Google Git
Sign in
flutter/third_party/openssl/refs/heads/upstream/master/./ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
blob: 29be982383ddb0fc3b5d1e390f2ef05e342545db [file] [log] [blame] [edit]
/*
* Copyright 2016-2026 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#include "../ssl_local.h"
#include "statem_local.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/trace.h>
#endif
#define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION 1
#define MAX_SUPPORTED_GROUPS 128
#define MAX_KEY_SHARES 16
/*
* 2 bytes for packet length, 2 bytes for format version, 2 bytes for
* protocol version, 2 bytes for group id, 2 bytes for cipher id, 1 byte for
* key_share present flag, 8 bytes for timestamp, 2 bytes for the hashlen,
* EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE for transcript hash, 1 byte for app cookie length, app cookie
* length bytes, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes for the HMAC of the whole thing.
*/
#define MAX_COOKIE_SIZE (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 8 + 2 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + 1 \
+ SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
/*
* Message header + 2 bytes for protocol version + number of random bytes +
* + 1 byte for legacy session id length + number of bytes in legacy session id
* + 2 bytes for ciphersuite + 1 byte for legacy compression
* + 2 bytes for extension block length + 6 bytes for key_share extension
* + 4 bytes for cookie extension header + the number of bytes in the cookie
*/
#define MAX_HRR_SIZE (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 \
+ SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH + 2 + 1 + 2 + 6 + 4 \
+ MAX_COOKIE_SIZE)
/*
* Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
*/
int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
unsigned int ilen;
const unsigned char *data;
int ok;
/* Parse the length byte */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
return 0;
}
/* Check that the extension matches */
if (ilen != s->s3.previous_client_finished_len) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
ok = memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
s->s3.previous_client_finished_len);
#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
if (ok) {
if ((data[0] ^ s->s3.previous_client_finished[0]) != 0xFF) {
ok = 0;
}
}
#endif
if (ok) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
return 1;
}
/*-
* The servername extension is treated as follows:
*
* - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
* - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
* in which case an fatal alert is generated.
* - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
* - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
* to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
* - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
* it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
* Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
* set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
* case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
* a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
* presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
* the value of the Host: field.
* - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
* if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
* session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
* extension.
* - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
*/
int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
unsigned int servname_type;
PACKET sni, hostname;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni)
/* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
|| PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/*
* Although the intent was for server_name to be extensible, RFC 4366
* was not clear about it; and so OpenSSL among other implementations,
* always and only allows a 'host_name' name types.
* RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
* is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
* SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
*
* Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
* i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
*/
if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
|| servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
|| !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/*
* In TLSv1.2 and below the SNI is associated with the session. In TLSv1.3
* we always use the SNI value from the handshake.
*/
if (!s->hit || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/*
* Store the requested SNI in the SSL as temporary storage.
* If we accept it, it will get stored in the SSL_SESSION as well.
*/
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname);
s->ext.hostname = NULL;
if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->ext.hostname)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->servername_done = 1;
} else {
/*
* In TLSv1.2 and below we should check if the SNI is consistent between
* the initial handshake and the resumption. In TLSv1.3 SNI is not
* associated with the session.
*/
s->servername_done = (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL)
&& PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname,
strlen(s->session->ext.hostname));
}
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
unsigned int value;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/* Received |value| should be a valid max-fragment-length code. */
if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_R_TLS_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
/*
* When doing a full handshake or a renegotiation max_fragment_len_mode will
* be TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_UNSPECIFIED
*
* In case of a resumption max_fragment_len_mode will be one of
* TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED, TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_512,
* TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_1024, TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_2048.
* TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_4096
*
* RFC 6066: The negotiated length applies for the duration of the session
* including session resumptions.
*
* So we only set the value in case it is unspecified.
*/
if (s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode == TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_UNSPECIFIED)
/*
* Store it in session, so it'll become binding for us
* and we'll include it in a next Server Hello.
*/
s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
PACKET srp_I;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I)
|| PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#endif
int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
PACKET ec_point_format_list;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list)
|| PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
&s->ext.peer_ecpointformats,
&s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb && !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s), PACKET_data(pkt), (int)PACKET_remaining(pkt), s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
ossl_unused unsigned int context,
ossl_unused X509 *x,
ossl_unused size_t chainidx)
{
PACKET supported_sig_algs;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
|| PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/*
* We use this routine on both clients and servers, and when clients
* get asked for PHA we need to always save the sigalgs regardless
* of whether it was a resumption or not.
*/
if ((!s->server || (s->server && !s->hit))
&& !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 1)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
PACKET supported_sig_algs;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
|| PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/*
* We use this routine on both clients and servers, and when clients
* get asked for PHA we need to always save the sigalgs regardless
* of whether it was a resumption or not.
*/
if ((!s->server || (s->server && !s->hit))
&& !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
/* We ignore this in a resumption handshake */
if (s->hit)
return 1;
/* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */
if (x != NULL)
return 1;
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
/*
* We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
*/
s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
return 1;
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &responder_id_list)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/*
* We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
* to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
*/
sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
return 0;
}
} else {
s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
OCSP_RESPID *id;
PACKET responder_id;
const unsigned char *id_data;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id)
|| PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
(int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
if (id == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
/* Read in request_extensions */
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts,
X509_EXTENSION_free);
s->ext.ocsp.exts = d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
/*
* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
* renegotiation.
*/
if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
s->s3.npn_seen = 1;
return 1;
}
#endif
/*
* Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN
* extension, not including type and length. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
*/
int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
return 1;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
|| PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
do {
/* Protocol names can't be empty. */
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
|| PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
} while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_proposed);
s->s3.alpn_proposed = NULL;
s->s3.alpn_proposed_len = 0;
if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
&s->s3.alpn_proposed, &s->s3.alpn_proposed_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
unsigned int ct, mki_len, id;
int i, srtp_pref;
PACKET subpkt;
SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
/* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */
if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl) == NULL)
return 1;
/* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
return 0;
}
srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl);
s->srtp_profile = NULL;
/* Search all profiles for a match initially */
srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
return 0;
}
/*
* Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
* current match.
* If no profiles have been have been configured then this
* does nothing.
*/
for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) {
SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
if (sprof->id == id) {
s->srtp_profile = sprof;
srtp_pref = i;
break;
}
}
}
/* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#endif
int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
s->ext.use_etm = 1;
return 1;
}
/*
* Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
* the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
*/
int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
PACKET psk_kex_modes;
unsigned int mode;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes)
|| PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) {
if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE
&& (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX) != 0)
s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
}
if (((s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) != 0)
&& (s->options & SSL_OP_PREFER_NO_DHE_KEX) != 0) {
/*
* If NO_DHE is supported and preferred, then we only remember this
* mode. DHE PSK will not be used for sure, because in any case where
* it would be supported (i.e. if a key share is present), NO_DHE would
* be supported as well. As the latter is preferred it would be
* chosen. By removing DHE PSK here, we don't have to deal with the
* SSL_OP_PREFER_NO_DHE_KEX option in any other place.
*/
s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
}
#endif
return 1;
}
/*
* Use function tls_parse_ctos_key_share with helper functions extract_keyshares,
* check_overlap and tls_accept_ksgroup to parse the key_share extension(s)
* received in the ClientHello and to select the group used of the key exchange
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
/*
* Accept a key share group by setting the related variables in s->s3 and
* by generating a pubkey for this group
*/
static int tls_accept_ksgroup(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t ksgroup, PACKET *encoded_pubkey)
{
/* Accept the key share group */
s->s3.group_id = ksgroup;
s->s3.group_id_candidate = ksgroup;
/* Cache the selected group ID in the SSL_SESSION */
s->session->kex_group = ksgroup;
if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, ksgroup)) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s,
SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
if (tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(s->s3.peer_tmp,
PACKET_data(encoded_pubkey),
PACKET_remaining(encoded_pubkey))
<= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#define GROUPLIST_INCREMENT 32 /* Memory allocation chunk size (nominally 64 Bytes chunks) */
typedef enum KS_EXTRACTION_RESULT {
EXTRACTION_FAILURE,
EXTRACTION_SUCCESS,
EXTRACTION_SUCCESS_HRR
} KS_EXTRACTION_RESULT;
static KS_EXTRACTION_RESULT extract_keyshares(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *key_share_list,
const uint16_t *clntgroups, size_t clnt_num_groups,
const uint16_t *srvrgroups, size_t srvr_num_groups,
uint16_t **keyshares_arr, PACKET **encoded_pubkey_arr,
size_t *keyshares_cnt)
{
PACKET encoded_pubkey;
size_t key_share_pos = 0;
size_t previous_key_share_pos = 0;
unsigned int group_id = 0;
unsigned int i;
/*
* Theoretically there is no limit on the number of keyshares as long as
* they are less than 2^16 bytes in total. It costs us something for each
* keyshare to confirm the groups are valid, so we restrict this to a
* sensible number (MAX_KEY_SHARES == 16). Any keyshares over this limit are
* simply ignored.
*/
/* Prepare memory to hold the extracted key share groups and related pubkeys */
*keyshares_arr = OPENSSL_malloc_array(MAX_KEY_SHARES,
sizeof(**keyshares_arr));
if (*keyshares_arr == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto failure;
}
*encoded_pubkey_arr = OPENSSL_malloc_array(MAX_KEY_SHARES,
sizeof(**encoded_pubkey_arr));
if (*encoded_pubkey_arr == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto failure;
}
/*
* We limit the number of key shares we are willing to process to
* MAX_KEY_SHARES regardless of whether we include them in keyshares_arr or
* not.
*/
for (i = 0; PACKET_remaining(key_share_list) > 0 && i < MAX_KEY_SHARES; i++) {
/* Get the group_id for the current share and its encoded_pubkey */
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(key_share_list, &group_id)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(key_share_list, &encoded_pubkey)
|| PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pubkey) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto failure;
}
/*
* If we sent an HRR then the key_share sent back MUST be for the group
* we requested, and must be the only key_share sent.
*/
if (s->s3.group_id != 0
&& (group_id != s->s3.group_id
|| PACKET_remaining(key_share_list) != 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
goto failure;
}
/*
* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client
* RFC 8446 also mandates that clients send keyshares in the same
* order as listed in the supported groups extension, but its not
* required that the server check that, and some clients violate this
* so instead of failing the connection when that occurs, log a trace
* message indicating the client discrepancy.
*/
if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 0, &key_share_pos)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
goto failure;
}
if (key_share_pos < previous_key_share_pos)
OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "key share group id %d is out of RFC 8446 order\n", group_id);
previous_key_share_pos = key_share_pos;
if (s->s3.group_id != 0) {
/*
* We have sent a HRR, and the key share we got back is
* the one we expected and is the only key share and is
* in the list of supported_groups (checked
* above already), hence we accept this key share group
*/
if (!tls_accept_ksgroup(s, s->s3.group_id, &encoded_pubkey))
goto failure; /* SSLfatal already called */
/* We have selected a key share group via HRR, hence we're done here */
return EXTRACTION_SUCCESS_HRR;
}
/*
* We tolerate but ignore a group id that we don't think is
* suitable for TLSv1.3 or which is not supported by the server
*/
if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrgroups, srvr_num_groups, 1, NULL)
|| !tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)
|| !tls_valid_group(s, group_id, TLS1_3_VERSION, TLS1_3_VERSION,
NULL, NULL)) {
/* Share not suitable or not supported, check next share */
continue;
}
/* Memorize this key share group ID and its encoded point */
(*keyshares_arr)[*keyshares_cnt] = group_id;
(*encoded_pubkey_arr)[(*keyshares_cnt)++] = encoded_pubkey;
}
return EXTRACTION_SUCCESS;
failure:
/* Fatal error -> free any allocated memory and return 0 */
OPENSSL_free(*keyshares_arr);
OPENSSL_free(*encoded_pubkey_arr);
return EXTRACTION_FAILURE;
}
#endif
/*
* For each group in the priority list of groups, check if that group is
* also present in the secondary list; if so, select the first overlap and
* assign to selected_group and also set the related index in the candidate group list,
* or set selected_group to 0 if no overlap
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
static void check_overlap(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
const uint16_t *prio_groups, size_t prio_num_groups,
const uint16_t *candidate_groups, size_t candidate_num_groups,
int *prio_group_idx, int *candidate_group_idx,
uint16_t *selected_group)
{
uint16_t current_group;
size_t group_idx = prio_num_groups;
size_t new_group_idx = 0;
*candidate_group_idx = 0;
*prio_group_idx = 0;
*selected_group = 0;
for (current_group = 0; current_group < candidate_num_groups; current_group++) {
if (!check_in_list(s, candidate_groups[current_group], prio_groups,
prio_num_groups, 1, &new_group_idx)
|| !tls_group_allowed(s, candidate_groups[current_group],
SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)
|| !tls_valid_group(s, candidate_groups[current_group], TLS1_3_VERSION,
TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL))
/* No overlap or group not suitable, check next group */
continue;
/*
* is the found new_group_idx earlier in the priority list than
* initial or last group_idx?
*/
if (new_group_idx < group_idx) {
group_idx = new_group_idx;
*candidate_group_idx = current_group;
*prio_group_idx = (int)group_idx;
*selected_group = prio_groups[group_idx];
}
}
}
#endif
int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
PACKET key_share_list;
const uint16_t *clntgroups, *srvrgroups;
const size_t *srvrtuples;
uint16_t *first_group_in_tuple;
size_t clnt_num_groups, srvr_num_groups, srvr_num_tuples;
PACKET *encoded_pubkey_arr = NULL;
uint16_t *keyshares_arr = NULL;
size_t keyshares_cnt = 0;
/* We conservatively assume that we did not find a suitable group */
uint16_t group_id_candidate = 0;
KS_EXTRACTION_RESULT ks_extraction_result;
size_t current_tuple;
int ret = 0;
s->s3.group_id_candidate = 0;
if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0)
return 1;
/* Sanity check */
if (s->s3.peer_tmp != NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
/* Get list of server supported groups and the group tuples */
tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &srvrgroups, &srvr_num_groups);
tls1_get_group_tuples(s, &srvrtuples, &srvr_num_tuples);
/* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups);
if (clnt_num_groups == 0) {
/*
* This can only happen if the supported_groups extension was not sent,
* because we verify that the length is non-zero when we process that
* extension.
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION,
SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (s->s3.group_id != 0 && PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) == 0) {
/*
* If we set a group_id already, then we must have sent an HRR
* requesting a new key_share. If we haven't got one then that is an
* error
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
/* We parse the key share extension and memorize the entries (after some checks) */
ks_extraction_result = extract_keyshares(s,
&key_share_list,
clntgroups, clnt_num_groups,
srvrgroups, srvr_num_groups,
&keyshares_arr, &encoded_pubkey_arr,
&keyshares_cnt);
if (ks_extraction_result == EXTRACTION_FAILURE) /* Fatal error during tests */
return 0; /* Memory already freed and SSLfatal already called */
if (ks_extraction_result == EXTRACTION_SUCCESS_HRR) /* Successful HRR */
goto end;
/*
* We now have the following lists available to make a decision for
* which group the server should use for key exchange :
* From client: clntgroups[clnt_num_groups],
* keyshares_arr[keyshares_cnt], encoded_pubkey_arr[keyshares_cnt]
* From server: srvrgroups[srvr_num_groups], srvrtuples[srvr_num_tuples]
*
* Group selection algorithm:
* For all tuples do:
* key share group(s) overlapping with current tuple?
* --> Yes: accept group_id for SH
* --> No: is any of the client supported_groups overlapping with current tuple?
* --> Yes: memorize group_id for HRR, break
* --> No: continue to check next tuple
*
* Remark: Selection priority different for client- or server-preference
*/
first_group_in_tuple = (uint16_t *)srvrgroups;
for (current_tuple = 0; current_tuple < srvr_num_tuples; current_tuple++) {
size_t number_of_groups_in_tuple = srvrtuples[current_tuple];
int prio_group_idx = 0, candidate_group_idx = 0;
/* Server or client preference ? */
if (s->options & SSL_OP_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
/* Server preference */
/* Is there overlap with a key share group? */
check_overlap(s,
first_group_in_tuple, number_of_groups_in_tuple,
keyshares_arr, keyshares_cnt,
&prio_group_idx, &candidate_group_idx,
&group_id_candidate);
if (group_id_candidate > 0) { /* Overlap found -> accept the key share group */
if (!tls_accept_ksgroup(s, group_id_candidate,
&encoded_pubkey_arr[candidate_group_idx]))
goto err; /* SSLfatal already called */
/* We have all info for a SH, hence we're done here */
goto end;
} else {
/*
* There's no overlap with a key share, but is there at least a client
* supported_group overlapping with the current tuple?
*/
check_overlap(s,
first_group_in_tuple, number_of_groups_in_tuple,
clntgroups, clnt_num_groups,
&prio_group_idx, &candidate_group_idx,
&group_id_candidate);
if (group_id_candidate > 0) {
/*
* We did not have a key share overlap, but at least the supported
* groups overlap hence we can stop searching
* (and report group_id_candidate 'upward' for HRR)
*/
s->s3.group_id_candidate = group_id_candidate;
goto end;
} else {
/*
* Neither key share nor supported_groups overlap current
* tuple, hence we try the next tuple
*/
first_group_in_tuple = &first_group_in_tuple[number_of_groups_in_tuple];
continue;
}
}
} else { /* We have client preference */
check_overlap(s,
keyshares_arr, keyshares_cnt,
first_group_in_tuple, number_of_groups_in_tuple,
&prio_group_idx, &candidate_group_idx,
&group_id_candidate);
if (group_id_candidate > 0) {
if (!tls_accept_ksgroup(s, group_id_candidate, &encoded_pubkey_arr[prio_group_idx]))
goto err;
goto end;
} else {
check_overlap(s,
clntgroups, clnt_num_groups,
first_group_in_tuple, number_of_groups_in_tuple,
&prio_group_idx, &candidate_group_idx,
&group_id_candidate);
if (group_id_candidate > 0) {
s->s3.group_id_candidate = group_id_candidate;
goto end;
} else {
first_group_in_tuple = &first_group_in_tuple[number_of_groups_in_tuple];
continue;
}
}
}
}
end:
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(keyshares_arr);
OPENSSL_free(encoded_pubkey_arr);
return ret;
#endif
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_ctos_cookie(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
unsigned int format, version, key_share, group_id;
EVP_MD_CTX *hctx;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
PACKET cookie, raw, chhash, appcookie;
WPACKET hrrpkt;
const unsigned char *data, *mdin, *ciphdata;
unsigned char hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char hrr[MAX_HRR_SIZE];
size_t rawlen, hmaclen, hrrlen, ciphlen;
uint64_t tm, now;
SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
/* Ignore any cookie if we're not set up to verify it */
if (sctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL
|| (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
return 1;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
raw = cookie;
data = PACKET_data(&raw);
rawlen = PACKET_remaining(&raw);
if (rawlen < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
|| !PACKET_forward(&raw, rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
mdin = PACKET_data(&raw);
/* Verify the HMAC of the cookie */
hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(sctx->libctx, "HMAC",
sctx->propq,
s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key));
if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
return 0;
}
hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(hctx, NULL, "SHA2-256", sctx->libctx,
sctx->propq, pkey, NULL)
<= 0
|| EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, data,
rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
<= 0
|| hmaclen != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(hmac, mdin, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &format)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
/* Check the cookie format is something we recognise. Ignore it if not */
if (format != COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
return 1;
/*
* The rest of these checks really shouldn't fail since we have verified the
* HMAC above.
*/
/* Check the version number is sane */
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &version)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &group_id)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
ciphdata = PACKET_data(&cookie);
if (!PACKET_forward(&cookie, 2)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
if (group_id != s->s3.group_id
|| s->s3.tmp.new_cipher
!= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, ciphdata, 0)) {
/*
* We chose a different cipher or group id this time around to what is
* in the cookie. Something must have changed.
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_1(&cookie, &key_share)
|| !PACKET_get_net_8(&cookie, &tm)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&cookie, &chhash)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cookie, &appcookie)
|| PACKET_remaining(&cookie) != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
/* We tolerate a cookie age of up to 10 minutes (= 60 * 10 seconds) */
now = time(NULL);
if (tm > now || (now - tm) > 600) {
/* Cookie is stale. Ignore it */
return 1;
}
/* Verify the app cookie */
if (sctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s),
PACKET_data(&appcookie),
PACKET_remaining(&appcookie))
== 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
/*
* Reconstruct the HRR that we would have sent in response to the original
* ClientHello so we can add it to the transcript hash.
* Note: This won't work with custom HRR extensions
*/
if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&hrrpkt, hrr, sizeof(hrr), 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&hrrpkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLS1_2_VERSION)
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(&hrrpkt, hrrrandom, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&hrrpkt, s->tmp_session_id,
s->tmp_session_id_len)
|| !ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, &hrrpkt,
&ciphlen)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, 0)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)) {
WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->version)
|| !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (key_share) {
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->s3.group_id)
|| !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(&hrrpkt, data, rawlen)
|| !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* cookie extension */
|| !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* extension block */
|| !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* message */
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(&hrrpkt, &hrrlen)
|| !WPACKET_finish(&hrrpkt)) {
WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* Reconstruct the transcript hash */
if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, PACKET_data(&chhash),
PACKET_remaining(&chhash), hrr,
hrrlen)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
/* Act as if this ClientHello came after a HelloRetryRequest */
s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
s->ext.cookieok = 1;
#endif
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
PACKET supported_groups_list;
/* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list)
|| PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
|| (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_supportedgroups);
s->ext.peer_supportedgroups = NULL;
s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len = 0;
/*
* We only pay attention to the first 128 supported groups and ignore
* any beyond that limit. Theoretically this could cause problems if
* the client also uses one of these groups (say in a key share extension)
* - but why would any valid client be sending such a huge supported
* groups list?
*/
if (!tls1_save_u16(&supported_groups_list,
&s->ext.peer_supportedgroups,
&s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len, MAX_SUPPORTED_GROUPS)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
/* The extension must always be empty */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
return 1;
s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
return 1;
}
int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_stateful_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *tick,
SSL_SESSION **sess)
{
SSL_SESSION *tmpsess = NULL;
s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
switch (PACKET_remaining(tick)) {
case 0:
return SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
case SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH:
break;
default:
return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
}
tmpsess = lookup_sess_in_cache(s, PACKET_data(tick),
SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
if (tmpsess == NULL)
return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
*sess = tmpsess;
return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
}
int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
PACKET identities, binders, binder;
size_t binderoffset;
int hashsize;
SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
unsigned int id, i, ext = 0;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
SSL *ussl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s);
/*
* If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so
* ignore this extension
*/
if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode
& (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE))
== 0)
return 1;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) {
PACKET identity;
unsigned long ticket_agel;
size_t idlen;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity)
|| !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
idlen = PACKET_remaining(&identity);
if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL
&& !s->psk_find_session_cb(ussl, PACKET_data(&identity), idlen,
&sess)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (sess == NULL
&& s->psk_server_callback != NULL
&& idlen <= PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
char *pskid = NULL;
unsigned char pskdata[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
unsigned int pskdatalen;
if (!PACKET_strndup(&identity, &pskid)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
pskdatalen = s->psk_server_callback(ussl, pskid, pskdata,
sizeof(pskdata));
OPENSSL_free(pskid);
if (pskdatalen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
} else if (pskdatalen > 0) {
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
/*
* We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
* the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
*/
cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
if (cipher == NULL) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
sess = SSL_SESSION_new();
if (sess == NULL
|| !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(sess, pskdata,
pskdatalen)
|| !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(sess, cipher)
|| !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(sess,
TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
if (sess != NULL) {
/* We found a PSK */
SSL_SESSION *sesstmp = ssl_session_dup(sess, 0);
if (sesstmp == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
sess = sesstmp;
/*
* We've just been told to use this session for this context so
* make sure the sid_ctx matches up.
*/
memcpy(sess->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
sess->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
ext = 1;
if (id == 0)
s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
} else {
OSSL_TIME t, age, expire;
int ret;
/*
* If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
* SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
* is no point in using full stateless tickets.
*/
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
|| (s->max_early_data > 0
&& (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))
ret = tls_get_stateful_ticket(s, &identity, &sess);
else
ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0,
&sess);
if (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
|| ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (ret == SSL_TICKET_NONE || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
continue;
/* Check for replay */
if (s->max_early_data > 0
&& (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0
&& !SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, sess)) {
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
sess = NULL;
continue;
}
age = ossl_time_subtract(ossl_ms2time(ticket_agel),
ossl_ms2time(sess->ext.tick_age_add));
t = ossl_time_subtract(ossl_time_now(), sess->time);
/*
* Although internally we use OSS_TIME which has ns granularity,
* when SSL_SESSION structures are serialised/deserialised we use
* second granularity for the sess->time field. Therefore it could
* appear that the client's ticket age is longer than ours (our
* ticket age calculation should always be slightly longer than the
* client's due to the network latency). Therefore we add 1000ms to
* our age calculation to adjust for rounding errors.
*/
expire = ossl_time_add(t, ossl_ms2time(1000));
if (id == 0
&& ossl_time_compare(sess->timeout, t) >= 0
&& ossl_time_compare(age, expire) <= 0
&& ossl_time_compare(ossl_time_add(age, TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE),
expire)
>= 0) {
/*
* Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it
* for early data
*/
s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
}
}
md = ssl_md(sctx, sess->cipher->algorithm2);
if (md == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_MD_is_a(md,
EVP_MD_get0_name(ssl_md(sctx,
s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)))) {
/* The ciphersuite is not compatible with this session. */
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
sess = NULL;
s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
continue;
}
break;
}
if (sess == NULL)
return 1;
binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - PACKET_msg_start(pkt);
hashsize = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
if (hashsize <= 0)
goto err;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
goto err;
}
for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) {
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
goto err;
}
}
if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != (size_t)hashsize) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
goto err;
}
if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, PACKET_msg_start(pkt), binderoffset,
PACKET_data(&binder), NULL, sess, 0, ext)
!= 1) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
s->ext.tick_identity = id;
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = sess;
return 1;
err:
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
return 0;
}
int tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
ossl_unused unsigned int context,
ossl_unused X509 *x,
ossl_unused size_t chainidx)
{
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
SSL_R_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_ENCODING_ERR);
return 0;
}
s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
return 1;
}
/*
* Add the server's renegotiation binding
*/
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
if (!s->s3.send_connection_binding)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/* Still add this even if SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is set */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.previous_server_finished,
s->s3.previous_server_finished_len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
if (s->servername_done != 1)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/*
* Prior to TLSv1.3 we ignore any SNI in the current handshake if resuming.
* We just use the servername from the initial handshake.
*/
if (s->hit && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
/* Add/include the server's max fragment len extension into ServerHello */
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
if (!USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session))
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/*-
* 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
* 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
*/
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
unsigned long alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
&& (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats != NULL);
const unsigned char *plist;
size_t plistlen;
if (!using_ecc)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
const uint16_t *groups;
size_t numgroups, i, first = 1;
int version;
/* s->s3.group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */
if (s->s3.group_id == 0)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/* Get our list of supported groups */
tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &numgroups);
if (numgroups == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/* Copy group ID if supported */
version = SSL_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
for (i = 0; i < numgroups; i++) {
uint16_t group = groups[i];
if (tls_valid_group(s, group, version, version, NULL, NULL)
&& tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
if (first) {
/*
* Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If
* so we don't need to add this extension
*/
if (s->s3.group_id == group)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/* Add extension header */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
/* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
first = 0;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, group)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
OCSP_RESPONSE *resp;
/* We don't currently support this extension inside a CertificateRequest */
if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!s->ext.status_expected)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/* Try to retrieve OCSP response for the actual certificate */
resp = ossl_get_ocsp_response(s, (int)chainidx);
/* If no OCSP response was found the extension is not sent */
if (resp == NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/*
* In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we
* send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a
* separate message
*/
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
&& !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, resp, pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
const unsigned char *npa;
unsigned int npalen;
int ret;
int npn_seen = s->s3.npn_seen;
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
s->s3.npn_seen = 0;
if (!npn_seen || sctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
ret = sctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s), &npa,
&npalen, sctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg);
if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
s->s3.npn_seen = 1;
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
#endif
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3.alpn_selected,
s->s3.alpn_selected_len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
if (s->srtp_profile == NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (!s->ext.use_etm)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/*
* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
* for other cases too.
*/
if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
|| s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
|| s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
|| s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12
|| s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_MAGMA
|| s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_KUZNYECHIK) {
s->ext.use_etm = 0;
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
if (!ossl_assert(SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
unsigned char *encoded_pubkey;
size_t encoded_pubkey_len = 0;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3.peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
if (ckey != NULL) {
/* Original key_share was acceptable so don't ask for another one */
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
if (ckey == NULL) {
/* No key_share received from client - must be resuming */
if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0) {
/*
* PSK ('hit') and explicitly not doing DHE. If the client sent the
* DHE option, we take it by default, except if non-DHE would be
* preferred by config, but this case would have been handled in
* tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes().
*/
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if ((ginf = tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
s->s3.group_id))
== NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (!ginf->is_kem) {
/* Regular KEX */
skey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, ckey);
if (skey == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/* Generate encoding of server key */
encoded_pubkey_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(skey, &encoded_pubkey);
if (encoded_pubkey_len == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_pubkey, encoded_pubkey_len)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
OPENSSL_free(encoded_pubkey);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
OPENSSL_free(encoded_pubkey);
/*
* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys
*/
if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
s->s3.tmp.pkey = skey;
} else {
/* KEM mode */
unsigned char *ct = NULL;
size_t ctlen = 0;
/*
* This does not update the crypto state.
*
* The generated pms is stored in `s->s3.tmp.pms` to be later used via
* ssl_gensecret().
*/
if (ssl_encapsulate(s, ckey, &ct, &ctlen, 0) == 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (ctlen == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
OPENSSL_free(ct);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, ct, ctlen)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
OPENSSL_free(ct);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
OPENSSL_free(ct);
/*
* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the generated pms
*/
if (ssl_gensecret(s, s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen) == 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
}
s->s3.did_kex = 1;
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
#else
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
#endif
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cookie(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
unsigned char *hashval1, *hashval2, *appcookie1, *appcookie2, *cookie;
unsigned char *hmac, *hmac2;
size_t startlen, ciphlen, totcookielen, hashlen, hmaclen, appcookielen;
EVP_MD_CTX *hctx;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
int ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
SSL *ussl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s);
if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (sctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_COOKIE_CALLBACK_SET);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &startlen)
|| !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, MAX_COOKIE_SIZE, &cookie)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)
|| !ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt,
&ciphlen)
/* Is there a key_share extension present in this HRR? */
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u64(pkt, time(NULL))
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashval1)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/*
* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello. ssl_handshake_hash() operates
* on raw buffers, so we first reserve sufficient bytes (above) and then
* subsequently allocate them (below)
*/
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
|| !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval1, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hashlen, &hashval2)
|| !ossl_assert(hashval1 == hashval2)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH, &appcookie1)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/* Generate the application cookie */
if (sctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb(ussl, appcookie1,
&appcookielen)
== 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, appcookielen, &appcookie2)
|| !ossl_assert(appcookie1 == appcookie2)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &totcookielen)
|| !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &hmac)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
totcookielen -= startlen;
if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/* HMAC the cookie */
hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(sctx->libctx, "HMAC",
sctx->propq,
s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key));
if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(hctx, NULL, "SHA2-256", sctx->libctx,
sctx->propq, pkey, NULL)
<= 0
|| EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, cookie,
totcookielen)
<= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen + hmaclen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hmaclen, &hmac2)
|| !ossl_assert(hmac == hmac2)
|| !ossl_assert(cookie == hmac - totcookielen)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return ret;
#else
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
#endif
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
};
if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80
&& (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81)
|| (SSL_get_options(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s))
& SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)
== 0)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
if (s->max_early_data == 0)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (!s->hit)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->ext.tick_identity)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_client_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos == OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_ERROR
&& (send_certificate_request(sc)
|| sc->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED)) {
/* Did not receive an acceptable cert type - and doing client auth */
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (sc->ext.client_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_x509) {
sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_NONE;
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
/*
* Note: only supposed to send this if we are going to do a cert request,
* but TLSv1.3 could do a PHA request if the client supports it
*/
if ((!send_certificate_request(sc) && sc->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED)
|| sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos != OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_GOOD
|| sc->client_cert_type == NULL) {
/* if we don't send it, reset to TLSEXT_cert_type_x509 */
sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_NONE;
sc->ext.client_cert_type = TLSEXT_cert_type_x509;
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_client_cert_type)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sc->ext.client_cert_type)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
/* One of |pref|, |other| is configured and the values are sanitized */
static int reconcile_cert_type(const unsigned char *pref, size_t pref_len,
const unsigned char *other, size_t other_len,
uint8_t *chosen_cert_type)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < pref_len; i++) {
if (memchr(other, pref[i], other_len) != NULL) {
*chosen_cert_type = pref[i];
return OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_GOOD;
}
}
return OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_ERROR;
}
int tls_parse_ctos_client_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
PACKET supported_cert_types;
const unsigned char *data;
size_t len;
/* Ignore the extension */
if (sc->client_cert_type == NULL) {
sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_NONE;
sc->ext.client_cert_type = TLSEXT_cert_type_x509;
return 1;
}
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &supported_cert_types)) {
sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_ERROR;
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if ((len = PACKET_remaining(&supported_cert_types)) == 0) {
sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_ERROR;
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&supported_cert_types, &data, len)) {
sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_ERROR;
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/* client_cert_type: client (peer) has priority */
sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos = reconcile_cert_type(data, len,
sc->client_cert_type, sc->client_cert_type_len,
&sc->ext.client_cert_type);
/* Ignore the error until sending - so we can check cert auth*/
return 1;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
if (sc->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_x509) {
sc->ext.server_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_NONE;
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
if (sc->ext.server_cert_type_ctos != OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_GOOD
|| sc->server_cert_type == NULL) {
/* if we don't send it, reset to TLSEXT_cert_type_x509 */
sc->ext.server_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_NONE;
sc->ext.server_cert_type = TLSEXT_cert_type_x509;
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_cert_type)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sc->ext.server_cert_type)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
int tls_parse_ctos_server_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
PACKET supported_cert_types;
const unsigned char *data;
size_t len;
/* Ignore the extension */
if (sc->server_cert_type == NULL) {
sc->ext.server_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_NONE;
sc->ext.server_cert_type = TLSEXT_cert_type_x509;
return 1;
}
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &supported_cert_types)) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if ((len = PACKET_remaining(&supported_cert_types)) == 0) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&supported_cert_types, &data, len)) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/* server_cert_type: server (this) has priority */
sc->ext.server_cert_type_ctos = reconcile_cert_type(sc->server_cert_type, sc->server_cert_type_len,
data, len,
&sc->ext.server_cert_type);
if (sc->ext.server_cert_type_ctos == OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_GOOD)
return 1;
/* Did not receive an acceptable cert type */
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECH
/*
* ECH handling for edge cases (GREASE/inner) and errors.
* return 1 for good, 0 otherwise
*
* Real ECH handling (i.e. decryption) happens before, via
* ech_early_decrypt(), but if that failed (e.g. decryption
* failed, which may be down to GREASE) then we end up here,
* processing the ECH from the outer CH.
* Otherwise, we only expect to see an inner ECH with a fixed
* value here.
*/
int tls_parse_ctos_ech(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
unsigned int echtype = 0;
if (s->ext.ech.grease == OSSL_ECH_IS_GREASE) {
/* GREASE is fine */
return 1;
}
if (s->ext.ech.es == NULL) {
/* If not configured for ECH then we ignore it */
return 1;
}
if (s->ext.ech.attempted_type != TLSEXT_TYPE_ech) {
/* if/when new versions of ECH are added we'll update here */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/*
* we only allow "inner" which is one octet, valued 0x01
* and only if we decrypted ok or are a backend
*/
if (PACKET_get_1(pkt, &echtype) != 1
|| echtype != OSSL_ECH_INNER_CH_TYPE
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
if (s->ext.ech.success != 1 && s->ext.ech.backend != 1) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/* yay - we're ok with this */
OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS)
{
BIO_printf(trc_out, "ECH seen in inner as expected.\n");
}
OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
return 1;
}
/*
* Answer an ECH, as needed
* return 1 for good, 0 otherwise
*
* Return most-recent ECH config for retry, as needed.
* If doing HRR we include the confirmation value, but
* for now, we'll just add the zeros - the real octets
* will be added later via ech_calc_ech_confirm() which
* is called when constructing the server hello.
*/
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ech(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
unsigned char *rcfgs = NULL;
size_t rcfgslen = 0;
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
&& (s->ext.ech.success == 1 || s->ext.ech.backend == 1)
&& s->ext.ech.attempted_type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ech) {
unsigned char eightzeros[8] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->ext.ech.attempted_type)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, eightzeros, 8)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS)
{
BIO_printf(trc_out, "set 8 zeros for ECH accept confirm in HRR\n");
}
OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
/* GREASE or error => random confirmation in HRR case */
if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
&& s->ext.ech.attempted_type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ech
&& s->ext.ech.attempted == 1) {
unsigned char randomconf[8];
if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, randomconf, 8,
RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH)
<= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->ext.ech.attempted_type)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, randomconf, 8)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS)
{
BIO_printf(trc_out, "set random for ECH acccpt confirm in HRR\n");
}
OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
/* in other HRR circumstances: don't set */
if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/* If in some weird state we ignore and send nothing */
if (s->ext.ech.grease != OSSL_ECH_IS_GREASE
|| s->ext.ech.attempted_type != TLSEXT_TYPE_ech)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/*
* If the client GREASEd, or we think it did, return the
* most-recently loaded ECHConfigList, as the value of the
* extension. Most-recently loaded can be anywhere in the
* list, depending on changing or non-changing file names.
*/
if (s->ext.ech.es == NULL) {
OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS)
{
BIO_printf(trc_out, "ECH - not sending ECHConfigList to client "
"even though they GREASE'd as I've no loaded configs\n");
}
OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
if (ossl_ech_get_retry_configs(s, &rcfgs, &rcfgslen) != 1) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (rcfgslen == 0) {
OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS)
{
BIO_printf(trc_out, "ECH - not sending ECHConfigList to client "
"even though they GREASE'd and I have configs but "
"I've no configs set to be returned\n");
}
OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
OPENSSL_free(rcfgs);
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ech)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, rcfgs, rcfgslen)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
OPENSSL_free(rcfgs);
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(rcfgs);
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
#endif /* END OPENSSL_NO_ECH */