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flutter/third_party/openssl/refs/heads/upstream/master/./ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
blob: b2a5de6a873037f1e40bb907084197881a43f468 [file] [log] [blame] [edit]
/*
* Copyright 2016-2026 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#include "../ssl_local.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h"
#include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
#include "statem_local.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "internal/ech_helpers.h"
#endif
/* Used in the negotiate_dhe function */
typedef enum {
ffdhe_check,
ecdhe_check,
ptfmt_check
} dhe_check_t;
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
if (!s->renegotiate) {
/* If not renegotiating, send an empty RI extension to indicate support */
#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
#error Internal DTLS version error
#endif
if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
&& (s->min_proto_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION
|| (ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, TLS1_VERSION, NULL)
&& s->min_proto_version <= TLS1_VERSION))) {
/*
* For TLS <= 1.0 SCSV is used instead, and for TLS 1.3 this
* extension isn't used at all.
*/
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
ECH_SAME_EXT(s, context, pkt)
#endif
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
ECH_SAME_EXT(s, context, pkt)
#endif
/* Add a complete RI extension if renegotiating */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
char *chosen = s->ext.hostname;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
OSSL_HPKE_SUITE suite;
OSSL_ECHSTORE_ENTRY *ee = NULL;
if (s->ext.ech.es != NULL) {
if (ossl_ech_pick_matching_cfg(s, &ee, &suite) != 1) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
/* Don't send outer SNI if external API says so */
if (s->ext.ech.ch_depth == 0 && s->ext.ech.no_outer == 1)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (s->ext.ech.ch_depth == 1) /* inner */
chosen = s->ext.hostname;
if (s->ext.ech.ch_depth == 0) { /* outer */
if (s->ext.ech.outer_hostname != NULL) /* prefer API */
chosen = s->ext.ech.outer_hostname;
else /* use name from ECHConfig */
chosen = ee->public_name;
}
}
#endif
if (chosen == NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
/* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
/* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, chosen, strlen(chosen))
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
/* Push a Max Fragment Len extension into ClientHello */
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
if (s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode == TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
ECH_SAME_EXT(s, context, pkt)
#endif
/* Add Max Fragment Length extension if client enabled it. */
/*-
* 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
* 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
*/
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
/* Sub-packet for Max Fragment Length extension (1 byte) */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
/* Add SRP username if there is one */
if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
ECH_SAME_EXT(s, context, pkt)
#endif
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
/* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
/* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
|| !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif
/*
* With (D)TLS < 1.3 the only negotiated supported key exchange groups are
* FFDHE (RFC7919) and ECDHE/ECX (RFC8422 + legacy). With (D)TLS 1.3, we add
* KEMs, and the supported groups are no longer cipher-dependent.
*
* This function serves two purposes:
*
* - To determine whether to send the supported point formats extension.
* This is no longer applicable with (D)TLS >= 1.3.
* - To determine whether to send the supported groups extension.
*
* In the former case, we only care about whether both ECC ciphers and EC/ECX
* supported groups are configured, and the (D)TLS min version is at most 1.2.
*
* In the latter case, we also admit DHE ciphers with FFDHE groups, or any TLS
* 1.3 cipher, since the extension is effectively mandatory for (D)TLS 1.3,
* with the sole exception of psk-ke resumption, provided the client is sure
* that the server will not want elect a full handshake. The check type then
* indicates whether ECDHE or FFDHE negotiation should be performed.
*/
static int negotiate_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, dhe_check_t check_type,
int min_version, int max_version)
{
int i, end, ret = 0;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL;
const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
size_t num_groups, j;
SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
int dtls = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s);
/* See if we support any EC or FFDHE ciphersuites */
cipher_stack = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(ssl);
end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack);
for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
unsigned long alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
unsigned long alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
int is_ffdhe_ciphersuite = (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK));
int is_ec_ciphersuite = ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
|| (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA));
int is_tls13 = (dtls ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, DTLS1_2_VERSION)
: (c->min_tls > TLS1_2_VERSION));
if ((check_type == ffdhe_check && (is_ffdhe_ciphersuite || is_tls13))
|| (check_type == ecdhe_check && (is_ec_ciphersuite || is_tls13))
|| (check_type == ptfmt_check && is_ec_ciphersuite)) {
ret = 1;
break;
}
}
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_stack);
if (ret == 0)
return 0;
/* Check we have at least one EC or FFDHE supported group */
tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
for (j = 0; j < num_groups; j++) {
uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[j];
const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = NULL;
if (!tls_valid_group(s, ctmp, min_version, max_version, NULL, &ginfo))
continue;
if (check_type == ffdhe_check && is_ffdhe_group(ginfo->group_id)
&& tls_group_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
return 1;
if (check_type != ffdhe_check && is_ecdhe_group(ginfo->group_id)
&& tls_group_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
const unsigned char *pformats;
size_t num_formats;
int reason, min_version, max_version;
reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
if (reason != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, reason);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (!negotiate_dhe(s, ptfmt_check, min_version, max_version))
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
if (num_formats == 0)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
ECH_SAME_EXT(s, context, pkt)
#endif
/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
/* Sub-packet for formats extension */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
size_t num_groups = 0, i, tls13added = 0, added = 0;
int min_version, max_version, reason;
int dtls = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s);
int use_ecdhe, use_ffdhe;
reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
if (reason != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, reason);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/*
* If we don't support suitable groups, don't send the extension
*/
use_ecdhe = negotiate_dhe(s, ecdhe_check, min_version, max_version);
use_ffdhe = negotiate_dhe(s, ffdhe_check, min_version, max_version);
if (!use_ecdhe && !use_ffdhe
&& (dtls ? DTLS_VERSION_LE(max_version, DTLS1_2_VERSION)
: (max_version <= TLS1_2_VERSION)))
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
ECH_SAME_EXT(s, context, pkt)
#endif
/*
* Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
*/
tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
/* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/* RFC 8701: prepend a GREASE group value */
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_GREASE) && !s->server) {
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
ossl_grease_value(s, OSSL_GREASE_GROUP))) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
/* Copy group ID if supported */
for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = NULL;
uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[i];
int okfortls13;
if (!tls_valid_group(s, ctmp, min_version, max_version, &okfortls13,
&ginfo)
|| (!use_ecdhe && is_ecdhe_group(ginfo->group_id))
|| (!use_ffdhe && is_ffdhe_group(ginfo->group_id))
/* Note: SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED covers all key exchange groups */
|| !tls_group_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
continue;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ctmp)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (okfortls13 && max_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
tls13added++;
added++;
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
if (added == 0)
SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_GROUPS,
"No groups enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version");
else
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (tls13added == 0 && max_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_GROUPS,
"No groups enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version");
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
size_t ticklen;
if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
ECH_SAME_EXT(s, context, pkt)
#endif
if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL
&& s->session->ext.tick != NULL
&& s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen;
} else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL
&& s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) {
ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length;
s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
memcpy(s->session->ext.tick,
s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen);
s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
} else {
ticklen = 0;
}
if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL && s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
size_t salglen;
const uint16_t *salg;
/*
* This used both in the initial hello and as part of renegotiation,
* in the latter case, the client version may be already set and may
* be lower than that initially offered in `client_version`.
*/
if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (s->client_version < TLS1_2_VERSION
|| (s->ssl.method->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION
&& s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION))
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
} else {
if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, DTLS1_2_VERSION)
|| (s->ssl.method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION
&& DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, DTLS1_2_VERSION)))
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
ECH_SAME_EXT(s, context, pkt)
#endif
salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
/* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
/* Sub-packet for the actual list */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/* RFC 8701: append a GREASE signature algorithm value */
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_GREASE) && !s->server) {
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
ossl_grease_value(s, OSSL_GREASE_SIGALG))) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
int i;
/* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */
if (x != NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
ECH_SAME_EXT(s, context, pkt)
#endif
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
/* Sub-packet for status request extension */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
/* Sub-packet for the ids */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) {
unsigned char *idbytes;
OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i);
int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
if (idlen <= 0
/* Sub-packet for an individual id */
|| !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
|| i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) {
unsigned char *extbytes;
int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL);
if (extlen < 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
|| i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes)
!= extlen) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL
|| !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
ECH_SAME_EXT(s, context, pkt)
#endif
/*
* The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
* for Next Protocol Negotiation
*/
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
unsigned char *aval = s->ext.alpn;
size_t alen = s->ext.alpn_len;
s->s3.alpn_sent = 0;
if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
/*
* If we have different alpn and alpn_outer values, then we set
* the appropriate one for inner and outer.
* If no alpn is set (for inner or outer), we don't send any.
* If only an inner is set then we send the same in both.
* Logic above is on the basis that alpn's aren't that sensitive,
* usually, so special action is needed to do better.
* We also don't support a way to send alpn only in the inner.
* If you don't want the inner value in the outer, you have to
* pick what to send in the outer and send that.
*/
if (s->ext.ech.ch_depth == 1 && s->ext.alpn == NULL) /* inner */
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (s->ext.ech.ch_depth == 0 && s->ext.alpn == NULL
&& s->ext.ech.alpn_outer == NULL) /* outer */
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (s->ext.ech.ch_depth == 0 && s->ext.ech.alpn_outer != NULL) {
aval = s->ext.ech.alpn_outer;
alen = s->ext.ech.alpn_outer_len;
}
#endif
if (aval == NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
/* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, aval, alen)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
s->s3.alpn_sent = 1;
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl);
int i, end;
if (clnt == NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
ECH_SAME_EXT(s, context, pkt)
#endif
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
/* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
/* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
/* Add an empty use_mki value */
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
ECH_SAME_EXT(s, context, pkt)
#endif
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/* Not defined for client Certificates */
if (x != NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
ECH_SAME_EXT(s, context, pkt)
#endif
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
ECH_SAME_EXT(s, context, pkt)
#endif
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
int currv, min_version, max_version, reason;
reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
if (reason != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, reason);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/*
* Don't include this if we can't negotiate TLSv1.3. We can do a straight
* comparison here because we will never be called in DTLS.
*/
if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
ECH_SAME_EXT(s, context, pkt)
#endif
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/* RFC 8701: prepend a GREASE version value */
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_GREASE) && !s->server) {
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
ossl_grease_value(s, OSSL_GREASE_VERSION))) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
/*
* Construct a psk_kex_modes extension.
*/
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
int nodhe = s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
ECH_SAME_EXT(s, context, pkt)
#endif
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
|| (nodhe && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE))
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
if (nodhe)
s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
#endif
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
static int add_key_share(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int group_id, size_t loop_num)
{
unsigned char *encoded_pubkey = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
size_t encodedlen;
if (loop_num < s->s3.tmp.num_ks_pkey) {
if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
|| !ossl_assert(s->s3.tmp.ks_pkey[loop_num] != NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
* Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share
*/
key_share_key = s->s3.tmp.ks_pkey[loop_num];
} else {
key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, group_id);
if (key_share_key == NULL) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
}
/* Encode the public key. */
encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(key_share_key,
&encoded_pubkey);
if (encodedlen == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* Create KeyShareEntry */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, group_id)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_pubkey, encodedlen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* For backward compatibility, we use the first valid group to add a key share */
if (loop_num == 0) {
s->s3.tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
s->s3.group_id = group_id;
}
/* We ensure in t1_lib.c that the loop number does not exceed OPENSSL_CLIENT_MAX_KEY_SHARES */
s->s3.tmp.ks_pkey[loop_num] = key_share_key;
s->s3.tmp.ks_group_id[loop_num] = group_id;
if (loop_num >= s->s3.tmp.num_ks_pkey)
s->s3.tmp.num_ks_pkey++;
OPENSSL_free(encoded_pubkey);
return 1;
err:
if (key_share_key != s->s3.tmp.ks_pkey[loop_num])
EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
OPENSSL_free(encoded_pubkey);
return 0;
}
#endif
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
size_t i, num_groups = 0;
const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
uint16_t group_id = 0;
int add_only_one = 0;
size_t valid_keyshare = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
ECH_SAME_EXT(s, context, pkt)
#endif
/* key_share extension */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
/* Extension data sub-packet */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
/* KeyShare list sub-packet */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/* RFC 8701: prepend a GREASE key share entry (1 byte of 0x00) */
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_GREASE) && !s->server) {
uint16_t grease_group = ossl_grease_value(s, OSSL_GREASE_GROUP);
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, grease_group)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
tls1_get_requested_keyshare_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
if (num_groups == 1 && pgroups[0] == 0) { /* Indication that no * prefix was used */
tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
add_only_one = 1;
}
/* If neither the default nor the keyshares have any entry --> fatal */
if (num_groups == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/* Add key shares */
if (s->s3.group_id != 0 && s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
/* new, single key share */
group_id = s->s3.group_id;
s->s3.tmp.num_ks_pkey = 0;
if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, group_id, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
valid_keyshare++;
} else {
if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) /* use default */
add_only_one = 1;
for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
if (!tls_group_allowed(s, pgroups[i], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
continue;
if (!tls_valid_group(s, pgroups[i], TLS1_3_VERSION, TLS1_3_VERSION,
NULL, NULL))
continue;
group_id = pgroups[i];
if (group_id == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, group_id, valid_keyshare)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
valid_keyshare++;
if (add_only_one)
break;
}
}
if (valid_keyshare == 0) {
/* No key shares were allowed */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
/* stash inner key shares */
if (s->ext.ech.ch_depth == 1 && ossl_ech_stash_keyshares(s) != 1) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
#endif
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
#else
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#endif
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
/* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */
if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
ECH_SAME_EXT(s, context, pkt)
#endif
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
/* Extension data sub-packet */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie,
s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto end;
}
ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
end:
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie);
s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL;
s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0;
return ret;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
const unsigned char *id = NULL;
size_t idlen = 0;
SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL;
SSL_SESSION *edsess = NULL;
const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL;
SSL *ussl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
/*
* If we're attempting ECH and processing the outer CH
* then we only need to check if the extension is to be
* sent or not - any other processing (with side effects)
* happened already for the inner CH.
*/
if (s->ext.ech.es != NULL && s->ext.ech.ch_depth == 0) {
/*
* if we called this for inner and did send then
* the following two things should be set, if so,
* then send again in the outer CH.
*/
if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED
&& s->ext.early_data_ok == 1) {
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
} else {
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
}
#endif
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
if (s->psk_use_session_cb != NULL
&& (!s->psk_use_session_cb(ussl, handmd, &id, &idlen, &psksess)
|| (psksess != NULL
&& psksess->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
SSL_SESSION_free(psksess);
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (psksess == NULL && s->psk_client_callback != NULL) {
unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
size_t psklen = 0;
memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
psklen = s->psk_client_callback(ussl, NULL,
identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
psk, sizeof(psk));
if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
} else if (psklen > 0) {
const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
idlen = strlen(identity);
if (idlen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
id = (unsigned char *)identity;
/*
* We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
* the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
*/
cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
if (cipher == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
psksess = SSL_SESSION_new();
if (psksess == NULL
|| !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(psksess, psk, psklen)
|| !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(psksess, cipher)
|| !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(psksess, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
s->psksession = psksess;
if (psksess != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id);
s->psksession_id = OPENSSL_memdup(id, idlen);
if (s->psksession_id == NULL) {
s->psksession_id_len = 0;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
s->psksession_id_len = idlen;
}
if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
|| (s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
&& (psksess == NULL || psksess->ext.max_early_data == 0))) {
s->max_early_data = 0;
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
edsess = s->session->ext.max_early_data != 0 ? s->session : psksess;
s->max_early_data = edsess->ext.max_early_data;
if (edsess->ext.hostname != NULL) {
if (s->ext.hostname == NULL
|| (s->ext.hostname != NULL
&& strcmp(s->ext.hostname, edsess->ext.hostname) != 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
if ((s->ext.alpn == NULL && edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/*
* Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early
* data.
*/
if (edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
PACKET prots, alpnpkt;
int found = 0;
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots, &alpnpkt)) {
if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt, edsess->ext.alpn_selected,
edsess->ext.alpn_selected_len)) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/*
* We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the
* extension, we set it to accepted.
*/
s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff
#define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200
/*
* PSK pre binder overhead =
* 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
* 2 bytes for extension length
* 2 bytes for identities list length
* 2 bytes for identity length
* 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age
* 2 bytes for binder list length
* 1 byte for binder length
* The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the
* subsequent binder bytes
*/
#define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1)
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
unsigned char *padbytes;
size_t hlen;
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
ECH_SAME_EXT(s, context, pkt);
#endif
/*
* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685.
* This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but
* excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore
* this extension MUST always appear second to last.
*/
if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/*
* If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this
* extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be.
*/
if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION
&& s->session->ext.ticklen != 0
&& s->session->cipher != NULL) {
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
if (md != NULL) {
/*
* Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder
* length.
*/
int md_size = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
if (md_size <= 0)
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen
+ md_size;
}
}
if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) {
/* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */
hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen;
/*
* Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and
* 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least
* 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x,
* 8.x are intolerant of that condition)
*/
if (hlen > 4)
hlen -= 4;
else
hlen = 1;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
|| !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
/*
* Construct the pre_shared_key extension
*/
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
uint32_t agesec, agems = 0;
size_t binderoffset, msglen;
int reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0;
unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL;
const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL;
int dores = 0;
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
OSSL_TIME t;
s->ext.tick_identity = 0;
/*
* Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
* resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length
* calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted.
*/
/*
* If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume
* so don't add this extension.
*/
if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION
|| (s->session->ext.ticklen == 0 && s->psksession == NULL))
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
if (s->session->ext.ticklen != 0) {
/* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */
if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
mdres = ssl_md(sctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
if (mdres == NULL) {
/*
* Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
* Ignore it
*/
goto dopsksess;
}
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdres != handmd) {
/*
* Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session
* so we can't use it.
*/
goto dopsksess;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
/*
* When doing ECH, we get here twice (for inner then outer). The
* 2nd time (for outer) we can skip some checks as we know how
* those went last time.
*/
if (s->ext.ech.es != NULL && s->ext.ech.ch_depth == 0) {
s->ext.tick_identity = s->ext.ech.tick_identity;
dores = (s->ext.tick_identity > 0);
goto dopsksess;
}
#endif
/*
* Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
* nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most
* implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in
* seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do
* this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an
* issue.
*/
t = ossl_time_subtract(ossl_time_now(), s->session->time);
agesec = (uint32_t)ossl_time2seconds(t);
/*
* We calculate the age in seconds but the server may work in ms. Due to
* rounding errors we could overestimate the age by up to 1s. It is
* better to underestimate it. Otherwise, if the RTT is very short, when
* the server calculates the age reported by the client it could be
* bigger than the age calculated on the server - which should never
* happen.
*/
if (agesec > 0)
agesec--;
if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) {
/* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
goto dopsksess;
}
/*
* Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
* good enough.
*/
agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) {
/*
* Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session.
* If so we just ignore it.
*/
goto dopsksess;
}
/*
* Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed
* to be mod 2^32.
*/
agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
reshashsize = EVP_MD_get_size(mdres);
if (reshashsize <= 0)
goto dopsksess;
s->ext.tick_identity++;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
/* stash this for re-use in outer CH */
if (s->ext.ech.es != NULL && s->ext.ech.ch_depth == 1)
s->ext.ech.tick_identity = s->ext.tick_identity;
#endif
dores = 1;
}
dopsksess:
if (!dores && s->psksession == NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (s->psksession != NULL) {
mdpsk = ssl_md(sctx, s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2);
if (mdpsk == NULL) {
/*
* Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
* If this happens it's an application bug.
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdpsk != handmd) {
/*
* Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK
* session. This is an application bug.
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
pskhashsize = EVP_MD_get_size(mdpsk);
if (pskhashsize <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
/* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
/*
* For ECH if we're processing the outer CH and the inner CH
* has a PSK, then we want to send a GREASE PSK in the outer.
* We'll do that by just replacing the ticket value itself
* with random values of the same length.
*/
if (s->ext.ech.es != NULL && s->ext.ech.ch_depth == 0) {
unsigned char *rndbuf = NULL, *rndbufp = NULL;
size_t totalrndsize = 0;
totalrndsize = s->session->ext.ticklen
+ sizeof(agems)
+ s->psksession_id_len
+ reshashsize
+ pskhashsize;
rndbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(totalrndsize);
if (rndbuf == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/* for outer CH allocate a similar sized random value */
if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, rndbuf, totalrndsize, 0) <= 0) {
OPENSSL_free(rndbuf);
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/* set agems from random buffer */
rndbufp = rndbuf;
memcpy(&agems, rndbufp, sizeof(agems));
rndbufp += sizeof(agems);
if (dores != 0) {
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, rndbufp,
s->session->ext.ticklen)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
OPENSSL_free(rndbuf);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
rndbufp += s->session->ext.ticklen;
}
if (s->psksession != NULL) {
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, rndbufp, s->psksession_id_len)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
OPENSSL_free(rndbuf);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
rndbufp += s->psksession_id_len;
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| (dores == 1
&& !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, rndbufp, reshashsize))
|| (s->psksession != NULL
&& !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, rndbufp, pskhashsize))
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
OPENSSL_free(rndbuf);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
OPENSSL_free(rndbuf);
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECH */
if (dores) {
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick,
s->session->ext.ticklen)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
if (s->psksession != NULL) {
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->psksession_id,
s->psksession_id_len)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
s->ext.tick_identity++;
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| (dores
&& !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, reshashsize, &resbinder))
|| (s->psksession != NULL
&& !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, pskhashsize, &pskbinder))
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen)
/*
* We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can
* calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders
*/
|| !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen;
if (dores
&& tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
resbinder, s->session, 1, 0)
!= 1) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (s->psksession != NULL
&& tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
pskbinder, s->psksession, 1, 1)
!= 1) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
#else
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#endif
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
ossl_unused unsigned int context,
ossl_unused X509 *x,
ossl_unused size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
if (!s->pha_enabled)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
ECH_SAME_EXT(s, context, pkt)
#endif
/* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
#else
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#endif
}
/*
* Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
*/
int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
size_t expected_len = s->s3.previous_client_finished_len
+ s->s3.previous_server_finished_len;
size_t ilen;
const unsigned char *data;
/* Check for logic errors */
if (!ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
|| s->s3.previous_client_finished_len != 0)
|| !ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
|| s->s3.previous_server_finished_len != 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* Parse the length byte */
if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
return 0;
}
/* Consistency check */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
return 0;
}
/* Check that the extension matches */
if (ilen != expected_len) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
|| memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
!= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3.previous_server_finished_len)
|| memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_server_finished,
s->s3.previous_server_finished_len)
!= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
return 1;
}
/* Parse the server's max fragment len extension packet */
int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
unsigned int value;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/* |value| should contains a valid max-fragment-length code. */
if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_R_TLS_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
/* Must be the same value as client-configured one who was sent to server */
/*-
* RFC 6066: if a client receives a maximum fragment length negotiation
* response that differs from the length it requested, ...
* It must abort with SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER alert
*/
if (value != s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_R_TLS_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
/*
* Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation succeeded.
* The negotiated Maximum Fragment Length is binding now.
*/
s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
char *eff_sni = s->ext.hostname;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
/* if we tried ECH and failed, the outer is what's expected */
if (s->ext.ech.es != NULL && s->ext.ech.success == 0)
eff_sni = s->ext.ech.outer_hostname;
#endif
if (eff_sni == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(eff_sni);
if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
size_t ecpointformats_len;
PACKET ecptformatlist;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist);
if (ecpointformats_len == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats);
s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len);
if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL) {
s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len;
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist,
s->ext.peer_ecpointformats,
ecpointformats_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s);
if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL && !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(ssl, PACKET_data(pkt), (int)PACKET_remaining(pkt), s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
/* We ignore this if the server sends a CertificateRequest */
return 1;
}
/*
* MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
* request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
*/
if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, chainidx, pkt);
}
/* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
s->ext.status_expected = 1;
return 1;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
/* We ignore this if the server sends it in a CertificateRequest */
return 1;
}
/*
* Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
* callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
* need to let control continue to flow to that.
*/
if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
/* Simply copy it off for later processing */
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts);
s->ext.scts = NULL;
s->ext.scts_len = (uint16_t)size;
if (size > 0) {
s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
if (s->ext.scts == NULL) {
s->ext.scts_len = 0;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
} else {
ENDPOINT role = (context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0
? ENDPOINT_CLIENT
: ENDPOINT_BOTH;
/*
* If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension,
* otherwise this is unsolicited.
*/
if (custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role,
TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
NULL)
== NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (!custom_ext_parse(s, context,
TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt),
x, chainidx)) {
/* SSLfatal already called */
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/*
* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
* elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
* fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
*/
static int ssl_next_proto_validate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
PACKET tmp_protocol;
while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
|| PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
unsigned char *selected;
unsigned char selected_len;
PACKET tmppkt;
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
/* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */
if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
return 1;
/* We must have requested it. */
if (sctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/* The data must be valid */
tmppkt = *pkt;
if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(s, &tmppkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
if (sctx->ext.npn_select_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s),
&selected, &selected_len,
PACKET_data(pkt), (unsigned int)PACKET_remaining(pkt),
sctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg)
!= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
|| selected_len == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/*
* Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
* a single Serverhello
*/
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn);
s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
if (s->ext.npn == NULL) {
s->ext.npn_len = 0;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len);
s->ext.npn_len = selected_len;
s->s3.npn_seen = 1;
return 1;
}
#endif
int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
size_t len;
PACKET confpkt, protpkt;
int valid = 0;
/* We must have requested it. */
if (!s->s3.alpn_sent) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/*-
* The extension data consists of:
* uint16 list_length
* uint8 proto_length;
* uint8 proto[proto_length];
*/
if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt, &len)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &len)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/* It must be a protocol that we sent */
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&confpkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&confpkt, &protpkt)) {
if (PACKET_remaining(&protpkt) != len)
continue;
if (memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_data(&protpkt), len) == 0) {
/* Valid protocol found */
valid = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!valid) {
/* The protocol sent from the server does not match one we advertised */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
s->s3.alpn_selected_len = 0;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.alpn_selected, len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
s->s3.alpn_selected_len = len;
if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
|| s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len != len
|| memcmp(s->session->ext.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected, len)
!= 0) {
/* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */
s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
/*
* This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have been
* initialised to NULL. We should update it with the selected ALPN.
*/
if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
}
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
unsigned int id, ct, mki;
int i;
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt;
SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id)
|| !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
return 0;
}
if (mki != 0) {
/* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
return 0;
}
/* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
if (clnt == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES);
return 0;
}
/*
* Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and
* presumably offered)
*/
for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); i++) {
prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
if (prof->id == id) {
s->srtp_profile = prof;
return 1;
}
}
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
return 0;
}
#endif
int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
/* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
&& s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
&& s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4
&& s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
&& s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12
&& s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_MAGMA
&& s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_KUZNYECHIK)
s->ext.use_etm = 1;
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
return 1;
s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
if (!s->hit)
s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
unsigned int version;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
/*
* The only protocol version we support which is valid in this extension in
* a ServerHello is TLSv1.3 therefore we shouldn't be getting anything else.
*/
if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
return 0;
}
/* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */
if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST)
return 1;
/* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */
s->version = version;
if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, version)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
unsigned int group_id;
PACKET encoded_pt;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3.tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
uint16_t valid_ks_id = 0;
size_t i;
/* Sanity check */
if (ckey == NULL || s->s3.peer_tmp != NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* Which group ID does the server want -> group_id */
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
/* RFC 8701: reject GREASE values selected by the server */
if (ossl_is_grease_value(group_id)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) {
const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
size_t num_groups;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
/*
* It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
* already sent in the first ClientHello
*/
for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.num_ks_pkey; i++) {
if (s->s3.tmp.ks_group_id[i] == group_id) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
}
/* Validate the selected group is one we support */
tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
if (group_id == pgroups[i])
break;
}
if (i >= num_groups
|| !tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)
|| !tls_valid_group(s, group_id, TLS1_3_VERSION, TLS1_3_VERSION,
NULL, NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
/* Memorize which groupID the server wants */
s->s3.group_id = group_id;
/* The initial keyshares are obsolete now, hence free memory */
for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.num_ks_pkey; i++) {
if (s->s3.tmp.ks_pkey[i] != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.ks_pkey[i]);
s->s3.tmp.ks_pkey[i] = NULL;
}
}
s->s3.tmp.num_ks_pkey = 0;
s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
return 1;
}
/*
* check that the group requested by the server is one we've
* sent a key share for, and if so: memorize which one
*/
for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.num_ks_pkey; i++) {
if (s->s3.tmp.ks_group_id[i] == group_id) {
valid_ks_id = group_id;
ckey = s->s3.tmp.ks_pkey[i];
s->s3.group_id = group_id;
s->s3.tmp.pkey = ckey;
break;
}
}
if (valid_ks_id == 0) {
/*
* This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
* key_share!
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
/* Retain this group in the SSL_SESSION */
if (!s->hit) {
s->session->kex_group = group_id;
} else if (group_id != s->session->kex_group) {
/*
* If this is a resumption but changed what group was used, we need
* to record the new group in the session, but the session is not
* a new session and could be in use by other threads. So, make
* a copy of the session to record the new information so that it's
* useful for any sessions resumed from tickets issued on this
* connection.
*/
SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
return 0;
}
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = new_sess;
s->session->kex_group = group_id;
}
if ((ginf = tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
group_id))
== NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt)
|| PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
if (!ginf->is_kem) {
/* Regular KEX */
skey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (skey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(skey, ckey) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
return 0;
}
if (tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))
<= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
return 0;
}
if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
return 0;
}
s->s3.peer_tmp = skey;
} else {
/* KEM Mode */
const unsigned char *ct = PACKET_data(&encoded_pt);
size_t ctlen = PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt);
if (ssl_decapsulate(s, ckey, ct, ctlen, 1) == 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
}
s->s3.did_kex = 1;
#endif
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
PACKET cookie;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)
|| !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie,
&s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
unsigned long max_early_data;
if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA);
return 0;
}
s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data;
if (SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s) && max_early_data != 0xffffffff) {
/*
* QUIC allows missing max_early_data, or a max_early_data value
* of 0xffffffff. Missing max_early_data is stored in the session
* as 0. This is indistinguishable in OpenSSL from a present
* max_early_data value that was 0. In order that later checks for
* invalid max_early_data correctly treat as an error the case where
* max_early_data is present and it is 0, we store any invalid
* value in the same (non-zero) way. Otherwise we would have to
* introduce a new flag just for this.
*/
s->session->ext.max_early_data = 1;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (!s->ext.early_data_ok
|| !s->hit) {
/*
* If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
* using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the
* server should not be accepting it.
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
unsigned int identity;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
if (identity >= (unsigned int)s->ext.tick_identity) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY);
return 0;
}
/*
* Session resumption tickets are always sent before PSK tickets. If the
* ticket index is 0 then it must be for a session resumption ticket if we
* sent two tickets, or if we didn't send a PSK ticket.
*/
if (identity == 0 && (s->psksession == NULL || s->ext.tick_identity == 2)) {
s->hit = 1;
SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
s->psksession = NULL;
return 1;
}
if (s->psksession == NULL) {
/* Should never happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
* If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret
* is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the
* early_secret across that we generated earlier.
*/
if ((s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
&& s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
|| s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0
|| s->psksession->ext.max_early_data == 0)
memcpy(s->early_secret, s->psksession->early_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = s->psksession;
s->psksession = NULL;
s->hit = 1;
/* Early data is only allowed if we used the first ticket */
if (identity != 0)
s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
#endif
return 1;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_client_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_NONE;
if (sc->client_cert_type == NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
ECH_SAME_EXT(sc, context, pkt)
#endif
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_client_cert_type)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, sc->client_cert_type, sc->client_cert_type_len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_GOOD;
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
int tls_parse_stoc_client_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
unsigned int type;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/* We did not send/ask for this */
if (!ossl_assert(sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos == OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_GOOD)) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/* We don't have this enabled */
if (sc->client_cert_type == NULL) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/* Given back a value we didn't configure */
if (memchr(sc->client_cert_type, type, sc->client_cert_type_len) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_VALUE);
return 0;
}
sc->ext.client_cert_type = type;
return 1;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
sc->ext.server_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_NONE;
if (sc->server_cert_type == NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
ECH_SAME_EXT(sc, context, pkt)
#endif
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_cert_type)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, sc->server_cert_type, sc->server_cert_type_len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
sc->ext.server_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_GOOD;
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
int tls_parse_stoc_server_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
unsigned int type;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/* We did not send/ask for this */
if (!ossl_assert(sc->ext.server_cert_type_ctos == OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_GOOD)) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/* We don't have this enabled */
if (sc->server_cert_type == NULL) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/* Given back a value we didn't configure */
if (memchr(sc->server_cert_type, type, sc->server_cert_type_len) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_VALUE);
return 0;
}
sc->ext.server_cert_type = type;
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ech(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
int rv = 0, hpke_mode = OSSL_HPKE_MODE_BASE;
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
OSSL_ECHSTORE_ENTRY *ee = NULL;
OSSL_HPKE_SUITE hpke_suite = OSSL_HPKE_SUITE_DEFAULT;
unsigned char config_id_to_use = 0x00, info[OSSL_ECH_MAX_INFO_LEN];
unsigned char *encoded = NULL, *mypub = NULL;
size_t cipherlen = 0, aad_len = 0, lenclen = 0, mypub_len = 0;
size_t info_len = OSSL_ECH_MAX_INFO_LEN, clear_len = 0, encoded_len = 0;
/* whether or not we've been asked to GREASE, one way or another */
int grease_opt_set = (s->ext.ech.attempted != 1
&& ((s->ext.ech.grease == OSSL_ECH_IS_GREASE)
|| ((s->options & SSL_OP_ECH_GREASE) != 0)));
/* if we're not doing real ECH and not GREASEing then exit */
if (s->ext.ech.attempted_type != TLSEXT_TYPE_ech && grease_opt_set == 0)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/* send grease if not really attempting ECH */
if (grease_opt_set == 1) {
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
&& s->ext.ech.sent != NULL) {
/* re-tx already sent GREASEy ECH */
if (WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->ext.ech.sent,
s->ext.ech.sent_len)
!= 1) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
/* if nobody set a type, use the default */
if (s->ext.ech.attempted_type == OSSL_ECH_type_unknown)
s->ext.ech.attempted_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_ech;
if (ossl_ech_send_grease(s, pkt) != 1) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
/* For the inner CH - we simply include one of these saying "inner" */
if (s->ext.ech.ch_depth == 1) {
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ech)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, OSSL_ECH_INNER_CH_TYPE)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
/*
* If not GREASEing we prepare sending the outer value - after the
* entire thing has been constructed, putting in zeros for now where
* we'd otherwise include ECH ciphertext, we later encode and encrypt.
* We need to do it that way as we need the rest of the outer CH to
* be known and used as AAD input before we do encryption.
*/
if (s->ext.ech.ch_depth != 0)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/* Make ClientHelloInner and EncodedClientHelloInner as per spec. */
if (ossl_ech_encode_inner(s, &encoded, &encoded_len) != 1) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->ext.ech.encoded_inner = encoded;
s->ext.ech.encoded_inner_len = encoded_len;
#ifdef OSSL_ECH_SUPERVERBOSE
ossl_ech_pbuf("encoded inner CH", encoded, encoded_len);
#endif
rv = ossl_ech_pick_matching_cfg(s, &ee, &hpke_suite);
if (rv != 1 || ee == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->ext.ech.attempted_type = ee->version;
OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS)
{
BIO_printf(trc_out, "EAAE: selected: version: %4x, config %2x\n",
ee->version, ee->config_id);
}
OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
config_id_to_use = ee->config_id; /* if requested, use a random config_id instead */
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ECH_IGNORE_CID) != 0) {
int max_iters = 1000, i = 0;
/* rejection sample to get a different but random config_id */
while (config_id_to_use == ee->config_id) {
#ifdef OSSL_ECH_SUPERVERBOSE
if (i > 0) {
OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS)
{
BIO_printf(trc_out, "EAAE: rejected random-config %02x\n",
config_id_to_use);
}
OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
}
#endif
if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, &config_id_to_use, 1, 0) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (i++ >= max_iters) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
#ifdef OSSL_ECH_SUPERVERBOSE
ossl_ech_pbuf("EAAE: random config_id", &config_id_to_use, 1);
#endif
}
s->ext.ech.attempted_cid = config_id_to_use;
#ifdef OSSL_ECH_SUPERVERBOSE
ossl_ech_pbuf("EAAE: peer pub", ee->pub, ee->pub_len);
ossl_ech_pbuf("EAAE: clear", encoded, encoded_len);
ossl_ech_pbuf("EAAE: ECHConfig", ee->encoded, ee->encoded_len);
#endif
/*
* The AAD is the full outer client hello but with the correct number of
* zeros for where the ECH ciphertext octets will later be placed. So we
* add the ECH extension to the |pkt| but with zeros for ciphertext, that
* forms up the AAD, then after we've encrypted, we'll splice in the actual
* ciphertext.
* Watch out for the "4" offsets that remove the type and 3-octet length
* from the encoded CH as per the spec.
*/
clear_len = ossl_ech_calc_padding(s, ee, encoded_len);
if (clear_len == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
lenclen = OSSL_HPKE_get_public_encap_size(hpke_suite);
if (s->ext.ech.hpke_ctx == NULL) { /* 1st CH */
if (ossl_ech_make_enc_info(ee->encoded, ee->encoded_len,
info, &info_len)
!= 1) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#ifdef OSSL_ECH_SUPERVERBOSE
ossl_ech_pbuf("EAAE info", info, info_len);
#endif
s->ext.ech.hpke_ctx = OSSL_HPKE_CTX_new(hpke_mode, hpke_suite,
OSSL_HPKE_ROLE_SENDER,
sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
if (s->ext.ech.hpke_ctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
mypub = OPENSSL_malloc(lenclen);
if (mypub == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
mypub_len = lenclen;
rv = OSSL_HPKE_encap(s->ext.ech.hpke_ctx, mypub, &mypub_len,
ee->pub, ee->pub_len, info, info_len);
if (rv != 1) {
OPENSSL_free(mypub);
mypub = NULL;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->ext.ech.pub = mypub;
s->ext.ech.pub_len = mypub_len;
} else { /* HRR - retrieve public */
mypub = s->ext.ech.pub;
mypub_len = s->ext.ech.pub_len;
if (mypub == NULL || mypub_len == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
#ifdef OSSL_ECH_SUPERVERBOSE
ossl_ech_pbuf("EAAE: mypub", mypub, mypub_len);
WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &aad_len); /* use aad_len for tracing */
ossl_ech_pbuf("EAAE pkt b4", WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - aad_len, aad_len);
#endif
cipherlen = OSSL_HPKE_get_ciphertext_size(hpke_suite, clear_len);
if (cipherlen <= clear_len || cipherlen > OSSL_ECH_MAX_PAYLOAD_LEN) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
goto err;
}
s->ext.ech.clearlen = clear_len;
s->ext.ech.cipherlen = cipherlen;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ech)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, OSSL_ECH_OUTER_CH_TYPE)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, hpke_suite.kdf_id)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, hpke_suite.aead_id)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, config_id_to_use)
|| (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
&& !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0x00)) /* no pub */
|| (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_PENDING
&& !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, mypub, mypub_len))
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &s->ext.ech.cipher_offset)
|| !WPACKET_memset(pkt, 0, cipherlen)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* don't count the type + 3-octet length */
s->ext.ech.cipher_offset -= 4;
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
err:
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/* if the server thinks we GREASE'd then we may get an ECHConfigList */
int tls_parse_stoc_ech(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
size_t rlen = 0;
const unsigned char *rval = NULL;
unsigned char *srval = NULL;
PACKET rcfgs_pkt;
/*
* An HRR will have an ECH extension with the 8-octet confirmation value.
* Store it away for when we check it later
*/
if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != OSSL_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
s->ext.ech.hrrsignal_p = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(pkt);
memcpy(s->ext.ech.hrrsignal, s->ext.ech.hrrsignal_p,
OSSL_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN);
return 1;
}
/* otherwise we expect retry-configs */
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &rcfgs_pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
rval = PACKET_data(&rcfgs_pkt);
rlen = (unsigned int)PACKET_remaining(&rcfgs_pkt);
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.ech.returned);
s->ext.ech.returned = NULL;
srval = OPENSSL_malloc(rlen + 2);
if (srval == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
srval[0] = (rlen >> 8) & 0xff;
srval[1] = rlen & 0xff;
memcpy(srval + 2, rval, rlen);
s->ext.ech.returned = srval;
s->ext.ech.returned_len = rlen + 2;
return 1;
}
#endif /* END_OPENSSL_NO_ECH */
/*
* RFC 8701 GREASE extension constructors. Each writes an empty extension
* whose type is a GREASE value (0x?A?A pattern).
*/
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_grease1(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
uint16_t grease_type;
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_GREASE) || s->server)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
grease_type = ossl_grease_value(s, OSSL_GREASE_EXT1);
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, grease_type)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_grease2(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
uint16_t grease_type;
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_GREASE) || s->server)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
grease_type = ossl_grease_value(s, OSSL_GREASE_EXT2);
/*
* RFC 8701 recommends "varying length and contents" for GREASE
* extensions. Extension 1 is empty; extension 2 carries one zero byte
* so that servers are tested against both empty and non-empty unknown
* extensions. This mirrors the BoringSSL behaviour.
*/
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, grease_type)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}