |
| * we just return INT_MAX. | |
| */ | |
| return pending < INT_MAX ? (int)pending : INT_MAX; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_has_pending(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| /* | |
| * Similar to SSL_pending() but returns a 1 to indicate that we have | |
| * processed or unprocessed data available or 0 otherwise (as opposed to the | |
| * number of bytes available). Unlike SSL_pending() this will take into | |
| * account read_ahead data. A 1 return simply indicates that we have data. | |
| * That data may not result in any application data, or we may fail to parse | |
| * the records for some reason. | |
| */ | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc; | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_has_pending(s); | |
| #endif | |
| sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| /* Check buffered app data if any first */ | |
| if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc)) { | |
| TLS_RECORD *rdata; | |
| pitem *item, *iter; | |
| iter = pqueue_iterator(sc->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data); | |
| while ((item = pqueue_next(&iter)) != NULL) { | |
| rdata = item->data; | |
| if (rdata->length > 0) | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&sc->rlayer)) | |
| return 1; | |
| return RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(&sc->rlayer); | |
| } | |
| X509 *SSL_get1_peer_certificate(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| X509 *r = SSL_get0_peer_certificate(s); | |
| if (r != NULL && !X509_up_ref(r)) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return r; | |
| } | |
| X509 *SSL_get0_peer_certificate(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| if (sc->session == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| else | |
| return sc->session->peer; | |
| } | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *r; | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| if (sc->session == NULL) | |
| r = NULL; | |
| else | |
| r = sc->session->peer_chain; | |
| /* | |
| * If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own certificate; if | |
| * we are a server, it does not. | |
| */ | |
| return r; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to | |
| * modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled | |
| */ | |
| int SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t, const SSL *f) | |
| { | |
| int i; | |
| /* TODO(QUIC FUTURE): Not allowed for QUIC currently. */ | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *tsc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(t); | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *fsc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL_ONLY(f); | |
| if (tsc == NULL || fsc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* Do we need to do SSL locking? */ | |
| if (!SSL_set_session(t, SSL_get_session(f))) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * what if we are setup for one protocol version but want to talk another | |
| */ | |
| if (t->method != f->method) { | |
| t->method->ssl_deinit(t); | |
| t->method = f->method; | |
| if (t->method->ssl_init(t) == 0) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| CRYPTO_UP_REF(&fsc->cert->references, &i); | |
| ssl_cert_free(tsc->cert); | |
| tsc->cert = fsc->cert; | |
| if (!SSL_set_session_id_context(t, fsc->sid_ctx, (int)fsc->sid_ctx_length)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */ | |
| int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| if ((ctx == NULL) || (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey); | |
| } | |
| /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ | |
| int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc; | |
| if ((sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(ssl)) == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (sc->cert->key->x509 == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (sc->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return X509_check_private_key(sc->cert->key->x509, | |
| sc->cert->key->privatekey); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_waiting_for_async(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (sc->job) | |
| return 1; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_all_async_fds(SSL *s, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fds, size_t *numfds) | |
| { | |
| ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if ((ctx = sc->waitctx) == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(ctx, fds, numfds); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_changed_async_fds(SSL *s, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *addfd, size_t *numaddfds, | |
| OSSL_ASYNC_FD *delfd, size_t *numdelfds) | |
| { | |
| ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if ((ctx = sc->waitctx) == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(ctx, addfd, numaddfds, delfd, | |
| numdelfds); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_async_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_async_callback_fn callback) | |
| { | |
| ctx->async_cb = callback; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_async_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg) | |
| { | |
| ctx->async_cb_arg = arg; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_async_callback(SSL *s, SSL_async_callback_fn callback) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| sc->async_cb = callback; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_async_callback_arg(SSL *s, void *arg) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| sc->async_cb_arg = arg; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_async_status(SSL *s, int *status) | |
| { | |
| ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if ((ctx = sc->waitctx) == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| *status = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_status(ctx); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Reset the statem error_state to ERROR_STATE_NOERROR to avoid the | |
| * error sticking. | |
| * Designed to be called at the beginning of any function that | |
| * is expected to be followed by a call to SSL_get_error(). | |
| * It returns 0 if the state machine is in the MSG_FLOW_ERROR state, | |
| * in this case the calling function can and should return immediately. | |
| */ | |
| static int ssl_reset_error_state(SSL_CONNECTION *sc) | |
| { | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 1; | |
| if (sc->statem.state == MSG_FLOW_ERROR) { | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_NOERROR; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Check if the connection failed into the MSG_FLOW_ERROR state during | |
| * the operation, if so, check the error stack and set the error_state | |
| * correspondently. | |
| * Designed to be called at the end of any function that | |
| * is expected to be followed by a call to SSL_get_error(). | |
| */ | |
| static void ssl_update_error_state(SSL_CONNECTION *sc) | |
| { | |
| unsigned long l; | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| if (sc->statem.state == MSG_FLOW_ERROR) { | |
| l = ERR_peek_error(); | |
| if (l != 0) { | |
| if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS) | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SYSCALL; | |
| else | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int SSL_accept(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) { | |
| return s->method->ssl_accept(s); | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (sc->handshake_func == NULL) { | |
| /* Not properly initialized yet */ | |
| SSL_set_accept_state(s); | |
| } | |
| return SSL_do_handshake(s); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_connect(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) { | |
| return s->method->ssl_connect(s); | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (sc->handshake_func == NULL) { | |
| /* Not properly initialized yet */ | |
| SSL_set_connect_state(s); | |
| } | |
| return SSL_do_handshake(s); | |
| } | |
| long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| return (long int)ossl_time2seconds(s->method->get_timeout()); | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_async_wait_ctx_cb(void *arg) | |
| { | |
| SSL *s = (SSL *)arg; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return sc->async_cb(s, sc->async_cb_arg); | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_start_async_job(SSL *s, struct ssl_async_args *args, | |
| int (*func)(void *)) | |
| { | |
| int ret; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (sc->waitctx == NULL) { | |
| sc->waitctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new(); | |
| if (sc->waitctx == NULL) | |
| return -1; | |
| if (sc->async_cb != NULL | |
| && !ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_callback(sc->waitctx, ssl_async_wait_ctx_cb, s)) | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| switch (ASYNC_start_job(&sc->job, sc->waitctx, &ret, func, args, | |
| sizeof(struct ssl_async_args))) { | |
| case ASYNC_ERR: | |
| sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_FAILED_TO_INIT_ASYNC); | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return -1; | |
| case ASYNC_PAUSE: | |
| sc->rwstate = SSL_ASYNC_PAUSED; | |
| return -1; | |
| case ASYNC_NO_JOBS: | |
| sc->rwstate = SSL_ASYNC_NO_JOBS; | |
| return -1; | |
| case ASYNC_FINISH: | |
| sc->job = NULL; | |
| return ret; | |
| default: | |
| sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_io_intern(void *vargs) | |
| { | |
| struct ssl_async_args *args; | |
| SSL *s; | |
| void *buf; | |
| size_t num; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc; | |
| args = (struct ssl_async_args *)vargs; | |
| s = args->s; | |
| buf = args->buf; | |
| num = args->num; | |
| if ((sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s)) == NULL) | |
| return -1; | |
| switch (args->type) { | |
| case READFUNC: | |
| return args->f.func_read(s, buf, num, &sc->asyncrw); | |
| case WRITEFUNC: | |
| return args->f.func_write(s, buf, num, &sc->asyncrw); | |
| case OTHERFUNC: | |
| return args->f.func_other(s); | |
| } | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t num, size_t *readbytes) | |
| { | |
| int ret; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return s->method->ssl_read(s, buf, num, readbytes); | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return -1; | |
| if (ssl_reset_error_state(sc) == 0) | |
| return -1; | |
| if (sc->handshake_func == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (sc->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { | |
| sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (sc->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECT_RETRY | |
| || sc->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPT_RETRY) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * If we are a client and haven't received the ServerHello etc then we | |
| * better do that | |
| */ | |
| if (!ossl_statem_check_finish_init(sc, 0)) | |
| return -1; | |
| if ((sc->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { | |
| struct ssl_async_args args; | |
| args.s = s; | |
| args.buf = buf; | |
| args.num = num; | |
| args.type = READFUNC; | |
| args.f.func_read = s->method->ssl_read; | |
| ret = ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern); | |
| *readbytes = sc->asyncrw; | |
| ssl_update_error_state(sc); | |
| return ret; | |
| } else { | |
| ret = s->method->ssl_read(s, buf, num, readbytes); | |
| ssl_update_error_state(sc); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) | |
| { | |
| int ret; | |
| size_t readbytes; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (num < 0) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
| if (sc != NULL) | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| ret = ssl_read_internal(s, buf, (size_t)num, &readbytes); | |
| /* | |
| * The cast is safe here because ret should be <= INT_MAX because num is | |
| * <= INT_MAX | |
| */ | |
| if (ret > 0) | |
| ret = (int)readbytes; | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_read_ex(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t num, size_t *readbytes) | |
| { | |
| int ret; | |
| ret = ssl_read_internal(s, buf, num, readbytes); | |
| if (ret < 0) | |
| ret = 0; | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_read_early_data(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t num, size_t *readbytes) | |
| { | |
| int ret; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); | |
| return SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR; | |
| } | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_read_early_data(s, buf, num, readbytes); | |
| #endif | |
| if (ssl_reset_error_state(sc) == 0) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (!sc->server) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR; | |
| } | |
| switch (sc->early_data_state) { | |
| case SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE: | |
| if (!SSL_in_before(s)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR; | |
| } | |
| /* fall through */ | |
| case SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPT_RETRY: | |
| sc->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING; | |
| ret = SSL_accept(s); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| /* NBIO or error */ | |
| sc->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPT_RETRY; | |
| return SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR; | |
| } | |
| /* fall through */ | |
| case SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY: | |
| if (sc->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { | |
| sc->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING; | |
| ret = SSL_read_ex(s, buf, num, readbytes); | |
| /* | |
| * State machine will update early_data_state to | |
| * SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING if we get an EndOfEarlyData | |
| * message | |
| */ | |
| if (ret > 0 || (ret <= 0 && sc->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING)) { | |
| sc->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY; | |
| return ret > 0 ? SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_SUCCESS | |
| : SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| sc->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING; | |
| } | |
| *readbytes = 0; | |
| return SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_FINISH; | |
| default: | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_early_data_status(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_get_early_data_status(s); | |
| #endif | |
| return sc->ext.early_data; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_peek_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t num, size_t *readbytes) | |
| { | |
| int ret; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return s->method->ssl_peek(s, buf, num, readbytes); | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (ssl_reset_error_state(sc) == 0) | |
| return -1; | |
| if (sc->handshake_func == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (sc->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if ((sc->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { | |
| struct ssl_async_args args; | |
| args.s = s; | |
| args.buf = buf; | |
| args.num = num; | |
| args.type = READFUNC; | |
| args.f.func_read = s->method->ssl_peek; | |
| ret = ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern); | |
| *readbytes = sc->asyncrw; | |
| ssl_update_error_state(sc); | |
| return ret; | |
| } else { | |
| ret = s->method->ssl_peek(s, buf, num, readbytes); | |
| ssl_update_error_state(sc); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) | |
| { | |
| int ret; | |
| size_t readbytes; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (num < 0) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
| if (sc != NULL) | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| ret = ssl_peek_internal(s, buf, (size_t)num, &readbytes); | |
| /* | |
| * The cast is safe here because ret should be <= INT_MAX because num is | |
| * <= INT_MAX | |
| */ | |
| if (ret > 0) | |
| ret = (int)readbytes; | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_peek_ex(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t num, size_t *readbytes) | |
| { | |
| int ret; | |
| ret = ssl_peek_internal(s, buf, num, readbytes); | |
| if (ret < 0) | |
| ret = 0; | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_write_internal(SSL *s, const void *buf, size_t num, | |
| uint64_t flags, size_t *written) | |
| { | |
| int ret; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_write_flags(s, buf, num, flags, written); | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (ssl_reset_error_state(sc) == 0) | |
| return -1; | |
| if (sc->handshake_func == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (sc->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { | |
| sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (flags != 0) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_WRITE_FLAG); | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (sc->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECT_RETRY | |
| || sc->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPT_RETRY | |
| || sc->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* If we are a client and haven't sent the Finished we better do that */ | |
| if (!ossl_statem_check_finish_init(sc, 1)) | |
| return -1; | |
| if ((sc->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { | |
| struct ssl_async_args args; | |
| args.s = s; | |
| args.buf = (void *)buf; | |
| args.num = num; | |
| args.type = WRITEFUNC; | |
| args.f.func_write = s->method->ssl_write; | |
| ret = ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern); | |
| *written = sc->asyncrw; | |
| ssl_update_error_state(sc); | |
| return ret; | |
| } else { | |
| ret = s->method->ssl_write(s, buf, num, written); | |
| ssl_update_error_state(sc); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ossl_ssize_t SSL_sendfile(SSL *s, int fd, off_t offset, size_t size, int flags) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS | |
| ossl_ssize_t sbytes; | |
| #endif | |
| int ret; | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (ssl_reset_error_state(sc) == 0) | |
| return -1; | |
| if (sc->handshake_func == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (sc->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { | |
| sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(sc->wbio)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ | |
| if (sc->s3.alert_dispatch > 0) { | |
| ret = (ossl_ssize_t)s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); | |
| ssl_update_error_state(sc); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ | |
| } | |
| sc->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; | |
| if (BIO_flush(sc->wbio) <= 0) { | |
| if (!BIO_should_retry(sc->wbio)) { | |
| sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| } else { | |
| #ifdef EAGAIN | |
| set_sys_error(EAGAIN); | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS | |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
| "can't call ktls_sendfile(), ktls disabled"); | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return -1; | |
| #else | |
| ret = ktls_sendfile(SSL_get_wfd(s), fd, offset, size, &sbytes, flags); | |
| ssl_update_error_state(sc); | |
| BIO_clear_retry_flags(sc->wbio); | |
| if (ret < 0) { | |
| if (BIO_sock_should_retry(ret)) { | |
| BIO_set_retry_write(sc->wbio); | |
| return (sbytes > 0 ? sbytes : ret); | |
| } else { | |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SYS, get_last_sys_error(), | |
| "ktls_sendfile failure"); | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SYSCALL; | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| return sbytes; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int SSL_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int num) | |
| { | |
| int ret; | |
| size_t written; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (num < 0) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
| if (sc != NULL) | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| ret = ssl_write_internal(s, buf, (size_t)num, 0, &written); | |
| /* | |
| * The cast is safe here because ret should be <= INT_MAX because num is | |
| * <= INT_MAX | |
| */ | |
| if (ret > 0) | |
| ret = (int)written; | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_write_ex(SSL *s, const void *buf, size_t num, size_t *written) | |
| { | |
| return SSL_write_ex2(s, buf, num, 0, written); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_write_ex2(SSL *s, const void *buf, size_t num, uint64_t flags, | |
| size_t *written) | |
| { | |
| int ret; | |
| ret = ssl_write_internal(s, buf, num, flags, written); | |
| if (ret < 0) | |
| ret = 0; | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_write_early_data(SSL *s, const void *buf, size_t num, size_t *written) | |
| { | |
| int ret, early_data_state; | |
| size_t writtmp; | |
| uint32_t partialwrite; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_write_early_data(s, buf, num, written); | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (ssl_reset_error_state(sc) == 0) | |
| return 0; | |
| switch (sc->early_data_state) { | |
| case SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE: | |
| if (sc->server | |
| || !SSL_in_before(s) | |
| || ((sc->session == NULL || sc->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) | |
| && (sc->psk_use_session_cb == NULL))) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* fall through */ | |
| case SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECT_RETRY: | |
| sc->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING; | |
| ret = SSL_connect(s); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| /* NBIO or error */ | |
| sc->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECT_RETRY; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* fall through */ | |
| case SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY: | |
| sc->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING; | |
| /* | |
| * We disable partial write for early data because we don't keep track | |
| * of how many bytes we've written between the SSL_write_ex() call and | |
| * the flush if the flush needs to be retried) | |
| */ | |
| partialwrite = sc->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE; | |
| sc->mode &= ~SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE; | |
| ret = SSL_write_ex(s, buf, num, &writtmp); | |
| sc->mode |= partialwrite; | |
| if (!ret) { | |
| sc->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY; | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| sc->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_FLUSH; | |
| /* fall through */ | |
| case SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_FLUSH: | |
| /* The buffering BIO is still in place so we need to flush it */ | |
| if (statem_flush(sc) != 1) | |
| return 0; | |
| *written = num; | |
| sc->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY; | |
| return 1; | |
| case SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING: | |
| case SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY: | |
| early_data_state = sc->early_data_state; | |
| /* We are a server writing to an unauthenticated client */ | |
| sc->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING; | |
| ret = SSL_write_ex(s, buf, num, written); | |
| /* The buffering BIO is still in place */ | |
| if (ret) | |
| (void)BIO_flush(sc->wbio); | |
| sc->early_data_state = early_data_state; | |
| return ret; | |
| default: | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| /* | |
| * Note that this function behaves differently from what one might | |
| * expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet), 1 for success; but | |
| * calling it once is usually not enough, even if blocking I/O is used | |
| * (see ssl3_shutdown). | |
| */ | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| int ret; | |
| if (ssl_reset_error_state(sc) == 0) | |
| return -1; | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_conn_shutdown(s, 0, NULL, 0); | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return -1; | |
| if (sc->handshake_func == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (!SSL_in_init(s)) { | |
| if ((sc->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { | |
| struct ssl_async_args args; | |
| memset(&args, 0, sizeof(args)); | |
| args.s = s; | |
| args.type = OTHERFUNC; | |
| args.f.func_other = s->method->ssl_shutdown; | |
| ret = ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern); | |
| } else { | |
| ret = s->method->ssl_shutdown(s); | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT); | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| ssl_update_error_state(sc); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_key_update(SSL *s, int updatetype) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_key_update(s, updatetype); | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED | |
| && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_KEY_UPDATE_TYPE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (!SSL_is_init_finished(s)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_STILL_IN_INIT); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&sc->rlayer)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ossl_statem_set_in_init(sc, 1); | |
| sc->key_update = updatetype; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_key_update_type(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_get_key_update_type(s); | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return sc->key_update; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Can we accept a renegotiation request? If yes, set the flag and | |
| * return 1 if yes. If not, raise error and return 0. | |
| */ | |
| static int can_renegotiate(const SSL_CONNECTION *sc) | |
| { | |
| if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if ((sc->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (!can_renegotiate(sc)) | |
| return 0; | |
| sc->renegotiate = 1; | |
| sc->new_session = 1; | |
| return s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (!can_renegotiate(sc)) | |
| return 0; | |
| sc->renegotiate = 1; | |
| sc->new_session = 0; | |
| return s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_renegotiate_pending(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* | |
| * becomes true when negotiation is requested; false again once a | |
| * handshake has finished | |
| */ | |
| return (sc->renegotiate != 0); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* If we are in init because we're sending tickets, okay to send more. */ | |
| if ((SSL_in_init(s) && sc->ext.extra_tickets_expected == 0) | |
| || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(sc) || !sc->server | |
| || !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) | |
| return 0; | |
| sc->ext.extra_tickets_expected++; | |
| if (!RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&sc->rlayer) && !SSL_in_init(s)) | |
| ossl_statem_set_in_init(sc, 1); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) | |
| { | |
| return ossl_ctrl_internal(s, cmd, larg, parg, /*no_quic=*/0); | |
| } | |
| long ossl_ctrl_internal(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg, int no_quic) | |
| { | |
| long l; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| /* | |
| * Routing of ctrl calls for QUIC is a little counterintuitive: | |
| * | |
| * - Firstly (no_quic=0), we pass the ctrl directly to our QUIC | |
| * implementation in case it wants to handle the ctrl specially. | |
| * | |
| * - If our QUIC implementation does not care about the ctrl, it | |
| * will reenter this function with no_quic=1 and we will try to handle | |
| * it directly using the QCSO SSL object stub (not the handshake layer | |
| * SSL object). This is important for e.g. the version configuration | |
| * ctrls below, which must use s->defltmeth (and not sc->defltmeth). | |
| * | |
| * - If we don't handle a ctrl here specially, then processing is | |
| * redirected to the handshake layer SSL object. | |
| */ | |
| if (!no_quic && IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return s->method->ssl_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| switch (cmd) { | |
| case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: | |
| return RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(&sc->rlayer); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: | |
| l = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(&sc->rlayer); | |
| RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&sc->rlayer, larg); | |
| return l; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_MODE: { | |
| OSSL_PARAM options[2], *opts = options; | |
| sc->mode |= larg; | |
| *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MODE, | |
| &sc->mode); | |
| *opts = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); | |
| /* Ignore return value */ | |
| sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_options(sc->rlayer.rrl, options); | |
| return sc->mode; | |
| } | |
| case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: | |
| return (sc->mode &= ~larg); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: | |
| return (long)sc->max_cert_list; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: | |
| if (larg < 0) | |
| return 0; | |
| l = (long)sc->max_cert_list; | |
| sc->max_cert_list = (size_t)larg; | |
| return l; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: | |
| if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) | |
| return 0; | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS | |
| if (sc->wbio != NULL && BIO_get_ktls_send(sc->wbio)) | |
| return 0; | |
| #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KTLS */ | |
| sc->max_send_fragment = larg; | |
| if (sc->max_send_fragment < sc->split_send_fragment) | |
| sc->split_send_fragment = sc->max_send_fragment; | |
| sc->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_max_frag_len(sc->rlayer.wrl, larg); | |
| return 1; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_SPLIT_SEND_FRAGMENT: | |
| if ((size_t)larg > sc->max_send_fragment || larg == 0) | |
| return 0; | |
| sc->split_send_fragment = larg; | |
| return 1; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PIPELINES: | |
| if (larg < 1 || larg > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) | |
| return 0; | |
| sc->max_pipelines = larg; | |
| if (sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_max_pipelines != NULL) | |
| sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_max_pipelines(sc->rlayer.rrl, (size_t)larg); | |
| return 1; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT: | |
| return sc->s3.send_connection_binding; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_RETRY_VERIFY: | |
| sc->rwstate = SSL_RETRY_VERIFY; | |
| return 1; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS: | |
| return (sc->cert->cert_flags |= larg); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS: | |
| return (sc->cert->cert_flags &= ~larg); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_GET_RAW_CIPHERLIST: | |
| if (parg) { | |
| if (sc->s3.tmp.ciphers_raw == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| *(unsigned char **)parg = sc->s3.tmp.ciphers_raw; | |
| return (int)sc->s3.tmp.ciphers_rawlen; | |
| } else { | |
| return TLS_CIPHER_LEN; | |
| } | |
| case SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTMS_SUPPORT: | |
| if (!sc->session || SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(sc)) | |
| return -1; | |
| if (sc->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) | |
| return 1; | |
| else | |
| return 0; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION: | |
| return ssl_check_allowed_versions(larg, sc->max_proto_version) | |
| && ssl_set_version_bound(s->defltmeth->version, (int)larg, | |
| &sc->min_proto_version); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_GET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION: | |
| return sc->min_proto_version; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION: | |
| return ssl_check_allowed_versions(sc->min_proto_version, larg) | |
| && ssl_set_version_bound(s->defltmeth->version, (int)larg, | |
| &sc->max_proto_version); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION: | |
| return sc->max_proto_version; | |
| default: | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return SSL_ctrl((SSL *)sc, cmd, larg, parg); | |
| else | |
| return s->method->ssl_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) | |
| { | |
| return s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s, cmd, fp); | |
| } | |
| LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->sessions; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_tsan_load(SSL_CTX *ctx, TSAN_QUALIFIER int *stat) | |
| { | |
| int res = 0; | |
| if (ssl_tsan_lock(ctx)) { | |
| res = tsan_load(stat); | |
| ssl_tsan_unlock(ctx); | |
| } | |
| return res; | |
| } | |
| long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) | |
| { | |
| long l; | |
| /* For some cases with ctx == NULL or larg == 1 perform syntax checks */ | |
| if (cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_GROUPS_LIST && larg == 1) | |
| return tls1_set_groups_list(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, parg); | |
| if (ctx == NULL) { | |
| switch (cmd) { | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST: | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST: | |
| return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(ctx, NULL, parg, 0); | |
| default: | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| switch (cmd) { | |
| case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: | |
| return ctx->read_ahead; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: | |
| l = ctx->read_ahead; | |
| ctx->read_ahead = larg; | |
| return l; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: | |
| ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg; | |
| return 1; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: | |
| return (long)ctx->max_cert_list; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: | |
| if (larg < 0) | |
| return 0; | |
| l = (long)ctx->max_cert_list; | |
| ctx->max_cert_list = (size_t)larg; | |
| return l; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: | |
| if (larg < 0) | |
| return 0; | |
| l = (long)ctx->session_cache_size; | |
| ctx->session_cache_size = (size_t)larg; | |
| return l; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: | |
| return (long)ctx->session_cache_size; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: | |
| l = ctx->session_cache_mode; | |
| ctx->session_cache_mode = larg; | |
| return l; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: | |
| return ctx->session_cache_mode; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER: | |
| return lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT: | |
| return ssl_tsan_load(ctx, &ctx->stats.sess_connect); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD: | |
| return ssl_tsan_load(ctx, &ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE: | |
| return ssl_tsan_load(ctx, &ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT: | |
| return ssl_tsan_load(ctx, &ctx->stats.sess_accept); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD: | |
| return ssl_tsan_load(ctx, &ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE: | |
| return ssl_tsan_load(ctx, &ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT: | |
| return ssl_tsan_load(ctx, &ctx->stats.sess_hit); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT: | |
| return ssl_tsan_load(ctx, &ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES: | |
| return ssl_tsan_load(ctx, &ctx->stats.sess_miss); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS: | |
| return ssl_tsan_load(ctx, &ctx->stats.sess_timeout); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL: | |
| return ssl_tsan_load(ctx, &ctx->stats.sess_cache_full); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_MODE: | |
| return (ctx->mode |= larg); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: | |
| return (ctx->mode &= ~larg); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: | |
| if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) | |
| return 0; | |
| ctx->max_send_fragment = larg; | |
| if (ctx->max_send_fragment < ctx->split_send_fragment) | |
| ctx->split_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment; | |
| return 1; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_SPLIT_SEND_FRAGMENT: | |
| if ((size_t)larg > ctx->max_send_fragment || larg == 0) | |
| return 0; | |
| ctx->split_send_fragment = larg; | |
| return 1; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PIPELINES: | |
| if (larg < 1 || larg > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) | |
| return 0; | |
| ctx->max_pipelines = larg; | |
| return 1; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS: | |
| return (ctx->cert->cert_flags |= larg); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS: | |
| return (ctx->cert->cert_flags &= ~larg); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION: | |
| return ssl_check_allowed_versions(larg, ctx->max_proto_version) | |
| && ssl_set_version_bound(ctx->method->version, (int)larg, | |
| &ctx->min_proto_version); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_GET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION: | |
| return ctx->min_proto_version; | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION: | |
| return ssl_check_allowed_versions(ctx->min_proto_version, larg) | |
| && ssl_set_version_bound(ctx->method->version, (int)larg, | |
| &ctx->max_proto_version); | |
| case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION: | |
| return ctx->max_proto_version; | |
| default: | |
| return ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx, cmd, larg, parg); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) | |
| { | |
| switch (cmd) { | |
| case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: | |
| ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, | |
| const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, | |
| void *arg))(fp); | |
| return 1; | |
| default: | |
| return ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, cmd, fp); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b) | |
| { | |
| if (a->id > b->id) | |
| return 1; | |
| if (a->id < b->id) | |
| return -1; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap, | |
| const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp) | |
| { | |
| if ((*ap)->id > (*bp)->id) | |
| return 1; | |
| if ((*ap)->id < (*bp)->id) | |
| return -1; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of | |
| * preference | |
| */ | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc != NULL) { | |
| if (sc->cipher_list != NULL) { | |
| return sc->cipher_list; | |
| } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) { | |
| return s->ctx->cipher_list; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_client_ciphers(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL || !sc->server) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return sc->peer_ciphers; | |
| } | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk = NULL, *ciphers; | |
| int i; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); | |
| if (!ciphers) | |
| return NULL; | |
| if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(sc)) | |
| return NULL; | |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { | |
| const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
| if (!ssl_cipher_disabled(sc, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0)) { | |
| if (!sk) | |
| sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); | |
| if (!sk) | |
| return NULL; | |
| if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) { | |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return sk; | |
| } | |
| /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of | |
| * algorithm id */ | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL_CONNECTION *s) | |
| { | |
| if (s != NULL) { | |
| if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) | |
| return s->cipher_list_by_id; | |
| else if (s->ssl.ctx != NULL | |
| && s->ssl.ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) | |
| return s->ssl.ctx->cipher_list_by_id; | |
| } | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| /** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */ | |
| const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; | |
| if (s == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s); | |
| if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n)) | |
| return NULL; | |
| c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n); | |
| if (c == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return c->name; | |
| } | |
| /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL_CTX and in order of | |
| * preference */ | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_CTX_get_ciphers(const SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| if (ctx != NULL) | |
| return ctx->cipher_list; | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Distinguish between ciphers controlled by set_ciphersuite() and | |
| * set_cipher_list() when counting. | |
| */ | |
| static int cipher_list_tls12_num(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk) | |
| { | |
| int i, num = 0; | |
| const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
| if (sk == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); ++i) { | |
| c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); | |
| if (c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
| continue; | |
| num++; | |
| } | |
| return num; | |
| } | |
| /** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */ | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) | |
| { | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; | |
| sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx, ctx->tls13_ciphersuites, | |
| &ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, str, | |
| ctx->cert); | |
| /* | |
| * ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it was unable to | |
| * find a cipher matching the given rule string (for example if the rule | |
| * string specifies a cipher which has been disabled). This is not an | |
| * error as far as ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence | |
| * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been updated. | |
| */ | |
| if (sk == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (ctx->method->num_ciphers() > 0 && cipher_list_tls12_num(sk) == 0) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */ | |
| int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str) | |
| { | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| SSL_CTX *ctx; | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| ctx = s->ctx; | |
| sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx, sc->tls13_ciphersuites, | |
| &sc->cipher_list, &sc->cipher_list_by_id, str, | |
| sc->cert); | |
| /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */ | |
| if (sk == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (ctx->method->num_ciphers() > 0 && cipher_list_tls12_num(sk) == 0) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int size) | |
| { | |
| char *p; | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clntsk, *srvrsk; | |
| const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
| int i; | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (size < 2 || buf == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| buf[0] = '\0'; | |
| if (sc == NULL || !sc->server) | |
| return NULL; | |
| p = buf; | |
| clntsk = sc->peer_ciphers; | |
| srvrsk = SSL_get_ciphers(s); | |
| if (clntsk == NULL || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clntsk) == 0 | |
| || srvrsk == NULL || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvrsk) == 0) | |
| return buf; | |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clntsk); i++) { | |
| int n; | |
| c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(clntsk, i); | |
| if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(srvrsk, c) < 0) | |
| continue; | |
| n = (int)OPENSSL_strnlen(c->name, size); | |
| if (n >= size) | |
| break; | |
| memcpy(p, c->name, n); | |
| p += n; | |
| *(p++) = ':'; | |
| size -= n + 1; | |
| } | |
| /* No overlap */ | |
| if (p != buf) | |
| p[-1] = '\0'; | |
| return buf; | |
| } | |
| /** | |
| * Return the requested servername (SNI) value. Note that the behaviour varies | |
| * depending on: | |
| * - whether this is called by the client or the server, | |
| * - if we are before or during/after the handshake, | |
| * - if a resumption or normal handshake is being attempted/has occurred | |
| * - whether we have negotiated TLSv1.2 (or below) or TLSv1.3 | |
| * | |
| * Note that only the host_name type is defined (RFC 3546). | |
| */ | |
| const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, int type) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| int server; | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| /* | |
| * If we don't know if we are the client or the server yet then we assume | |
| * client. | |
| */ | |
| server = sc->handshake_func == NULL ? 0 : sc->server; | |
| if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) | |
| return NULL; | |
| if (server) { | |
| /** | |
| * Server side | |
| * In TLSv1.3 on the server SNI is not associated with the session | |
| * but in TLSv1.2 or below it is. | |
| * | |
| * Before the handshake: | |
| * - return NULL | |
| * | |
| * During/after the handshake (TLSv1.2 or below resumption occurred): | |
| * - If a servername was accepted by the server in the original | |
| * handshake then it will return that servername, or NULL otherwise. | |
| * | |
| * During/after the handshake (TLSv1.2 or below resumption did not occur): | |
| * - The function will return the servername requested by the client in | |
| * this handshake or NULL if none was requested. | |
| */ | |
| if (sc->hit && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) | |
| return sc->session->ext.hostname; | |
| } else { | |
| /** | |
| * Client side | |
| * | |
| * Before the handshake: | |
| * - If a servername has been set via a call to | |
| * SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() then it will return that servername | |
| * - If one has not been set, but a TLSv1.2 resumption is being | |
| * attempted and the session from the original handshake had a | |
| * servername accepted by the server then it will return that | |
| * servername | |
| * - Otherwise it returns NULL | |
| * | |
| * During/after the handshake (TLSv1.2 or below resumption occurred): | |
| * - If the session from the original handshake had a servername accepted | |
| * by the server then it will return that servername. | |
| * - Otherwise it returns the servername set via | |
| * SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() (or NULL if it was not called). | |
| * | |
| * During/after the handshake (TLSv1.2 or below resumption did not occur): | |
| * - It will return the servername set via SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() | |
| * (or NULL if it was not called). | |
| */ | |
| if (SSL_in_before(s)) { | |
| if (sc->ext.hostname == NULL | |
| && sc->session != NULL | |
| && sc->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
| return sc->session->ext.hostname; | |
| } else { | |
| if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc) && sc->hit | |
| && sc->session->ext.hostname != NULL) | |
| return sc->session->ext.hostname; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return sc->ext.hostname; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| if (SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) != NULL) | |
| return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is | |
| * expected that this function is called from the callback set by | |
| * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. The protocol data is assumed to be a | |
| * vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte strings. The length byte itself is | |
| * not included in the length. A byte string of length 0 is invalid. No byte | |
| * string may be truncated. The current, but experimental algorithm for | |
| * selecting the protocol is: 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this | |
| * is indicated to the callback. In this case, the client application has to | |
| * abort the connection or have a default application level protocol. 2) If | |
| * the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the client | |
| * selects the first protocol in its list, but indicates via the API that this | |
| * fallback case was enacted. 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first | |
| * protocol in the server's list that it supports and selects this protocol. | |
| * This is because it's assumed that the server has better information about | |
| * which protocol a client should use. 4) If the client doesn't support any | |
| * of the server's advertised protocols, then this is treated the same as | |
| * case 2. It returns either OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was | |
| * found, or OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached. | |
| */ | |
| int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, | |
| const unsigned char *server, | |
| unsigned int server_len, | |
| const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len) | |
| { | |
| PACKET cpkt, csubpkt, spkt, ssubpkt; | |
| if (!PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len) | |
| || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt) | |
| || PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt) == 0) { | |
| *out = NULL; | |
| *outlen = 0; | |
| return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Set the default opportunistic protocol. Will be overwritten if we find | |
| * a match. | |
| */ | |
| *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&csubpkt); | |
| *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt); | |
| /* | |
| * For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. | |
| */ | |
| if (PACKET_buf_init(&spkt, server, server_len)) { | |
| while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&spkt, &ssubpkt)) { | |
| if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) == 0) | |
| continue; /* Invalid - ignore it */ | |
| if (PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)) { | |
| while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)) { | |
| if (PACKET_equal(&csubpkt, PACKET_data(&ssubpkt), | |
| PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt))) { | |
| /* We found a match */ | |
| *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&ssubpkt); | |
| *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt); | |
| return OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the client list */ | |
| } else { | |
| /* This should never happen */ | |
| return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the server list */ | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. We use | |
| * the default opportunistic protocol selected earlier | |
| */ | |
| return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; | |
| } | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
| /* | |
| * SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the | |
| * client's requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the | |
| * client didn't request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. Note that | |
| * the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned from | |
| * this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols | |
| * provided by the callback. | |
| */ | |
| void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, | |
| unsigned *len) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) { | |
| /* We have no other way to indicate error */ | |
| *data = NULL; | |
| *len = 0; | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| *data = sc->ext.npn; | |
| if (*data == NULL) { | |
| *len = 0; | |
| } else { | |
| *len = (unsigned int)sc->ext.npn_len; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * SSL_CTX_set_npn_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when | |
| * a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol | |
| * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is | |
| * returned by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This | |
| * memory will not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a | |
| * reference to it. The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it | |
| * wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the | |
| * ServerHello. | |
| */ | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_npn_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| SSL_CTX_npn_advertised_cb_func cb, | |
| void *arg) | |
| { | |
| if (IS_QUIC_CTX(ctx)) | |
| /* NPN not allowed for QUIC */ | |
| return; | |
| ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb = cb; | |
| ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg = arg; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a | |
| * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out| | |
| * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|). | |
| * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The | |
| * server's advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The | |
| * callback can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. The client must | |
| * select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns | |
| * a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK. | |
| */ | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_npn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| SSL_CTX_npn_select_cb_func cb, | |
| void *arg) | |
| { | |
| if (IS_QUIC_CTX(ctx)) | |
| /* NPN not allowed for QUIC */ | |
| return; | |
| ctx->ext.npn_select_cb = cb; | |
| ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg = arg; | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| static int alpn_value_ok(const unsigned char *protos, unsigned int protos_len) | |
| { | |
| unsigned int idx; | |
| if (protos_len < 2 || protos == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| for (idx = 0; idx < protos_len; idx += protos[idx] + 1) { | |
| if (protos[idx] == 0) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return idx == protos_len; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ctx| to |protos|. | |
| * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit | |
| * length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success. | |
| */ | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *protos, | |
| unsigned int protos_len) | |
| { | |
| unsigned char *alpn; | |
| if (protos_len == 0 || protos == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->ext.alpn); | |
| ctx->ext.alpn = NULL; | |
| ctx->ext.alpn_len = 0; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Not valid per RFC */ | |
| if (!alpn_value_ok(protos, protos_len)) | |
| return 1; | |
| alpn = OPENSSL_memdup(protos, protos_len); | |
| if (alpn == NULL) | |
| return 1; | |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->ext.alpn); | |
| ctx->ext.alpn = alpn; | |
| ctx->ext.alpn_len = protos_len; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * SSL_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ssl| to |protos|. | |
| * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit | |
| * length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success. | |
| */ | |
| int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *protos, | |
| unsigned int protos_len) | |
| { | |
| unsigned char *alpn; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 1; | |
| if (protos_len == 0 || protos == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(sc->ext.alpn); | |
| sc->ext.alpn = NULL; | |
| sc->ext.alpn_len = 0; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Not valid per RFC */ | |
| if (!alpn_value_ok(protos, protos_len)) | |
| return 1; | |
| alpn = OPENSSL_memdup(protos, protos_len); | |
| if (alpn == NULL) | |
| return 1; | |
| OPENSSL_free(sc->ext.alpn); | |
| sc->ext.alpn = alpn; | |
| sc->ext.alpn_len = protos_len; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * SSL_CTX_set_get0_protos gets the ALPN protocol list on |ctx| to |protos|. | |
| */ | |
| void SSL_CTX_get0_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char **protos, | |
| unsigned int *protos_len) | |
| { | |
| unsigned char *p = NULL; | |
| unsigned int len = 0; | |
| if (ctx != NULL) { | |
| p = ctx->ext.alpn; | |
| len = (unsigned int)ctx->ext.alpn_len; | |
| } | |
| if (protos != NULL) | |
| *protos = p; | |
| if (protos_len != NULL) | |
| *protos_len = len; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * SSL_get0_alpn_protos gets the ALPN protocol list on |ssl| to |protos|. | |
| */ | |
| void SSL_get0_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **protos, | |
| unsigned int *protos_len) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl); | |
| unsigned char *p = NULL; | |
| unsigned int len = 0; | |
| if (sc != NULL) { | |
| p = sc->ext.alpn; | |
| len = (unsigned int)sc->ext.alpn_len; | |
| } | |
| if (protos != NULL) | |
| *protos = p; | |
| if (protos_len != NULL) | |
| *protos_len = len; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb sets a callback function on |ctx| that is | |
| * called during ClientHello processing in order to select an ALPN protocol | |
| * from the client's list of offered protocols. | |
| */ | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| SSL_CTX_alpn_select_cb_func cb, | |
| void *arg) | |
| { | |
| ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb = cb; | |
| ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg = arg; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * SSL_get0_alpn_selected gets the selected ALPN protocol (if any) from |ssl|. | |
| * On return it sets |*data| to point to |*len| bytes of protocol name | |
| * (not including the leading length-prefix byte). If the server didn't | |
| * respond with a negotiated protocol then |*len| will be zero. | |
| */ | |
| void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data, | |
| unsigned int *len) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(ssl); | |
| if (sc == NULL) { | |
| /* We have no other way to indicate error */ | |
| *data = NULL; | |
| *len = 0; | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| *data = sc->s3.alpn_selected; | |
| if (*data == NULL) | |
| *len = 0; | |
| else | |
| *len = (unsigned int)sc->s3.alpn_selected_len; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, | |
| const char *label, size_t llen, | |
| const unsigned char *context, size_t contextlen, | |
| int use_context) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return -1; | |
| if (sc->session == NULL | |
| || (sc->version < TLS1_VERSION && sc->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)) | |
| return -1; | |
| return sc->ssl.method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(sc, out, olen, label, | |
| llen, context, | |
| contextlen, | |
| use_context); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_export_keying_material_early(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, | |
| const char *label, size_t llen, | |
| const unsigned char *context, | |
| size_t contextlen) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return -1; | |
| if (sc->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
| return 0; | |
| return tls13_export_keying_material_early(sc, out, olen, label, llen, | |
| context, contextlen); | |
| } | |
| static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a) | |
| { | |
| const unsigned char *session_id = a->session_id; | |
| unsigned long l; | |
| unsigned char tmp_storage[4]; | |
| if (a->session_id_length < sizeof(tmp_storage)) { | |
| memset(tmp_storage, 0, sizeof(tmp_storage)); | |
| memcpy(tmp_storage, a->session_id, a->session_id_length); | |
| session_id = tmp_storage; | |
| } | |
| l = (unsigned long)((unsigned long)session_id[0]) | ((unsigned long)session_id[1] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)session_id[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)session_id[3] << 24L); | |
| return l; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of | |
| * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure | |
| * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on | |
| * being able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing | |
| * session with a matching session ID. | |
| */ | |
| static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b) | |
| { | |
| if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) | |
| return 1; | |
| if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) | |
| return 1; | |
| return memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length); | |
| } | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSLKEYLOG | |
| /** | |
| * @brief Static initialization for a one-time action to initialize the SSL key log. | |
| */ | |
| static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_keylog_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; | |
| /** | |
| * @brief Pointer to a read-write lock used to protect access to the key log. | |
| */ | |
| static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *keylog_lock = NULL; | |
| /** | |
| * @brief Pointer to a BIO structure used for writing the key log information. | |
| */ | |
| static BIO *keylog_bio = NULL; | |
| /** | |
| * @brief Initializes the SSLKEYLOGFILE lock. | |
| * | |
| * @return 1 on success, 0 on failure. | |
| */ | |
| DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ssl_keylog_init) | |
| { | |
| keylog_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); | |
| if (keylog_lock == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /** | |
| * @brief checks when a BIO refcount has reached zero, and sets | |
| * keylog_cb to NULL if it has | |
| * | |
| * @returns 1 always | |
| */ | |
| static long check_keylog_bio_free(BIO *b, int oper, const char *argp, | |
| size_t len, int argi, long argl, int ret, | |
| size_t *processed) | |
| { | |
| /* | |
| * Note we _dont_ take the keylog_lock here | |
| * This is intentional, because we only free the keylog lock | |
| * During SSL_CTX_free, in which we already possess the lock, so | |
| * There's no need to grab it again here | |
| */ | |
| if (oper == BIO_CB_FREE) | |
| keylog_bio = NULL; | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| /** | |
| * @brief records ssl secrets to a file | |
| */ | |
| static void do_sslkeylogfile(const SSL *ssl, const char *line) | |
| { | |
| if (keylog_lock == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(keylog_lock)) | |
| return; | |
| if (keylog_bio != NULL) { | |
| BIO_printf(keylog_bio, "%s\n", line); | |
| (void)BIO_flush(keylog_bio); | |
| } | |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(keylog_lock); | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| /* | |
| * These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring | |
| * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each | |
| * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed | |
| * via ssl.h. | |
| */ | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSLKEYLOG | |
| static BIO *get_sslkeylog_bio(const char *keylogfile) | |
| { | |
| #ifdef _POSIX_C_SOURCE | |
| BIO *b; | |
| int fdno = -1; | |
| FILE *fp = NULL; | |
| fdno = open(keylogfile, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_APPEND, 0600); | |
| if (fdno < 0) | |
| return NULL; | |
| fp = fdopen(fdno, "a"); | |
| if (fp == NULL) { | |
| close(fdno); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| if ((b = BIO_new_fp(fp, BIO_CLOSE)) == NULL) | |
| fclose(fp); | |
| return b; | |
| #else | |
| return BIO_new_file(keylogfile, "a"); | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq, | |
| const SSL_METHOD *meth) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CTX *ret = NULL; | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSLKEYLOG | |
| const char *keylogfile = ossl_safe_getenv("SSLKEYLOGFILE"); | |
| #endif | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG | |
| int i; | |
| #endif | |
| if (meth == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (!OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS, NULL)) | |
| return NULL; | |
| /* Doing this for the run once effect */ | |
| if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); | |
| if (ret == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| /* Init the reference counting before any call to SSL_CTX_free */ | |
| if (!CRYPTO_NEW_REF(&ret->references, 1)) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(ret); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); | |
| if (ret->lock == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| #ifdef TSAN_REQUIRES_LOCKING | |
| ret->tsan_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); | |
| if (ret->tsan_lock == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| ret->libctx = libctx; | |
| if (propq != NULL) { | |
| ret->propq = OPENSSL_strdup(propq); | |
| if (ret->propq == NULL) | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ret->method = meth; | |
| ret->min_proto_version = 0; | |
| ret->max_proto_version = 0; | |
| ret->mode = SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY; | |
| ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER; | |
| ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT; | |
| /* We take the system default. */ | |
| ret->session_timeout = meth->get_timeout(); | |
| ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT; | |
| ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; | |
| ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new(ssl_session_hash, ssl_session_cmp); | |
| if (ret->sessions == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ret->cert_store = X509_STORE_new(); | |
| if (ret->cert_store == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT | |
| ret->ctlog_store = CTLOG_STORE_new_ex(libctx, propq); | |
| if (ret->ctlog_store == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CT_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| /* initialize cipher/digest methods table */ | |
| if (!ssl_load_ciphers(ret)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SSL_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!ssl_load_groups(ret)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SSL_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* load provider sigalgs */ | |
| if (!ssl_load_sigalgs(ret)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SSL_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* initialise sig algs */ | |
| if (!ssl_setup_sigalgs(ret)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SSL_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(ret, OSSL_default_ciphersuites())) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SSL_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if ((ret->cert = ssl_cert_new(SSL_PKEY_NUM + ret->sigalg_list_len)) == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SSL_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!ssl_create_cipher_list(ret, | |
| ret->tls13_ciphersuites, | |
| &ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id, | |
| OSSL_default_cipher_list(), ret->cert) | |
| || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); | |
| if (ret->param == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * If these aren't available from the provider we'll get NULL returns. | |
| * That's fine but will cause errors later if SSLv3 is negotiated | |
| */ | |
| ERR_set_mark(); | |
| ret->md5 = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, "MD5", propq); | |
| ret->sha1 = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, "SHA1", propq); | |
| ERR_pop_to_mark(); | |
| if ((ret->ca_names = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if ((ret->client_ca_names = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if ((ret->ext.secure = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*ret->ext.secure))) == NULL) | |
| goto err; | |
| /* No compression for DTLS */ | |
| if (!(meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS)) | |
| ret->comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(); | |
| ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
| ret->split_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
| /* Setup RFC5077 ticket keys */ | |
| if ((RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, ret->ext.tick_key_name, | |
| sizeof(ret->ext.tick_key_name), 0) | |
| <= 0) | |
| || (RAND_priv_bytes_ex(libctx, ret->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key, | |
| sizeof(ret->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key), 0) | |
| <= 0) | |
| || (RAND_priv_bytes_ex(libctx, ret->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, | |
| sizeof(ret->ext.secure->tick_aes_key), 0) | |
| <= 0)) | |
| ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; | |
| if (RAND_priv_bytes_ex(libctx, ret->ext.cookie_hmac_key, | |
| sizeof(ret->ext.cookie_hmac_key), 0) | |
| <= 0) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_RAND_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
| if (!ssl_ctx_srp_ctx_init_intern(ret)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SSL_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG | |
| /* | |
| * Set the default order: brotli, zlib, zstd | |
| * Including only those enabled algorithms | |
| */ | |
| memset(ret->cert_comp_prefs, 0, sizeof(ret->cert_comp_prefs)); | |
| i = 0; | |
| if (ossl_comp_has_alg(TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli)) | |
| ret->cert_comp_prefs[i++] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli; | |
| if (ossl_comp_has_alg(TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib)) | |
| ret->cert_comp_prefs[i++] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib; | |
| if (ossl_comp_has_alg(TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd)) | |
| ret->cert_comp_prefs[i++] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd; | |
| #endif | |
| /* | |
| * Disable compression by default to prevent CRIME. Applications can | |
| * re-enable compression by configuring | |
| * SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION); | |
| * or by using the SSL_CONF library. Similarly we also enable TLSv1.3 | |
| * middlebox compatibility by default. This may be disabled by default in | |
| * a later OpenSSL version. | |
| */ | |
| ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION | SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT; | |
| ret->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing; | |
| /* | |
| * We cannot usefully set a default max_early_data here (which gets | |
| * propagated in SSL_new(), for the following reason: setting the | |
| * SSL field causes tls_construct_stoc_early_data() to tell the | |
| * client that early data will be accepted when constructing a TLS 1.3 | |
| * session ticket, and the client will accordingly send us early data | |
| * when using that ticket (if the client has early data to send). | |
| * However, in order for the early data to actually be consumed by | |
| * the application, the application must also have calls to | |
| * SSL_read_early_data(); otherwise we'll just skip past the early data | |
| * and ignore it. So, since the application must add calls to | |
| * SSL_read_early_data(), we also require them to add | |
| * calls to SSL_CTX_set_max_early_data() in order to use early data, | |
| * eliminating the bandwidth-wasting early data in the case described | |
| * above. | |
| */ | |
| ret->max_early_data = 0; | |
| /* | |
| * Default recv_max_early_data is a fully loaded single record. Could be | |
| * split across multiple records in practice. We set this differently to | |
| * max_early_data so that, in the default case, we do not advertise any | |
| * support for early_data, but if a client were to send us some (e.g. | |
| * because of an old, stale ticket) then we will tolerate it and skip over | |
| * it. | |
| */ | |
| ret->recv_max_early_data = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
| /* By default we send two session tickets automatically in TLSv1.3 */ | |
| ret->num_tickets = 2; | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| /* only create a cache for client CTX-es */ | |
| if (meth == OSSL_QUIC_client_method()) | |
| if ((ret->tokencache = ossl_quic_new_token_store()) == NULL) | |
| goto err; | |
| ret->domain_flags = 0; | |
| if (IS_QUIC_METHOD(meth)) { | |
| #if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) | |
| if (meth == OSSL_QUIC_client_thread_method()) | |
| ret->domain_flags | |
| = SSL_DOMAIN_FLAG_MULTI_THREAD | |
| | SSL_DOMAIN_FLAG_THREAD_ASSISTED | |
| | SSL_DOMAIN_FLAG_BLOCKING; | |
| else | |
| ret->domain_flags | |
| = SSL_DOMAIN_FLAG_MULTI_THREAD | |
| | SSL_DOMAIN_FLAG_LEGACY_BLOCKING; | |
| #else | |
| ret->domain_flags | |
| = SSL_DOMAIN_FLAG_SINGLE_THREAD | |
| | SSL_DOMAIN_FLAG_LEGACY_BLOCKING; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| if (!ssl_ctx_system_config(ret)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CONFIG); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSLKEYLOG | |
| if (keylogfile != NULL && strlen(keylogfile) != 0) { | |
| /* Make sure we have a global lock allocated */ | |
| if (!RUN_ONCE(&ssl_keylog_once, ssl_keylog_init)) { | |
| /* use a trace message as a warning */ | |
| OSSL_TRACE(TLS, "Unable to initialize keylog data\n"); | |
| goto out; | |
| } | |
| /* Grab our global lock */ | |
| if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(keylog_lock)) { | |
| OSSL_TRACE(TLS, "Unable to acquire keylog write lock\n"); | |
| goto out; | |
| } else { | |
| /* | |
| * If the bio for the requested keylog file hasn't been | |
| * created yet, go ahead and create it, and set it to append | |
| * if its already there. | |
| */ | |
| if (keylog_bio == NULL) { | |
| keylog_bio = get_sslkeylog_bio(keylogfile); | |
| if (keylog_bio == NULL) { | |
| OSSL_TRACE(TLS, "Unable to create keylog bio\n"); | |
| goto out; | |
| } | |
| BIO_set_callback_ex(keylog_bio, check_keylog_bio_free); | |
| } else { | |
| /* up our refcount for the already-created case */ | |
| BIO_up_ref(keylog_bio); | |
| } | |
| /* If we have a bio now, assign the callback handler */ | |
| if (keylog_bio != NULL) | |
| ret->do_sslkeylog = 1; | |
| /* unlock, and we're done */ | |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(keylog_lock); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| out: | |
| #endif | |
| return ret; | |
| err: | |
| SSL_CTX_free(ret); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSLKEYLOG | |
| BIO_free(keylog_bio); | |
| #endif | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth) | |
| { | |
| return SSL_CTX_new_ex(NULL, NULL, meth); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| int i; | |
| if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&ctx->references, &i) <= 0) | |
| return 0; | |
| REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_CTX", i, ctx); | |
| REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); | |
| return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) | |
| { | |
| int i; | |
| size_t j; | |
| if (a == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&a->references, &i); | |
| REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_CTX", i, a); | |
| if (i > 0) | |
| return; | |
| REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSLKEYLOG | |
| if (keylog_lock != NULL && CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(keylog_lock)) { | |
| if (a->do_sslkeylog == 1) | |
| BIO_free(keylog_bio); | |
| a->do_sslkeylog = 0; | |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(keylog_lock); | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param); | |
| dane_ctx_final(&a->dane); | |
| /* | |
| * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference | |
| * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed | |
| * after the sessions were flushed. | |
| * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache, | |
| * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then | |
| * free ex_data, then finally free the cache. | |
| * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].) | |
| */ | |
| if (a->sessions != NULL) | |
| SSL_CTX_flush_sessions_ex(a, 0); | |
| CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data); | |
| lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions); | |
| X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT | |
| CTLOG_STORE_free(a->ctlog_store); | |
| #endif | |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list); | |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id); | |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->tls13_ciphersuites); | |
| ssl_cert_free(a->cert); | |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->ca_names, X509_NAME_free); | |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); | |
| OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(a->extra_certs); | |
| a->comp_methods = NULL; | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP | |
| sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles); | |
| #endif | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
| ssl_ctx_srp_ctx_free_intern(a); | |
| #endif | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->ext.ecpointformats); | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->ext.supportedgroups); | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->ext.keyshares); | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->ext.tuples); | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->ext.alpn); | |
| OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(a->ext.secure, sizeof(*a->ext.secure)); | |
| ssl_evp_md_free(a->md5); | |
| ssl_evp_md_free(a->sha1); | |
| for (j = 0; j < SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX; j++) | |
| ssl_evp_cipher_free(a->ssl_cipher_methods[j]); | |
| for (j = 0; j < SSL_MD_NUM_IDX; j++) | |
| ssl_evp_md_free(a->ssl_digest_methods[j]); | |
| for (j = 0; j < a->group_list_len; j++) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->group_list[j].tlsname); | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->group_list[j].realname); | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->group_list[j].algorithm); | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->group_list); | |
| for (j = 0; j < a->sigalg_list_len; j++) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->sigalg_list[j].name); | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->sigalg_list[j].sigalg_name); | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->sigalg_list[j].sigalg_oid); | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->sigalg_list[j].sig_name); | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->sigalg_list[j].sig_oid); | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->sigalg_list[j].hash_name); | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->sigalg_list[j].hash_oid); | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->sigalg_list[j].keytype); | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->sigalg_list[j].keytype_oid); | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->sigalg_list); | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->ssl_cert_info); | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->sigalg_lookup_cache); | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->tls12_sigalgs); | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->client_cert_type); | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->server_cert_type); | |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(a->lock); | |
| CRYPTO_FREE_REF(&a->references); | |
| #ifdef TSAN_REQUIRES_LOCKING | |
| CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(a->tsan_lock); | |
| #endif | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->propq); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QLOG | |
| OPENSSL_free(a->qlog_title); | |
| #endif | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| ossl_quic_free_token_store(a->tokencache); | |
| #endif | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH | |
| ossl_ech_ctx_clear(&a->ext.ech); | |
| #endif | |
| OPENSSL_free(a); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb) | |
| { | |
| ctx->default_passwd_callback = cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u) | |
| { | |
| ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u; | |
| } | |
| pem_password_cb *SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->default_passwd_callback; | |
| } | |
| void *SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL *s, pem_password_cb *cb) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| sc->default_passwd_callback = cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL *s, void *u) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| sc->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u; | |
| } | |
| pem_password_cb *SSL_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return sc->default_passwd_callback; | |
| } | |
| void *SSL_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return sc->default_passwd_callback_userdata; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *, void *), | |
| void *arg) | |
| { | |
| ctx->app_verify_callback = cb; | |
| ctx->app_verify_arg = arg; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, | |
| int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) | |
| { | |
| ctx->verify_mode = mode; | |
| ctx->default_verify_callback = cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth) | |
| { | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) | |
| { | |
| ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(c->cert, cb, arg); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *s, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(sc->cert, cb, arg); | |
| } | |
| void ssl_set_masks(SSL_CONNECTION *s) | |
| { | |
| CERT *c = s->cert; | |
| uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags; | |
| int rsa_enc, rsa_sign, dh_tmp, dsa_sign; | |
| unsigned long mask_k, mask_a; | |
| int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok; | |
| if (c == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| dh_tmp = (c->dh_tmp != NULL | |
| || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL | |
| || c->dh_tmp_auto | |
| || tls1_shared_group(s, TLS1_GROUPS_RETURN_TMP_ID, | |
| TLS1_GROUPS_FFDHE_GROUPS) | |
| != 0); | |
| rsa_enc = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA] & CERT_PKEY_VALID; | |
| rsa_sign = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA] & CERT_PKEY_VALID; | |
| dsa_sign = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] & CERT_PKEY_VALID; | |
| have_ecc_cert = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ECC] & CERT_PKEY_VALID; | |
| mask_k = 0; | |
| mask_a = 0; | |
| OSSL_TRACE4(TLS_CIPHER, "dh_tmp=%d rsa_enc=%d rsa_sign=%d dsa_sign=%d\n", | |
| dh_tmp, rsa_enc, rsa_sign, dsa_sign); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
| if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512)) { | |
| mask_k |= SSL_kGOST | SSL_kGOST18; | |
| mask_a |= SSL_aGOST12; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256)) { | |
| mask_k |= SSL_kGOST | SSL_kGOST18; | |
| mask_a |= SSL_aGOST12; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST01)) { | |
| mask_k |= SSL_kGOST; | |
| mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01; | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| if (rsa_enc) | |
| mask_k |= SSL_kRSA; | |
| if (dh_tmp) | |
| mask_k |= SSL_kDHE; | |
| /* | |
| * If we only have an RSA-PSS certificate allow RSA authentication | |
| * if TLS 1.2 and peer supports it. | |
| */ | |
| if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN) && pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN] & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN && TLS1_get_version(&s->ssl) == TLS1_2_VERSION)) | |
| mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; | |
| if (dsa_sign) { | |
| mask_a |= SSL_aDSS; | |
| } | |
| mask_a |= SSL_aNULL; | |
| /* | |
| * You can do anything with an RPK key, since there's no cert to restrict it | |
| * But we need to check for private keys | |
| */ | |
| if (pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA] & CERT_PKEY_RPK) { | |
| mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; | |
| mask_k |= SSL_kRSA; | |
| } | |
| if (pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ECC] & CERT_PKEY_RPK) | |
| mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; | |
| if (TLS1_get_version(&s->ssl) == TLS1_2_VERSION) { | |
| if (pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN] & CERT_PKEY_RPK) | |
| mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; | |
| if (pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ED25519] & CERT_PKEY_RPK | |
| || pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ED448] & CERT_PKEY_RPK) | |
| mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or ECDSA cipher suites | |
| * depending on the key usage extension. | |
| */ | |
| if (have_ecc_cert) { | |
| uint32_t ex_kusage; | |
| ex_kusage = X509_get_key_usage(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); | |
| ecdsa_ok = ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; | |
| if (!(pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ECC] & CERT_PKEY_SIGN)) | |
| ecdsa_ok = 0; | |
| if (ecdsa_ok) | |
| mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; | |
| } | |
| /* Allow Ed25519 for TLS 1.2 if peer supports it */ | |
| if (!(mask_a & SSL_aECDSA) && ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_ED25519) | |
| && pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ED25519] & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | |
| && TLS1_get_version(&s->ssl) == TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
| mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; | |
| /* Allow Ed448 for TLS 1.2 if peer supports it */ | |
| if (!(mask_a & SSL_aECDSA) && ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_ED448) | |
| && pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ED448] & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | |
| && TLS1_get_version(&s->ssl) == TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
| mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; | |
| mask_k |= SSL_kECDHE; | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
| mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; | |
| mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; | |
| if (mask_k & SSL_kRSA) | |
| mask_k |= SSL_kRSAPSK; | |
| if (mask_k & SSL_kDHE) | |
| mask_k |= SSL_kDHEPSK; | |
| if (mask_k & SSL_kECDHE) | |
| mask_k |= SSL_kECDHEPSK; | |
| #endif | |
| s->s3.tmp.mask_k = mask_k; | |
| s->s3.tmp.mask_a = mask_a; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL_CONNECTION *s) | |
| { | |
| if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) { | |
| /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */ | |
| if (!(X509_get_key_usage(x) & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 1; /* all checks are ok */ | |
| } | |
| int ssl_get_server_cert_serverinfo(SSL_CONNECTION *s, | |
| const unsigned char **serverinfo, | |
| size_t *serverinfo_length) | |
| { | |
| CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3.tmp.cert; | |
| *serverinfo_length = 0; | |
| if (cpk == NULL || cpk->serverinfo == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| *serverinfo = cpk->serverinfo; | |
| *serverinfo_length = cpk->serverinfo_length; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| void ssl_update_cache(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mode) | |
| { | |
| int i; | |
| /* | |
| * If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it | |
| * would be rather hard to do anyway :-). Also if the session has already | |
| * been marked as not_resumable we should not cache it for later reuse. | |
| */ | |
| if (s->session->session_id_length == 0 || s->session->not_resumable) | |
| return; | |
| /* | |
| * If sid_ctx_length is 0 there is no specific application context | |
| * associated with this session, so when we try to resume it and | |
| * SSL_VERIFY_PEER is requested to verify the client identity, we have no | |
| * indication that this is actually a session for the proper application | |
| * context, and the *handshake* will fail, not just the resumption attempt. | |
| * Do not cache (on the server) these sessions that are not resumable | |
| * (clients can set SSL_VERIFY_PEER without needing a sid_ctx set). | |
| */ | |
| if (s->server && s->session->sid_ctx_length == 0 | |
| && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) != 0) | |
| return; | |
| i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode; | |
| if ((i & mode) != 0 | |
| && (!s->hit || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))) { | |
| /* | |
| * Add the session to the internal cache. In server side TLSv1.3 we | |
| * normally don't do this because by default it's a full stateless ticket | |
| * with only a dummy session id so there is no reason to cache it, | |
| * unless: | |
| * - we are doing early_data, in which case we cache so that we can | |
| * detect replays | |
| * - the application has set a remove_session_cb so needs to know about | |
| * session timeout events | |
| * - SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set in which case it is a stateful ticket | |
| */ | |
| if ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) == 0 | |
| && (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) | |
| || !s->server | |
| || (s->max_early_data > 0 | |
| && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0) | |
| || s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL | |
| || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0)) | |
| SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); | |
| /* | |
| * Add the session to the external cache. We do this even in server side | |
| * TLSv1.3 without early data because some applications just want to | |
| * know about the creation of a session and aren't doing a full cache. | |
| */ | |
| if (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL && SSL_SESSION_up_ref(s->session)) { | |
| if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s), | |
| s->session)) | |
| SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* auto flush every 255 connections */ | |
| if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && ((i & mode) == mode)) { | |
| TSAN_QUALIFIER int *stat; | |
| if (mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) | |
| stat = &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good; | |
| else | |
| stat = &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good; | |
| if ((ssl_tsan_load(s->session_ctx, stat) & 0xff) == 0xff) | |
| SSL_CTX_flush_sessions_ex(s->session_ctx, time(NULL)); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| const SSL_METHOD *SSL_CTX_get_ssl_method(const SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->method; | |
| } | |
| const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| return s->method; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth) | |
| { | |
| int ret = 1; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| /* Not allowed for QUIC */ | |
| if (sc == NULL | |
| || (s->type != SSL_TYPE_SSL_CONNECTION && s->method != meth) | |
| || (s->type == SSL_TYPE_SSL_CONNECTION && IS_QUIC_METHOD(meth))) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (s->method != meth) { | |
| const SSL_METHOD *sm = s->method; | |
| int (*hf)(SSL *) = sc->handshake_func; | |
| if (sm->version == meth->version) | |
| s->method = meth; | |
| else { | |
| sm->ssl_deinit(s); | |
| s->method = meth; | |
| ret = s->method->ssl_init(s); | |
| } | |
| if (hf == sm->ssl_connect) | |
| sc->handshake_func = meth->ssl_connect; | |
| else if (hf == sm->ssl_accept) | |
| sc->handshake_func = meth->ssl_accept; | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int i) | |
| { | |
| return ossl_ssl_get_error(s, i, /*check_err=*/1); | |
| } | |
| int ossl_ssl_get_error(const SSL *s, int i, int check_err) | |
| { | |
| int reason; | |
| BIO *bio; | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (i > 0) | |
| return SSL_ERROR_NONE; | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) { | |
| reason = ossl_quic_get_error(s, i); | |
| if (reason != SSL_ERROR_NONE) | |
| return reason; | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return SSL_ERROR_SSL; | |
| if (check_err != 0) { | |
| if (sc->statem.error_state == ERROR_STATE_SSL) | |
| return SSL_ERROR_SSL; | |
| if (sc->statem.error_state == ERROR_STATE_SYSCALL) | |
| return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; | |
| } | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| #endif | |
| { | |
| if (SSL_want_read(s)) { | |
| bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); | |
| if (BIO_should_read(bio)) | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ; | |
| else if (BIO_should_write(bio)) | |
| /* | |
| * This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to | |
| * write to the rbio, and an application program where rbio and | |
| * wbio are separate couldn't even know what it should wait for. | |
| * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we | |
| * have SSL_want_read(s) instead of SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio | |
| * and wbio *are* the same, this test works around that bug; so | |
| * it might be safer to keep it. | |
| */ | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE; | |
| else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { | |
| reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); | |
| if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT; | |
| else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT; | |
| else | |
| return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; /* unknown */ | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (SSL_want_write(s)) { | |
| /* | |
| * Access wbio directly - in order to use the buffered bio if | |
| * present | |
| */ | |
| bio = sc->wbio; | |
| if (BIO_should_write(bio)) | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE; | |
| else if (BIO_should_read(bio)) | |
| /* | |
| * See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) | |
| */ | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ; | |
| else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { | |
| reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); | |
| if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT; | |
| else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT; | |
| else | |
| return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP; | |
| if (SSL_want_retry_verify(s)) | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_RETRY_VERIFY; | |
| if (SSL_want_async(s)) | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC; | |
| if (SSL_want_async_job(s)) | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB; | |
| if (SSL_want_client_hello_cb(s)) | |
| return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CLIENT_HELLO_CB; | |
| if ((sc->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) && (sc->s3.warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) | |
| return SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN; | |
| return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_do_handshake_intern(void *vargs) | |
| { | |
| struct ssl_async_args *args = (struct ssl_async_args *)vargs; | |
| SSL *s = args->s; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return -1; | |
| return sc->handshake_func(s); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| int ret = 1; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_do_handshake(s); | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return -1; | |
| if (ssl_reset_error_state(sc) == 0) | |
| return -1; | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_NOERROR; | |
| if (sc->handshake_func == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET); | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (!ossl_statem_check_finish_init(sc, -1)) { | |
| ssl_update_error_state(sc); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s, 0); | |
| if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) { | |
| if ((sc->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { | |
| struct ssl_async_args args; | |
| memset(&args, 0, sizeof(args)); | |
| args.s = s; | |
| ret = ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_do_handshake_intern); | |
| } else { | |
| ret = sc->handshake_func(s); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ssl_update_error_state(sc); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) { | |
| /* We suppress errors because this is a void function */ | |
| (void)ossl_quic_set_accept_state(s, 0 /* suppress errors */); | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| sc->server = 1; | |
| sc->shutdown = 0; | |
| ossl_statem_clear(sc); | |
| sc->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_accept; | |
| /* Ignore return value. Its a void public API function */ | |
| RECORD_LAYER_reset(&sc->rlayer); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) { | |
| /* We suppress errors because this is a void function */ | |
| (void)ossl_quic_set_connect_state(s, 0 /* suppress errors */); | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| sc->server = 0; | |
| sc->shutdown = 0; | |
| ossl_statem_clear(sc); | |
| sc->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_connect; | |
| /* Ignore return value. Its a void public API function */ | |
| RECORD_LAYER_reset(&sc->rlayer); | |
| } | |
| int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc != NULL) | |
| sc->statem.error_state = ERROR_STATE_SSL; | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_undefined_void_function(void) | |
| { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| const char *ssl_protocol_to_string(int version) | |
| { | |
| switch (version) { | |
| case TLS1_3_VERSION: | |
| return "TLSv1.3"; | |
| case TLS1_2_VERSION: | |
| return "TLSv1.2"; | |
| case TLS1_1_VERSION: | |
| return "TLSv1.1"; | |
| case TLS1_VERSION: | |
| return "TLSv1"; | |
| case SSL3_VERSION: | |
| return "SSLv3"; | |
| case DTLS1_BAD_VER: | |
| return "DTLSv0.9"; | |
| case DTLS1_VERSION: | |
| return "DTLSv1"; | |
| case DTLS1_2_VERSION: | |
| return "DTLSv1.2"; | |
| default: | |
| return "unknown"; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| /* We only support QUICv1 - so if its QUIC its QUICv1 */ | |
| if (s->type == SSL_TYPE_QUIC_CONNECTION || s->type == SSL_TYPE_QUIC_XSO) | |
| return "QUICv1"; | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return ssl_protocol_to_string(sc->version); | |
| } | |
| __owur int SSL_get_handshake_rtt(const SSL *s, uint64_t *rtt) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return -1; | |
| if (sc->ts_msg_write.t <= 0 || sc->ts_msg_read.t <= 0) | |
| return 0; /* data not (yet) available */ | |
| if (sc->ts_msg_read.t < sc->ts_msg_write.t) | |
| return -1; | |
| *rtt = ossl_time2us(ossl_time_subtract(sc->ts_msg_read, sc->ts_msg_write)); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int dup_ca_names(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **dst, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *src) | |
| { | |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk; | |
| X509_NAME *xn; | |
| int i; | |
| if (src == NULL) { | |
| *dst = NULL; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if ((sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(src); i++) { | |
| xn = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(src, i)); | |
| if (xn == NULL) { | |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(sk, X509_NAME_free); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (sk_X509_NAME_insert(sk, xn, i) == 0) { | |
| X509_NAME_free(xn); | |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(sk, X509_NAME_free); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| *dst = sk; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| SSL *ret; | |
| int i; | |
| /* TODO(QUIC FUTURE): Add an SSL_METHOD function for duplication */ | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *retsc; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| /* If we're not quiescent, just up_ref! */ | |
| if (!SSL_in_init(s) || !SSL_in_before(s)) { | |
| CRYPTO_UP_REF(&s->references, &i); | |
| return s; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Otherwise, copy configuration state, and session if set. | |
| */ | |
| if ((ret = SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| if ((retsc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ret)) == NULL) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (sc->session != NULL) { | |
| /* | |
| * Arranges to share the same session via up_ref. This "copies" | |
| * session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' | |
| */ | |
| if (!SSL_copy_session_id(ret, s)) | |
| goto err; | |
| } else { | |
| /* | |
| * No session has been established yet, so we have to expect that | |
| * s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later -- they should not both | |
| * point to the same object, and thus we can't use | |
| * SSL_copy_session_id. | |
| */ | |
| if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(ret, s->method)) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (sc->cert != NULL) { | |
| ssl_cert_free(retsc->cert); | |
| retsc->cert = ssl_cert_dup(sc->cert); | |
| if (retsc->cert == NULL) | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!SSL_set_session_id_context(ret, sc->sid_ctx, | |
| (int)sc->sid_ctx_length)) | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!ssl_dane_dup(retsc, sc)) | |
| goto err; | |
| retsc->version = sc->version; | |
| retsc->options = sc->options; | |
| retsc->min_proto_version = sc->min_proto_version; | |
| retsc->max_proto_version = sc->max_proto_version; | |
| retsc->mode = sc->mode; | |
| SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret, SSL_get_max_cert_list(s)); | |
| SSL_set_read_ahead(ret, SSL_get_read_ahead(s)); | |
| retsc->msg_callback = sc->msg_callback; | |
| retsc->msg_callback_arg = sc->msg_callback_arg; | |
| SSL_set_verify(ret, SSL_get_verify_mode(s), SSL_get_verify_callback(s)); | |
| SSL_set_verify_depth(ret, SSL_get_verify_depth(s)); | |
| retsc->generate_session_id = sc->generate_session_id; | |
| SSL_set_info_callback(ret, SSL_get_info_callback(s)); | |
| /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */ | |
| if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data)) | |
| goto err; | |
| retsc->server = sc->server; | |
| if (sc->handshake_func) { | |
| if (sc->server) | |
| SSL_set_accept_state(ret); | |
| else | |
| SSL_set_connect_state(ret); | |
| } | |
| retsc->shutdown = sc->shutdown; | |
| retsc->hit = sc->hit; | |
| retsc->default_passwd_callback = sc->default_passwd_callback; | |
| retsc->default_passwd_callback_userdata = sc->default_passwd_callback_userdata; | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(retsc->param, sc->param); | |
| /* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */ | |
| if (sc->cipher_list != NULL) { | |
| if ((retsc->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(sc->cipher_list)) == NULL) | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (sc->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) | |
| if ((retsc->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(sc->cipher_list_by_id)) | |
| == NULL) | |
| goto err; | |
| /* Dup the client_CA list */ | |
| if (!dup_ca_names(&retsc->ca_names, sc->ca_names) | |
| || !dup_ca_names(&retsc->client_ca_names, sc->client_ca_names)) | |
| goto err; | |
| return ret; | |
| err: | |
| SSL_free(ret); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| if (sc->cert != NULL) | |
| return sc->cert->key->x509; | |
| else | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| if (sc->cert != NULL) | |
| return sc->cert->key->privatekey; | |
| else | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| if (ctx->cert != NULL) | |
| return ctx->cert->key->x509; | |
| else | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| if (ctx->cert != NULL) | |
| return ctx->cert->key->privatekey; | |
| else | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| if ((sc->session != NULL) && (sc->session->cipher != NULL)) | |
| return sc->session->cipher; | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_pending_cipher(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return sc->s3.tmp.new_cipher; | |
| } | |
| const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return sc->rlayer.wrlmethod->get_compression(sc->rlayer.wrl); | |
| #else | |
| return NULL; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_compression(sc->rlayer.rrl); | |
| #else | |
| return NULL; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL_CONNECTION *s) | |
| { | |
| BIO *bbio; | |
| if (s->bbio != NULL) { | |
| /* Already buffered. */ | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); | |
| if (bbio == NULL || BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1) <= 0) { | |
| BIO_free(bbio); | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| s->bbio = bbio; | |
| s->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, s->wbio); | |
| s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set1_bio(s->rlayer.wrl, s->wbio); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL_CONNECTION *s) | |
| { | |
| /* callers ensure s is never null */ | |
| if (s->bbio == NULL) | |
| return 1; | |
| s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); | |
| s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set1_bio(s->rlayer.wrl, s->wbio); | |
| BIO_free(s->bbio); | |
| s->bbio = NULL; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode) | |
| { | |
| ctx->quiet_shutdown = mode; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->quiet_shutdown; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| /* Not supported with QUIC */ | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| sc->quiet_shutdown = mode; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| /* Not supported with QUIC */ | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return sc->quiet_shutdown; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| /* Not supported with QUIC */ | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| sc->shutdown = mode; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| /* QUIC: Just indicate whether the connection was shutdown cleanly. */ | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_get_shutdown(s); | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return sc->shutdown; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_version(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| /* We only support QUICv1 - so if its QUIC its QUICv1 */ | |
| if (s->type == SSL_TYPE_QUIC_CONNECTION || s->type == SSL_TYPE_QUIC_XSO) | |
| return OSSL_QUIC1_VERSION; | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return sc->version; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_client_version(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| /* We only support QUICv1 - so if its QUIC its QUICv1 */ | |
| if (s->type == SSL_TYPE_QUIC_CONNECTION || s->type == SSL_TYPE_QUIC_XSO) | |
| return OSSL_QUIC1_VERSION; | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return sc->client_version; | |
| } | |
| SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) | |
| { | |
| return ssl->ctx; | |
| } | |
| SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| CERT *new_cert; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl); | |
| /* TODO(QUIC FUTURE): Add support for QUIC */ | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| if (ssl->ctx == ctx) | |
| return ssl->ctx; | |
| if (ctx == NULL) | |
| ctx = sc->session_ctx; | |
| new_cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); | |
| if (new_cert == NULL) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (!custom_exts_copy_conn(&new_cert->custext, &sc->cert->custext)) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (!custom_exts_copy_flags(&new_cert->custext, &sc->cert->custext)) | |
| goto err; | |
| /* | |
| * Program invariant: |sid_ctx| has fixed size (SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH), | |
| * so setter APIs must prevent invalid lengths from entering the system. | |
| */ | |
| if (!ossl_assert(sc->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(sc->sid_ctx))) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (!SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx)) | |
| goto err; | |
| /* | |
| * If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX, | |
| * inherit it from the new SSL_CTX as well. If however the context does | |
| * not match (i.e., it was set per-ssl with SSL_set_session_id_context), | |
| * leave it unchanged. | |
| */ | |
| if ((ssl->ctx != NULL) && (sc->sid_ctx_length == ssl->ctx->sid_ctx_length) && (memcmp(sc->sid_ctx, ssl->ctx->sid_ctx, sc->sid_ctx_length) == 0)) { | |
| sc->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length; | |
| memcpy(&sc->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(sc->sid_ctx)); | |
| } | |
| ssl_cert_free(sc->cert); | |
| sc->cert = new_cert; | |
| SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ | |
| ssl->ctx = ctx; | |
| return ssl->ctx; | |
| err: | |
| ssl_cert_free(new_cert); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return X509_STORE_set_default_paths_ex(ctx->cert_store, ctx->libctx, | |
| ctx->propq); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_dir(SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| X509_LOOKUP *lookup; | |
| lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx->cert_store, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir()); | |
| if (lookup == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* We ignore errors, in case the directory doesn't exist */ | |
| ERR_set_mark(); | |
| X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT); | |
| ERR_pop_to_mark(); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_file(SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| X509_LOOKUP *lookup; | |
| lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx->cert_store, X509_LOOKUP_file()); | |
| if (lookup == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* We ignore errors, in case the file doesn't exist */ | |
| ERR_set_mark(); | |
| X509_LOOKUP_load_file_ex(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT, ctx->libctx, | |
| ctx->propq); | |
| ERR_pop_to_mark(); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_store(SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| X509_LOOKUP *lookup; | |
| lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx->cert_store, X509_LOOKUP_store()); | |
| if (lookup == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* We ignore errors, in case the directory doesn't exist */ | |
| ERR_set_mark(); | |
| X509_LOOKUP_add_store_ex(lookup, NULL, ctx->libctx, ctx->propq); | |
| ERR_pop_to_mark(); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_load_verify_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile) | |
| { | |
| return X509_STORE_load_file_ex(ctx->cert_store, CAfile, ctx->libctx, | |
| ctx->propq); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_load_verify_dir(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CApath) | |
| { | |
| return X509_STORE_load_path(ctx->cert_store, CApath); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_load_verify_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAstore) | |
| { | |
| return X509_STORE_load_store_ex(ctx->cert_store, CAstore, ctx->libctx, | |
| ctx->propq); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, | |
| const char *CApath) | |
| { | |
| if (CAfile == NULL && CApath == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (CAfile != NULL && !SSL_CTX_load_verify_file(ctx, CAfile)) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (CApath != NULL && !SSL_CTX_load_verify_dir(ctx, CApath)) | |
| return 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, | |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| sc->info_callback = cb; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned function | |
| * pointer. | |
| */ | |
| void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL * /* ssl */, | |
| int /* type */, | |
| int /* val */) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(ssl); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return sc->info_callback; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long arg) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| sc->verify_result = arg; | |
| } | |
| long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(ssl); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return sc->verify_result; | |
| } | |
| size_t SSL_get_client_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(ssl); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (outlen == 0) | |
| return sizeof(sc->s3.client_random); | |
| if (outlen > sizeof(sc->s3.client_random)) | |
| outlen = sizeof(sc->s3.client_random); | |
| memcpy(out, sc->s3.client_random, outlen); | |
| return outlen; | |
| } | |
| size_t SSL_get_server_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(ssl); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (outlen == 0) | |
| return sizeof(sc->s3.server_random); | |
| if (outlen > sizeof(sc->s3.server_random)) | |
| outlen = sizeof(sc->s3.server_random); | |
| memcpy(out, sc->s3.server_random, outlen); | |
| return outlen; | |
| } | |
| size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *session, | |
| unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) | |
| { | |
| if (outlen == 0) | |
| return session->master_key_length; | |
| if (outlen > session->master_key_length) | |
| outlen = session->master_key_length; | |
| memcpy(out, session->master_key, outlen); | |
| return outlen; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(SSL_SESSION *sess, const unsigned char *in, | |
| size_t len) | |
| { | |
| if (len > sizeof(sess->master_key)) | |
| return 0; | |
| memcpy(sess->master_key, in, len); | |
| sess->master_key_length = len; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s, int idx, void *arg) | |
| { | |
| return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg); | |
| } | |
| void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s, int idx) | |
| { | |
| return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, void *arg) | |
| { | |
| return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg); | |
| } | |
| void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx) | |
| { | |
| return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx); | |
| } | |
| X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->cert_store; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) | |
| { | |
| X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store); | |
| ctx->cert_store = store; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set1_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) | |
| { | |
| if (store != NULL && !X509_STORE_up_ref(store)) | |
| return; | |
| SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(ctx, store); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_want(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_want(s); | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return SSL_NOTHING; | |
| return sc->rwstate; | |
| } | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
| int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint) | |
| { | |
| if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint); | |
| if (identity_hint != NULL) { | |
| ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(identity_hint); | |
| if (ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| } else | |
| ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint = NULL; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(sc->cert->psk_identity_hint); | |
| if (identity_hint != NULL) { | |
| sc->cert->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(identity_hint); | |
| if (sc->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| } else | |
| sc->cert->psk_identity_hint = NULL; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL || sc->session == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return sc->session->psk_identity_hint; | |
| } | |
| const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL || sc->session == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return sc->session->psk_identity; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s, SSL_psk_client_cb_func cb) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| sc->psk_client_callback = cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_psk_client_cb_func cb) | |
| { | |
| ctx->psk_client_callback = cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s, SSL_psk_server_cb_func cb) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| sc->psk_server_callback = cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_psk_server_cb_func cb) | |
| { | |
| ctx->psk_server_callback = cb; | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| void SSL_set_psk_find_session_callback(SSL *s, SSL_psk_find_session_cb_func cb) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| sc->psk_find_session_cb = cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_psk_find_session_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| SSL_psk_find_session_cb_func cb) | |
| { | |
| ctx->psk_find_session_cb = cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_psk_use_session_callback(SSL *s, SSL_psk_use_session_cb_func cb) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| sc->psk_use_session_cb = cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_psk_use_session_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| SSL_psk_use_session_cb_func cb) | |
| { | |
| ctx->psk_use_session_cb = cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, | |
| int content_type, const void *buf, | |
| size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, | |
| void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, | |
| int content_type, const void *buf, | |
| size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) | |
| { | |
| SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, | |
| int | |
| is_forward_secure)) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_NOT_RESUMABLE_SESS_CB, | |
| (void (*)(void))cb); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL *ssl, | |
| int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, | |
| int is_forward_secure)) | |
| { | |
| SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_NOT_RESUMABLE_SESS_CB, | |
| (void (*)(void))cb); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_record_padding_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| size_t (*cb)(SSL *ssl, int type, | |
| size_t len, void *arg)) | |
| { | |
| ctx->record_padding_cb = cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_record_padding_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg) | |
| { | |
| ctx->record_padding_arg = arg; | |
| } | |
| void *SSL_CTX_get_record_padding_callback_arg(const SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->record_padding_arg; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_block_padding_ex(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t app_block_size, | |
| size_t hs_block_size) | |
| { | |
| if (IS_QUIC_CTX(ctx) && (app_block_size > 1 || hs_block_size > 1)) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* block size of 0 or 1 is basically no padding */ | |
| if (app_block_size == 1) { | |
| ctx->block_padding = 0; | |
| } else if (app_block_size <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { | |
| ctx->block_padding = app_block_size; | |
| } else { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (hs_block_size == 1) { | |
| ctx->hs_padding = 0; | |
| } else if (hs_block_size <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { | |
| ctx->hs_padding = hs_block_size; | |
| } else { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_block_padding(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t block_size) | |
| { | |
| return SSL_CTX_set_block_padding_ex(ctx, block_size, block_size); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_record_padding_callback(SSL *ssl, | |
| size_t (*cb)(SSL *ssl, int type, | |
| size_t len, void *arg)) | |
| { | |
| BIO *b; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| b = SSL_get_wbio(ssl); | |
| if (b == NULL || !BIO_get_ktls_send(b)) { | |
| sc->rlayer.record_padding_cb = cb; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_record_padding_callback_arg(SSL *ssl, void *arg) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| sc->rlayer.record_padding_arg = arg; | |
| } | |
| void *SSL_get_record_padding_callback_arg(const SSL *ssl) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(ssl); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return sc->rlayer.record_padding_arg; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_block_padding_ex(SSL *ssl, size_t app_block_size, | |
| size_t hs_block_size) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl); | |
| if (sc == NULL | |
| || (IS_QUIC(ssl) | |
| && (app_block_size > 1 || hs_block_size > 1))) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* block size of 0 or 1 is basically no padding */ | |
| if (app_block_size == 1) { | |
| sc->rlayer.block_padding = 0; | |
| } else if (app_block_size <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { | |
| sc->rlayer.block_padding = app_block_size; | |
| } else { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (hs_block_size == 1) { | |
| sc->rlayer.hs_padding = 0; | |
| } else if (hs_block_size <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { | |
| sc->rlayer.hs_padding = hs_block_size; | |
| } else { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_block_padding(SSL *ssl, size_t block_size) | |
| { | |
| return SSL_set_block_padding_ex(ssl, block_size, block_size); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_num_tickets(SSL *s, size_t num_tickets) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| sc->num_tickets = num_tickets; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| size_t SSL_get_num_tickets(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return sc->num_tickets; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t num_tickets) | |
| { | |
| ctx->num_tickets = num_tickets; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| size_t SSL_CTX_get_num_tickets(const SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->num_tickets; | |
| } | |
| /* Retrieve handshake hashes */ | |
| int ssl_handshake_hash(SSL_CONNECTION *s, | |
| unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, | |
| size_t *hashlen) | |
| { | |
| EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL; | |
| EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3.handshake_dgst; | |
| int hashleni = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hdgst); | |
| int ret = 0; | |
| if (hashleni < 0 || (size_t)hashleni > outlen) { | |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
| if (ctx == NULL) { | |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, hdgst) | |
| || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL) <= 0) { | |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| *hashlen = hashleni; | |
| ret = 1; | |
| err: | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_session_reused(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return sc->hit; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_is_server(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return sc->server; | |
| } | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_1_1_0 | |
| void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug) | |
| { | |
| /* Old function was do-nothing anyway... */ | |
| (void)s; | |
| (void)debug; | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| void SSL_set_security_level(SSL *s, int level) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| sc->cert->sec_level = level; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_security_level(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return sc->cert->sec_level; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_security_callback(SSL *s, | |
| int (*cb)(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| int op, int bits, int nid, | |
| void *other, void *ex)) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| sc->cert->sec_cb = cb; | |
| } | |
| int (*SSL_get_security_callback(const SSL *s))(const SSL *s, | |
| const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, | |
| int bits, int nid, void *other, | |
| void *ex) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return sc->cert->sec_cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set0_security_ex_data(SSL *s, void *ex) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| sc->cert->sec_ex = ex; | |
| } | |
| void *SSL_get0_security_ex_data(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return sc->cert->sec_ex; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_security_level(SSL_CTX *ctx, int level) | |
| { | |
| ctx->cert->sec_level = level; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_get_security_level(const SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->cert->sec_level; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_security_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| int (*cb)(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| int op, int bits, int nid, | |
| void *other, void *ex)) | |
| { | |
| ctx->cert->sec_cb = cb; | |
| } | |
| int (*SSL_CTX_get_security_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *s, | |
| const SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| int op, int bits, | |
| int nid, | |
| void *other, | |
| void *ex) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->cert->sec_cb; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set0_security_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *ex) | |
| { | |
| ctx->cert->sec_ex = ex; | |
| } | |
| void *SSL_CTX_get0_security_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->cert->sec_ex; | |
| } | |
| uint64_t SSL_CTX_get_options(const SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->options; | |
| } | |
| uint64_t SSL_get_options(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_get_options(s); | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return sc->options; | |
| } | |
| uint64_t SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t op) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->options |= op; | |
| } | |
| uint64_t SSL_set_options(SSL *s, uint64_t op) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc; | |
| OSSL_PARAM options[2], *opts = options; | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_set_options(s, op); | |
| #endif | |
| sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| sc->options |= op; | |
| *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint64(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_OPTIONS, | |
| &sc->options); | |
| *opts = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); | |
| /* Ignore return value */ | |
| sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_options(sc->rlayer.rrl, options); | |
| sc->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_options(sc->rlayer.wrl, options); | |
| return sc->options; | |
| } | |
| uint64_t SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t op) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->options &= ~op; | |
| } | |
| uint64_t SSL_clear_options(SSL *s, uint64_t op) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| OSSL_PARAM options[2], *opts = options; | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_clear_options(s, op); | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| sc->options &= ~op; | |
| *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint64(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_OPTIONS, | |
| &sc->options); | |
| *opts = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); | |
| /* Ignore return value */ | |
| sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_options(sc->rlayer.rrl, options); | |
| sc->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_options(sc->rlayer.wrl, options); | |
| return sc->options; | |
| } | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get0_verified_chain(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return sc->verified_chain; | |
| } | |
| IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT | |
| /* | |
| * Moves SCTs from the |src| stack to the |dst| stack. | |
| * The source of each SCT will be set to |origin|. | |
| * If |dst| points to a NULL pointer, a new stack will be created and owned by | |
| * the caller. | |
| * Returns the number of SCTs moved, or a negative integer if an error occurs. | |
| * The |dst| stack is created and possibly partially populated even in case | |
| * of error, likewise the |src| stack may be left in an intermediate state. | |
| */ | |
| static int ct_move_scts(STACK_OF(SCT) **dst, STACK_OF(SCT) *src, | |
| sct_source_t origin) | |
| { | |
| int scts_moved = 0; | |
| SCT *sct = NULL; | |
| if (*dst == NULL) { | |
| *dst = sk_SCT_new_null(); | |
| if (*dst == NULL) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| while ((sct = sk_SCT_pop(src)) != NULL) { | |
| if (SCT_set_source(sct, origin) != 1) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (!sk_SCT_push(*dst, sct)) | |
| goto err; | |
| scts_moved += 1; | |
| } | |
| return scts_moved; | |
| err: | |
| SCT_free(sct); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Look for data collected during ServerHello and parse if found. | |
| * Returns the number of SCTs extracted. | |
| */ | |
| static int ct_extract_tls_extension_scts(SSL_CONNECTION *s) | |
| { | |
| int scts_extracted = 0; | |
| if (s->ext.scts != NULL) { | |
| const unsigned char *p = s->ext.scts; | |
| STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = o2i_SCT_LIST(NULL, &p, s->ext.scts_len); | |
| scts_extracted = ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, SCT_SOURCE_TLS_EXTENSION); | |
| SCT_LIST_free(scts); | |
| } | |
| return scts_extracted; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Checks for an OCSP response and then attempts to extract any SCTs found if it | |
| * contains an SCT X509 extension. They will be stored in |s->scts|. | |
| * Returns: | |
| * - The number of SCTs extracted, assuming an OCSP response exists. | |
| * - 0 if no OCSP response exists or it contains no SCTs. | |
| * - A negative integer if an error occurs. | |
| */ | |
| static int ct_extract_ocsp_response_scts(SSL_CONNECTION *s) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP | |
| int scts_extracted = 0; | |
| OCSP_BASICRESP *br = NULL; | |
| OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL; | |
| STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = NULL; | |
| int ret; | |
| int i, j; | |
| if (s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex == NULL) | |
| goto err; | |
| for (j = 0; j < sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_num(s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex); j++) { | |
| rsp = sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_value(s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex, j); | |
| if (rsp == NULL) | |
| goto err; | |
| br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp); | |
| if (br == NULL) | |
| goto err; | |
| for (i = 0; i < OCSP_resp_count(br); ++i) { | |
| OCSP_SINGLERESP *single = OCSP_resp_get0(br, i); | |
| if (single == NULL) | |
| continue; | |
| scts = OCSP_SINGLERESP_get1_ext_d2i(single, | |
| NID_ct_cert_scts, NULL, NULL); | |
| if (scts == NULL) { | |
| scts_extracted = -1; | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ret = ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, | |
| SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE); | |
| SCT_LIST_free(scts); | |
| if (ret < 0) { | |
| scts_extracted = -1; | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| scts_extracted += ret; | |
| } | |
| OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br); | |
| /* to assure that is not freed twice */ | |
| br = NULL; | |
| } | |
| err: | |
| OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br); | |
| return scts_extracted; | |
| #else | |
| /* Behave as if no OCSP response exists */ | |
| return 0; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Attempts to extract SCTs from the peer certificate. | |
| * Return the number of SCTs extracted, or a negative integer if an error | |
| * occurs. | |
| */ | |
| static int ct_extract_x509v3_extension_scts(SSL_CONNECTION *s) | |
| { | |
| int scts_extracted = 0; | |
| X509 *cert = s->session != NULL ? s->session->peer : NULL; | |
| if (cert != NULL) { | |
| STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_ct_precert_scts, NULL, NULL); | |
| scts_extracted = ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION); | |
| SCT_LIST_free(scts); | |
| } | |
| return scts_extracted; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Attempts to find all received SCTs by checking TLS extensions, the OCSP | |
| * response (if it exists) and X509v3 extensions in the certificate. | |
| * Returns NULL if an error occurs. | |
| */ | |
| const STACK_OF(SCT) *SSL_get0_peer_scts(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| if (!sc->scts_parsed) { | |
| if (ct_extract_tls_extension_scts(sc) < 0 || ct_extract_ocsp_response_scts(sc) < 0 || ct_extract_x509v3_extension_scts(sc) < 0) | |
| goto err; | |
| sc->scts_parsed = 1; | |
| } | |
| return sc->scts; | |
| err: | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| static int ct_permissive(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, | |
| const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, void *unused_arg) | |
| { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ct_strict(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, | |
| const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, void *unused_arg) | |
| { | |
| int count = scts != NULL ? sk_SCT_num(scts) : 0; | |
| int i; | |
| for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) { | |
| SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(scts, i); | |
| int status = SCT_get_validation_status(sct); | |
| if (status == SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID) | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_VALID_SCTS); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL *s, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, | |
| void *arg) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* | |
| * Since code exists that uses the custom extension handler for CT, look | |
| * for this and throw an error if they have already registered to use CT. | |
| */ | |
| if (callback != NULL && SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(s->ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXT_HANDLER_ALREADY_INSTALLED); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (callback != NULL) { | |
| /* | |
| * If we are validating CT, then we MUST accept SCTs served via OCSP | |
| */ | |
| if (!SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(s, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| sc->ct_validation_callback = callback; | |
| sc->ct_validation_callback_arg = arg; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, void *arg) | |
| { | |
| /* | |
| * Since code exists that uses the custom extension handler for CT, look for | |
| * this and throw an error if they have already registered to use CT. | |
| */ | |
| if (callback != NULL && SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXT_HANDLER_ALREADY_INSTALLED); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ctx->ct_validation_callback = callback; | |
| ctx->ct_validation_callback_arg = arg; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_ct_is_enabled(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return sc->ct_validation_callback != NULL; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled(const SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->ct_validation_callback != NULL; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_validate_ct(SSL_CONNECTION *s) | |
| { | |
| int ret = 0; | |
| X509 *cert = s->session != NULL ? s->session->peer : NULL; | |
| X509 *issuer; | |
| SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane; | |
| CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx = NULL; | |
| const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts; | |
| /* | |
| * If no callback is set, the peer is anonymous, or its chain is invalid, | |
| * skip SCT validation - just return success. Applications that continue | |
| * handshakes without certificates, with unverified chains, or pinned leaf | |
| * certificates are outside the scope of the WebPKI and CT. | |
| * | |
| * The above exclusions notwithstanding the vast majority of peers will | |
| * have rather ordinary certificate chains validated by typical | |
| * applications that perform certificate verification and therefore will | |
| * process SCTs when enabled. | |
| */ | |
| if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL || cert == NULL || s->verify_result != X509_V_OK || s->verified_chain == NULL || sk_X509_num(s->verified_chain) <= 1) | |
| return 1; | |
| /* | |
| * CT not applicable for chains validated via DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3) | |
| * trust-anchors. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-4.2 | |
| */ | |
| if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->mtlsa != NULL) { | |
| switch (dane->mtlsa->usage) { | |
| case DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA: | |
| case DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_EE: | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ctx = CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new_ex(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx, | |
| SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->propq); | |
| if (ctx == NULL) { | |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CT_LIB); | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| issuer = sk_X509_value(s->verified_chain, 1); | |
| CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_cert(ctx, cert); | |
| CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_issuer(ctx, issuer); | |
| CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE(ctx, | |
| SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->ctlog_store); | |
| CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time( | |
| ctx, (uint64_t)SSL_SESSION_get_time_ex(s->session) * 1000); | |
| scts = SSL_get0_peer_scts(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)); | |
| /* | |
| * This function returns success (> 0) only when all the SCTs are valid, 0 | |
| * when some are invalid, and < 0 on various internal errors (out of | |
| * memory, etc.). Having some, or even all, invalid SCTs is not sufficient | |
| * reason to abort the handshake, that decision is up to the callback. | |
| * Therefore, we error out only in the unexpected case that the return | |
| * value is negative. | |
| * | |
| * XXX: One might well argue that the return value of this function is an | |
| * unfortunate design choice. Its job is only to determine the validation | |
| * status of each of the provided SCTs. So long as it correctly separates | |
| * the wheat from the chaff it should return success. Failure in this case | |
| * ought to correspond to an inability to carry out its duties. | |
| */ | |
| if (SCT_LIST_validate(scts, ctx) < 0) { | |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_SCT_VERIFICATION_FAILED); | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| ret = s->ct_validation_callback(ctx, scts, s->ct_validation_callback_arg); | |
| if (ret < 0) | |
| ret = 0; /* This function returns 0 on failure */ | |
| if (!ret) | |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); | |
| end: | |
| CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free(ctx); | |
| /* | |
| * With SSL_VERIFY_NONE the session may be cached and reused despite a | |
| * failure return code here. Also the application may wish the complete | |
| * the handshake, and then disconnect cleanly at a higher layer, after | |
| * checking the verification status of the completed connection. | |
| * | |
| * We therefore force a certificate verification failure which will be | |
| * visible via SSL_get_verify_result() and cached as part of any resumed | |
| * session. | |
| * | |
| * Note: the permissive callback is for information gathering only, always | |
| * returns success, and does not affect verification status. Only the | |
| * strict callback or a custom application-specified callback can trigger | |
| * connection failure or record a verification error. | |
| */ | |
| if (ret <= 0) | |
| s->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS; | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_enable_ct(SSL_CTX *ctx, int validation_mode) | |
| { | |
| switch (validation_mode) { | |
| default: | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_CT_VALIDATION_TYPE); | |
| return 0; | |
| case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE: | |
| return SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(ctx, ct_permissive, NULL); | |
| case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT: | |
| return SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(ctx, ct_strict, NULL); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int SSL_enable_ct(SSL *s, int validation_mode) | |
| { | |
| switch (validation_mode) { | |
| default: | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_CT_VALIDATION_TYPE); | |
| return 0; | |
| case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE: | |
| return SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(s, ct_permissive, NULL); | |
| case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT: | |
| return SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(s, ct_strict, NULL); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file(ctx->ctlog_store); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *path) | |
| { | |
| return CTLOG_STORE_load_file(ctx->ctlog_store, path); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set0_ctlog_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, CTLOG_STORE *logs) | |
| { | |
| CTLOG_STORE_free(ctx->ctlog_store); | |
| ctx->ctlog_store = logs; | |
| } | |
| const CTLOG_STORE *SSL_CTX_get0_ctlog_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->ctlog_store; | |
| } | |
| #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CT */ | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_client_hello_cb(SSL_CTX *c, SSL_client_hello_cb_fn cb, | |
| void *arg) | |
| { | |
| c->client_hello_cb = cb; | |
| c->client_hello_cb_arg = arg; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_new_pending_conn_cb(SSL_CTX *c, SSL_new_pending_conn_cb_fn cb, | |
| void *arg) | |
| { | |
| c->new_pending_conn_cb = cb; | |
| c->new_pending_conn_arg = arg; | |
| } | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_4_0 | |
| int SSL_client_hello_isv2(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| unsigned int SSL_client_hello_get0_legacy_version(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (sc->clienthello == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return sc->clienthello->legacy_version; | |
| } | |
| size_t SSL_client_hello_get0_random(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (sc->clienthello == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (out != NULL) | |
| *out = sc->clienthello->random; | |
| return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; | |
| } | |
| size_t SSL_client_hello_get0_session_id(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (sc->clienthello == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (out != NULL) | |
| *out = sc->clienthello->session_id; | |
| return sc->clienthello->session_id_len; | |
| } | |
| size_t SSL_client_hello_get0_ciphers(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (sc->clienthello == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (out != NULL) | |
| *out = PACKET_data(&sc->clienthello->ciphersuites); | |
| return PACKET_remaining(&sc->clienthello->ciphersuites); | |
| } | |
| size_t SSL_client_hello_get0_compression_methods(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (sc->clienthello == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (out != NULL) | |
| *out = sc->clienthello->compressions; | |
| return sc->clienthello->compressions_len; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_client_hello_get1_extensions_present(SSL *s, int **out, size_t *outlen) | |
| { | |
| RAW_EXTENSION *ext; | |
| int *present; | |
| size_t num = 0, i; | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (sc->clienthello == NULL || out == NULL || outlen == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| for (i = 0; i < sc->clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len; i++) { | |
| ext = sc->clienthello->pre_proc_exts + i; | |
| if (ext->present) | |
| num++; | |
| } | |
| if (num == 0) { | |
| *out = NULL; | |
| *outlen = 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if ((present = OPENSSL_malloc_array(num, sizeof(*present))) == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| for (i = 0; i < sc->clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len; i++) { | |
| ext = sc->clienthello->pre_proc_exts + i; | |
| if (ext->present) { | |
| if (ext->received_order >= num) | |
| goto err; | |
| present[ext->received_order] = ext->type; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| *out = present; | |
| *outlen = num; | |
| return 1; | |
| err: | |
| OPENSSL_free(present); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_client_hello_get_extension_order(SSL *s, uint16_t *exts, size_t *num_exts) | |
| { | |
| RAW_EXTENSION *ext; | |
| size_t num = 0, i; | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (sc->clienthello == NULL || num_exts == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| for (i = 0; i < sc->clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len; i++) { | |
| ext = sc->clienthello->pre_proc_exts + i; | |
| if (ext->present) | |
| num++; | |
| } | |
| if (num == 0) { | |
| *num_exts = 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (exts == NULL) { | |
| *num_exts = num; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (*num_exts < num) | |
| return 0; | |
| for (i = 0; i < sc->clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len; i++) { | |
| ext = sc->clienthello->pre_proc_exts + i; | |
| if (ext->present) { | |
| if (ext->received_order >= num) | |
| return 0; | |
| exts[ext->received_order] = ext->type; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| *num_exts = num; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_client_hello_get0_ext(SSL *s, unsigned int type, const unsigned char **out, | |
| size_t *outlen) | |
| { | |
| size_t i; | |
| RAW_EXTENSION *r; | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (sc->clienthello == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| for (i = 0; i < sc->clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len; ++i) { | |
| r = sc->clienthello->pre_proc_exts + i; | |
| if (r->present && r->type == type) { | |
| if (out != NULL) | |
| *out = PACKET_data(&r->data); | |
| if (outlen != NULL) | |
| *outlen = PACKET_remaining(&r->data); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_free_buffers(SSL *ssl) | |
| { | |
| RECORD_LAYER *rl; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| rl = &sc->rlayer; | |
| return rl->rrlmethod->free_buffers(rl->rrl) | |
| && rl->wrlmethod->free_buffers(rl->wrl); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_alloc_buffers(SSL *ssl) | |
| { | |
| RECORD_LAYER *rl; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* QUIC always has buffers allocated. */ | |
| if (IS_QUIC(ssl)) | |
| return 1; | |
| rl = &sc->rlayer; | |
| return rl->rrlmethod->alloc_buffers(rl->rrl) | |
| && rl->wrlmethod->alloc_buffers(rl->wrl); | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_CTX_keylog_cb_func cb) | |
| { | |
| ctx->keylog_callback = cb; | |
| } | |
| SSL_CTX_keylog_cb_func SSL_CTX_get_keylog_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->keylog_callback; | |
| } | |
| static int nss_keylog_int(const char *prefix, | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc, | |
| const uint8_t *parameter_1, | |
| size_t parameter_1_len, | |
| const uint8_t *parameter_2, | |
| size_t parameter_2_len) | |
| { | |
| char *out = NULL; | |
| char *cursor = NULL; | |
| size_t out_len = 0, i, prefix_len; | |
| SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(sc); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSLKEYLOG | |
| if (sctx->keylog_callback == NULL && sctx->do_sslkeylog == 0) | |
| return 1; | |
| #else | |
| if (sctx->keylog_callback == NULL) | |
| return 1; | |
| #endif | |
| /* | |
| * Our output buffer will contain the following strings, rendered with | |
| * space characters in between, terminated by a NULL character: first the | |
| * prefix, then the first parameter, then the second parameter. The | |
| * meaning of each parameter depends on the specific key material being | |
| * logged. Note that the first and second parameters are encoded in | |
| * hexadecimal, so we need a buffer that is twice their lengths. | |
| */ | |
| prefix_len = strlen(prefix); | |
| out_len = prefix_len + (2 * parameter_1_len) + (2 * parameter_2_len) + 3; | |
| if ((out = cursor = OPENSSL_malloc(out_len)) == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| memcpy(cursor, prefix, prefix_len); | |
| cursor += prefix_len; | |
| *cursor++ = ' '; | |
| for (i = 0; i < parameter_1_len; ++i) | |
| cursor += ossl_to_lowerhex(cursor, parameter_1[i]); | |
| *cursor++ = ' '; | |
| for (i = 0; i < parameter_2_len; ++i) | |
| cursor += ossl_to_lowerhex(cursor, parameter_2[i]); | |
| *cursor = '\0'; | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSLKEYLOG | |
| if (sctx->do_sslkeylog == 1) | |
| do_sslkeylogfile(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc), (const char *)out); | |
| #endif | |
| if (sctx->keylog_callback != NULL) | |
| sctx->keylog_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(sc), (const char *)out); | |
| OPENSSL_clear_free(out, out_len); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, | |
| const uint8_t *encrypted_premaster, | |
| size_t encrypted_premaster_len, | |
| const uint8_t *premaster, | |
| size_t premaster_len) | |
| { | |
| if (encrypted_premaster_len < 8) { | |
| SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* We only want the first 8 bytes of the encrypted premaster as a tag. */ | |
| return nss_keylog_int("RSA", | |
| sc, | |
| encrypted_premaster, | |
| 8, | |
| premaster, | |
| premaster_len); | |
| } | |
| int ssl_log_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, | |
| const char *label, | |
| const uint8_t *secret, | |
| size_t secret_len) | |
| { | |
| return nss_keylog_int(label, | |
| sc, | |
| sc->s3.client_random, | |
| SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, | |
| secret, | |
| secret_len); | |
| } | |
| int ssl_cache_cipherlist(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *cipher_suites) | |
| { | |
| if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) { | |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % TLS_CIPHER_LEN != 0) { | |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.ciphers_raw); | |
| s->s3.tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL; | |
| s->s3.tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0; | |
| if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3.tmp.ciphers_raw, | |
| &s->s3.tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) { | |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, const unsigned char *bytes, size_t len, | |
| int isv2format, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **sk, | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **scsvs) | |
| { | |
| PACKET pkt; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL || isv2format) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, bytes, len)) | |
| return 0; | |
| return ossl_bytes_to_cipher_list(sc, &pkt, sk, scsvs, 0); | |
| } | |
| int ossl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *cipher_suites, | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp, | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **scsvs_out, | |
| int fatal) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk = NULL; | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL; | |
| int n = TLS_CIPHER_LEN; | |
| unsigned char cipher[TLS_CIPHER_LEN]; | |
| if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) { | |
| if (fatal) | |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); | |
| else | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) { | |
| if (fatal) | |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, | |
| SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); | |
| else | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); | |
| scsvs = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); | |
| if (sk == NULL || scsvs == NULL) { | |
| if (fatal) | |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); | |
| else | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) { | |
| c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipher, 1); | |
| if (c != NULL) { | |
| if ((c->valid && !sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) || (!c->valid && !sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(scsvs, c))) { | |
| if (fatal) | |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); | |
| else | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) { | |
| if (fatal) | |
| SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
| else | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (skp != NULL) | |
| *skp = sk; | |
| else | |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); | |
| if (scsvs_out != NULL) | |
| *scsvs_out = scsvs; | |
| else | |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); | |
| return 1; | |
| err: | |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); | |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_max_early_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t max_early_data) | |
| { | |
| ctx->max_early_data = max_early_data; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_max_early_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->max_early_data; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_max_early_data(SSL *s, uint32_t max_early_data) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_set_max_early_data(s, max_early_data); | |
| #endif | |
| sc->max_early_data = max_early_data; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| uint32_t SSL_get_max_early_data(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_get_max_early_data(s); | |
| #endif | |
| return sc->max_early_data; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_recv_max_early_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t recv_max_early_data) | |
| { | |
| ctx->recv_max_early_data = recv_max_early_data; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_recv_max_early_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->recv_max_early_data; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_recv_max_early_data(SSL *s, uint32_t recv_max_early_data) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_set_recv_max_early_data(s, recv_max_early_data); | |
| #endif | |
| sc->recv_max_early_data = recv_max_early_data; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| uint32_t SSL_get_recv_max_early_data(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_get_recv_max_early_data(s); | |
| #endif | |
| return sc->recv_max_early_data; | |
| } | |
| __owur unsigned int ssl_get_max_send_fragment(const SSL_CONNECTION *sc) | |
| { | |
| /* Return any active Max Fragment Len extension */ | |
| if (sc->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(sc->session)) | |
| return GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(sc->session); | |
| /* return current SSL connection setting */ | |
| return (unsigned int)sc->max_send_fragment; | |
| } | |
| __owur unsigned int ssl_get_split_send_fragment(const SSL_CONNECTION *sc) | |
| { | |
| /* Return a value regarding an active Max Fragment Len extension */ | |
| if (sc->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(sc->session) | |
| && sc->split_send_fragment > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(sc->session)) | |
| return GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(sc->session); | |
| /* else limit |split_send_fragment| to current |max_send_fragment| */ | |
| if (sc->split_send_fragment > sc->max_send_fragment) | |
| return (unsigned int)sc->max_send_fragment; | |
| /* return current SSL connection setting */ | |
| return (unsigned int)sc->split_send_fragment; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_stateless(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| int ret; | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */ | |
| if (!SSL_clear(s)) | |
| return 0; | |
| ERR_clear_error(); | |
| sc->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS; | |
| ret = SSL_accept(s); | |
| sc->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS; | |
| if (ret > 0 && sc->ext.cookieok) | |
| return 1; | |
| if (sc->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && !ossl_statem_in_error(sc)) | |
| return 0; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int val) | |
| { | |
| ctx->pha_enabled = val; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL *ssl, int val) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| sc->pha_enabled = val; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_verify_client_post_handshake(SSL *ssl) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(ssl)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (!sc->server) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NOT_SERVER); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (!SSL_is_init_finished(ssl)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_STILL_IN_INIT); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| switch (sc->post_handshake_auth) { | |
| case SSL_PHA_NONE: | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_EXTENSION_NOT_RECEIVED); | |
| return 0; | |
| default: | |
| case SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT: | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| case SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED: | |
| break; | |
| case SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING: | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_REQUEST_PENDING); | |
| return 0; | |
| case SSL_PHA_REQUESTED: | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_REQUEST_SENT); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| sc->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING; | |
| /* checks verify_mode and algorithm_auth */ | |
| if (!send_certificate_request(sc)) { | |
| sc->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED; /* restore on error */ | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_CONFIG); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ossl_statem_set_in_init(sc, 1); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_session_ticket_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| SSL_CTX_generate_session_ticket_fn gen_cb, | |
| SSL_CTX_decrypt_session_ticket_fn dec_cb, | |
| void *arg) | |
| { | |
| ctx->generate_ticket_cb = gen_cb; | |
| ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb = dec_cb; | |
| ctx->ticket_cb_data = arg; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_CTX_set_allow_early_data_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
| SSL_allow_early_data_cb_fn cb, | |
| void *arg) | |
| { | |
| ctx->allow_early_data_cb = cb; | |
| ctx->allow_early_data_cb_data = arg; | |
| } | |
| void SSL_set_allow_early_data_cb(SSL *s, | |
| SSL_allow_early_data_cb_fn cb, | |
| void *arg) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| sc->allow_early_data_cb = cb; | |
| sc->allow_early_data_cb_data = arg; | |
| } | |
| const EVP_CIPHER *ssl_evp_cipher_fetch(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, | |
| const char *name, | |
| const char *properties) | |
| { | |
| const EVP_CIPHER *ciph; | |
| ERR_set_mark(); | |
| ciph = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(libctx, name, properties); | |
| if (ciph != NULL) { | |
| OSSL_PARAM params[2]; | |
| int decrypt_only = 0; | |
| params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_DECRYPT_ONLY, | |
| &decrypt_only); | |
| params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); | |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_get_params((EVP_CIPHER *)ciph, params) | |
| && decrypt_only) { | |
| /* If a cipher is decrypt-only, it is unusable */ | |
| EVP_CIPHER_free((EVP_CIPHER *)ciph); | |
| ciph = NULL; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ERR_pop_to_mark(); | |
| return ciph; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_evp_cipher_up_ref(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) | |
| { | |
| /* Don't up-ref an implicit EVP_CIPHER */ | |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(cipher) == NULL) | |
| return 1; | |
| /* | |
| * The cipher was explicitly fetched and therefore it is safe to cast | |
| * away the const | |
| */ | |
| return EVP_CIPHER_up_ref((EVP_CIPHER *)cipher); | |
| } | |
| void ssl_evp_cipher_free(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) | |
| { | |
| if (cipher == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(cipher) != NULL) { | |
| /* | |
| * The cipher was explicitly fetched and therefore it is safe to cast | |
| * away the const | |
| */ | |
| EVP_CIPHER_free((EVP_CIPHER *)cipher); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int ssl_evp_md_up_ref(const EVP_MD *md) | |
| { | |
| /* Don't up-ref an implicit EVP_MD */ | |
| if (EVP_MD_get0_provider(md) == NULL) | |
| return 1; | |
| /* | |
| * The digest was explicitly fetched and therefore it is safe to cast | |
| * away the const | |
| */ | |
| return EVP_MD_up_ref((EVP_MD *)md); | |
| } | |
| void ssl_evp_md_free(const EVP_MD *md) | |
| { | |
| if (md == NULL) | |
| return; | |
| if (EVP_MD_get0_provider(md) != NULL) { | |
| /* | |
| * The digest was explicitly fetched and therefore it is safe to cast | |
| * away the const | |
| */ | |
| EVP_MD_free((EVP_MD *)md); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set0_tmp_dh_pkey(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *dhpkey) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (!ssl_security(sc, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, | |
| EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(dhpkey), 0, dhpkey)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(sc->cert->dh_tmp); | |
| sc->cert->dh_tmp = dhpkey; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set0_tmp_dh_pkey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *dhpkey) | |
| { | |
| if (!ssl_ctx_security(ctx, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, | |
| EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(dhpkey), 0, dhpkey)) { | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->cert->dh_tmp); | |
| ctx->cert->dh_tmp = dhpkey; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* QUIC-specific methods which are supported on QUIC connections only. */ | |
| int SSL_handle_events(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc; | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_handle_events(s); | |
| #endif | |
| sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| if (sc != NULL && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc)) | |
| /* | |
| * DTLSv1_handle_timeout returns 0 if the timer wasn't expired yet, | |
| * which we consider a success case. Theoretically DTLSv1_handle_timeout | |
| * can also return 0 if s is NULL or not a DTLS object, but we've | |
| * already ruled out those possibilities above, so this is not possible | |
| * here. Thus the only failure cases are where DTLSv1_handle_timeout | |
| * returns -1. | |
| */ | |
| return DTLSv1_handle_timeout(s) >= 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_event_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *tv, int *is_infinite) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc; | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_get_event_timeout(s, tv, is_infinite); | |
| #endif | |
| sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(s); | |
| if (sc != NULL && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc) | |
| && DTLSv1_get_timeout(s, tv)) { | |
| *is_infinite = 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| tv->tv_sec = 1000000; | |
| tv->tv_usec = 0; | |
| *is_infinite = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_rpoll_descriptor(SSL *s, BIO_POLL_DESCRIPTOR *desc) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_get_rpoll_descriptor(s, desc); | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL || sc->rbio == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return BIO_get_rpoll_descriptor(sc->rbio, desc); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_wpoll_descriptor(SSL *s, BIO_POLL_DESCRIPTOR *desc) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_get_wpoll_descriptor(s, desc); | |
| #endif | |
| if (sc == NULL || sc->wbio == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return BIO_get_wpoll_descriptor(sc->wbio, desc); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_net_read_desired(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return SSL_want_read(s); | |
| return ossl_quic_get_net_read_desired(s); | |
| #else | |
| return SSL_want_read(s); | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int SSL_net_write_desired(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return SSL_want_write(s); | |
| return ossl_quic_get_net_write_desired(s); | |
| #else | |
| return SSL_want_write(s); | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_blocking_mode(SSL *s, int blocking) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return 0; | |
| return ossl_quic_conn_set_blocking_mode(s, blocking); | |
| #else | |
| return 0; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_blocking_mode(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return -1; | |
| return ossl_quic_conn_get_blocking_mode(s); | |
| #else | |
| return -1; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set1_initial_peer_addr(SSL *s, const BIO_ADDR *peer_addr) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return 0; | |
| return ossl_quic_conn_set_initial_peer_addr(s, peer_addr); | |
| #else | |
| return 0; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int SSL_shutdown_ex(SSL *ssl, uint64_t flags, | |
| const SSL_SHUTDOWN_EX_ARGS *args, | |
| size_t args_len) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(ssl)) | |
| return SSL_shutdown(ssl); | |
| return ossl_quic_conn_shutdown(ssl, flags, args, args_len); | |
| #else | |
| return SSL_shutdown(ssl); | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int SSL_stream_conclude(SSL *ssl, uint64_t flags) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(ssl)) | |
| return 0; | |
| return ossl_quic_conn_stream_conclude(ssl); | |
| #else | |
| return 0; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| SSL *SSL_new_stream(SSL *s, uint64_t flags) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return ossl_quic_conn_stream_new(s, flags); | |
| #else | |
| return NULL; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| SSL *SSL_get0_connection(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return s; | |
| return ossl_quic_get0_connection(s); | |
| #else | |
| return s; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int SSL_is_connection(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| return SSL_get0_connection(s) == s; | |
| } | |
| SSL *SSL_get0_listener(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return ossl_quic_get0_listener(s); | |
| #else | |
| return NULL; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| SSL *SSL_get0_domain(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return ossl_quic_get0_domain(s); | |
| #else | |
| return NULL; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int SSL_is_listener(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| return SSL_get0_listener(s) == s; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_is_domain(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| return SSL_get0_domain(s) == s; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_stream_type(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return SSL_STREAM_TYPE_BIDI; | |
| return ossl_quic_get_stream_type(s); | |
| #else | |
| return SSL_STREAM_TYPE_BIDI; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| uint64_t SSL_get_stream_id(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return UINT64_MAX; | |
| return ossl_quic_get_stream_id(s); | |
| #else | |
| return UINT64_MAX; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int SSL_is_stream_local(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return -1; | |
| return ossl_quic_is_stream_local(s); | |
| #else | |
| return -1; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_default_stream_mode(SSL *s, uint32_t mode) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return 0; | |
| return ossl_quic_set_default_stream_mode(s, mode); | |
| #else | |
| return 0; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_incoming_stream_policy(SSL *s, int policy, uint64_t aec) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return 0; | |
| return ossl_quic_set_incoming_stream_policy(s, policy, aec); | |
| #else | |
| return 0; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| SSL *SSL_accept_stream(SSL *s, uint64_t flags) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return ossl_quic_accept_stream(s, flags); | |
| #else | |
| return NULL; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| size_t SSL_get_accept_stream_queue_len(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return 0; | |
| return ossl_quic_get_accept_stream_queue_len(s); | |
| #else | |
| return 0; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int SSL_stream_reset(SSL *s, | |
| const SSL_STREAM_RESET_ARGS *args, | |
| size_t args_len) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return 0; | |
| return ossl_quic_stream_reset(s, args, args_len); | |
| #else | |
| return 0; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_stream_read_state(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return SSL_STREAM_STATE_NONE; | |
| return ossl_quic_get_stream_read_state(s); | |
| #else | |
| return SSL_STREAM_STATE_NONE; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_stream_write_state(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return SSL_STREAM_STATE_NONE; | |
| return ossl_quic_get_stream_write_state(s); | |
| #else | |
| return SSL_STREAM_STATE_NONE; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_stream_read_error_code(SSL *s, uint64_t *app_error_code) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return -1; | |
| return ossl_quic_get_stream_read_error_code(s, app_error_code); | |
| #else | |
| return -1; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_stream_write_error_code(SSL *s, uint64_t *app_error_code) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return -1; | |
| return ossl_quic_get_stream_write_error_code(s, app_error_code); | |
| #else | |
| return -1; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_conn_close_info(SSL *s, SSL_CONN_CLOSE_INFO *info, | |
| size_t info_len) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return -1; | |
| return ossl_quic_get_conn_close_info(s, info, info_len); | |
| #else | |
| return -1; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_value_uint(SSL *s, uint32_t class_, uint32_t id, | |
| uint64_t *value) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_get_value_uint(s, class_, id, value); | |
| #endif | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set_value_uint(SSL *s, uint32_t class_, uint32_t id, | |
| uint64_t value) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(s)) | |
| return ossl_quic_set_value_uint(s, class_, id, value); | |
| #endif | |
| ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| SSL *SSL_new_listener(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t flags) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC_CTX(ctx)) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return ossl_quic_new_listener(ctx, flags); | |
| #else | |
| return NULL; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| SSL *SSL_new_listener_from(SSL *ssl, uint64_t flags) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(ssl)) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return ossl_quic_new_listener_from(ssl, flags); | |
| #else | |
| return NULL; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| SSL *SSL_new_from_listener(SSL *ssl, uint64_t flags) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(ssl)) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return ossl_quic_new_from_listener(ssl, flags); | |
| #else | |
| return NULL; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| SSL *SSL_accept_connection(SSL *ssl, uint64_t flags) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(ssl)) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return ossl_quic_accept_connection(ssl, flags); | |
| #else | |
| return NULL; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| size_t SSL_get_accept_connection_queue_len(SSL *ssl) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(ssl)) | |
| return 0; | |
| return ossl_quic_get_accept_connection_queue_len(ssl); | |
| #else | |
| return 0; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_peer_addr(SSL *ssl, BIO_ADDR *peer_addr) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(ssl)) | |
| return 0; | |
| return ossl_quic_get_peer_addr(ssl, peer_addr); | |
| #else | |
| return 0; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int SSL_listen_ex(SSL *listener, SSL *new_conn) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(listener) && IS_QUIC(new_conn)) | |
| return ossl_quic_peeloff_conn(listener, new_conn); | |
| else | |
| #endif | |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT, | |
| "SSL_listen_ex only operates on QUIC SSL objects"); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_listen(SSL *ssl) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC(ssl)) | |
| return 0; | |
| return ossl_quic_listen(ssl); | |
| #else | |
| return 0; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| SSL *SSL_new_domain(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t flags) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (!IS_QUIC_CTX(ctx)) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return ossl_quic_new_domain(ctx, flags); | |
| #else | |
| return NULL; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| int ossl_adjust_domain_flags(uint64_t domain_flags, uint64_t *p_domain_flags) | |
| { | |
| if ((domain_flags & ~OSSL_QUIC_SUPPORTED_DOMAIN_FLAGS) != 0) { | |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED, | |
| "unsupported domain flag requested"); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if ((domain_flags & SSL_DOMAIN_FLAG_THREAD_ASSISTED) != 0) | |
| domain_flags |= SSL_DOMAIN_FLAG_MULTI_THREAD; | |
| if ((domain_flags & (SSL_DOMAIN_FLAG_MULTI_THREAD | SSL_DOMAIN_FLAG_SINGLE_THREAD)) == 0) | |
| domain_flags |= SSL_DOMAIN_FLAG_MULTI_THREAD; | |
| if ((domain_flags & SSL_DOMAIN_FLAG_SINGLE_THREAD) != 0 | |
| && (domain_flags & SSL_DOMAIN_FLAG_MULTI_THREAD) != 0) { | |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT, | |
| "mutually exclusive domain flags specified"); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Note: We treat MULTI_THREAD as a no-op in non-threaded builds, but | |
| * not THREAD_ASSISTED. | |
| */ | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_THREADS | |
| if ((domain_flags & SSL_DOMAIN_FLAG_THREAD_ASSISTED) != 0) { | |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED, | |
| "thread assisted mode not available in this build"); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| *p_domain_flags = domain_flags; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set_domain_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t domain_flags) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC_CTX(ctx)) { | |
| if (!ossl_adjust_domain_flags(domain_flags, &domain_flags)) | |
| return 0; | |
| ctx->domain_flags = domain_flags; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED, | |
| "domain flags unsupported on this kind of SSL_CTX"); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_get_domain_flags(const SSL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t *domain_flags) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC_CTX(ctx)) { | |
| if (domain_flags != NULL) | |
| *domain_flags = ctx->domain_flags; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED, | |
| "domain flags unsupported on this kind of SSL_CTX"); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_domain_flags(const SSL *ssl, uint64_t *domain_flags) | |
| { | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QUIC | |
| if (IS_QUIC(ssl)) | |
| return ossl_quic_get_domain_flags(ssl, domain_flags); | |
| #endif | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_add_expected_rpk(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *rpk) | |
| { | |
| unsigned char *data = NULL; | |
| SSL_DANE *dane = SSL_get0_dane(s); | |
| int ret; | |
| if (dane == NULL || dane->dctx == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| if ((ret = i2d_PUBKEY(rpk, &data)) <= 0) | |
| return 0; | |
| ret = SSL_dane_tlsa_add(s, DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_EE, | |
| DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI, | |
| DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL, | |
| data, (size_t)ret) | |
| > 0; | |
| OPENSSL_free(data); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY *SSL_get0_peer_rpk(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL || sc->session == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return sc->session->peer_rpk; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_negotiated_client_cert_type(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return sc->ext.client_cert_type; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_negotiated_server_cert_type(const SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return sc->ext.server_cert_type; | |
| } | |
| static int validate_cert_type(const unsigned char *val, size_t len) | |
| { | |
| size_t i; | |
| int saw_rpk = 0; | |
| int saw_x509 = 0; | |
| if (val == NULL && len == 0) | |
| return 1; | |
| if (val == NULL || len == 0) | |
| return 0; | |
| for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { | |
| switch (val[i]) { | |
| case TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk: | |
| if (saw_rpk) | |
| return 0; | |
| saw_rpk = 1; | |
| break; | |
| case TLSEXT_cert_type_x509: | |
| if (saw_x509) | |
| return 0; | |
| saw_x509 = 1; | |
| break; | |
| case TLSEXT_cert_type_pgp: | |
| case TLSEXT_cert_type_1609dot2: | |
| default: | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int set_cert_type(unsigned char **cert_type, | |
| size_t *cert_type_len, | |
| const unsigned char *val, | |
| size_t len) | |
| { | |
| unsigned char *tmp = NULL; | |
| if (!validate_cert_type(val, len)) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (val != NULL && (tmp = OPENSSL_memdup(val, len)) == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| OPENSSL_free(*cert_type); | |
| *cert_type = tmp; | |
| *cert_type_len = len; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set1_client_cert_type(SSL *s, const unsigned char *val, size_t len) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return set_cert_type(&sc->client_cert_type, &sc->client_cert_type_len, | |
| val, len); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_set1_server_cert_type(SSL *s, const unsigned char *val, size_t len) | |
| { | |
| SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
| if (sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| return set_cert_type(&sc->server_cert_type, &sc->server_cert_type_len, | |
| val, len); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set1_client_cert_type(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *val, size_t len) | |
| { | |
| return set_cert_type(&ctx->client_cert_type, &ctx->client_cert_type_len, | |
| val, len); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_set1_server_cert_type(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *val, size_t len) | |
| { | |
| return set_cert_type(&ctx->server_cert_type, &ctx->server_cert_type_len, | |
| val, len); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get0_client_cert_type(const SSL *s, unsigned char **t, size_t *len) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (t == NULL || len == NULL || sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| *t = sc->client_cert_type; | |
| *len = sc->client_cert_type_len; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get0_server_cert_type(const SSL *s, unsigned char **t, size_t *len) | |
| { | |
| const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); | |
| if (t == NULL || len == NULL || sc == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| *t = sc->server_cert_type; | |
| *len = sc->server_cert_type_len; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_get0_client_cert_type(const SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **t, size_t *len) | |
| { | |
| if (t == NULL || len == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| *t = ctx->client_cert_type; | |
| *len = ctx->client_cert_type_len; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_CTX_get0_server_cert_type(const SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **t, size_t *len) | |
| { | |
| if (t == NULL || len == NULL) | |
| return 0; | |
| *t = ctx->server_cert_type; | |
| *len = ctx->server_cert_type_len; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * RFC 8701 GREASE - returns a GREASE value (0x?A?A pattern) for the given | |
| * index. Seeds are generated lazily on first use and remain stable for the | |
| * lifetime of the connection so that HelloRetryRequest replays get identical | |
| * values. | |
| */ | |
| uint16_t ossl_grease_value(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int index) | |
| { | |
| uint16_t ret; | |
| if (index < 0 || index > OSSL_GREASE_LAST_INDEX) | |
| return 0x0A0A; | |
| if (!s->ext.grease_seeded) { | |
| if (RAND_bytes_ex(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx, | |
| s->ext.grease_seed, | |
| sizeof(s->ext.grease_seed), 0) | |
| <= 0) | |
| memset(s->ext.grease_seed, 0x42, sizeof(s->ext.grease_seed)); | |
| s->ext.grease_seeded = 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Map seed byte to 0x?A?A pattern */ | |
| ret = (s->ext.grease_seed[index] & 0xf0) | 0x0a; | |
| ret |= ret << 8; | |
| /* Ensure EXT2 differs from EXT1 */ | |
| if (index == OSSL_GREASE_EXT2 | |
| && ret == ossl_grease_value(s, OSSL_GREASE_EXT1)) | |
| ret ^= 0x1010; | |
| return ret; | |
| } |